Liber III, Pars I — Quae mala consequuntur, si in civitate uxores et filii ponantur esse communes. Cap. X.

Liber III, Pars I — Quae mala consequuntur, si in civitate uxores et filii ponantur esse communes. Cap. X.

The Philosopher. Politics. He proves that many evils follow in a city if wives and children are made common. As for the present situation, we can enumerate five evils that the Philosopher touches upon in the subsequent discussion regarding such a community. The first is the injury to relatives. The second is the degradation of the nobility. The third is the injury to children. The fourth is the intemperance of the passions. Fifth, the abuse of parents. This is evident in the first point. For in a city, there must arise disputes, injuries, and insults, which are all the more detestable when they occur against those who are more closely connected. Therefore, it is beneficial for the city that parents have a clear responsibility for their children, and that anyone can be certain about their relatives, so that out of ignorance, children do not inflict injuries and insults upon their own parents and relatives. For when the community of wives, as Socrates established, removes the certainty of children and the knowledge of kinship, it is not commendable; for from this, it follows that some may easily injure their relatives out of ignorance. The second evil is thus demonstrated. For with the community of wives and children established, there would follow the degradation of the nobility, and the elevation of farmers and lowly people. For it cannot be that wives and children are common unless equal care is taken for the children of the nobility and the guardians of the city, as is taken for the children of farmers and lowly people. Noble children are oppressed, while the children of the lowly are exalted. Therefore, there will be no friendship among citizens, because, according to the Philosopher, in the Ethics... Friendship is dissolved by inequality and imbalance. When good and noble people are above the lowly and the ignoble, then there is friendship among them, when each one acts according to their own proportion, such that when the ignoble serve the nobles, the nobles repay them according to the measure of their service. To desire that the children of citizens be common and that equal care be taken for the children of nobles and the ignoble is to devalue the nobles, to exalt the ignoble, and to destroy friendship among them. The third evil is thus declared. For, given the aforementioned community, it would follow in the court of the children, as the Philosopher says. Ethics. It's impossible for many to be friends according to perfect friendship, nor is it possible to love many people at once very much. For to love very much, he says, is a kind of superabundance. Indeed, superabundance is more suited to being directed toward one than toward many. From this, it follows in the same way. The philosopher concludes that it is not easy for many to be loved very much. Therefore, if any citizen believed that any of the children were his own, because his love would be divided among such a multitude, he would love each one only a little and care for each one only a little. Indeed, no citizen, unless he were a fool, could suspect that all the children were his own. If therefore everyone loved as if they were their own children, this would be based on the reasoning of two or three children whom they believed to be their own: and because those children would not be certainly known to them, Socrates thought that everyone would love all the others intimately because of them. But as the Philosopher argues. It is political. To want to love a great multitude of children as if they were one’s own, because of two or three children, is like putting a little honey in a lot of water. Just as a little honey cannot make an entire river sweet, so the love of two or three sons cannot make an innumerable multitude of children in one city pleasing and beloved. But if there is no affection of the citizens toward the children, their proper care will not be given; it follows that under the community that Socrates had established, proper care and diligence toward the children will not be present. The fourth evil can be shown in this way: because the generative power is so corrupted, and thus the desire of insatiable lust is such that a man having only one wife finds it very difficult to behave properly and temperately toward her. Just as it is difficult for a glutton to abstain from a multitude of foods, so it is difficult and almost impossible for one provoked by lust to be temperate among a multitude of women. The fifth evil can be shown in this way. For if parents lack knowledge of their own sons and daughters, there would be a slight abuse by parents and relatives, so that sons would recognize their mothers and fathers their daughters. Socrates, wishing to avoid this inconvenience, said that it was the duty of the ruler of the city to take care and show diligence, so that sons do not run off with their mothers, and fathers with their daughters. But the philosopher says this is not enough, because if sons and daughters were common and their own parents were not recognized by them, even if the son were prohibited from sexual acts with his mother, and the father with his daughter, they would not be prevented from having lustful love and desire, which would not reveal to them that kinship. Therefore, since in such closely connected persons not only is the actual mingling detestable, but lustful desire and love are also abominable, this is a reprehensible opinion of Socrates regarding the community of wives and children. Therefore, it is fitting for kings and rulers to arrange the city in such a way that, with the community of women and wives prohibited, parents can be certain about their own children.