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Chapter 139GilesRP.1.139

Liber III, Pars I — Quod non expedit civitati omnia sic esse communia, ut Socrates ordinavit: et quod reges, et principes hoc decet cognoscere. Cap. IX.

Liber III, Pars I — Quod non expedit civitati omnia sic esse communia, ut Socrates ordinavit: et quod reges, et principes hoc decet cognoscere. Cap. IX.

A discussion should be lengthy at the beginning because a small error at the start can lead to a major mistake at the end. Therefore, the principles must be thoroughly examined for a long time, and they should be discussed in lengthy sermons to avoid any errors regarding them. Thus, since the governance of the city requires that its political structure be established first, it is necessary to investigate for a long time how the city should be one, what kind of diversity it should have, and how the citizens should relate to one another, whom they should communicate with, whether everything should be common, and what they should possess as their own. For these are like principles and certain preliminary points leading to what follows. We want to show in this chapter that it is not beneficial for a city to have everything in common as Socrates arranged; nor would those goods that Socrates believed would follow be realized if the city were organized this way, for he thought that if possessions, wives, and children were common, disputes would cease because all citizens would believe that all children were their own, and thus there would be the greatest love in the city. Therefore, we can demonstrate this in three ways, that this is not beneficial for the city. First, because disputes would not cease. Second, because the citizens would not consider all children to be their own. Third, because there wouldn't be great love among them. The first way is clear. For even if possessions were common, the use of what belongs to others would still be private: for just as it cannot happen that from all citizens one body is formed in reality, so it cannot be that the same food that nourishes the body of one citizen also nourishes the body of another. Therefore, if possessions were common, they would need to be distributed to each person according to what is required to meet their physical needs; and because a person is easily deceived in their own interests, it always seems to them that they should receive more than they actually do. Moreover, because it is impossible for all citizens to be equally wise and good, and to be equally useful to the city, a quarrel would immediately arise among the citizens, since each would believe they were entitled to receive more: so that when one citizen judged themselves better than another, they would want to receive compensation according to their own status. This equality, however, would not easily be maintained among citizens without dissension and conflict, because each person, deceived in judging themselves, would think they are worth more than they actually are. Therefore, the community of possessions that Socrates proposed to avoid disputes would actually be a cause of conflict rather than peace. For (as we touched on above in the second book) this is the life of the perfect. They do not have anything of their own: however, the perfect are few. Therefore, the law must be imposed on all citizens and the entire people, so that it allows people to live together. Hence, the philosopher says in his Politics that citizens should not be subjected to laws, but laws should be for the citizens. For such should be the laws, and such should be the organization of the state, which is suitable for all people and for common life; such an organization was not that of Socrates, because it could not be maintained among peoples living together without many disputes. Even if it were possible to maintain a community of possessions without disputes, it is not possible to maintain a community of women, for which Socrates wanted children to be common, without disputes. The second way is clear: for if everything were common in this way, then all citizens would not need to consider all children as their own. In fact, because some children might resemble some citizens, and others resemble others, each citizen would claim as his own child any child he saw as similar to himself. Thus, the philosopher narrates. In politics. In some societies, like in Upper Libya, wives are shared, but citizens divide their children according to resemblance; each person claims as their own those children they see as similar to themselves. For this also happens in other animals, because many females give birth to offspring resembling their fathers; just as in the land of Pharsalia, a certain mare (as the Philosopher recounts) always bore a foal resembling its father, for which reason she was called Iusta. Therefore, if the community of wives were established, it wouldn't be the good that Socrates thought it to be. That is, so that all citizens would believe their children to be their own. The third way is clear. For the community of wives would not create such a strong love in the city as Socrates believed; for a slight connection induces more love if it is certain and known than a greater one if it is unknown and doubtful. For although the bond between a father and son is greater than that between an uncle and nephew, yet an uncle would love his nephew more if he firmly believed him to be such than a father would love his son if he reasonably doubted that he had fathered him. For there is more love in a community when the relationships are known and certain, as the Philosopher suggests. The Philosopher. For one person loves another as a son, another as a brother, another as a nephew, and another as a cousin (the Philosopher calls those cousins who are born of two brothers); yet another loves someone as a close relative, that is, as someone born of the same tribe, or according to some other kinship that the love Socrates proposed. Indeed, a slight kinship, if it is known and certain, causes a greater love than parentage, if it is uncertain and unknown. Therefore, the community that Socrates proposed is not beneficial for the city; however, it is fitting for kings and princes to pay careful attention to this, so they know how to order the city in a way that is beneficial for the community of citizens.

Read the original Latin

Sermo in principiis debet esse longus, eo quod parvus error in principio, maximus est in fine. Diu ergo sunt principia pertractanda, et longis sermonibus sunt excutienda, ne circa ipsa contingat error. Quare cum in regimine civitatis primo sit politia ordinanda, diu investigandum est, qualiter civitatem oportet esse unam, et quam diversitatem habere debet, et quomodo cives decet se habere ad invicem, quibus communicare debent, utrum omnia deberent esse communia, et quid debeant habere proprium. Haec enim sunt quasi principia et quasi quaedam praeambula ad sequentia. Volumus autem in hoc capitulo ostendere, quod non expedit civitati habere omnia communia ut Socrates ordinavit: nec sequerentur illa bona quae opinabatur Socrates, si sic ordinaretur civitas: credebat enim si essent communes possessiones, uxores, et filii, cessarent litigia, quia crederent cives omnes pueros esse filios suos, et sic esset in civitate maximus amor. Possumus ergo triplici via ostendere, quod hoc non expedit civitati. Primo, quia non cessarent litigia. Secundo, quia cives non reputarent omnes pueros proprios filios.

Tertio, quia inter eos non esset magnus amor. Prima via sic patet. nam quantumcunque possessiones essent communes, usus tamen pertientium ad victum esset proprius: nam sicut fieri non potest, quod ex omnibus civibus fiat unum corpus realiter; ita esse non potest, quod ille idem cibus qui nutrit corpus unius civis, nutriat corpus alterius. existentibus ergo possessionibus communibus oporteret cuilibet distribui quae requiruntur ad supplendam indigentiam corporalem: et quia homo nimis decipitur in proprio commodo, semper videtur ei se plus debere recipere quam accipiat. Immo quia impossibile est omnes cives aequaliter esse prudentes et bonos, et esse aequaliter utiles civitati, statim insurgeret rixa inter cives, quia quilibet crederet plus esse accepturum: ut dum unus civis iudicaret se meliorem alio, vellet secundum dignitatem suam ei fieri retributionem. Hanc autem aequalitatem non de facili esset possibile reservari inter cives absque dissensione et lite, quia quilibet deceptus in iudicando de seipso, appreciatur se plus valere quam valeat. communitas ergo possessiones quam ordinabat Socrates ad vitandum lites, potius esset causa litigii quam pacis. nam (ut supra in secundo libro tetigimus) haec est vita perfectorum.

non habere proprium: perfecti autem sunt pauci. Lex ergo imponenda omnibus civibus et toti populo debet esse talis, secundum quam homines communiter possint vivere. Unde et Philosophus ait in Politicis cives non esse applicandos legibus, sed leges civibus. Tales enim debent esse leges, et talis debet esse ordinatio civitatis, quae competat omni populo et communi vitae; cuiusmodi non fuit ordinatio Socratis, quia inter gentes communiter viventes absque multis litigiis observari non posset. Dato tamen communitatem possessionum posse observare absque litigiis, communitatem tamen foeminarum, propter quam volebat Socrates filios esse communes, non est possibile observare absque litigiis. Secundo via sic patet: nam si omnia sic essent communia, non oporteret cives omnes pueros reputare filios proprios. immo quia puerorum aliqui esent similes aliquibus civibus, et aliqui aliis, quilibet civis appropriaret sibi in filium, quem videret sibi esse similem. Unde et Philosophus narrat 2.

Politicor. quod apud quasdam gentes, ut in superiori Libia, uxores sunt communes: filios tamen cives dividunt secundum similitudinem, quilibet enim appropriabat sibi in filios, quos videbat ei esse similes. Nam et in aliis animalibus hoc contingit, quia multae foemelle redudnt filios similes patribus; quemadmodum in terra Pharsaliae quaedam equa (ut Philosophus recitat) semper reddebat filium similem patri, propter quod vocata est Iusta. Non ergo supposita communitate uxorum esset bonum illud quod opinabatur Socrates. videlicet, ut cives omnes pueros crederent esse proprios filios. Tertia via sic patet. nam supposita communitate uxorum non esset tantus amor in civitate ut opinabatur Socrates: nam modica coniunctio plus inducit de amore, si sit certa et nota, quam multa, si sit ignota et dubia. licet enim maior sit coniunctio patris ad filium, quam patrui ad nepotem: plus tamen patruus diligeret nepotem, si firmiter crederet ipsum esse talem; quam pater filium, si rationabiliter dubitaret se eum genuisse.

Nam plus est modo de dilectione in civitate, ut Philosophus innuit 2. Politicor. quia unus diligit alium tanquam filium, alius tanquam fratrem, alius tanquam nepotem, alius tanquam fratruelem (appellat autem Philosophus fratueles qui sunt ex duobus fratribus nati) alius vero diligit ipsum tanquam contribuelem idest tanquam natum ex eadem tribu, vel secundum aliquam aliam consanguinaitatem, quam fuerit dilectio quam ponebat Socrates. Modica enim consanguineitas si sit nota et certa, maiorem dilectionem causat, quam filiatio, si sit dubia et ignota. communitas ergo illa, quam ponebat Socrates, non est expediens civitati, Decet autem hoc reges, et principes diligenter advertere, ut sciant sic civitatem ordinare, ut expedit communitati civium.

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