Liber III, Pars I — Quomodo expediat civitati possessiones esse proprias, et non communes. Cap. XI.

Liber III, Pars I — Quomodo expediat civitati possessiones esse proprias, et non communes. Cap. XI.

It is said that things are common, as the philosopher states. Political. It can be understood in three ways. For in matters concerning sustenance, two things must be considered: namely, fruitful things, such as fields, vineyards, and trees; and the fruit that arises from such things, like grapes, grains, and apples. Therefore, if there is a community among citizens regarding such matters, either there will be common fruitful things, and the fruits will be shared; or the possessions will be private, and the fruits will be gathered together, which in ancient times (as the philosopher recounts) occurred among certain nations; or both the fruitful things and the fruits will be common, as Socrates arranged. For he wanted, as was mentioned earlier, that if nothing were private in the city—neither possessions nor fruits, nor sons nor wives—there would be no dissension in the city. However, this arrangement of Socrates (as the philosopher says) seems very expedient for the city when someone hears that the city is organized in such a way where there is such a great community of citizens; they consider it to be a happy city and believe that the citizens love each other greatly and live without conflict, among whom such a community is observed. But as it is said in the second book of the Politics, in particular actions, one must return to experience: for we are told that having some common things leads to more disputes among themselves than if each possessed their own. We can investigate this in three ways: if the possessions of the citizens were common, more disputes would arise in the city than if they enjoyed their own possessions. The first way is taken from the perspective of common possessions. The second is from the perspective of those sharing in those possessions. The third is from the perspective of the inequality among the citizens. The first way is clear. For when something is common to some, if one is hindered from using and enjoying that common thing because of another, disputes and discord arise among them. For we see that uterine brothers, because of the inheritance they share, have many disputes, while one does not use that inheritance as the other does, and they firmly believe they are connected by such a close kinship; they have many disputes because they share an inheritance: how much more would disputes arise among citizens if everything were common to them, since they are many and of diverse wills. And there would not be such a close bond of kinship among them as there is among uterine brothers. For even if it were as Socrates said, that all citizens believed themselves to be related by the community of women and wives, still, according to the truth of the matter, there wouldn't be such a close kinship among them as there is among uterine brothers. Indeed, that kinship which would exist among them could not be certain or well-known, as has been shown in previous examples. If a certain kinship does not eliminate disputes among a few who share a common inheritance, then much less could it eliminate such disputes among many, as would be the case among all citizens. The second way to investigate this same issue is taken from the perspective of those sharing in a common inheritance. For as much as some have in common, they interact more with each other; but it cannot be that some could interact closely and for a long time without disputes arising among them, especially when they share a common inheritance, as it is shown that most people have disputes and quarrels. Polit. For we are most offended and indignant towards those servants whom we greatly depend on for their administrative duties, and we must have many conversations with them and spend a long time interacting with them. Therefore, if so many disputes arise between masters and their servants due to long-term interactions, how much more would disputes arise among citizens, where one would not want to be subject to another, if they shared a common inheritance and were required to interact closely? The third way is taken from the perspective of the inequality among citizens. For if all citizens had common inheritances, it would be very difficult and very costly to seek such a large number of outsiders who could cultivate such land: it would be better for the city to be divided in such a way that some citizens would cultivate the land, while others would focus on the defense of the city, which Socrates also conceded. Thus, when the guardians of the city are of a higher status than the farmers, they would consider themselves to be receiving more from the fruits of the possessions than those who labor in the fields. Therefore, there would arise discord among them, because the farmers, working harder around the possessions, would receive less of the fruits. Considering, therefore, the frailty of humanity, and having carefully observed that the common people generally deviate from the perfect path, it is beneficial for the city to avoid having common possessions among citizens, as Socrates stated. However, the philosopher's way, if one considers the condition and status of people, is more advantageous for the city: he says that the possessions and goods of citizens should be their own and common, their own in terms of ownership, but common due to the virtue of generosity. Therefore, having carefully examined the human condition, as the common people are generally observant of laws and commendable ordinances, it is beneficial for each person to have their own possessions in terms of ownership: for each owner of private goods will exercise due diligence regarding them. However, it is beneficial for such things to be common according to generosity: because citizens ought to be generous with one another, sharing their own goods with each other. Thus, it is recounted among the Lacedaemonians, as stated in the second book of Politics. Such was their generosity that although anyone could own property in terms of ownership, still, due to their liberality, there were common servants, horses, and dogs for those citizens: for whenever any citizen was in need, he could use another's horses, dogs, and servants without any other request.