Liber I, Pars I — Quomodo in amore Dei, et in actu prudentiae, est ponenda felicitas. Cap. XII.

Liber I, Pars I — Quomodo in amore Dei, et in actu prudentiae, est ponenda felicitas. Cap. XII.

The Philosopher identified two kinds of happiness: one is political, and the other is contemplative. He did not want happiness to be based on strengths or the powers of the soul, because both good and evil people can share in these. Nor did he want happiness to be based on habits, because having a habit without acting is likened to someone who is asleep: while people sleep, they cannot be distinguished as happy or miserable, as the Philosopher indicates in Book I. This is discussed in the Ethics. Therefore, happiness should be placed in action, or in the operation of the soul: not in the operation of vice, but in the operation of virtue; not in just any virtue, but in perfect virtue. Happiness, therefore, is said to be in perfect virtue. This is also referenced in the Ethics. It is the operation of the soul according to perfect virtue. Since perfect virtue, according to the Philosopher, is prudence in political life. And in contemplative life, perfect virtue is wisdom, or metaphysics, according to him; whoever knows how to govern others well according to prudence is happy politically, but whoever knows how to contemplate well according to metaphysics is happy contemplatively. Therefore, he made mention of these two kinds of happiness: of which one is discussed in the first book. Of the Ethics, concerning political happiness; but the other, namely contemplative, is discussed in Book 10. Whether that position of the Philosopher is true or not is not the subject of this inquiry. Nevertheless, so that it may be clear how it is fitting for royal majesty to place its happiness in the act of prudence, it must be known that it is especially fitting for a king to place his happiness in God himself, which we can pursue in three ways. For a king is a man, he is a minister of God, and he is a ruler of the multitude. Insofar as he is a man, he shares in intellect and reason. Therefore, since the good of reason is not a particular good, which is good according to sense, but the good of reason is a universal and intelligible good, it is fitting for royal majesty, inasmuch as it is human and participates in reason, to place its happiness in the highest universal and intelligible good: this is God himself, who is the highest universal good, because he is the good of all good; in him, indeed, all goodness is found; he is also the most intelligible good, because he is the most simple and most separated from matter. Secondly, it is fitting for a prince to place his happiness in God himself, not only because he is human, but also because he is specially God's minister. For that which has something by participation, and imperfectly, is an instrument and organ of that which has it essentially and perfectly; therefore, only God has the governing power and the ability to rule primarily and perfectly; thus, whoever governs or reigns must be a divine instrument or a minister of God. Therefore, if a minister must place his reward and his prize in his Lord and must expect it from him, it is fitting for a king, who is a minister of God, to place his happiness in God himself and to expect his reward from him. Thirdly, this is fitting for a king, because he is the ruler of the multitude: for one who governs a multitude must aim for the common good. In this, therefore, he must place his happiness, which is the highest and common good. However, this (as has been said) is God himself: therefore, the king, both because he is God's minister and also because he has understanding, and because he aims for the common good, must place his happiness in God, to whom he serves, who is the most intelligible good, and the most universal and common. If, therefore, the king must place his happiness in God, he must place this kind of happiness in the act of that virtue through which we are most closely united to God: this kind of act is the act of love or charity. For love and affection have a unifying and connecting power. Regarding divine names, it is said that love, whether divine, angelic, human, natural, or animal, is a certain unifying virtue. Therefore, happiness should be placed in divine love. But since the proof of love is the manifestation of action, and from this, someone is shown to be loving towards another if they do what they wish: if a prince is happy in loving God, he should believe that he is happy by doing what God wants. Indeed, God especially requires from kings and princes that they govern the people entrusted to them justly and holily through wisdom and law. Therefore, happiness must be placed in the act of wisdom by kings and princes, not simply, but as it is prepared by love. For this reason, in the very act of charity, by which we are immediately united to God, happiness should be placed more in this than in the act of wisdom; although in such an act, in the manner previously mentioned, happiness can be placed to some extent.