Liber II, Pars III — Quod praeter servitutem naturalem, quae est quasi servitus simpliciter, est dare servitutem legalem et positivam. Cap. XIV.

Liber II, Pars III — Quod praeter servitutem naturalem, quae est quasi servitus simpliciter, est dare servitutem legalem et positivam. Cap. XIV.

Just as it was necessary to establish some positive laws for the common good, according to which kingdoms and cities are governed, it seemed right to the lawgivers that, beyond natural servitude, according to which the ignorant must serve the wise, there should also be a legal and somewhat positive servitude, under which the weak and conquered would serve the victors and the powerful. For it is just to have legal authority, as the Philosopher states. The Politician states that the conquered serve the victors in war. However, this kind of justice seems to have a threefold congruence, as the Philosopher indicates, being both conditional and positive. The first congruence is derived from the lawgivers. The second comes from the defense of the homeland. The third is for the safety of the warriors. The first congruence is clear: for it is necessary for the ruler, as it is said in the Politician. To have someone in excess with respect to a servant. Such an excess can exist in two ways, either according to the soul or according to the body. For every human being is naturally composed of these two parts. An excess according to the goods of the soul is like an absolute excess, because those goods can be called absolute. However, an excess according to the goods of the body, in relation to that, is like the goods of the soul, and they fall short of those goods. For this reason, it has been rightly said that it is stated in the first book of the Politics. In the Politics. If we consider the goods of the body, since they are beautiful and strong, it is much more just to define here in the soul, so that we may say that some dominate, because they excel in the goods of the soul: for the soul is superior to the body. Wisdom and goodness, which are the goods of the soul, naturally and simply confer rightful dominion: for it is fitting that the wise and good should rule over the ignorant and the wicked. But civil power and the strength of the body, which are the external and material goods, do not constitute rightful and positive authority. For what dominates through the strength of the body, such as in physical power or civil authority, over those it has conquered, is not a natural right, but is according to the promulgation of law. Yet it seems that such a thing is just in some way, if we consider the lawgivers. For since the lawgivers are men, who are more familiar with the goods of the body and the external, than with those of the soul and the internal: it seemed good to the lawgivers that those who prevail in war should rightly dominate over the conquered. Thus the Philosopher says that it is more just to define dominion according to the goods of the soul than according to the goods of the body; but (as he says) it is not equally easy to see the beauty of the soul and that of the body. The second congruity arises from the defense of the homeland: for in order that men might fight bravely for the defense of their own city and kingdom, it has been established for the common good and the defense of the homeland that those who prevail in war should dominate over the conquered. Therefore, it is fitting for the virtuous, wise, and good not to resist legal authority: because the common good must be preferred over private good. The third reason comes from the salvation of those who have been defeated in battle: for by this law, many who are overcome in war are saved; indeed, men would be more inclined to commit murder against others if they knew they would gain no benefit from them; but when they consider acquiring them as slaves, they spare them for the benefit they hope to gain from them. Thus, a slave is said to be derived from the word 'to save': because such people are reserved by victors in battle; and they are not killed so that they can be possessed as slaves and servants. The second reason is that those of noble birth, throughout their entire lives, do not engage in any just war, so that they might acquire some servants and slaves from it; therefore, it was necessary that such people not be entirely deprived of ministers, to supply domestic needs, and that there be some hired ministers serving for wages, and some virtuous ministers serving out of love for good. To those ministers whom virtue and love of good incline to serve, it is fitting for rulers to treat them as sons, and to govern them not with a servile rule, but rather as if with a paternal and royal one. We can show, however, in two ways, that such ministers (if any should happen to exist) are to be honored and rewarded more than others. The first way is based on the dignity of those ministers. The second is based on the unity and closeness they have to the ruler. The first way is thus clear. For those who are more worthy, greater benefits should always be granted: therefore, a virtuous servant, motivated by a love for what is honorable and a desire for good, is more deserving than a hired hand who primarily serves for pay, and he is also more deserving than a servant who lacks that honorable love but is merely a captive from war, and certainly better than a barbarian who serves, because he does not know how to direct himself and fails to use reason; from the very dignity of the ministers, such ministers should be honored and rewarded more by the leader. The second way to demonstrate the same is taken from the unity and closeness that such ministers have to the leader. It is fitting that the closer parts are to the source, the more they are immersed in the water; therefore, if all love is said to have a certain unifying and connecting virtue, as Dionysius wishes. Those who serve in divine matters are more closely united to the leader not primarily for pay, but out of love, and they are more joined to him according to their will than others. Therefore, it is fitting that they receive more influence, and be honored more, and rewarded more by the leader.