Liber I, Pars I — Quod non decet regiam maiestatem, suam ponere felicitatem in gloria, vel in fama. Cap. IX.

Liber I, Pars I — Quod non decet regiam maiestatem, suam ponere felicitatem in gloria, vel in fama. Cap. IX.

Glory and fame differ from honor and praise, because honor and praise are the cause of fame and glory; for someone is in fame and glory because they are praised and honored. Honor, however, differs from praise, because it is more universal; praise, properly speaking, is not given except through vocal signs, but honor can be given through any external signs. Hence it is said in Rhetoric. Rhetoric. It is said that the parts of honor are sacrifices, records in verses, a chant, or the recitation of a prayer for praise, the first assembly, and other such external signs related to reverence. Indeed, glory and fame are commonly accepted as the same: for glory is a certain clear recognition of someone; it is indeed a certain brightness: this is also fame, because fame is a certain clear recognition with praise. If, however, we wanted to distinguish somehow between glory and fame, we would say that fame arises from glory: thus, the order is this, because glory arises from honor; for from the fact that someone is in great honor and in great display, it appears that they are clear and glorious: fame, however, arises from honor and glory, because from the fact that someone is in honor and glory, they are held in fame and esteem. Accepting glory and fame broadly and for the same reason, it might seem to someone that happiness could be placed in fame and glory, because one might be of great breadth, as they can spread to various parts; and of great duration, since it may happen that it remains indelible for a long time. Therefore, it seems that a prince ought to place his happiness in this, as the Philosopher says. Ethics. For a certain reward is to be given to princes; this is honor and glory, which if they are not content with, they become tyrants. But this cannot stand, that we can pursue in a threefold way. For as far as the present is concerned, it can sufficiently be clear through the qualities possessed, happiness is not merely a sign of good. But it is also a perfect good, sufficient in itself. Secondly, happiness exists only in good and blessed people, but not in the unhappy and wicked. Thirdly, it is in inner goods, not in those that exist externally. Fame, however, is more a sign of goodness than goodness itself. And it is not only fitting for the good, but also often fitting for the wicked. Again, it relies more on external signs than on inner goodness. For if someone's fame exists because they are regarded as praiseworthy and notable among people, while our knowledge does not grasp the essence of things nor is it the cause of things, but rather serves as a sign of them and what is caused by them, then fame is neither our goodness nor does our goodness depend on it; it is merely an apparent sign of our goodness. Therefore, our happiness cannot be based on that. Secondly, this cannot stand because fame and glory among people are not only attributed to the good but also to the wicked; for we are often deceived in our judgments, and it frequently happens that the detestable wickedness is such that the good and worthy are not valued, while the wicked and unfortunate are in glory and fame. Thirdly, happiness should not be placed in fame, because it relies more on external signs than on inner goodness; for a person does not perceive anything except what is outwardly evident: we do not see the thoughts of the mind, nor the virtues and vices existing in the soul; but if we judge someone to be good and virtuous, it is based on those things that are outwardly known. For just as it suffices for someone to be honored if they appear good outwardly, so it seems sufficient for someone to be in fame and glory among people if they outwardly pretend to be good. Therefore, since it is fitting for a king to be entirely divine and almost semi-divine, it is inappropriate to place happiness in something that is merely a sign of goodness rather than goodness itself, especially since even the wicked can share in it, and it relies more on external signs than on inner goodness. Thus, a king should not believe himself to be blessed if he is in glory among men; rather, he is truly blessed if he is in glory before God. For it has been said that glory and fame are a certain clear acknowledgment accompanied by praise. However, God's knowledge (as it pertains to the present) differs from our knowledge in three ways: for God's knowledge causes things, while our knowledge is caused by things, as Commen states. 12. Met. Again, God's knowledge is infallible, while our knowledge is often mistaken. Moreover, God's knowledge pertains to our innermost selves, while our knowledge only directly comprehends external things; thus, our goodness depends on God's knowledge, like an effect depends on its cause. Again, God's knowledge of our goodness does not fail, since His knowledge cannot be deceived. Moreover, God clearly sees and perceives both our goodness and our inner malice. Therefore, it cannot be that someone is in glory and fame before God unless they are good and blessed, as their state requires. Thus, although this is true regarding God's knowledge, fame and glory among men should never be the basis for happiness. What was said is that it is enduring and broad. It can be said that conversely, because it is modest and narrow: for according to Boethius, the fame of the Roman people never crossed the Caucasus mountains. How then could the fame of one man extend throughout the whole earth? But, since the whole earth is as a point in relation to heaven, and according to astronomers, any fixed star is notably larger than the whole earth, the fame of any man is narrow and insignificant. Again, a person's fame is brief and not lasting, since the entire time of this present life is like a moment in comparison to God's eternity. For since man is immortal in understanding, he should place his happiness in what can endure forever. However, it was said that a reward should be given to kings, along with this honor and glory. The text of the philosophers should not be understood to mean that kings should primarily seek glory and the fame of men, for their glory and fame would be modest, and their fruits would be modest as well; rather, this is said to emphasize that kings and princes should be magnificent and noble. Noble people, although they may not primarily seek honor but rather goodness, still deserve honor, and it is fitting for them to accept the honor offered to them, since common people have nothing greater to give them. Ethic. Not that honor is a fitting reward for them, as is stated there. Therefore, accepting honor as a fitting reward can be understood in two ways: either in regard to the honor itself or as it proceeds from the affection of those giving it. However, honor in itself, since it is only a sign and a testimony of goodness, as is evident, is not a fitting reward in life. However, since this kind of honor comes from the affection of those giving it, there is a fitting reward: for in the very fact that those giving do not have anything greater to repay, it is appropriate for a prince to accept the honor offered in this way. For this reason (as is evident), in such a retribution, the affection of those giving is accepted, and not the honor given in a proper sense. But if princes were to reject this affection of those giving, and instead seek other external goods from the people entrusted to them, such as gold, silver, or other riches, they would be tyrants: for from this, the people would become plunderers.