Liber I, Pars I — Quod non decet regiam maiestatem, suam felicitatem ponere in honoribus. Cap. VIII.

Liber I, Pars I — Quod non decet regiam maiestatem, suam felicitatem ponere in honoribus. Cap. VIII.

Perhaps many people living a political life believe that happiness should be found in honors, because most citizens desire to be honored. However, there are three things to consider regarding honors, through which we can pursue happiness in them. First, honor is a good that is ordered toward something else. Secondly, it is an external good. Thirdly, it is more in the one honoring than in the one honored. Happiness, however, is the opposite. It is not a good ordered toward something else, but it is a good toward which other things are ordered. It is not an external good, but an internal one. Happiness is found especially in the one who is happy, or in the one whose happiness it is. However, it is clear that honor is a good ordered toward something else, as the Philosopher states. In the Ethics, the Philosopher says that honor is a manifestation of reverence as a testimony to virtue. Therefore, the reason why men especially wish to be honored is so that they may appear wise and virtuous, to whom honor is especially owed. Therefore, according to the Philosopher, no one cares to be honored by boys because the reverence for such is not a debt of testimony to wisdom and virtue; thus, if honor is a good ordered toward virtue, happiness should not be placed in honor, but rather in the virtues themselves or in their actions. Secondly, happiness is not properly placed in honors because honor is not an intrinsic good, but an extrinsic one; for it has been said that honor is reverence exhibited as a sign of virtue: a sign or testimony, if it wishes to fully manifest what is signified, must be something known and manifest; however, intrinsic things are not known and manifest to us, but extrinsic ones: for we do not know what someone thinks in their heart, but what they represent externally. Therefore, reverence, which is honor, if it is to manifest the virtue of the one to whom it is shown, is not sufficient if it is only in thoughts in the heart, but it is required that it be brought forth externally. Honor, therefore, has the character of an extrinsic good since it is reverence shown through certain external signs. Therefore, if happiness is not to be placed in external goods, which are lesser goods, but in internal goods, which are greater goods, happiness should not be placed in honors. Thirdly, this is evident from the fact that honor is more in the one who honors than in the one who is honored, as the philosopher clearly states. As the philosopher points out, if happiness is placed in honors, it leads to a detestable perversion, since happiness would be more in another than in the one to whom it belongs. For it is clearly stated that, as is proverbially said, honor is in the one who gives it, rather than in the one who receives it. It is evident that this is sensibly true: for if someone inclines themselves respectfully to another, or honors them, it is clear that that inclination is properly in the one who inclines, not in the one to whom the inclination is shown. For an accident is properly in its subject, not in the object; or if it is in the object in some way, it is still more in the subject. Therefore, that inclination and reverence, or honor, is more in the one who honors than in the one who is honored. But since happiness is primarily in the one who is blessed, or in the one who is beatified, happiness should not be placed in honors. It's inappropriate for anyone to place their happiness in honors, believing they are happy if they are honored by others. This is especially inappropriate for royal majesty. This can be pursued in three ways. If a king places his happiness in honors, three evils will follow: he will superficially appear good, he will be presumptuous, and he will be unjust. For if a prince places his happiness in honors, while it suffices for someone to be honored, and to appear good, he won't care about being genuinely good, but only about appearing good superficially. Therefore, if it is especially fitting for a king to be genuinely good, it is especially inappropriate for him to place his happiness in honors, lest he be superficial and presumptuous. Secondly, it is inappropriate for a king to place his happiness in honors because this will make him a danger to the people and presumptuous; for when the end is greatly desired, if a prince places his happiness in honors to achieve honor, he will presume to expose his people to every danger. We have an example of this from the son of a certain Roman prince named Torquatus, who, eager for excessive honor, exposed himself to military dangers against his father's authority, so that he might achieve honor; hence, Torquatus, the Roman prince, killed his son, who was so presumptuous, so that others would not take this example and become excessively eager for honor, despite the fact that this son had won victory over an enemy. So that a prince doesn't fall into ruin and doesn't presume too much, it's not wise for him to place his happiness in honors. Third, it indicates to him that he shouldn't be unjust or unequal: for a prince ought to distribute his goods according to the dignity of persons, so that more goods are given to those who are worthy and wise than to the unworthy and actors. But if a prince places his happiness in honors, because he loves the end with utmost fervor, he won't care to reward people according to their proper dignity, but will only distribute benefits in such a way that he places more value on honors; he will be bad for the people entrusted to him, because he won't care to expose them to dangers presumptuously and recklessly; he will be bad in his own affairs, because he won't distribute them equally according to the dignity of persons.