Des affections de la volonté
Affections of the Will
The will possesses its own distinct movements called affections, which differ from the passions of the sensitive appetite.
There are just as many movements in the intellectual or rational appetite—what we call the will—as there are in the sensory or sensual appetite; however, the former are usually called affections, while the latter are called passions. The philosophers and pagans loved God to some degree; they loved their commonwealths, virtue, and learning; they hated vice, hoped for honors, despaired of escaping death or slander, and desired knowledge—even desired to be blessed after death; they took courage to overcome the difficulties in the pursuit of virtue, feared blame, fled from many faults, avenged public wrongs, and were indignant against tyrants, without any self-interest of their own.1 Now all these movements were in the rational part, since the senses—and consequently the sensual appetite—are not capable of being applied to such objects; and therefore these movements were affections of the intellectual or rational appetite, and not passions of the sensual appetite.
The War Within
The human experience is marked by a constant struggle between the rational will and the sensual appetites.
How often do we have passions in the sensual appetite, or concupiscence, that run contrary to the affections we feel at the same time in the rational appetite, or will? The young man of whom Saint Jerome speaks—biting off his own tongue with his teeth and spitting it into the face of that cursed woman who was inflaming him toward lust—did he not show that he had in his will an extreme affection of displeasure, contrary to the passion of pleasure that they were forcing him to feel in his concupiscence and sensual appetite?2 How often do we tremble with fear amid the dangers that our will leads us into and keeps us in? How often do we hate the pleasures that our sensual appetite enjoys, while loving the spiritual goods that it finds no pleasure in? This is the war we feel every day between the spirit and the flesh; between our outer man, which relies on the senses, and the inner man, which relies on reason; between the old Adam, who follows the appetites of his Eve—or his concupiscence—and the new Adam, who sides with heavenly wisdom and holy reason.3
Stoic Errors and True Mercy
While the Stoics correctly identified rational affections, they erred in denying the place of virtuous sadness and mercy in the human heart.
As Saint Augustine reports, the Stoics denied that a wise man could have passions, yet they seemingly admitted he had affections—what they called eupathies or good passions, or, as Cicero put it, constancies. They argued that a wise man doesn't covet, but wills; he doesn't feel giddy delight, but joy; he has no fear, but foresight and precaution. In this way, he is moved only by reason and in accordance with reason.4 For that reason, they especially denied that a wise man could ever feel sadness, since sadness only concerns evil that has already occurred, and they believed no evil ever happens to a wise man, because, according to their maxim, no one is ever harmed except by himself. And indeed, Theotimus, they were right to hold that there are eupathies and good affections in the rational part of man, but they were wrong to say there are no passions in the sensitive part and that sadness never touches the heart of a wise man. Setting aside the fact that they themselves were troubled by these things, as already mentioned, could wisdom really strip us of mercy? Mercy is a virtuous sadness that enters our hearts to move us to desire to free our neighbor from the evil he suffers. Moreover, the best man in all of paganism, Epictetus, did not follow this error that passions never rise in a wise man, as Saint Augustine attests. Augustine further shows that the Stoics' disagreement with other philosophers on this subject was nothing more than a dispute over words and a quarrel of language.
The Hierarchy of Affections
Affections are ordered by their objects, ranging from natural desires to supernatural movements poured into the soul by God.
Now these affections we feel in our rational part are more or less noble and spiritual according as their objects are more or less elevated, and according as they stand at a more eminent degree of the mind: for some affections in us proceed from the reasoning we do on the basis of sense experience; others are formed on reasoning drawn from the human sciences; still others come from reasonings made according to the faith; and finally, some have their origin in the simple sense and acquiescence the soul gives to the truth and will of God. The first are called natural affections; for who is there who doesn't naturally desire health, the provisions needed for clothing and food, and sweet and pleasant conversation? The second affections are called rational, because they all rest on the spiritual knowledge of reason, by which our will is stirred to seek the heart's tranquility, the moral virtues, true honor, and the philosophical contemplation of eternal things. The affections of the third rank are called Christian, because they take their birth from reasonings drawn from Our Lord's teaching, which makes us cherish voluntary poverty, perfect chastity, and the glory of Paradise. But the affections of the supreme degree are called divine and supernatural, because God himself pours them into our minds, and because they look toward God and tend toward him without the mediation of any reasoning or any natural light—as it is easy to grasp from what we will say later about the acquiescences and feelings practiced in the sanctuary of the soul.5 And these supernatural affections are chiefly three: the mind's love for the beauties of the mysteries of the faith, love for the benefit of the goods promised us in the life to come, and love for the sovereign goodness of the most holy and eternal Divinity.
Read the original Latin
Il n'y a pas moins de mouvemens en l'appetit intellectuel ou raysonnable qu'on appelle volonté, qu'il y en a en l'appetit sensible ou sensuel; mays ceux la sont ordinairement appellés affections, et ceux cy, passions. Les philosophes et payens ont aymé aucunement Dieu; leurs republiques, la vertu, les sciences; ilz ont haï le vice, esperé les honneurs, desesperé d'eviter la mort ou la calomnie,desiré de sçavoir, voire mesme d'estre bienheureux apres la mort; se sont enhardis pour surmonter les difficultés qu'il y avoit au pourchas de la vertu, ont craint le blasme, ont fui plusieurs fautes, ont vengé l'injure publique, se sont indignés contre les tyrans, sans aucun propre interest. Or tous ces mouvemens estoient en la partie raysonnable, puisque les sens, ni par consequent l'appetit sensuel, ne sont pas capables d'estre appliqués a ces objetz,et partant,ces mouvemens estoient des affections de l'appetit intellectuel ou raysonnable,et non pas des passions de l'appetit sensuel.
Combien de fois avons-nous des passions en l'appetit sensuel ou convoitise, contraires aux affections que nous sentons en mesme temps dans l'appetit raysonnable ou dans la volonté? Le jeune homme duquel parle saint Hierosme, se coupant la langue a belles dens; et la crachant sur le nés de cette maudite femme qui l'enflammait a la volupté, ne tesmoignoit-il pas d'avoir en la volonté une extreme affection de desplaysir,contraire a la passion du playsir que,par force, on luy faisoit sentir en la convoitise et appetit sensuel? Combien de fois tremblons nous de crainte entre les hazards auxquelz nostre volonté nous porte et nous fait demeurer? combien de fois haïssons nous les voluptés esquelles nostre appetit sensuel se plait, aymans les biens spirituels esquelz il se desplait? En cela consiste la guerre que nous sentons tous les jours entre l'esprit et la chair; entre nostre homme exterieur, qui depend des sens, et l'homme interieur,qui depend de la rayson; entre le viel Adam,qui suit les appetitz de son Eve ou de sa convoitise, et le nouvel Adam, qui seconde la sagesse celeste et la sainte rayson.
Les Stoïciens ainsy que saint Augustin le rapporte, nians que l'homme sage puisse avoir des passions, confessoient neanmoins, ce semble, qu'il avoit des affections,lesquelles ilz appeloyent eupathies et bonnes passions, ou bien, comme Ciceron, constances; car ilz disoyent que le sage ne convoitoit pas, mays vouloit; qu'il n'avoit pas de liesse, mays de joye; qu'il n'avoit point de crainte, mays de prevoyance et precaution: en sorte qu'il n'estoit esmeu sinon pour la rayson et selon la rayson. Pour cela, ilz nioyent sur tout que l'homme sage peust jamais avoir aucune tristesse, d'autant qu'elle ne regarde que le mal survenu, et que rien n'advient en mal a l'homme sage, puisque nul n'est jamais offensé que par soy mesme, selon leur maxime. Et certes, Theotime, ilz n'eurent pas tort de vouloir qu'il y eust des eupathies et bonnes affections en la partie raysonnable de l'homme, mais ilz eurent tort de dire qu'il n'y avoit point de passions en la partie sensitive et que la tristesse ne touchoit point le coeur de l'homme sage;car, laissant a part que eux mesmes en estoyent troublés,comme il a esté dit, se pourroit-il bien faire que la sagesse nous privast de la misericorde,qui est une vertueuse tristesse laquelle arrive en nos coeurs pour nous porter au desir de delivrer le prochain du mal qu'il endure? Aussi, le plus homme de bien de tout le paganisme, Epictete, ne suivit pas cet erreur, que les passions ne s'eslevassent point en l'homme sage, ainsy que saint Augustin atteste, lequel mesme monstre encores que la dissension des Stoïciens avec les autres philosophes en ce sujet, n'a pas esté qu'une pure dispute de paroles et desbat de langage.
Or ces affections que nous sentons en nostre partie raysonnable sont plus ou moins nobles et spirituelles selon qu'elles ont leurs objectz plus ou moins relevés, et qu'elles se treuvent en un degré plus éminent de l'esprit: car il y a des affections en nous qui procedent du discours que nous faysons selon l'experience des sens; il y en d'autres,formées sur le discours tiré des sciences humaines; il y en a encor d'autres qui proviennent des discours faitz selon la foy; et en fin,il y en a qui ont leur origine du simple sentiment et acquiescement que l'ame fait a la verité et volonté de Dieu. Les premieres sont nommes affections naturelles; car, qui est celuy qui ne desire pas naturellement d'avoir la santé,les provisions requises au vestir et a la nourriture, les douces et aggreables conversations? Les secondes affections sont nommees raysonnables, d'autant qu'elles sont toutes appuyees sur la connoissance spirituelle de la rayson, par laquelle nostre volonté est excitee a rechercher la tranquillité du coeur, les vertus morales, le vray honneur, la contemplation philosophique des choses eternelles. Les affections du troisieme rang se nomment chrestiennes, parce qu'elles prennent leur naissance des discours tirés de la doctrine de Nostre Seigneur, qui nous fait chérir la pauvreté volontaire, la chasteté parfaite, la gloire du Paradis. Mais les affections du supreme degré sont nommees divines et surnaturelles, parce que Dieu luy mesme les respand en nos esprits, et qu'elles regardent et tendent en Dieu par l'entremise d'aucun discours ni d'aucune lumiere naturelle; selon qu'il est aysé de concevoir par ce que nous dirons ci apres des acquiescemens et sentimens qui se prattiquent au sanctuaire de l'ame. Et ces affections surnaturelles sont principalement trois: l'amour de l'esprit envers les beautés des mysteres de la foy,l'amour envers l'utilité des biens qui nous sont promis en l'autre vie, et l'amour envers la souveraine bonté de la tressainte et éternelle Divinité.
Notes
- 1 ↩aucunement is taken in the early-modern affirmative sense 'to some degree / somewhat,' not the modern French negative 'not at all.'
- 2 ↩Early modern spelling dens/nés/desplaysir/playsir/Hierosme normalized as teeth/face (nose)/displeasure/pleasure/Jerome; 'a belles dens' rendered as biting off with the teeth, matching the Jerome anecdote of voluntary self-mutilation against forced lust.
- 3 ↩'seconde' rendered as 'sides with' (supports/backs); 'son Eve ou de sa convoitise' keeps Sales's figurative pairing of Eve with concupiscence as the sensual appetite the old Adam follows.
- 4 ↩French 'constances' (Cicero’s constantiae) names the Stoic 'good passions' or stable rational affections, contrasted with disordered passions; 'liesse' is rendered as 'giddy delight' against deeper 'joy' (joye).
- 5 ↩French 'par l'entremise d'aucun discours ni d'aucune lumière naturelle' is rendered as without mediation of discursive reasoning or natural light (infused, non-discursive motion), not as mediation by some discourse.
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