Recapitulatio eorum quae dicta sunt, et quomodo vera Dei cognoscatur dilectio
What Love Is and When It Goes Wrong
Love is defined as the mind's choice, desire, and action toward what it enjoys, and becomes perverse when the choice, desire, or action exceeds the bounds of loving God and neighbor.
So, pulling together everything that's been said, let's briefly gather where the whole force of love is rooted. First, if the mind chooses something for its own enjoyment, then reaches toward it with a certain inner desire, and finally acts to reach what it longs for — this, without doubt, is what we must call love. Now the more fervently and urgently someone carries all this out, the more they love as well. And if they do it from affection, they certainly love more sweetly, and as a result act more easily. But if one person does all this from affection, and another from reason alone — the latter loves less sweetly, to be sure, but won't obtain what they desire any more slowly. Furthermore, if the choice itself is perverse — so that it chooses what it shouldn't for enjoyment — then whatever follows that choice will clearly be perverse as well. And such love will be perverse, and must be called not love but greed.1 But as we taught above, whatever else the mind chooses for enjoyment — besides God in himself, or the neighbor in God — whether enticed or deceived, it exceeds the bounds of true love. Besides this, the choice itself can be sound, yet both movements still perverse. Both the choice and the movement that follows in desire can be grounded in reason; but the other movement, the one in action, can corrupt the whole of love — which will become clearer through examples.
Sound Choice, Fitting Desire, Right Practice
A sound choice of God is necessary but not sufficient; desire and practice must also be rightly ordered, and love is perfected through the interplay of affection, discernment, and strength.
So if anyone has chosen God for the purpose of enjoying him, that choice is a sound one. But if in that very enjoyment the person has desired something carnal, supposing that once they've arrived at God they will, as the Jewish fables tell it, wallow in banquets and give themselves over to pleasures — the soundness of their choice will profit them nothing when it's followed by so great a perversity of desire.2 But even if a person has chosen God for the fruit of their own happiness and has desired nothing in God except God — nevertheless, if they've sought so great a good through practices other than what is fitting, for example through Jewish ceremonies, or pagan sacrifices, or some other superstition, they'll surely empty the entire fruit of love of its value.3 Let the choice be sound, the desire fitting, the practice reasoned — and so it won't exceed the bounds of love. It does indeed make a difference how much affection, discernment, and strength a person brings to this love. The affectionate person loves sweetly; the discerning person loves prudently; the strong person loves perseveringly. The affectionate person, so that they may savor in desire what they have chosen; the discerning person, so that they may not exceed proper measure in practice; the strong person, so that no temptation may turn them away from it. Affection helps against perverse pleasures, discernment against deceptions, strength against persecutions.
Loving Sweetly and Pressing On
Perfection in affection, discernment, and strength yields sweet love, and even those who lack one virtue can still make real progress toward future happiness.
But if anyone is known to be perfect in these three things, he doesn't just love happily — he loves sweetly. Truly, if he can't be strong in affection, let him at least be discerning and steadfast; and if he falls short in this life, he will nonetheless make no less progress toward future happiness.
Read the original Latin
Igitur ex his omnibus quae dicta sunt; in quo tota vis consistat amoris breviter colligamus. Primo si mens aliquid ad fruendum elegerit, deinde ad id quodam interno desiderio sese extenderit, postremo id agat, quo ad desideratum pervenire valuerit, hoc sine dubio amare dicendum est. Hoc autem quanto quisque ferventius instantiusque peregerit, tanto magis et diligit : quod si ex affectu id fecerit, dulcius utique diligit, ac proinde facilius agit. Si autem totum hoc quod alius ex affectu, alter ex sola fecerit ratione; minus quidem dulce diligit, sed non tardius, quod desiderat, obtinebit. Porro si ipsa electio perversa fuerit, ut quod non oportet eligat ad fruendum; et illa quae ipsam sequuntur electionem, perversa esse constabit; et talis amor perversus erit, cupiditatis non charitatis vocabulo censendus. Sed sicut superius docuimus, quidquid aliud mens ad fruendum praeter Deum in seipso, proximum autem in Deo, vel illecta, vel decepta elegerit, metas verae dilectionis excedit. Potest praeterea ipsa electio sana esse, motus tamen uterque perversus. Potest et electio, et sequens motus in desiderio, ex ratione consistere; alter autem motus, qui in actu est totam dilectionem corrumpere : quod exemplis manifestius fiet.
Si quis igitur Deum ad fruendum elegerit, sana est ista electio. Si vero in ipso fructu carnale aliquid desideraverit, existimans cum ad Deum pervenerit, quod ibi, ut Judaicae fabulae ferunt, et epulis effluere, et voluptatibus habeat incubare: nihil proderit electionis integritas quam sequitur desiderii tanta perversitas. Sed et si Deum ad fructum sibi felicitatis elegerit, nec in Deo quidquam nisi Deum desideraverit ; si tamen aliis quam oportet actibus, verbi gratia, aut Judaicis caeremoniis, aut gentilium sacrificiis, vel alia aliqua superstitione ad tantum bonum ambierit, totum utique dilectionis fructum evacuabit. Sit ergo electio sana, desiderium competens, actus rationalis ; et sic non excedet limites charitatis. Interest sane quantum fuerit quis in hac dilectione affectuosus, discretus, fortis. Affectuosus ut dulciter, discretus ut prudenter, fortis ut diligat perseveranter. Affectuosus, ut quod elegit in desiderio, sapiat; discretus, ne in actu modum excedat ; fortis, ne inde aliqua eum tentatio avertat. Affectus prodest contra perversas dulcedines, discretio contra deceptiones, fortitudo contra persecutiones.
Si quis autem in tribus his noscitur esse perfectus, non solum feliciter, sed et suaviter amat. Sane si non poterit affectuosus; sit tamen discretus et fortis ; et si non ad praesentem, non minus tamen proficiet ad futuram felicitatem.
Notes
- 1 ↩The Latin charitas/cupiditas contrast is rendered 'love'/'greed' to preserve the structural opposition; 'charity' is avoided here since the register calls for plain English, but the theological force is preserved by the contrast with cupiditas.
- 2 ↩Judaicae fabulae likely refers to Jewish eschatological expectations of a messianic banquet, viewed here as carnal misunderstanding. The polemical tone reflects medieval Christian polemic rather than Jewish theology proper.
- 3 ↩The argument is that even a correct choice of God as the end is vitiated if the means employed are superstitious or merely external. Verbi gratia introduces illustrative examples, not an exhaustive list.
Speculum caritatis (The Mirror of Charity) companion
Reorder one love at a time, daily
Use the study map with the free Chosen Portion app's daily readings to work through Aelred at a sustainable pace.
Aelred wrote the Mirror as a rule for daily interior discipline in community, and Chosen Portion carries that discipline forward as a short ordered reading each day.
- All 3 books and 102 chapters mapped into 4 weekly themes with page-level pointers
- Aelred's choice-motion-fruit test, turned into a one-page self-examination worksheet
- 16 discussion questions ready for personal journaling or a 4-session small group