De’ beni naturali, cioè corporali.
The Vanity of Bodily Goods
The speaker argues that physical beauty and strength are transient gifts of fortune that cannot constitute the true good.
— What Fortune holds in her power, the new Plato added as he spoke to us, therefore cannot be called a complete good. The good of a well-proportioned body is divided and set in only three parts: being strong, healthy, and born beautiful. The first two, once hurt by even a slight injury, lose that good which sturdy Milo once prized as the highest good.1 So happiness never rested in these, nor is there yet a calm harbor in what was born beautiful and fair. Erillo already placed the highest good in this; and even if it contained every beauty, you still couldn't call yourself content on that account.2 If someone is gifted with beauty, that appearance benefits others far more than it does the person themselves. This is a good that nature both gives and takes away, and you can't put your hope in it, because time withers it like a flower and steals it away.✦
The Limits of Sensual Pleasure
The dialogue shifts to the soul, dismissing sensual pleasure as a source of conflict and pain rather than lasting satisfaction.
So the thought goes further on and runs ahead, saying: — Perhaps it will be in our mind, which no one but we ourselves can dispose of. — The wise divide the goods of our living soul into two parts: one rational, the other sensory. Reason holds a divine part within itself; common sense is shared with the animals; and by two paths we walk in this.3 The first is that your senses should be such as to perform their function perfectly; the second is sensual pleasures. Here Aristippus went wrong with empty judgment, and here he set his aim too low, taking up both of these vices. Some kind of animal surpasses us, because they have certain senses sharper than our soul, troubled and weary. So the beasts would be happier; and beyond that, through their keen senses, more displeasure than pleasure has been had. If the bad outweighs the good, it naturally follows that more things are tasted, smelled, and sifted through with displeasure—and I don't know what good could make up for that. Sensual pleasures are endless war: first they bring a burning passion that destroys the heart; suspicion goes with them and rules them; then regret, when the pleasure flees; and this sensual delight lasts only as long as the heart, driven by its fire, longs and roars for it; For the sweetness of drinking lasts only as long as thirst keeps the taste ensnared: if that thirst is gone, so is such happiness. Nothing can stand alongside its opposite; so where pain mixes with pleasure, it isn't good—it's actually something bad. We're finished with the sensual part, and we're moving on to the other—if you remember correctly—the more beautiful one, which is called the rational.
The Rational Path and Moral Virtue
The discussion moves to the rational soul, examining natural and acquired virtues while noting their inherent labor and imperfection.
This head has two members under it: natural virtue and acquired virtue, and so it is first divided and broken into parts. The first is born with our life.4 Each of us has certain seeds of it and a certain light, just as the soul is set within its body.5 Memory, boldness, and sharpness of mind are instruments for good or for ill, depending on how they're used, and on good or bad habit. In fact, the more perfect they are, the heavier the burden they place on the soul if they're misused, as the blind world so often does. The goods acquired during our lifetime are further divided into two parts—and so, step by step, we have climbed higher. speculative and active virtue; of these two, the first is far more worthy: we'll begin with the other, which is baser. This alone teaches us how to live in the world alongside the moral virtues, and it also works to prepare us for the others. Zeno and his school took that path, and the whole Cynic crowd rushed along it too, saying that the true end lies in them.6 Nature gave them no greater light, and they said what would perhaps be harder to put into practice than to say. Each of these goods seems to involve toil, sweat, and hardship, so reason won't allow that any of them is perfect. Because temperance and fortitude are found in hard work, the more painful the effort, the more each is valued. The end of all human things seems to be toil—not for the sake of the toil itself, but so that the soul may then settle into quiet rest. It's a mistake to say that the true goal consists in this good—a good that only derives its goodness from its own pain.
The Superiority of Contemplation
Drawing on the example of Mary Magdalene, the text identifies contemplation as the 'best part' and the true path to rest.
But what more do you need to see, since the one who leads us to the true end has already given the verdict, and you stand firm in that? Mary Magdalene chose the best part, since one of the two is necessary; Martha's is full of restlessness. This is the truth that never changes: no one appeals against its true judgment; rather, everything contrary to it is false. As you see, Martha is not the one who can quench our long thirst, but the water asked for by the little woman✦7 the Samaritan woman; and drink of that water: let's follow Mary, who stays at the holy feet not busy and hurried, but at rest. So the mind that contemplates sits still, and as it draws near enough to what it contemplates, it asks for nothing more than to keep contemplating.✦ Then its health is granted to it; now, because a certain ignorance still clothes it, it is afterward divided into three parts as well.8 The first is to contemplate earthly and natural things; the second, the heavens; the third is whatever is supercelestial.
The Ascent of the Mind
The chapter concludes by analyzing the levels of contemplation, acknowledging that the soul's desire for pure truth is hindered by its earthly body.
Democritus stopped at his initial zeal, maintaining that nature produced everything that is or will be by chance, and that it remains hidden behind such a veil.9 And he wanted whatever the world possessed—without excepting a single thing—to be made by the multitude of atoms. But the true good is not under the moon: so it isn't in contemplating those things that fall apart one by one. Contemplating heavenly and beautiful things, just as the great Anaxagoras wanted, content to gaze at the sky and the stars, It is not the highest good; and that palm was taken from it by another, greater good that stands above it—one that gathered into itself the honor of the lower goods. And just as the sun seems to cover the other stars, so this bright and clear splendor overshadows the lesser one—a worthier work. The rarer it is, the more worthy it is to contemplate what dwells above the heavens, as it seemed to the illustrious philosopher Aristotle, whom the whole world honors. But that contemplation has two parts within it: one that the soul still performs while joined to the body; the other, which this life cannot give you. It seems Aristotle places the highest good in the first, without making any further distinction for you.10 Anyone who has carefully read his teaching says that happiness is the exercise of perfect virtue in a life that is perfect as well. But if the true good must rest on two things—the will and the understanding—neither one alone can make it perfect. Because the mind can't fully understand while it's bound and confined within this body, it always longs to rise higher. It remains in anxiety, and is surrounded by still greater ardor for that good it lacks, and more confused within the intellect. The intellect and desire grow so weary: therefore our soul never finds the pure truth, beautiful and white, while this earthly body weighs it down.11 —
Read the original Latin
— Quel che Fortuna in sua potenzia tiene, soggiunse a noi parlando il novel Plato, dunque chiamar non puossi intero bene.
Il ben del corpo ben proporzionato solo in tre parti si divide e pone: l’esser robusto, sano e pulcro nato.
I primi due, da poca lesione offesi, quel ben pèrdon, che giá piacque per sommo bene al robusto Milone.
Però felicitá giamai non giacque in questi, né è ancor porto tranquillo in quel che bello e specioso nacque.
In questa il sommo ben giá pose Erillo; e benché fusse ogni bellezza in esso, giá contento per questo non puoi dillo.
Se l’esser pulcro ad alcuno è concesso, ad altri giova piú quella figura sanza comparazione che a se stesso.
Quest’è un bene che toglie e dá Natura, né puossi in esso la speranza porre, ché, come fior, lo strugge il tempo, e fura.
Però passa il pensier piú oltra e scorre, dicendo: — Forse fia in nostra mente, di cui altri che noi non può disporre. —
I ben della nostr’anima vivente son divisi da’ savi in parte bina, l’una razional, l’altra che sente.
La ragion tiene in sé parte divina, il senso comun è con gli animali, e per due vie in questo si cammina.
La prima è che’ sensi tuoi sien tali da far perfettamente il loro uffizio; la seconda è i diletti sensuali.
Qui Aristippo errò con van giudizio, e qui pose la mira troppo bassa, pigliando d’esti l’uno e l’altro vizio.
Alcuna spezie d’animal ne passa, perché hanno certi sensi piú acuti, che l’alma nostra infastidita e lassa.
Sarieno adunque piú felici i bruti; ed oltr’a questo per gli acuti sensi piú dispiacer che piacer sonsi avuti.
S’egli è piú il mal che il ben, certo conviensi che piú cose si gusti, odori e cerna con dispiacer, né so qual ben compensi.
Diletti sensual son guerra eterna: innanzi hanno un ardor che ’l cor distrugge; sospizion gli accompagna e governa;
poi pentimento, quando il piacer fugge; e tanto dura questa voluttate quanto il cor, per l’ardor, disia e rugge;
ché tanto dura la suavitate del ber, quanto la sete il gusto invischia: se quella manca, e tal felicitate.
Nulla col suo contrario star s’arrischia: ben non è dunque, anzi piuttosto male, dove dolor con voluttá si mischia.
Qui s’assolve la parte sensuale, e viensi all’altra, chi ben si rimembra, piú bella, che detta è razionale.
Ha questo capo sotto sé due membra, la virtú naturale e l’acquisita, e cosí prima si divide e smembra.
La prima nasce con la nostra vita. Ciascun n’ha certi semi e certo lume, come l’alma è dentro al suo corpo sita.
Memoria, audacia e dell’ingegno acume sono strumenti buoni o rei, secondo che gli fa l’uso, e il buono o rio costume.
Anzi, se piú perfetti, maggior pondo all’alma dánno, se son male usati, come fa le piú volte il cieco mondo.
E i ben, che son nel vivere acquistati, si dividono ancora in parti due: — cosí di grado in grado siam montati, —
speculativa ed attiva virtue; di queste due la prima è assai piú degna: comincerem dall’altra ch’è vil piue.
Questa vivere al mondo sol ne insegna con le virtú morali in compagnia, e prepararne all’altre ancor s’ingegna.
Zenone e la sua sètta per tal via, e la cinica turba tutta corse, dicendo il vero fine in esse stia.
Piú lume la Natura non gli porse, e disson quel che a mettere ad effetto piú difficil che a dir sarebbe forse.
Ciascun di questi ben par sia suggetto a fatica, a sudore ed a durezza; però non vuol ragion che sia perfetto.
Perché la temperanza e la fortezza son nelle operazioni laboriose: in piú dolor, piú ciascuna si prezza.
Il fin par sia di tutte umane cose affaticarsi, non giá per fatica, ma perché l’alma poi quieta pose.
Laonde falsamente par si dica, che in questo bene il vero fin consiste, che dal proprio dolore il ben mendica;
ma che bisogna aver piú cose viste, poiché colui che al vero fin ne mena, ne dié sentenzia, e tu in quella siste.
Ottima parte elesse Maddalena, poi ch’una delle due è necessaria; quella di Marta è d’inquiete piena.
Questa è la veritá che mai non varia: nessuno al vero suo giudizio appella, anzi ogni cosa è falsa a lei contraria.
Come vedete, Marta non è quella che spegner possa nostra lunga sete, ma l’acqua chiesta dalla femminella
Samaritana; e di quella bevete: seguiam Maria, che presso al santo piede non sollecita stassi, ma in quiete.
Cosí la mente che contempla siede, e quando al contemplato ben s’appressa, altro che contemplar giamai non chiede.
Allor la sua salute gli è concessa; or perché alcun certa ignoranza veste, anco in tre parti poi divisa è essa.
La prima è contemplar cose terreste e naturali, la seconda il cielo, la terza è quel che sia superceleste.
Democrito fermossi al primo zelo, e che natura a caso producesse quel ch’è, o fia, e stia sotto tal velo.
E voleva che quel che ’l mondo avesse, sanza fare eccezion di cosa alcuna, la multitudin d’atomi facesse.
Ma il vero ben non è sotto la luna: dunque non è nel contemplar di quelle cose, che si disfanno a una a una.
Lo specular cose celesti e belle, sí come il grande Anassagora volse contento al ciel mirare e alle stelle,
non è ben sommo; e tal palma gli tolse un altro maggior ben che gli sta sopra, che in sé l’onor de’ piú bassi raccolse.
E come il sol par l’altre stelle cuopra, cosí questo splendor lucente e chiaro ombra l’inferior, ch’è piú degna opra.
Tanto piú degno, quanto egli è piú raro, contemplar quel che sopra il ciel dimora, come parve al filosofo preclaro
Aristotil, che il mondo tutto onora. Ma tal contemplazione ha in sé due parti: una che l’alma fa col corpo ancora;
l’altra che questa vita non può darti. Par che Aristotil nella prima metta il sommo ben, sanz’altro separarti.
Dice, chi bene sua sentenzia ha letta, che la felicitá è l’operare virtú perfetta in vita ancor perfetta.
Ma se in due cose il vero ben dee stare, l’una la volontá, l’altra l’intendere, perfetta o l’una o l’altra non può fare.
Perché la mente non può ben comprendere, sendo legata in questo corpo e inclusa, ha disio sempre di piú alto ascendere.
Resta in ansietá, e circunfusa da piú ardor per quel ben che le manca, e dentro allo intelletto piú confusa.
L’intelletto e il disir cosí si stanca: adunque mai non trova la nostr’alma la pura veritá formosa e bianca,
mentre l’aggrava esta terrestre salma. —
Scripture echoes
- ↩Isa.40.6-Isa.40.8;Ps.103.15-Ps.103.16;1Pet.1.24 — A voice says, "Cry out!" And I said, "What shall I cry?" All flesh is grass, and all its faithfulness is like the flower of the field. Isa.40.7 — The grass withers, the flower fades, for the breath of the LORD blows upon it; truly, the grass is the people. Isa.40.8 — The grass withers, the flower fades, but the word of our God stands forever. Ps.103.15 — As for mortals, their days are like grass; like a flower of the field, so they blossom. Ps.103.16 — For the wind passes over it, and it is gone, and its place knows it no more. 1Pet.1.24 — For all flesh is like grass, and all its glory like the flower of grass. The grass withers, and the flower falls,
- ↩Luke.10.38-Luke.10.42 — Now as they went on their way, he entered a certain village, and a woman named Martha welcomed him into her house. Luke.10.39 — She had a sister called Mary, who also sat at the Lord's feet and listened to his word. Luke.10.40 — But Martha was distracted by much service. She came up and said, "Lord, do you not care that my sister has left me to serve alone? Tell her then to help me." Luke.10.41 — But the Lord answered her, 'Martha, Martha, you are worried and troubled about many things.' Luke.10.42 — Few things are needed, or only one. For Mary has chosen the good portion, which will not be taken away from her.
- ↩Luke.10.39-Luke.10.42 — She had a sister called Mary, who also sat at the Lord's feet and listened to his word. Luke.10.40 — But Martha was distracted by much service. She came up and said, "Lord, do you not care that my sister has left me to serve alone? Tell her then to help me." Luke.10.41 — But the Lord answered her, 'Martha, Martha, you are worried and troubled about many things.' Luke.10.42 — Few things are needed, or only one. For Mary has chosen the good portion, which will not be taken away from her.
Notes
- 1 ↩I primi due points back to the chapter's first two bodily goods (strength and health), not beauty. Milone is Milo of Croton, the proverbial strongman; the line means bodily vigor fails at a small wound, so it cannot be the supreme good.
- 2 ↩Erillo is the classical philosopher Herillus (often linked to knowledge as the summum bonum). Here 'questa' / 'esso' point back to the bodily/natural good under discussion (beauty), not named again in this tercet.
- 3 ↩senso comun renders the medieval faculty of common sense (sensus communis), the sensory power shared with animals—not everyday practical judgment. in questo points back to the sensing part of the soul named in 1.3.9; the two paths are taken up in 1.3.11.
- 4 ↩La prima points back to natural virtue (virtú naturale) from the previous section’s two members: natural and acquired.
- 5 ↩n’ha (‘has of it’) resumes natural virtue: innate seeds and light present in every person.
- 6 ↩"in esse" points back to the moral virtues of the preceding tercet (virtú morali); "fine" is the philosophical telos / highest good, not a temporal ending.
- 7 ↩femminella is a diminutive of femmina ('little woman'); the next section names her Samaritana, so this is the Samaritan woman at the well (John 4), contrasted with Martha (Luke 10). The sentence is enjambed into 1.3.38.
- 8 ↩Italian salute here names the mind’s contemplative well-being/health (from the prior stanza), not bodily health or eschatological salvation.
- 9 ↩primo zelo picks up the previous section’s first grade of contemplation (earthly/natural things): fermossi al primo zelo = he halted/confined himself to that first pursuit. tal velo (‘such a veil’) is the covering of chance/material nature under which, on this reading, all that is or will be remains.
- 10 ↩sanz’altro separarti is compressed: roughly ‘without further separating/distinguishing anything for you,’ i.e. he locates the supreme good wholly in the first part of contemplation (the one still possible with the body).
- 11 ↩salma is the body as a heavy load (corporeal burden); esta is an older form of questa.
Lorenzo de' Medici, Altercazione companion
A daily portion of stillness
Chosen Portion delivers one short contemplative reading and a guided moment of silence each day — the ascent, one step at a time.
Chosen Portion is the paced doorway into this collection: it portions the dense mystical treatises into one daily reading plus guided silence, exactly as the 14-day plan teaches.
- Daily bite-sized excerpts from the contemplative classics, never a wall of text
- A built-in timed stillness practice that grows from 2 minutes to 10
- Gentle progression through the tradition — the app remembers where you are on the ascent