QtLod rarus est contemptor gloriae; et de tribus
The Three Sources of Praise
True praise is derived from the soul, the body, or external things, with only the former offering lasting value.
The places from which the material for praise is drawn; what constitutes true praise, what is perfect, and what is neither; and the moderation of gifts. Yet there’s hardly anyone who doesn’t pursue empty glory, or who doesn’t crave the praise that comes from people. Some move toward this through virtue, others through the image of virtue, and others through the benefit of nature or fortune. For it's from these three places that orators have decided the material for praise should come. For it ought to be sought from the soul, from the body, or from external things. Furthermore, the goods of the soul or body are either naturally innate, acquired through study, or have come about by cause and chance. But in these, there are certain degrees according to the dignity of those in whom they consist and from whom they are sought. The first degree of commendation, indeed, is that which comes from a gift of the soul. The second, middle grade is the one that approves of bodily health and beauty. The third and final grade is that which concerns the praise of external things; I mentioned earlier that Apuleius taught this. Praise of the soul is indeed true and often perfect, provided the good qualities for which it is praised are so firmly rooted within it that they are inseparable. It's certain that these cannot be taken away against one's will; otherwise, while the praise might be true, it cannot be perfect. Commendation of the body, however, is plausible but never perfect, for its goods can always be taken away against one's will; its nature can be constantly weakened and corrupted. The grace of external things is superficial, and they possess neither true nor perfect praise—in fact, not even plausible praise. Let it suffice for them if they merely imitate what is plausible; for they are easily swayed in either direction, and unless they are helped by the habit of those who possess them, they are more prone to blame than to praise. For wealth, power, and influence, since they provide so much strength, serve as a most certain test of character, and the possessor is sometimes made better by them, and sometimes worse.
The Judgment of Character
The value of an action depends on the character of the actor and the discernment of the audience.
Beyond that, the very works of the mind or body—whether they are simply good or absolutely evil—sometimes draw blame or praise depending on the judgment of the observer. This is why Aristotle thinks it matters a great deal where something is praised or blamed. For it matters a great deal what the character of the audience is, and what is publicly accepted as true. In his Rhetoric, he teaches that you should make people believe that the things being praised are present in the person being honored, or that the things everyone hates are present in the person being criticized. Whenever possible, you should also teach the usefulness of the individual actions—for everyone approves of what is expedient, even if one person's idea of what is honorable differs from another's. Literary studies earn less honor in Sparta than in Athens; perhaps patience and fortitude earn more. For some, living by plunder is honorable; for others, it's upholding the law. Frugality might be hated among the Sybarites, while for the ancient Romans, it was the greatest crime of luxury. You must also consider the person being praised, since free and upright actions can snatch away praise from necessary works, and depending on the person, a thing is often considered either honorable or shameful. If, therefore, someone wins praise for themselves by the right path—that is, by virtue—they are resting on a foundation of praise. But if they seek glory from elsewhere, they are clearly foolish, and they will not reach the goal they seem to be chasing. Yet among the very works of virtue, those that spring from the source of generosity or magnanimity are considered to be of greater grace.
The Folly of Prodigality
Seeking fame through excessive spending and the support of base entertainments is a corruption of true generosity.
For those things are made more prominent by popular favor and seem to be of primary importance which are more difficult or which benefit the most people. Yet in these matters, generosity stands far above the rest, for it softens the mind's indignation, blunts the tongues of detractors, restrains even hostile hands, and covers a multitude of sins from the sight of men. Those, therefore, who either crave or fear the tongues of men squander their wealth, throw gifts to the crowd, host banquets, fawn upon the small and the great alike, and many—acting more like pigs than humans—insist on gluttony and drunkenness, support mimes and actors, reward the most wicked arts, admit scoundrels, and stir up the tongues of slanderers to satisfy the malice of their own insolence, while the silence of these people or their poisonous wit is rewarded with an undeserved prize. Some consider the greatest and only real use of wealth to be multiplying pots and pans, engaging in gluttonous feasts, and having no sense of moderation in their banquets, no count of their guests, and no plan for managing their household. If you happen to see them gathered, you'd think it was a public forum, not a group of people eating or dining. This is the case among the very wealthy, even if those of lower status also follow in the footsteps of the powerful according to their own means. For whoever seeks fame exceeds his own strength; he pays attention not to what he can do but to what pleases others, and he rushes to fulfill that. But let's say someone exercises generosity for the sake of fame rather than conscience, because the path to no virtue should be blocked; nevertheless, to support mimes and obscene professions with benefits is illicit and shameful.
Lessons in Moral Guardianship
Historical examples from Massilia and Sparta demonstrate the necessity of censoring corrupting influences to preserve public character.
Valerius reports that the city of Massilia was such a guardian of gravity that it barred stage mimes whose performances consisted mostly of debauchery, fearing that the habit of watching such things would create a license to imitate them. Is it right, then, for those to be heard by Christians—or rather, by clergy—at dinner, who were not even heard by pagans on the stage? The Lacedaemonians ordered the books of Archilochus removed from their city, judging that reading them was neither modest nor decent. They didn't want their children's minds filled with such things, lest it harm their character more than it benefited their intellect. Therefore, they punished a great poet—or at least one very close to the greatest—with exile, because he had attacked a house he hated with obscene and insulting verses. The lasciviousness of Ovid's poems was condemned by a nearly identical judgment. Is it permissible to listen at drinking parties to what sober temperance wouldn't dare to hear? That same city kept its gates closed to anyone seeking to live off idleness under the pretense of religious life, judging that deceitful and hypocritical superstition should be removed.
The Corruption of Bought Loyalty
True loyalty cannot be purchased, and the pursuit of popularity through bribery leads only to ruin and injustice.
Yet those who are conscious of their own superstition claim the primary share among those who are consumed by a love of praise. Furthermore, just as they considered the miser and the generous person to be opposites, those who saw these two as contrary held that one differed by quantity and the other by quality; for timidity opposes magnanimity by the quality of the evil, since it fears what should be dared, while audacity opposes it by quantity, since it presumes more than should be dared. Prodigality, therefore, pours out what should be given—and what shouldn't—on things that will have no memory at all, or only a brief one. Theophrastus, however, is said to have commended this effusion in the book he wrote On Riches, as Cicero reports. In that book, while many things are stated clearly, it's absurd that he considers the fruit of riches to be the ability to spend on the laudable magnificence and display of popular gifts and similar expenses. How much more gravely and truly Aristotle criticizes these outpourings of money, especially since they neither help the needy nor increase one's dignity, and that pleasure of the appeased crowd lasts for only a brief and meager time, and is even lost by the most trivial person, in whom the memory of the pleasure dies along with the satisfaction itself. He also rightly concludes that these things are pleasing to children, silly women, slaves, and those who are very much like slaves, but that they cannot in any way be approved by a serious person who weighs what is done with sound judgment. Valerius Maximus, and Cicero as well, report that Philip criticized this profusion of money in Alexander, who was seeking the goodwill of the Macedonians through bribery; and the words of the letter are indeed these: 'What madness of reason led you into this hope, that you would think those faithful to you whom you had corrupted with money?' Are you acting this way so that the Macedonians won't think of you as their king, but as a mere servant and provider? You don't doubt that this is shameful for a king, and that it's more accurately called corruption than generosity; for the one who receives becomes worse, and all the more ready to expect the same thing again. What, then, is more foolish than to willingly take pains to do something you can't keep doing for long? Excessive generosity will be followed by robbery; for when you start to run out of your own resources by giving them away, you'll be forced to lay hands on the property of others. Therefore, when you are prodigal for the sake of winning goodwill, you don't gain as much devotion from those to whom you give as you earn hatred from those from whom you take. For this reason, your private resources shouldn't be so locked up that kindness can't open them, nor so wide open that they are exposed to everyone; rather, a balance should be applied in both directions, and that balance should be measured by your means. And indeed, whether it was Philip or some other public figure who elegantly curbed the excess of this kind of lavishness—which seems to bring glory, but like a prostitute, vanishes once the resources are gone—he was right to do so. For the love that is won not by virtue but by fortune is most accurately compared to the love of a prostitute.
Read the original Latin
locis a quibus laudis materia trahitur; et quae sit laus uera, quae perfecta, quae neutra; et de moderatione largitionum. Vix tamen est qui uanae gloriae non insistat, et eam quae ab hominibus est non concupiscat laudem. Ad hanc alii uirtute, alii uirtutis imagine, alii naturae aut fortunae beneficio proficiscuntur. Ex his enim tribus locis placuit oratoribus laudis esse materiam. Nam ab animo aut corpore aut ab extrapositis peti debet. Porro animi bona aut corporis aut naturaliter insita sunt aut studio comb parata aut causaliter et casualiter accesserunt. At in his certi sunt gradus pro dignitate eorum in quibus consistunt et a quibus petuntur. Primus siquidem commendationis gradus est qui ab animi dote prouenit.
Secundus et medius qui corporis ualitudinem approbat et uenustatem. Tertius idemque nouissimus qui exteriorum continet laudem; quod et Apuleium docuisse superius retuli. Et laus quidem animi uera est saepeque perfecta, si tamen ei tenaciter bona, quae in ipso commendantur, inheserint adeo quidem ut sint inseparabilia. Certum est enim quia inuito auferri non possunt; alias quidem uera fortasse sed perfecta esse non potest. Corporis autem uerisimilis est commendatio sed perfecta numquam; nam bona eius queunt semper auferri inuito; natura enim eius et debilitari potest iugiter et corrumpi. Aduentitiorum uero perfunctoria gratia est, et nec ueram nec perfectam habent laudem, imo nec uerisimilem. Sufficiat eis si uel probabilem imit ntur; siquidem in utramque partem flectuntur facile et, nisi possidentium iuuentur usu, non ad laudem sunt quam ad uituperium proniora. Nam diuitiae et potentia et gratia, cum plurimum uirium dent, in utramque partem certissimum faciunt experimentum morum, fitque possessor ab eis quandoque melior interdum peior.
Ceterum opera ipsa mentis aut corporis, etsi simpliciter bona uel absolute mala sint, uituperationem interdum aut laudem contrahunt pro arbitrio iudicantis. Vnde et interesse plurimum putat Aristotiles ubi quidque laudetur aut uituperetur. Nam plurimum refert qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio; docetque in Rethoricis ut illa maxime quae probant esse in eo qui laudabitur publice credant, aut in eo contra quem dicitur ea quae omnes oderunt, eritque quotiens fieri poterit singulorum docenda utilitas (quod enim expedit, omnes approbant, etsi honestum aliud aliis uideatur). Studia litterarum minus honoris merentur Lacedemoniae quam Athenis; forte plus patientia, fortitudo. His rapto uiuere honestum, aliis cura legum; frugalitas a apud Sibaritas fortassis odio foret, ueteribus Romanis summum luxuria crimen. Eius quoque qui laudatur habenda est ratio, cum operibus necessariis gratuita recte facta laudem praeripiant et pro ratione personarum res plerumque habeatur uel honesta uel turpis. Si ergo recta uia, id est, uirtute, sibi quis laudem conciliat, suo laudis innititur fundamento; si uero aliunde gloriam quaerat, plane desipit, nec ad eam quam uidetur afFectare pertinget. At inter ipsa uirtutis opera censentur gratiae amplioris quae de liberalitatis aut magnanimitatis fonte proueniunt.
Ea enim fauore populari clarius efieruntur et uidentur esse praecipua, quae magis ardua sunt uel quae pluribus prosunt. In his tamen longe liberalitas antecellit, quae et animi indignationem mitigat, detrahentium linguas obtundit, cohibet etiam manus hostiles et a facie hominum operit multitudinem peceatorum. Qui ergo linguas hominum aut captant aut metuunt, effundunt patrimonia sua, mittunt in uulgus missilia, conuiuia extruunt, pusillis et maioribus adulantur, et plerique, porcum potius agentes quam hominem, comesationibus et ebrietatibus insistunt, mimos et histriones fouent, nequissimas artes remunerant, admittunt nebulones, maledicorum excitant linguas ad implendam procacitatis suae malitiam, dum silentium eorum aut uirulenta dicacitas male merito donatur praemio. Sunt qui in his maximum et uere solum diuitiarum reputant usum, si multiplicent ollas camium, conuiscerationes exerceant cotic dianas, si nec modum conuiuii nec numerum nouerint conuiuarum nec aliquam habeant regendae familiae rationem. Quam si forte uideris conuenisse, forum conuocatum credes, non prandentium aut cenantium turbam. Hoc tamen apud ditissimos, licet et manus inferior in eo pro modulo suo praepotentium uestigia imitetur. Quisquis enim famae petitor est, uires suas excedit, et non quid possit sed quid aliis placeat attendit, et illud festinat implere. Sed esto ut ad famam potius quam ad conscientiam quis liberalitatem exerceat, quia nulli uirtuti praecludenda est uia, mimos tamen et prof essiones obscenas fouere beneficiis illicitum est et infame.
Refert Valerius quod ciuitas Massiliensium tantae grauitatis custos extiterit ut nullum aditum mimis daret in scena quorum argumenta maiore ex parte stuprorum continerent actus, ne talia spectandi consuetudo etiam imitandi licentiam faceret. Numquid ergo honestum est illos a Christianis, imo et clericis, audiri in cena qui nec a gentilibus audiebantur in scena? Lacedemonii libros Archilochi e ciuitate sua exportari iusserunt, quod eorum parum uerecundam ac pudicam lectionem arbitrabantur. Noluerunt enim ea liberorum suorum animos imbui, ne plus moribus noceret quam ingeniis prodesset. Itaque maximum poetam aut certe summo proximum, quia domum sibi inuisam obscenis maledictis lacerauerat carminum, exilio multarunt. Simili a fere sententia condempnata est lasciuia carminum in Nasone. Numquid licitum est audiri in poculis quod ieiuna sobrietas non audebat audire? Eadem ciuitas omnibus qui per aliquam religionis simulationem alimenta inhertiae quaerebant clausas habebat portas, mendacem et fucosam superstitionem submouendam esse existimans.
li tamen qui superstitionis sibi conscii sunt praecipuam partem uendicant apud eos qui laudis amore macerantur. Porro sicut auarum a largo, ita et prodigum quadam contrarietate differre censuerunt qui duo unius opinati sunt esse contraria, quantitate alterum, alterum qualitate; siquidem magnanimitati timiditas aduersatur qualitate mali, dum audenda metuit; et audacia quantitate, dum plus quam audenda praesumit. Prodigalitas itaque eroganda et non eroganda profundit in eas res quae nullam sunt omnino aut breuem habiturae memoriam. Hanc autem effusionem, auctore Cicerone, commendasse dictus est Teofrastus in libro quem De Diuitiis scripsit. In quo multa praeclare, illud absurde quod multus in laudanda magnificentia et apparatione popularium munerum taliumque sumptuum facultatem fructum diuitiarum putat. Quanto Aristotiles grauius et uerius has pecuniarum reprehendit effusiones, praesertim cum neque necessitati subueniant nec augeant dignitatem, ipsaque illa delectatio delinitae multitudinis ad breue exiguumque tempus sit, eaque a leuissimo quoque, in quo tamen ipso una cum satietate memoria quoque moritur uoluptatis. Bene etiam colligit haec pueris et mulierculis et seruis et seruonim simillimis liberis grata esse, graui uero homini et ea quae fiunt certo iudicio ponderanti nullo modo posse probari. Valerius Maximus, sed et Cicero, referi; quod in Alexandro, qui largitione beniuolentiam Macedonum sectabatur, hanc profusionem pecuniae Philippus arguerit; et epistolae quidem uerba sunt haec: Quod te malum rationis in istam spem induxit ut eos tibi fideles putes quos pecunia corrupisses?
An tu ideo agis ut Macedones non te regem suum sed ministrum et praebitorem putent Quod quidem regi sordidum esse non ambigis et corruptelam quam largitionem potius dici; fit enim deterior qui accipit atque ad idem semper expectandum paratior. Quid autem est stultius quam quod facias libenter curare ut id diutius facere non possis? Largitiones immoderatas rapinae sequentur; cum enim dando egere coeperis, bonis alienis manus cogeris inferre. Itaque, cum beniuolentiae comparandae causa sis prodigus, non tanta studia assequeris eorum quibus dederis quanta eorum odia quibus ademeris. Quamobrem nec ita claudenda est res familiaris ut eam benignitas aperire non possit, nec ita reseranda ut omnibus pateat; sed utrimque modus adhibeatur isque referatur ad facultat s. Et quidem eleganter siue Philippus siue alius popularis huius profusionis immoderationem cohibuit, quae quidem gloriam uidetur afierre, sed more meretricio, cum res defecerint, a euanescit. Nam gratiae quam non uirtus sed fortuna conciliat amor meretricis rectissime comparatur.
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