Vnde dicti sint Achademicij et quis timor aut
The Nature of Holy Fear
The author explores the Stoic view of fear, distinguishing between a soul-disturbing passion and a humble, soul-composing fear.
Whether a passion of the mind can fall upon a wise man, according to Agellius and the Stoics. The Academics were named after the Academy, where Plato came from, who made that same place of his birth famous through the practice of study, the frequency of his students, and the renown of his own merits. He preferred that place to others because it was suited for striking fear, by which vices might be repressed and, once the condition of one's own nature was recognized, modesty might be more faithfully preserved. It seemed especially suitable because of the frequent earthquakes that often shook the area. For fear, just as it is born of modesty, is also familiar to the wise person; not the kind, however, that disturbs the mind and blinds the eye of reason and intelligence like a whirlwind, but the kind that composes the soul and, like a spark of humility, makes a person more ready for all the duties of virtue. In his Attic Nights, Agellius—a man of elegant eloquence and great learning—writes that he once sailed with a philosopher who was a notable figure among the Stoics. The Stoics, however, had largely settled on the opinion that there is no place for fear in the mind of a wise person, since all things happen by necessity and it's foolish to fear what can't be avoided. On the contrary, the only remedy is for a prudent person to prepare the strengths of fortitude and, with the armor of patience—like a solid shield for an unconquered soul—withstand all the arrows of necessity. When, therefore, the ship was being tossed most dangerously in a turbulent sea by the violence of the winds and a threatening sky, the philosopher turned pale from the force of fear.
Reason, Passion, and Grace
Through the account of Agellius, the author examines how the wise distinguish between involuntary impressions and the consent of the mind, while noting the necessity of divine grace.
Once the storm passed and safety allowed for conversation—as often happens—one of the companions, a wealthy, self-indulgent man from Asia, began to mock the philosopher for having turned pale with fear, contrary to his own profession, while he himself, who wasn't a philosopher at all, had remained fearless in the face of the impending destruction. But he gave the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, when criticized in a similar situation by a similar person, answered that he had rightly not been worried about the soul of a worthless scoundrel, but that he had every reason to fear for the soul of Aristippus. Once the rich man's questioning was pushed aside, Agellius approached him—not to provoke him, but to learn—and asked in a friendly way what the cause of his fear was, since it's a tenet of Stoic discipline that one shouldn't fear the arrival of death, which is known to be the certain end of life. The philosopher, seeing that the man was genuinely burning with a desire to learn, brought out a book by the Stoic Epictetus from his bag, which contained ideas that aligned with the teachings of Zeno and Chrysippus, the reputed leaders of the Stoics. When Agellius had the book in his hands, he found that the Stoics held it wasn't in a person's power whether impressions—which they call phantasies—enter or leave the mind. They assert that when these come from terrifying events or their opposites, it's necessary for the mind, even of a wise person, to be moved so that for a short time he trembles with fear, is constricted by sadness, is expanded by joy, or is moved by desires, as if these passions were anticipating the work of reason and the mind; yet they maintained that this doesn't mean the conscience of evil is present in the mind, nor that these things are approved or that any consent is given to them. They want this to be within our power, and they believe this is the difference between the mind of the wise and the foolish: the foolish person yields to passions with the consent of the mind, whereas the wise person, though he may suffer them out of necessity, still retains a true and firm judgment with an unshaken mind regarding what should reasonably be sought or avoided. These things, then, are presented elegantly and truthfully by Agellius. They are mistaken, however, if they attribute the repression and correction of these passions—which are necessary—to their own strength without grace, because it belongs to God alone who shows mercy, not to the person who runs or the person who wills, that these things are turned to the service of justice.
The Beginning of Wisdom
The chapter concludes by affirming that fear serves as the foundation for modesty and the beginning of true wisdom.
Let this be enough to show that modesty is governed by fear, and that the first path of philosophy is paved and prepared by it. For it's written that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom and the end of modesty.
Read the original Latin
passio mentis secundum Agdlium et Stoicos in sapient&m cadat. Achademici quidem dicti sunt ab Achademia, unde Plato extitit oriundus, qui eundem suae natiuitatis locum et studendi usu et discipulorum frequentia meritorumque suorum celebritate fecit insignem. Illum uero locum ceteris praetulit eo quod ad incutiendum timorem, quo uitia reprimerentur et agnita conditione sui modestia fidelius reseruaretur. maxime uisus est ex frequenti terrae motu, quo saepe colliditur, esse idoneus. Timor enim, sicut modestiae cob gnatus est, ita familiaris est sapienti; non ille tamen qui mentem turbat et quasi turbine quodam rationis et intelligentiae praestringit oculum, sed qui componit animum et, quasi humilitatis fomes, hominem reddit ad omnia uirtutis officia aptiorem. Vnde in libris Noctium Athicarum scribit Agellius, uir elegantis eloquii et multae scientiae, se aliquando nauigasse cum quodam philosopho eoque nobili inter Stoicos. IUis autem ex magna parte in sententiam sedit timori locum non esse in animo sapientis, cum omnia ex necessitate proueniant stultumque sit timere quod uitari non potest, et e contra unicum sit remedium ut uir prudens fortitudinis uires praeparet et robore patientiae quasi solidissimo animi inuicti clipeo omnia tela necessitatis excipiat. Cum ergo nauigium turbato mari uentorum uehementia celoque minaci periculosissime iactaretur, philosophus ui timoris expalluit.
Deinde, cum tempestate transacta securitas praebuisset colloquendi ut fit et congarriendi locum, sociorum unus, diues, luxuriosus, Asiaticus, coepit compellare philosophum et illudere ei eo quod contra professionem suam timore palluerat, cum ipse, qui minime philosophabatur, mansisset intrepidus in eo quod impendebat exitio. At ille Aristippi Socratici responsum retulit, qui, cum in re simili similiter et a consimili argueretur, respondit illum pro anima nequissimi nebulonis merito non fuisse soUicitum, se autem debuisse timere pro anima Arid stippi. Diuitis ergo quaestione depulsa, accessit Agellius, non exagitandi animo sed discendi, familiariter quaerens quaenam esset causa timoris sui, cum praeceptum sit disciplinae Stoicorum ne mortis timeatur aduentus, quam constat esse indubium terminum uitae. IUe autem, cum diseendi auiditate gnauiter accensum uidisset hominem, librum Epitecti Stoici de mantica protulit, in quo scripta erant ea quae congruebant decretis Zenonis et Crisippi, qui dicuntur fuisse principes Stoicorum. Cum ergo librum in manibus Agellius tenuisset, inuenit Stoicis placuisse non esse in potestate hominis ut uisa, quae phantasias appellant, in animum ueniant aut recedant; et, cum uenerint ex terribilibus rebus aut contra, necesse asserunt moueri animum etiam sapientis ut paulisper metu trepidet, tristitia contrahatur, a dilatetur letitia, cupiditatibus moueatur, tamquam his passionibus praeuenientibus rationis et mentis officium; nec tamen ideo conscientiam mali in mente uersari, nec approbari ista aut eis aliquem indulgeri consensum. Hoc enim esse uolunt in potestate idque interesse censent inter animum sapientis et stulti, quod stultus consensu mentis passionibus cedit; sapiens autem, licet eas necessitate patiatur, retinet tamen de rationabiliter appetendis uel fugiendis ueram et firmam inconcussa mente sententiam. Haec quidem illi auctore Agellio et pro parte eleganter et uere. Errant tamen, si istarum passionum, quae necessariae sunt, repressionem et castigationem citra gratiam uiribus suis adscribunt, eo quod solius miserentis Dei est, non utique currentis hominis aut uolentis, ut hae in usum iustitiae conuertantur.
Hoc autem sufficiat demonstrare quod timore modestia dispensatur et philosophandi prima stemitur et disponitur uia. Siquidem scriptum est quia initium sapientiae et finis modestiae timor Domini.
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