De errore Achademicorum ; et quos eorum liceat
The Folly of Universal Doubt
The author critiques the Academic school for their excessive skepticism, arguing that constant doubt undermines both human reason and the dignity of the soul.
to imitate, and what things are worth doubting for a wise person. However, not everyone who calls themselves an Academic has followed this rule of modesty; their school is divided, and in some ways, it's as open to ridicule as it is to error. For what is more foolish than to waver over every detail, to be certain of nothing, and yet to claim the title of philosopher? Those who doubt everything because they have nothing certain are strangers to both faith and knowledge. Although faith may not reach the prize of knowledge while it gazes upon the truth of absent things as if through a mirror, it still possesses certainty, with the fog of ambiguity cast aside. Furthermore, if an Academic doubts every single thing, he is certain of nothing—unless, perhaps, he finds even this uncertain: whether, given contradictory positions on the same subject, he could be both doubtful and certain. But he is uncertain whether he even doubts, since he doesn't know whether he knows nothing. Yet since a human being excels other animals in that he thrives by reason and intelligence (for in the senses, which are said to belong to the body even if they are of the soul, he is easily surpassed; he cannot match the lynx in sharpness of sight, the pig in hearing, the vulture or dog in smell, the ape in taste, or the spider in touch); since, I say, a human being leads in the powers of discerning and understanding, who would not consider a person who lacks reason and whose intellect does not taste of wisdom to be superior to beasts, or rather, who would not consider him inferior and, if I may say so, more brutish—especially when even brute animals seem to rise in some way toward a certain image of reason?
Reason and the Limits of Skepticism
By comparing human reason to the instincts of animals, the author demonstrates that a life of total uncertainty is contrary to the nature of a rational being.
Even a dog distinguishes its own feelings, remembers kindnesses, and forms a familiarity with a human based on experience and habit; by showing a kind of loyalty to its familiar companions, it is ennobled by a certain capacity for reason and understanding. But the memory of injuries also sticks tenaciously in a camel, and the rhinoceros—also known as the unicorn—recognizes a virgin's purity so well that it can only be captured by her embrace. Other animals follow the scent of the panther, and, more remarkably, fish in the depths are drawn to the sight of gold; this is why the emperor Nero, in his raging luxury, is said to have fished with golden nets. Why say more? The fierce lioness follows the wolf, the wolf itself follows the goat, and the playful goat follows the flowering cytisus; in this way, many creatures are drawn by their own desires—something that, I believe, could not happen if even brute animals doubted their own instincts. Those who are ignorant of everything, then, with what recklessness or impudence do they take up the profession of philosophy? For just as 'notion' is derived from what is 'known,' so 'reason' is grammatically derived from what is 'ratified'—that is, what is certain and firm. And truly, the reason of a person is empty if nothing can persuade them, and they always waver in the slipperiness of their opinions about everything.
The Path to Wisdom
The author warns that a mind torn by constant contradiction cannot reach the truth, though he acknowledges that even great thinkers like Augustine used a cautious, Academic style.
For what good does philosophy do someone who is always wavering in their opinions, and for whom the light of reason is extinguished—and its eye, as it were, plucked out—when it comes to showing the way to happiness, so that the traveler might walk more cautiously and correctly? Doesn't it also do a great deal of harm to someone who is blinded? What else is someone to follow who is torn apart by such great contradiction? Truly, no one reaches their homeland unless they follow a single path; and anyone who listens to every word will never be at peace. Isn't such a person more like a lethargic, foolish, or insane individual than a philosopher—someone who, when they remember a dream, doubts whether they were asleep, and when they are full of food, doesn't know if they are fasting, and has no knowledge of anything they did even a moment ago? Furthermore, by what path will someone make progress in the study of philosophy if reason persuades them of nothing they can hold onto or follow, but instead they remain forever uncertain about everything? Such an Academic is certainly unable to be compared even to brute animals, nor is he worthy of the honor or the name of a human, let alone a philosopher; indeed, the great father and faithful doctor of the Church, Augustine, as well as Cicero, argue against the foolishness of these people with powerful reasoning and very elegant language. Nevertheless, Cicero passed over those who doubt every single thing that poses a question to a wise person; and our own Augustine does not pursue them, since he himself uses the Academic temperament quite often in his works and presents many things under ambiguity that others, arguing more confidently and no less rashly, would not seem to find problematic.
The Virtue of Academic Caution
While universal doubt is foolish, a measured caution regarding complex or unknowable matters is a mark of wisdom and humility.
Still, it doesn't seem to me that anyone speaks more securely than the person who is so careful with their words that they avoid slipping into falsehood. There are, however, things that are doubtful to a wise person—things that the authority of faith, the senses, or clear reason doesn't settle, and which have their own arguments supporting both sides. Such, indeed, are the questions asked about providence; about the substance, quantity, power, efficacy, and origin of the soul; about fate and the ease of nature, chance, and free will; about matter, motion, and the principles of bodies; about the progression of a multitude and the division of magnitude—whether they have no limits at all or whether they finally find them in the irrational; about time and place; about number and speech; about the same and the different, in which there is much friction; about the divisible and the indivisible; about the substance and form of a voice; about the status of universals; about the use, end, and origin of virtues and vices; whether someone who has one virtue has them all; and whether all sins are equal and deserve equal punishment. Likewise, there are questions about the causes of things and their connection or opposition; about the ebb and flow of the Ocean; about the source of the Nile; about the increase and decrease of humors in animal bodies according to the motion of the moon; about various secrets of hidden nature; about the duties and various bonds of causes that arise in different ways in contracts or quasi-contracts, crimes or quasi-crimes, or other forms of things; about nature and its works; about truth and the first beginnings of things in which human talent fails; whether angels have bodies of their own or what kind they might have; and those things that are piously asked about God Himself, who exceeds the investigation of all rational nature and is exalted above everything that can be conceived by the mind. Many things that a wise person might find doubtful could be listed this way, even if that doubt itself escapes the common person. In these matters, I can easily believe that the Academics doubted all the more modestly because I find they were more diligent in guarding against the precipice of rashness. In fact, when ambiguous words like 'perhaps,' 'possibly,' and 'perchance' are used by writers in places that aren't entirely doubtful, they are said to be used with an Academic temperament; this is because the Academics were more moderate than others, fearing the stigma of rash definition and the precipice of falsehood.
Read the original Latin
imitari, et quae sint duhitahilia sapienti. as Non tamen omnes, qui Achademicorum censentur nomine, hanc dico modestiae regulam tenuisse; cum et professio scissa sit et pro parte tam risui pateat quam errori. Quid enim ineptius quam fluctuare in singulis et nullius rei habere certitudinem et nomen philosophi profiteri? Nam qui de omnibus dubitant, eo quod nichil habent certum, tam a fide quam a scientia alieni sunt. Licet enim fides ad a scientiae brauium non perueniat, dum quasi per speculum ueritatem absentium contuetur, habet tamen certitudinem caligine ambiguitatis exclusa. Porro, si de singulis Achademicus dubitat, de nuUo certus est; nisi forte et hoc ipsum incertum habeat an contrariis existentibus in eodem circa idem posset et dubius et certus esse. Sed an dubitet incertum habet, dum hoc ipsum nescit an nesciat. Cum uero homo in eo ceteris animalibus praestet quod ratione uiget et intelligentia (nam in sensibus qui, licet animae sint, corporis esse dicuntur, facile superatur; neque linci ualeat aequari perspicacia oculorum; sus auditu praeualeat, uultur aut canis odoratu, gustu simia, aranea tactu); cum, inquam, discernendi et intelligendi uiribus homo praecedat, quis praestantiorem bestiis aut potius quis non inferiorem et, ut ita dicam, quis non brutiorem credat hominem cui ratio non discemit, intellectus non sapit; cum et bruta ad quandam rationis imaginem quodammodo uideantur assurgere?
Nam et canis suos discemit affectus, beneficiorum memor est, familiaritatem cum homine ab experientia remm et usu contrahit et, amicitiae prae ceteris quasi fidem familiaribus exhibens, rationis et intellectus quodam nobilitatur ingenio. Sed et iniuriarum memoria camelo tenaciter residet, et rinocems, qui et unicomis est, uirginis integritatem sic agnoscit ut dumtaxat illius fere amplexibus capiatur. Odorem pantherae cet ra sequuntur animalia et, quod mirabilius est, pisces in gurgitibus ad speciem auri conueniunt; unde et seuientis luxuriae imperator Nero aureis, ut dicitur, retibus piscabatur. Quid multa? Torua leena lupum sequitur, lupus ipse capellam, florentem cithisum sequitur lasciua capella, et in hunc modum uoluptate sua trahuntur plurima; quod (ut credo) euenire non posset si de affectionibus suis uel bruta animalia dubitarent. Qui ergo ad singula nescii sunt, qua temeritate uel impudentia philosophandi professionem arripiunt? Nam sicut ab eo quod notum est notio, sic et ratio ab eo quod ratum est, id est certum et firmum, gramatice denominatur. Et profecto inanis est ratio hominis cui nichil persuaderi potest quin semper et in omnibus opinionum lubrico uacillet.
Quid enim ei philosophia confert qui semper fluctuat opinionibus, et cui in ostendenda felicitatis uia rationis lumen extinguit et quasi oculum eruit ut cautius et rectius pergat uiator cxii ostensura est uiam? Nonne et plurimum obest illi qui excecatur? Quid potius sequetur qui tanta contrarietate distrahitur? Sane ad patriam nemo peruenit nisi qui unam sequitur uiam; et qui omni uerbo aurem accommodat, numquam quietus erit. Nonne similior est letargico aut insipienti siue insano quam philosopho qui, cum somnii meminerit, an dormierit dubitat, et, cum cibo satiatus est, an ieiunus sit nescit, et nullius eorum, quae egit uel in proximo, scientiam habet "? Deinde a quanam uia in philosophiae inuestigatione proficiet cui ratio nichil persuadet quod teneat aut sequatur, sed est ad omnia semper incertus? Talis utique Achademicus, cum nec brutis animalibus ualeat adaequari nec dignus est hominis nedum philosophi uel honore uel nomine; et quidem aduersus istorum ineptias magnus pater et fidelis doctor Ecclesiae Augustinus sed et Cicero ualidis rationibus et sermone elegantissimo copiosius disputant. Verumtamen ad illos qui de singulis dubitant quae sapienti faciunt quaestionem, Cicero seipso teste transiuit; nec eos noster Augustinus persequitur, cum et ipse in operibus suis Achademico temperamento utatur frequentius et sub ambiguitate proponat multa quae alii confidentius nec magis temeb rarie disputanti non uiderentur habere quaestionem.
Michi tamen non uidetur quisquam eo loqui securius qui ita circumspectus est in uerbo ne prolabi possit ad falsa. Sunt autem dubitabilia sapienti quae nec fidei nec sensus aut rationis manifestae persuadet auctoritas et quae suis in utramque partem nituntur firmamentis. Talia quidem sunt quae quaeruntur de prouidentia, de substantia quantitate uiribus efficacia et origine animae, de fato et faciHtate naturae, casu et libero arbitrio, de materia et motu et principiis corporum, de progressu multitudinis et magnitudinis sectione an terminos omnino non habeant an eos dumtaxat alogos tandem inueniant, de tempore et loco, de numero et oratione, de eodem et diuerso, in quo plurima attritio est, de diuiduo et indiuiduo, de substantia et forma uocis, de statu uniuersalium, de usu et fine ortuque uirtutum et uitiorum, an omnes uirtutes habeat qui unam habet, an omnia sint peccata aequalia et aequaliter punienda; item de causis rerum et adiunctione earum uel repugnantia, de effluxione et defluxione Occeani, de ortu Nili, de humonim in animalibusr corporibus augmento et diminutione ad motum lunae, de uariis latentis naturae secretis, de officiis et uariis liguris causarum quae in contractibus aut quasi contractibus, maleficiis aut quasi maleficiis, aut aliis rerum formis uarie oriuntur, de natura et operibus eius, de ueritate et primis rerum initiis in quibus humanum ingenium deficit, an angeK omnino sua non habeant aut qualia habeant corpora, et quae pie quaeruntur de ipso Deo qui totius naturae rationalis excedit inuestigationem et super omnia, quae mente possunt concipi, exaltatur. Possent in hunc modum enarrari quam plurima quae sic dubitationem sapientis admittunt ut tamen dubitatio ipsa uulgum praetereat. In his itaque facile crediderim Achademicos tanto modestius dubitasse quanto eos temeritatis praecipitium diligentius praecauisse repperio. Adeo quidem ut, cum apud scriptores in locis non passim dubiis uerba quodammodo ambigua, qualia sunt haec: forte fortasse et forsitan, proferuntur, Achademico dicantur usi temperamento, eo quod temperatiores aliis Achademici fuerint, qui omnem ueriti sunt temea rariae diffinitionis subire notam et praecipitium falsitatis.
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