De sacramento ivAicumy et collatione Pitagorae
The Sacred Duty of the Judge
Judges must maintain impartiality and avoid hasty decisions, keeping the fear of God before them at all times.
And regarding Alexander, and in what matters a judge may grant favor to the parties, and concerning tricky questions. Indeed, judges are bound by oath to the laws, because they must arrange the judgment in every way with truth and in observance of the laws. It is provided by law itself that the terrifying scriptures of the holy Gospels be placed before the judicial bench and remain there from the beginning of the lawsuits until the end, and not be removed until the verdict is read, so that the breadth of the entire courtroom, filled with the presence of God Himself, may strike fear and reverence into everyone toward the holy scriptures, and that all iniquity may be driven away from the inquiry of truth. Judicial discipline also drives away all affections of flesh and blood, emptying out anger and hatred, fear and friendship; for, as Julius Caesar says, the mind does not easily foresee the truth where these things prevail. Hence comes that famous ancient proverb, attributed to Cicero: Whoever puts on the friend, puts off the judge. For equity, to which a judge owes obedience, knows neither the left hand of hatred nor the right hand of love; it is not permitted to deviate from the truth in judgments. Yet, to indulge friendship as much as possible, a judge sometimes grants a friend the favor of a delay. However, this is done rarely and only after the case has been examined. Furthermore, while a case is uncertain, a delay should be extended—if not for the sake of the argument, then at least for the sake of the decision. Hasty judgments only lead to regret. This is why the Greeks, when pressured to reach a verdict before a case is clear, reply that their ancestors didn't see the sun at the antipodes, but always waited until it rose for them as well. They say, in fact, that a traveler is reckless who sets out on a journey before the morning star rises, while the darkness is still thick and the light is far off.
The Vanity of Earthly Power
A comparison between the virtues of Pythagoras and the worldly, often flawed, character of Alexander the Great.
But a judge shouldn't be intimidated by the authority of powerful people, given that the petition of Pythagoras was delayed for a very long time, and the case of Alexander the Great was condemned in a military court; Alexander himself accepted this, thanking the judges whose integrity he had tested by the fact that they valued justice above all worldly power. In my judgment, I have found nothing truly remarkable in any history regarding that Alexander whom public opinion claims to be 'Great'. To me, the poor Pythagoras will always be greater than the wealthiest Alexander—if I may say so with the permission of those who prefer boldness over virtue. If you want to consider this with me, you should look over the comparison of Philip and Alexander in Trogus Pompeius, or in the summary by Justin, if you prefer. He says, therefore: Philip was a king more interested in weapons than in banquets, for whom great wealth was merely a tool for war, and who was more skilled at acquiring riches than at keeping them. And so, despite his daily looting, he was always poor. In him, mercy and treachery were held in equal regard. For him, no method of winning was considered shameful. He was equally smooth and deceitful in his speech, promising more than he ever delivered; he was an expert at both serious matters and games. He cultivated friendships based on utility, not loyalty. Book. It was his habit to feign kindness while harboring hatred, to sow discord among those who were in agreement, and to seek favor from both sides. He possessed an eloquence and a remarkable way of speaking, full of sharpness and skill, so that his polish never lacked ease, nor his ease, polish. His son, Alexander, succeeded him and was greater than his father in both virtue and vice. Consequently, their methods of winning were different. The father handled wars openly, while the son relied on strategy. The father took pleasure in enemies he had deceived; the son, in those he had openly routed. The father was more prudent in counsel, while the son was more magnificent in spirit. The father knew how to hide his anger, and often even to overcome it; but when the son’s anger flared up, there was neither delay in his vengeance nor any limit to it. Both were overly fond of wine, but their drunkenness led to different vices. It was the father's habit to rush at the enemy even from a banquet, recklessly exposing himself to danger; Alexander, however, raged not against the enemy, but against his own people. That’s why battles often sent Philip back wounded, while the latter frequently left the banquet of his murdered friends. The former wanted to reign with his friends; the latter exercised his rule over his friends. The father preferred to be loved; the son, to be feared. Both had a similar devotion to literature. The father was greater in shrewdness; the son, in loyalty. In words and speech, Philip was more moderate; the son was more moderate in deeds. The son had a readier and more honorable spirit for sparing the conquered.1 The father was more devoted to frugality, the son to luxury. The father laid the foundations of the empire's world through his skills, but the son brought the glory of such a great work to completion. Yet in one respect he surpassed the vices not only of his father but of all noble men—a matter of the most unrestrained envy—to such a degree that even his father's triumphs moved him to tears, as if his father's virtue were stealing the glory from all his own achievements. He would even kill with his own hands, or order to be dragged to punishment, those who praised his father's virtue.
The Paradox of the Law
The famous legal dilemma between Pythagoras and his student Euallus serves as a warning against unsolvable logical traps.
But Pythagoras held such authority among philosophers that it was enough to settle any question if it were believed that he had taken a side. For a preconceived opinion had such power that nothing could prevail against it once it was said that he himself had spoken, and by the custom of his followers, the very use of the pronoun indicated Pythagoras. For when it was said simply, 'He himself said this,' it was understood—as Cicero testifies—that Pythagoras was meant, based on the authority of his teaching. Yet he didn't sway the judgment with all his authority; rather, the verdict remains pending due to the ambiguity of the matter and the time that has passed. The case is this: Euallus, a young man with a gift for eloquence, was eager to learn the art of pleading cases. He became a student of Pythagoras, promising to pay the fee Pythagoras requested—half before he began his studies, and the other half on the first day he argued a case before the judges and won. Later, when he had been a student and advocate of Pythagoras for a long time and had advanced in his studies, but after a long time had passed was refusing to take on cases—as it was thought, so that he would not have to pay the teacher his fee—Pythagoras, after taking counsel, brought a lawsuit against him. When they appeared before the judges to open the case, Pythagoras began: "Understand, you foolish young man, that either way you'll have to pay what I'm asking, whether the verdict goes for you or against you." If the lawsuit is decided against you, the fee is owed to me by the court's judgment because I will have won; but if it is decided in your favor, the fee is owed to me by our contract because you will have won. To this, Euallus calmly replied: "I would counter this clever trap of yours, if I weren't pleading the case myself and using another lawyer." But this is just a prelude to victory, since I will defeat you not only in the case itself but in this very argument. Learn then, you wise teacher, that either way it will turn out that I won't pay what you're asking, whether the verdict is against me or for me. For if the judges decide in favor of my case, you will owe me nothing based on the verdict, because I will have won; if they decide against me, I owe you nothing based on our agreement, because I will not have won. In this way, the famous master of eloquence was refuted by his young student, frustrated by his own clever and carefully crafted trap. Then the judges—to use the words of the ancient story—reasoning that the matter was doubtful and inexplicable because of the arguments on both sides, and fearing that their own verdict might cancel itself out by applying to both parties, left the case undecided and postponed it to a distant date. It doesn't matter much whether it was Pythagoras or Protagoras who litigated, as Quintilian and Aulus Gellius suggest; there is no power in the name, so long as it is clear that an ambiguous matter cannot be settled without recklessness. There are, however, many captious questions that are safer and more convenient to postpone, especially in court, than to rush. Hence, among dialecticians, this type of argument is called a 'tract,' and the Greeks describe it as a situation where whatever you decide is true turns out to be false. And if, in most cases, the matter can be tempered by an exception of bad faith, and the very equity of the law can sometimes mitigate its rigor, it is better to postpone a verdict in such matters than to deliver one, unless the most urgent necessity compels it. If you have learned from childhood that in questions which have implicit positions and which latently involve contradictions, the solution is laborious, unless perhaps you consider yourself more cautious than the ancient Nestor.
The Wisdom of Prudent Delay
While some matters require careful postponement, justice should not be unnecessarily delayed when the rights of others are at stake.
Don't put any stock in the dream that Agamemnon was told in his sleep while Greece was struggling through the destruction of Troy. The wisest of the Greeks decided that interpreting this dream should be left to Jupiter. I've seen many people struggle to figure out whether someone who says, 'I am lying,' is telling the truth. But I've never seen anyone avoid Scylla and Charybdis unless they were willing to face a weak or favorable enemy. Yet in argumentative debates and academic speeches, these things are handled without any real danger. But once you reach the forum—where empty displays of wit fall silent and only serious matters are discussed—there is no danger to the litigants, and the judge doesn't err in his final calculation. And in my opinion, there is nothing more useful than putting off a danger if it cannot be avoided altogether. It is, however, highly unfair to drag out lawsuits when the interests of one of the litigants are at risk and the difficulty of the case doesn't justify the delay. Whatever can be settled quickly should be hurried along; whatever requires more careful consideration should be put off.
Read the original Latin
et Aleaxindri, et in quibus rebus gratiam partibus posdt facere iudex, et de qvMestionibus captiosis. Et quidem iudices sacramento legibus alligantur iurati, quia omni modo iudicium cum ueritate et legum obseruatione disponent. Ipsoque iure cautum est ut sacrorum Euangeliorum scripturae terribiles ante sedem iudicialem deponantur ibique ab initio litium ad finem usque permaneant nec amoueantur nisi sententia recitata, quo totius consistorii latitudo Dei ipsius repleta praesentia omnibus ad sacrosanctas scripturas metum incutiat et reuerentiam et ab inquisitione ueritatis omnis iniquitas propulsetur. Omnes quoque carnis et sanguinis religio iudiciaria propellit affectus euacuans iram et odium, metum et amicitiam; J quia, ut ait lulius Cesar, haud facile animus uerum prouidet, ubi ista proficiunt. Hinc est illud prouerbium auctore Cicerone apud antiquos celeberrimum: Exuit personam iudicis quisquis amicum induit. Aequitas enim, cui iudex i obsequium debet, odii sinistram aut amoris dexteram nescit; nam a ueritate non licet in iudiciis declinare. I Vt uero plurimum indulgeatur amicitiae, amico interdum dilationis gratiam facit. Hcx; tamen ipsnm raro et non nisi causa cognita.
Porro, dum causa anceps est, dilatio protelatur, si non contentionis, saltem decisionis. Nam iudicia festinata penitentiam pariunt. Vnde et Greci, cum urgentur ad sententiam antequam de causa liqueat, respondent patres suos solem apud antipodas non uidisse sed expectasse semper donec et ipsis oriretur. Dicunt enim praeproperum esse uiatorem qui, antequam lucifer oriatur, crassis adhuc tenebris luceque remota, dietam aggreditur. Sed nec iudicem terreat auctoritas ligatorum, cum Pitagorae in longissimum tempus sit dilata petitio, et Alexandri Macedonis in castrensi iudicio sit causa dampnata; quod et ille acceptum habuit, iudicibus agens gratiam, quorum in eo fidem probauerat, quod iustitiam omni potentatui praeferebant. Nichil uero praeclarius de Alexandro illo, quem publica opinio magnum asserit, in aliqua historia meo iudicio repperi. Michi quidem semper (ut tamen pace eorum loquar, qui temeritatem uirtuti praed ferunt) ditissimo Alexandro pauper Pitagoras maior erit. Quod ut mecum conicias, collationem Philippi et Alexandri Trogo Pompeio uel lustino compendiario eius (si mauis) auctore reuoluas.
Ait ergo: Fuit Philippus rex armormn quam conuiuiorum studiosior, cui maximae opes erant instrumenta bellorum, diuitiarum quaestus quam custodia soUertior. Itaque inter cotidianas rapinas semper inops erat. Misericordia in eo et perfidia pari iure dilectae. Apud eum nulla ratio uincendi turpis. Blandus pariter et insidiosus alloquio, qui plura promitteret quam praestaret; in seria et iocos artif ex. Amicitias utilitate non fide colebat. lib. V a Gratiam fingere in odio, instruere inter concordantes odia, apud utrumque gratiam quaerere soUempnis illi consuetudo.
Inter haec eloquentia et insignis oratio, acuminis et sollertiae plena, ut nec omatui facilitas nec facilitati inuentionum deesset omatus. Huic Alexander filius successit, et uirtute et uitiis patre maior. Itaque uincendi ratio utrique diuersa. Hic aperta, ille artibus bella tractabat. Deceptis ille gaudere hostibus, hic palam fusis. Prudentior ille consilio, hic animo magnificentior. Iram pater dissimulare, pleramque etiam uincere; hic ubi ej:arsisset, nec dilatio ultionis nec modus erat. Vini nimis uterque auidus, sed ebrietatis diuersa uitia.
Patri mos erat etiam de conuiuio in hostem procurrere, se temere periculis offerre; Alexander non in hostem sed in suos saeuiebat. Quamobrem saepe Philippum uulneratum praelia remiserunt, hic amicomm interfectorum conuiuio frequenter excessit. Regnare ille cum amicis uolebat, hic in amicos regna exercebat. Amari pater malle, hic metui. Litterarum cultus utrique similis. Sollertiae pater maioris, hic fidei. Verbis atque oratione Philippus, hic rebus moderatior. Parcendi uictis fiho animus promptior et honestior.
Frugalitati pater, luxuriae filius magis deditus erat. j Quibus artibus orbis imperii fundamenta pater iecit, operis tanti gloriam filius consummauit. Ast in uno non modo patris sed omnium ingenuomm transcendit uitia, quod incontinentissimae fuit inuidiae, adeo ut etiam patemi jj triumphi ei lacrimas extorquerent ac si ei uirtus patema I omnium gerendomm praeriperet gloriam. Eos etiam aut propriis manibus interficiebat aut rapi praecipiebat ad penam, qui patemae uirtutis praeconia praedicabant. At Pitagoras apud philosophos tantae extitit auctoritatis ut ad omnium quaestionum decisionem sufficeret, si in parte crederetur Pitagoras extitisse. Tantum namque opinio praeiudicata poterat ut nichil conualesceret ab opposito, dum hoc ipse dixisse diceretur, et ex usu adquiescentium uox ipsa pronominis Pitagoram indicabat. Cum enim simpliciter dicebatur: Ipse hoc dixit; ex praecepta auctoritate, teste Tullio, Pitagoram intelligi oportebat. Hic tamen tota auctoritate sua nequaquam iudicium flexit, sed adhuc interueniente dilatione propter rei ambiguitatem pendet sententia.
Thema quidem huiusmodi est: Euallus adolescens diues eloquentiae diseendae gratia causasque orandi cupiens fuit. Hic in disciplina Pitagorao I se dedit, promittens pecuniam quantam Pitagoras petierat, data medietate antequam ingrederetur, daturus alteram quo primum die causam apud iudices perorasset et uicisset. Postea cum diutius auditor assertorque Pitagorae fuisset facundiamque promouisset a studio et transcurso tempore longiori causantibus patrocinium denegaret, ut putabatur, j ne doctoris impleret mercedem, habito consilio litem cum eo Pitagoras contestatur. Cum ergo ad iudices ineundae constituendaeque causae uenissent gratia, Pitagoras sic exorsus est: Disce, inquit, stultissime adolescens, utroque a id modo fore uti reddas quod peto, siue pro te pronuntiatum erit siue contra te. Nam si contra te lis data erit, merces michi ex sententia debebitur, quia ego euicero; sin uero secundum te iudicatum erit, merces michi ex pacto debebitur, quia tu uiceris. Ad ea placide Euallus: Opto, inquit, huic tuae tam ancipiti captioni isse obuiam, si uerba non ipse facerem atque aho patrono uterer. Sed magis in ista uictoria proludium est, cum te non in causa tantum sed in argumento quoque isto euicero. Disee ergo tu, magister sapientissime, utroque modo futurum uti non reddam quod petis, siue contra me pronuntiatum fuerit siue pro me.
Nam, si iudices pro causa mea senserint, nichil tibi ex sententia debebitur, quia ego uicero; si contra pronuntiatum fuerit, nichil tibi ex pacto debeo, quia non uicero. Sic ab adolescente discipulo magister eloquentiae inclitus suo argumento confutatus est et captionis uersutae et excogitatae frustratus fuit. Tum iudices, ut antiquae uerbis utar historiae, dubiosum hoc inexplicabileque esse quod utrimque dicebatur rati, ne sententia sua utramque in partem dicta ipsa sese rescinderet, rem iniudicatam reliquerunt, causam in diem longissimum protelantes. Nec multum refert ad propositum Pitagoras an Protagoras, sicut Quintiliano placet et Agellio, litigauerit; li neque enim uis est in nomine, dum constet rem ambiguam sine temeritate diffiniri non posse. Sunt autem multae captiosae quaestiones, quae tutius et commodius praesertim in iudiciis differuntur quam accelerentur. Vnde et apud dialecticos genus hoc tractus appellatur et a Grecis dicitur, ac ubi quicquid uerum esse statueris falsum repperitur. Et, si plerumque in his per exceptionem doli mali possit res temperari, et aequitas ipsa iuris interdum queat mitigare rigorem, nisi urgentissima rerum necessitas cogat, in talibus sententiam expedit differre quam ferre. Fere a puero si didicisti quia in quaestionibus, quae habent positiones implicitas et quae latenter inuoluunt contraria, laboriosa solutio est, nisi forte te antiquo Nestore reputes cautiorem.
Ne credas somnio, Agamemnoni dictum est in sompnis, dum in excidio Troia Grecia laboraret. Huiusque somnii interpretationem loui censuerunt Grecorum sapientissimi reseruandam. Laborantes uidi quamplurimos, dum quaeritur an qui dicit ' Ego mentior ' uerum dicat. Sed neminem uidi qui Scillam uitaret et Caribdim, nisi debilem aut propitium sustinuerit hostem. At in litigiosis disputationibus et declamationibus scolasticis sine periculo ista uersantur. Sed ubi ad forum uentum est, in quo inanis ostentatio ingenii conquiescit et seria dumtaxat agitantur, sine periculo litigatorum aut iudicis in sententiae calculo non erratur. Nec est, ut opinor, quicquam utilius quam periculum differri, si omnino uitari non potest. Iniquissimum tamen est iurgia protelari, cum alterutrius a litigantium periclitatur utilitas et rei difficultas moram non contrahit.
Quicquid igitur expediri potest, accelerandum est; quod consultiore tractatu indiget, differendum.
Notes
- 1 ↩The source text 'fiho' is a likely typo for 'filius' (the son).
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