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The Calling of a Just Judge
A governor must possess both the knowledge and the moral integrity to administer justice, as ignorance or malice in office carries heavy consequences.
The office of a governor, and the fact that a judge must possess knowledge of both law and equity, the will to do good, the power to carry it out, and the obligation to be bound by the laws through an oath and to be free from the taint of bribes. Next comes a comparison of the eyes, ears, and tongue, which were mentioned earlier as belonging to provincial governors. A governor, therefore, is someone who oversees the administration of justice for the people of a province. He must, however, have knowledge of what is fair and what is unfair, and the ability and the spirit to carry out what is just. For just as a doctor should not be blamed for the outcome of a death, so, if anything sad happens through his incompetence, it is rightly blamed on him. But if he knows and does not want to act, he is condemned not for ignorance but for malice. The outcome for both is condemnation, though the ignorant may be punished more lightly—unless, perhaps, they brought that ignorance upon themselves through negligence. If the ignorance is invincible, it doesn't lead to death but is excused by the darkness in which one was born.
Wisdom and the Burden of Authority
A judge must be guided by divine wisdom and a pure will, recognizing that the responsibility of office is a heavy burden that cannot be satisfied by mere external offerings.
If, however, he knows what is right and wants to serve justice but cannot, the fault lies less with the official than with the ruler. It is certain that these same requirements apply to the religious life of a judge, since he must possess knowledge of the law, a desire for the good, and the strength to carry it out. He must also be bound by oath to the laws, so he knows it’s entirely forbidden for him to deviate from their integrity. For Wisdom teaches us about his wisdom. A wise judge, it says, has judged his people, and the government of a sensible man will be stable. As the judge of the people is, so are his ministers; and whatever the ruler of a city is like, so are those who live in it. But it also doesn't remain silent about the necessary strengths, saying: Do not seek to become a judge unless you have the power to break through iniquities, lest you happen to fear the face of the powerful and place a stumbling block in your own path. Do not sin against the multitude of the city, nor throw yourself into the crowd; do not bind up double sins, for you won't be innocent in even one. Do not be faint-hearted in your soul; do not despise praying and giving alms. Don't say: "God will look at the many gifts I bring, and when I offer them to God Most High, He will accept my offerings." Do not mock a person in the bitterness of their soul; for it is God who is the overseer, who humbles and exalts. From this, the diligent reader will realize that a will for the good is just as necessary for a judge as knowledge or power. He is held accountable not only for his own sins but for the sins of others, and he is weighed down by the double burden of his own and others' faults, so that even with a multitude of offerings, he can have no confidence before God without a purity of will. Plato also asserts—excellently and clearly, if one would only listen—that those who fight to hold public office are like sailors struggling in a storm, arguing among themselves about who among them should best take the helm. In such a gamble of fortune, there is either no one, or a rare and reckless person, who claims an office without the necessary skill and strength. And in my own time, I have seen nothing more miserable than judges who are ignorant of the science of the law and empty of a good will—a fact proven by their love of gifts and rewards, and by the way they exercise the power they have in the service of greed, vanity, or flesh and blood, while being absolved from the necessity of a legitimate oath. From this, it is plain that the princes who granted them their ordinary jurisdiction are themselves ignorant of the law or hold it in contempt. But whatever we may say about legal expertise or the power to execute it, a judge must be deeply religious and one who hates every injustice more than death itself.
The Corruption of Selling Justice
Selling justice is an act of profound iniquity, as it treats the sacred duty of the magistrate as a commodity and betrays the trust of the office.
Because presiding officials hold the ordinary power to declare the law, the scrutiny required of them and of other judges is the same; and what is said of them is easily applied to the rest. The first requirement for both, by the necessity of their office, is that they obey justice in all things and that nothing which must be done is done for a price. For what is unjust is never permitted, so that it may not be done even for the sake of temporal life. What is just, however, does not require the intervention of a reward, since it ought to be done for its own sake, and it is unjust to sell what is owed. To sell justice, therefore, is iniquity; to sell injustice is a wicked madness. The former is so universally condemned that it ought nowhere to exist; the latter is so universally required that it cannot be sold without committing a crime. For Balaam is not blamed because he condemned the cause of God's people or said anything other than what the Lord inspired, but because, blinded by greed, he instructed the cause of the infidels, and at the prompting of malice, he sought how Israel might sin so as to provoke the wrath of God. He sought, therefore, how he might justly justify the cause of the wicked and, as if God were deceived, withdraw His grace from the elect. Or if the case couldn't be justified, he at least acted to ensure that God would withdraw from it. For when the wicked fight, it’s usually the one with the superior strength who wins, as the saying goes. You can see many Balaamites who, even if they don't want to hand down an unjust verdict, are so corrupted by bribes that they try to shift the justice of one side to the other using any trick they can. I wouldn't easily say which is worse, even if the seller of justice colors over his malice with a more deceptive veneer. Yet he may seem worse who treats the prince and queen of his own office—to whom his loyalty is pledged—like merchandise in the marketplace, just as if an unfaithful servant were selling his master. For every magistrate is a servant of justice. It is clear, however, that justice is alienated from the seller, even if it doesn't pass to the buyer; and the injustice that is bought passes to the buyer in such a way that it by no means departs from the seller. And what is not found in other contracts is this: only he sells justice who does not possess it.
The Purity of the Soul
True integrity requires detachment from worldly gain, as the judge must ultimately answer to the incorruptible Judge who weighs every action.
In fact, it abandons the corrupt seller before the transaction even starts. Isn't he sordid who pollutes his conscience with filth he has either accepted or offered, and who possesses not so much a venal justice as a venal soul? The Teacher of the Gentiles despises riches, honors, and the varied furnishings of the whole world as dung, so that he might gain Christ alone, reckoning everything that brings loss to salvation as something to be added to the heap of filth. This is right and faithful, for nothing clean, honorable, or decent hinders salvation; only baseness does. Because it is unbecoming, it is also unclean and certainly useless—so damaging that no temporal gain can make up for it. For what does it profit a man if he gains the whole world but loses his own soul?✦ And notice that he didn't say the world is useless only when salvation is lost, but also when glory is diminished. No matter how much gems may glitter, gold may shine, and the world may smile with all its allurements, whatever destroys a person's purity is corrupt; whatever extinguishes the beauty of the soul is base; whatever subverts integrity is shameful. Hence also. Even among the ancients who were ignorant of the life-giving truth, anything that ought to be done freely as a duty of office is considered filthy if it is done for a price. They even stretch the definition of 'price' to include not just money or goods, but also favors and any kind of service that isn't otherwise owed. For what comes from filth, what can it be but filthy? A bad tree can't produce good fruit, since it's in the very nature of things that like begets like. Furthermore, because we've already established that the oversight of governors and other judges is a shared responsibility, they are ministers of equity and public peace; they must be all the more circumspect, cautious, and solicitous, because they are reserved for the examination of the One whose wisdom cannot be circumvented and whose justice cannot be corrupted. He ensures that they'll be judged by the same standard they used to judge others, and that they'll receive from the just Judge a measure that is good, pressed down, shaken together, and running over into their own laps.
Read the original Latin
offixyio praesidis, et quod iudicem oportet habere iuris et aequi notitiam, uoluntatem boni, et potestatem exequendi, et quod iuramento debet esse legibus alligatus et a sordibus munerum alienus. Sequitur oculorum aurium et linguae coUatio, quam in praesidibus prouinciarum consistere superius dictum est. Praeses igitur est qui in iure reddendo prouincialibus praesidet. Hic autem aequi et iniqui debet habere notitiam et facultatem et animum eius quod iustum est exequendi. Nam sicut medico euentus mortalitatis imputari non debet, ita, si quid triste per imperitiam eius contigerit, ei merito imputatur. Quod si nouit et non uult, non ex ignorantia sed ex malitia condempnatur. Finis siquidem utriusque dampnatio est; licet ignari mitius puniantur, nisi forte ignorantiam negligentia procurauerit. Nam si ignorantia inuincibilis est, non affert mortem sed ab innatis tenebris excusatur.
Si uero scit et uult aequitati seruire nec potest, non tam praesidis est culpa quam principis. Sed ad religionem iudicis haec eadem pertinere certissimum est, cum ipsum iuris oporteat habere notitiam, uoluntatem boni, uires exequendi, et sacramento debeat esse legibus obligatus ut sibi omnino illicitum nouerit ab earum sinceritate diuertere. Nam de sapientia eius Sapientia docet. ludex, inquit sapiens, iudicauit populum suum et principatus sensati stabilis erit. Secundum iudicem populi, sic et ministri eius; et qualis rector est ciuitatis, tales et inhabitantes in ea. Sed et uires necessarias esse non tacuit, dicens: Noli quaerere iudex fieri, nisi ualeas uirtute irrumpere iniquitates, ne forte extimescas faciem potentis et a ponas scandalum in agilitate tua. Non pecces in multitudine ciuitatis nec te immittas in populum; neque alliges duplicia peccata, nec enim in uno eris immunis. Noli esse pusillanimis in anima tua; exorare et facere elemosinam non despicias.
Ne dicas: In multitudine munerum meorum respiciet Deus, et offerente me Deo altissimo suscipiet munera mea. Non irrideas hominem in amaritudine animae; est enim qui humiliat et exaltat circumspector Deus. Ex his diligenti lectori occurret quod uoluntas boni non minus iudici necessaria est quam notitia uel potestas, cum non modo de suis sed ex alienis delictis teneatur et duplici suorum et aliorum prematur onere ut nec in multitudine munerum citra munditiam uoluntatis sit ei fiducia ante Deum. Vnde et Plato egregie quidem et luculenter (si tamen audiatur) eos qui de rei publicae gerendo magistratu contendunt, ita inter se uersari asserit ut si nautae sub aduersa tempestate decertent quis eorum debeat potissimum gubemare. In quo fortunae calculo aut nullus aut rarus idemque temerarius est qui sine arte et uiribus uendicet magistratum. Et meo quidem tempore nichil miserabilius uidi quam iudices scientiae legis ignaros, bonae uoluntatis inanes, quod conuincit amor munerum et retributionum, id uirium quod habent in obsequio auaritiae iactantiae aut camis et sanguinis exercentes et a necessitate sacramenti legitimi absolutos. Ex quo planum est principes, qui eis ordinariam iurisdictionem contulerunt, iuris esse ignaros uel contemptores. Sed, quicquid de peritia iuris dicamus aut de uiribus exequendi, iudicem oportet esse religiosissimum et qui omne iniquum morte ipsa magis oderit.
Quia ergo praesides ordinariam habent iuris dicendi potestatem, ipsorum et iudicum aliorum una est speculatio; et quod de his dicitur, facile ad aliorum consequentiam trahitur. Est itaque primum quod ex necessitate officii utrisque indicitur, ut iustitiae in omnibus pareatur et nichil eorum quae facienda sunt, fiat ad pretium. Nam quod iniustum est, usquequaque non licet ut nec pro temporali uita fieri liceat. Quod uero iustum est, mercedis interuentu non indiget, cum per se fieri debeat et iniquum sit uendere quod debetur. lustitiam ergo uendere iniquitas est; iniustitiam, iniqua insania. Haec siquidem ubique reprobata est ut nusquam esse debeat; illa ubique debita est ut sine scelere uendi non possit. Neque enim Balaam ex eo culpatur, quod populi Dei causam dampnauerat aliudue dixerit quam quod Dominus inspirabat, sed quia auaritia excecatus, infidelium causam instruens, quomodo ad prouocandam iram Dei delinqueret Israel dictante malitia procurauit. Quaerebat ergo quomodo iuste iustificaret causam impii et quasi illuso Deo gratiam eius subtraheret electis.
Aut si aduersa iustificari non posset causa, hoc saltem agebat ut et ab ista a recederet Deus. Compugnantibus namque iniquis, uincere (ut dicitur) consueuit qui uiribus superior est. Balaamitas uideas plurimos qui, licet iniquam nolint ferre sententiam, corrupti tamen muneribus iustitiam partis unius in alteram quauis arte transferre moliuntur. Non facile dixerim 3C utrum sit nequius, licet uenditor aequitatis malitiam fuco, fallaciori coloret. Potest tamen uideri nequior qui officii sui principem et reginam, cui fides famulatur, quasi mercem ' in foro distrahit ac si seruus infidelis dominum uendat. Omnis etenim magistratus iustitiae famulus est. Constat autem quia aequitas alienatur a uenditore, licet ad emptorem non transeat; et empta iniquitas sic ad emptorem transit ut nequaquam a uenditore recedat. Et quod in aliis contractibus non reperitur, solus ille iustitiam uendit qui non habet.
Siquidem ante commercium relinquit sordidum uenditorem. Nonne sordidus est qui ad acceptas uel oblatas sordes conscientiam polluit et non tam iustitiam uenalem habet quam animam suam? Doctor gentium diuitias honores et totius mundi uariam suppellectilem contempnit ut stercora, ut solum lucrifaciat Christum, ratus omnia, quae dispendium salutis afferunt, sordibus aggreganda. Recte quidem et fideliter, eo quod nichil mundum, nichil honestum, nichil decens salutem impedit, sed sola turpitudo, quae, sicut dedecet, sic et immunda est et certe inutilis, adeo dampnosa ut nullo temporali emolumento ualeat compensari. Quid enim prodest homini, si uniuersum mundum lucretur faciens detrimentum animae suae ■? Et uide quia non dixit mundum inutilem ubi salus perditur, sed etiam ubi minuitur gloria. Quantumuis rutilent gemmae, aurum splendeat et omnibus lenociniis suis arrideat mundus, quicquid munditiam hominis perimit, sordidum; quod decorem animae extinguit, turpe; quod honestatem subuertit, ignominiosum est. Vnde et.
apud antiquos etiam salutiferae ueritatis ignaros omne quod ex debito oflBcii gratuitum esse oportet, si fiat ad pretium, in sordibus computatur. Ipsius quoque pretii sic dilatant interpretationem, ut non modo pecuniam speciemue contineat, sed obsequium omnemque operam, quatenus alias non debetur. Quod enim ex sordibus est, quid erit nisi sordidum? Non enim potest arbor mala fructus bonos facere, cum in eo uis naturae consistat, ut similia ex similibus procreentur. Ceterum, quia praesidum et aliorum iudicum communem esse inspectionem praemisimus, aequitatis et publicae quietis ministri sunt, quos tanto circumspectiores et cautiores oportet esse magisque sollicitos, quo illius reseruantur examini, cuius prudentia circumueniri non potest aut iustitia corrumpi; illo optinente, ut in quo iudicio iudicauerint, iudicentur, et mensuram bonam et conf ertam et coagitatam et supereffluentem in sinus suos a iudice iusto recipiant.
Scripture echoes
- ↩Matt.16.26 — For what will it benefit a person if they gain the whole world but forfeit their life? Or what will a person give in exchange for their life?
Policraticus companion
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