Quod ex possibUi non sequitur imposdhile
The Logic of Divine Providence
The author addresses the tension between divine foreknowledge and the logical necessity of events, refusing to accept that an impossible outcome can follow from a possible one.
The Most High, who alone has power over all things, knows what necessarily follows from what. You insist, however, that if something He has foreseen doesn't happen—for instance, if a stone that He has clearly foreseen falling to the ground doesn't fall—then His plan is mistaken. Because a stone cannot fail to fall, you force me to choose between two options, neither of which is commonly accepted: either I must admit that providence can be mistaken—which faith abhors—or I must agree to the absurd notion that an impossible thing can follow from a possible one by a true logical consequence. I am truly in a tight spot; on one hand, I don't want to diminish the divine majesty, and on the other, I don't want to contradict the clamor of the many and the opinion that is now accepted by almost everyone. But because it's better to fall into the tongues of men than to act impiously toward God, if I cannot avoid both, I would rather seem absurd than faithless. For it isn't yet accepted by everyone that an impossible thing cannot follow from a possible one. Some people do accept this, but whether they are right, let them see and judge for themselves. But no wise person agrees that a falsehood can follow from a truth. It's true that both truth and falsehood can follow from a falsehood, but only truth follows from truth. Sometimes a possibility follows from both a possibility and an impossibility; yet, not all impossibilities follow from just any impossibility. Unless, perhaps, you've been persuaded otherwise by those who claim that if all their premises are true, then all impossibilities follow from a single impossibility, and any false statement follows from any falsehood. If, however, you had managed to derive a falsehood from the truth, I would rightly join everyone else in complaining that I had been led away from the path of truth. Still, I'm not so pressured by these persistent demands that I would stubbornly defend the unthinkable, even if I found others who shared that error. I prefer, if no other way is open, to doubt individual points with the Academics rather than to rashly define what is unknown or hidden through a harmful pretense of knowledge—especially in matters where almost the whole world would oppose my assertion. I listen to the Academics all the more willingly because they take away nothing of what I know, and in many things they make me more cautious, supported by the authority of great men. Even in his old age, the man in whom our Latin tradition finds everything it elegantly opposes to or prefers over the insolent Greeks—I mean Cicero, the author of Roman eloquence—turned to them, as his book titled 'On the Nature of the Gods' shows. Let the Stoics parade their unthinkable ideas—what they call paradoxes—as true, brilliant, and admirable; we, acting with 'plain common sense' as the saying goes, approve of nothing of theirs that seems false to everyone, or to the majority, or to individual wise men who are more probable in their own field. And if Cicero himself or Aristotle were to derive an impossibility from a possibility, I don't think I should agree; I would rather assume that I've been deceived by some cloud of fallacy. I am escaping your traps this way: by saying that while providence cannot be mistaken, what has been foreseen can still fail to happen. I know what you're going to say next. Therefore, it's possible for it not to have been foreseen. Granted, I say. Where are you going with this? So you ask—with philosophy protesting—that what is might not be, that what was is possibly something that never happened, and that things which have already passed can be called back so that they never existed. I certainly don't limit the infinite power of God to the laws of my own limited knowledge and reasoning, nor do I impose a limit on Him that He doesn't have. I know He can do all things, but I can clearly see that your reasoning is flawed.
Eternity and the Immutable Gaze
God's knowledge is distinguished from human cognition by His eternal, immutable nature, which exists outside the flow of time.
First, because you try to limit the vastness of the divine majesty to the small scale of human nature, and you distinguish the unchanging state of eternity by the image of passing things and the variety of times that follow one another. But it should have been understood that things are far different here than in those previous examples, since no movement at all touches the state of eternity, whereas every creature is moved by the arrival or departure of changing circumstances. When a person foresees anything of the future, a certain movement immediately stirs their mind, so that the soul, by applying itself to something else, prefigures the form of a future work within itself; it then often stores this away, as if in the archives of memory, or reflects and turns it over, as if in a mirror of natural purity. It's actually easier for this movement to fade from the mind entirely than for it to cling to the mind through constant contemplation. And indeed, this movement—if it isn't providence itself—either produces providence or is closely related to the knowledge of some kind of agreement. But when the preceding movement and the form of the future work conceived from it are frustrated by the outcome, the agitation of the mind is empty, and it vanishes like a shadow in a dream, without the substance of truth. Yet the movement, because it actually existed in the soul, cannot have failed to exist in the soul; and the soul, which was moved by the agitation of the movement, cannot have failed to have been moved. Furthermore, the state of divine simplicity is a condition of a far different kind. For with a simple and undivided gaze, as has been said, God contemplates all things that are, that have been, and that are to come; He is not moved by the passing of mutable things, but remaining immutable and stable, He subsists in Himself, seeing all things at once and together, and grants that all things be moved. Although words referring to past or future time are sometimes applied to Him, nothing is taken away from Him or added; rather, if we speak properly, it is the mutability of the things subject to Him that is being truthfully indicated. Therefore, when we hear that He has foreknown something, we don't mean that His knowledge has passed by in the flow of time, but—if we follow the nature of words—that the time has preceded in which it is truthfully believed that He had knowledge of what was to be. Thus, it's certain that He has foreknown all things from eternity, not because time takes anything away from His vision by its own motion, but because He who is by nature prior to all time always comprehends all things with His gaze. His providence, therefore, is not deceived in its own disposition, because the consequence of the work always accompanies it. But He cannot be deceived, because nothing can be hidden from His eyes by the mutability of things, nor by the flight or changeability of time. A human's disposition, however, can be deceived and is deceived; the thing whose form he has prefigured within himself either doesn't happen at all in the passage of time, or it proceeds into the public in a different form. Yet not everything that is enclosed by the meaning of a past-tense verb should be grouped with past things. Even if I claim to have lived while the Peripatetic of the Palatine was flourishing, I don't admit that my life has therefore slipped away or passed into the past. Or if I disagreed with the Arians while Eugenius was presiding, I didn't turn away from the integrity of that faith and confession for the sake of time gone by. However, because it was once true to say, 'I am living now' or 'I feel this way,' I elegantly and truly admit in what follows that 'I was living then' and 'I felt that way,' without, however, implying that the life or the feeling has passed away. I know, however, who said that we are wrong to look ahead to death, since a large part of it has already passed; death holds whatever age is behind us. But surely, if life had once slipped away from him, he would either not say this at all, or he would say it as one reborn. It isn't necessary, therefore, that whatever past time is indicated by a verb has passed away; and although many are predestined, the predestination by which they are chosen hasn't therefore passed away. And even if they aren't predestined, something that is past could be recalled in such a way that it hasn't passed away. Note, indeed, that the term 'predestination,' in whatever tense of the verb you use it, points more to the future than to the past, as far as it is concerned, and indicates that the one of whom it is spoken is to be saved, unless he has already escaped that fate.
Grace, Merit, and Human Freedom
The author explores how predestination and grace interact with human free will, emphasizing that God's judgments remain beyond human comprehension.
As the saying goes, there is a fruitful word, and it always contains within itself the understanding of another word. It doesn't, therefore, force any movement upon the one who predestines; rather, for the one who is to be saved, it asserts that the door of salvation and the gate of mercy—through which, in the course of time, grace proceeds—are opened by the primary grace of the God who disposes all things. He can be saved—indeed, he will be saved—even though he could also not be saved. Don't throw that point of your Aristotle at me, that it is necessary for what has been to have been, and for what is to be, when it is; you're trying to conclude that statements with a past-tense copula are either precisely true or precisely and necessarily false. This objection won't help you at all, since even Aristotle’s own words create a question, and they offer little or no support for the point under discussion. Indeed, statements that attach the force of a future contingent to past events undermine the integrity of the rules; for example, 'it was true yesterday that you would read tomorrow,' or 'Plato once knew that you would sleep.' In these cases, the certainty of the past wavers due to the addition of the future. For while you will be able not to sleep, and Plato will be able to have been ignorant of this, it isn't that the movement which was in his soul could not have happened, but that what was once knowledge can be reduced to mere opinion by the mutability of things and the slipperiness of time. If, however, there can be any knowledge of contingent future events—even if it's merely an unshakable opinion that only mimics knowledge—then what we predicted yesterday to be true could turn out not to have been true; not because the past event is being undone (for nothing of it has passed away), but because the future event is still awaited, and its existence hangs on the traps of fortune. Furthermore, you yourself might have foreseen some good that's likely to happen, yet it might not turn out to be good; and you might also have failed to foresee a good, not because you could have failed to foresee what you actually did foresee, but because what you foresaw might not turn out to be good. Likewise, you can promise something or enter into a contract usefully, and you can also fail to promise or fail to enter into a contract usefully; but what you've already promised or contracted, you can't then say you didn't promise or contract. Furthermore, you preceded someone else onto that Sempronian estate that follows you; and if you preceded someone else, then someone else has either followed you, is following you, or will follow you. Since, therefore, the outcome of a consequence can be voided, the truth of the antecedent can also be weakened, so that even you, who had preceded, could be said not to have preceded. Yet, where you've entered, you can't say you didn't enter; nor can what has been done be counted among things undone; nor can what has already passed be recalled so that it never happened. For in all these things that have passed—whether conceived in the mind, expressed in words, or completed in action—it's impossible for them not to have been, and they'll never be able to be considered as not having been, even if, while their nature was still uncertain and their outcome not yet fixed, they might have been able not to have been. Indeed, all things that fall under the label of 'imminent' are encompassed by such terms, even if they're more familiarly applied to quantity, or to something else, or to any other things by their nature. So why is it surprising if He who has power over all things can also not have foreseen what He has foreseen? For it is established by faith that things which have been foreseen cannot fail to happen, and things which have not been foreseen can happen, yet they cannot happen outside the scope of providence. Isaiah says: "If you are willing to walk in my commandments and listen to me, you will eat the good things of the land; but if you are unwilling, and provoke me to anger, the sword will devour you, for the mouth of the Lord has spoken." See how freedom is preserved here, like the Sempronian estate: it is an example of discretion among legal experts, for by saying "if you are willing" and "if you are unwilling," He promises punishment or reward to everyone, not based on an unchangeable decree or the fate of God, but based on the merit of each individual. The condition of earning merit would be useless if it were bound to the bonds of providence or fate, and if the necessity of doing or not doing were imposed upon the will. But if this doesn't satisfy those who love to argue, couldn't the Son have asked His Father during His passion to provide Him with more than twelve legions of angels, even though it's clear after the fact that it was not this, but the opposite of what happened, that had been foreseen? And let it not disturb the mind of a sharper intellect if we fall short in examples when scrutinizing such great majesty, nor that we lack reasons, since reason itself removes wonder and the introduction of examples excludes uniqueness. For He is wonderful in His ineffable uniqueness and unique in His wonderful immensity, surpassing every mind, not only of men but of angels. I know, of course, that anyone who pries into majesty will be overwhelmed by its glory, and that by the decree of the Most High, the beast that touches the mountain is to be crushed with stones. Therefore, what is proposed in such matters is stated for the mind of the investigator without prejudice to those who are better, rather than out of any reckless contention to challenge the one who establishes the truth. But I also confess that I don't know why He chose one while rejecting the other, except that, with the Fathers, I feel that in the one case the hidden justice of God is to be revered, and in the other, the manifest mercy of grace is to be embraced. For even he who was caught up to the third heaven and heard secret words that a human is not permitted to speak, did not so much argue the point of this difficulty as he did marvel at the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, and in humble confession, he venerated His judgments as incomprehensible and His ways as unsearchable. He asserts that the works of God—the uncertain and hidden things of His wisdom, which he rejoices to have had revealed to him—are magnified beyond human sense, and while he searches into all things, he acknowledges the thoughts of the Most High to be too profound. What holy Solomon proclaims in the hearing of the faithful in Ecclesiastes agrees with this truth: 'There is a man who does not take sleep with his eyes by day or by night,' and 'I understood that a man can find no reason for all the works of God that are done under the sun.' And the more he labors to search, the less he will find; even if a wise man says he knows, he won't be able to discover it. If, therefore, the reason for things under the sun cannot be found, who is going to fully explain the reason for things above the sun?
The Limits of Human Inquiry
Concluding with humility, the author acknowledges the limits of human reason when probing the divine, deferring to the authority of Scripture and the Fathers.
For who has known the mind of the Lord, or what effect of providence is not fulfilled, since what is to be can both not happen and, for that matter, not have been foreseen? Yet, as I said before, I don't diminish God's omnipotence through the audacity of my investigation, nor do I set any limits on His immensity. However, I feel with many that if God has foreseen something, it will happen; and if it doesn't happen, He didn't foresee it. From this, it's at least reasonable to infer that if something can fail to happen, it can also not have been foreseen. For Truth itself knows what follows truthfully from what, and the primary reason fully and perfectly weighs the connection of these arguments. The ancient Academy, however, grants this liberty to the human race: that everyone may defend whatever seems probable to them as their own right. The Peripatetic Palatine of our time used to object to all these conditions where the concept of the antecedent does not close off the understanding of the consequent, or where the contrary of the antecedent does not posit the destruction of the consequent, because everyone wants to hold to a necessary consequence, even if some are content with only a great probability. For just as a more evident opinion, due to its clarity, assists knowledge, so too do individual things, the more probable they are, present a more faithful image of necessary things. So that you don't think I'm just drifting on the slippery ground of my own opinion, I bring forward the great authority I rely on: Augustine. In explaining the Gospel passage where the Savior mentions the many rooms in the Father's house, he says: "If I hadn't told you that I'm going to prepare a place for you—that is, if they weren't already predestined—I would have said, 'I will go and I will predestine.'" He connects the diversity of the rooms prepared in the Father's house for His chosen ones to divine predestination, which produces various gifts of grace and merit for those to be saved, according to the good pleasure of the One who disposes them. Since such a great father has grasped this sense of interpretation, saying, 'If they weren't predestined, I would have told you, I will go and I will predestine,' it is credible that while the outcome of things hangs in the balance, if it pleases the Almighty, those who are not yet predestined can be predestined to life, and those who are already written in the book of life can, if their merits demand it, be erased by Him from that possibility. Perhaps this is the meaning of: 'Let them be erased from the book of the living, and not be written down with the righteous.' And likewise: 'Either forgive them this offense, or erase me from your book that you have written.' The Evangelist says, 'Whoever is born of God does not sin, because the heavenly generation keeps him.' This heavenly generation is certainly eternal predestination, whose children all enter into life, even if it is possible for them to wander away from the justice that is the way of life through the merit of their own wrongdoing. If you don't believe me, listen at least to him—a man who, if an angel from heaven were to contradict him, would be condemned with a most worthy anathema. “Father,” he says, “of those you gave me, I have lost not one, but keep them safe.” Hadn't he already lost those who had turned back? Hadn't he, in a sense, already lost Judas? But certainly, the Son hadn't accepted him into his secret counsel, nor had the Father given him to the Son to be kept among those written down, for he hadn't been predestined to life. If, however, others were preordained, and if they couldn't fall, why does the Son intercede for them with such diligence? They were to be saved; yet, while they were pilgrims away from the Lord, they could earn death, not bound to life by any necessity of predestination. Someone might boast that nothing will separate him from the love of Christ, and yet he disciplines his body and brings it into subjection, lest perhaps, after preaching to others, he himself should be found disqualified. In the Apocalypse, too, the angels of the churches are warned to repent now and do their first works lest their lampstand be moved, and to hold their place now lest they yield it to another. Why would that be, if the things destined to happen couldn't be changed? This perspective wasn't unknown to the pagan philosophers, who describe the sequence of fate as unchangeable—not because it's impossible to move, but because it never actually happens to be moved. Hence the saying: 'Pharsalia could escape from the midst of the fates.' There is also the poetic line that the old man of Chartres used quite often when facing the straits of fortune: 'The fates will find a way,' and so on. But things that have already passed, and have been completed by the secondary effect of providence, naturally cannot have failed to happen; though I wouldn't dare assert anything either way that might detract from the One who disposes them. Yet the most learned of doctors, Jerome, says: 'I will speak boldly: although God can do all things, He cannot restore a virgin after her fall; yet He can crown one who has been corrupted.' And indeed, the Apostle, with Jerome interpreting, defines a virgin as one who is holy in body and spirit. But undoubtedly, God can both sanctify the soul with virtues and restore the corrupted flesh, so that the whole substance of the person who had fallen can be seen as restored. If, however, he used a rhetorical figure to mean that what has happened could not have been otherwise, there was no need to fall back on the example of the ruined virgin, since the same logic or error could be applied to any past event. I intentionally distinguish between a sound judgment and an error, because a judgment must always convey the truth, as you find in holy Job: 'Who is this that obscures counsel with ignorant words?'✦ But perhaps virginity is a certain level of grace that it's impossible for any woman who has been corrupted to attain. As for what is called 'possible,' it sometimes refers to the ease inherent in individuals, whether by a stroke of fortune or by a natural aptitude; sometimes it looks to the very nature of things; and at other times it is reflected back to the source of all, the divine majesty, from whom comes the power not only of people, but of all things that can be seen or imagined. Hence that saying of Solomon: 'All power is from the Lord God.'✦ I will never stubbornly set myself against this, certain that He alone is the one who can cast both soul and body into hell.✦
Read the original Latin
et quid ex qvx) necessario consequatur nouit Altissimus, qui solus omnia potest. Instas tamen dicens, nisi euenerit aliquid quod praeuidit, illud certa significatione complectens, forte lapidem recasurum in terram, fallitur dispositio. Quia ergo lapis non recidere pot st, iubes me de duobus eligere, quorum neutrum communiter approbatur, ut uel fatear prouidentiam posse falli, quod fides abhorret, uel, quod absonum est, ex possibili impossibile consecutione uera consentiam euenire. Angustiae quidem sunt undique; hinc, ne diuinam minuam maiestatem; inde, ne multorum clamoribus et sententiae, quae iam fere omnibus persuasa est, contradicam. Sed quia melius est incidere in linguas hominum quam impie uersari in Deum, si utrumque uitare non possum, absonus malo uideri quam perfidus. Nondum etenim omnibus persuasum est quod ex possibili impossibile non sequatur. Nam hoc nonnulli recipiunt; sed an recte, uiderint ipsi et iudicent. At ut ex uero falsum sequatur, nemo sapiens adquiescit.
Verum siquidem ex falso sequitur et uero, sed ex uero non nisi uerum. Ex possibili quoque et impossibili interdum possibile sequitur; non tamen ex quouis impossibili omnia impossibilia. Nisi forte aliud tibi persuaserint illi, quorum si omnia uera suht, ex uno impossibili, sequuntur omnia impossibilia, et ex quouis falso quaelibet falsa. Si uero obtinuisses ex uero falsum, iure et ex sententia omnium quererer me a semita ueritatis abductum. Non tamen his importunitatibus eatenus premor, ut quod inopinabile est, licet inueniam consortes erroris, propria temeritate tueri a contendam. Malo cum Academicis, si tamen alia uia non pateat, de singulis dubitare quam pemiciosa simulatione scientiae quod ignotum uel absconditum est temere diffinire, praesertim in quo assertioni meae fere totus aduersabitur mundus Eoque libentius Academicos audio, quod eorum quae noui nichil auferunt, et in multis faciunt cautiorem, magnorum uirorum auctoritate suffulti, cum ad eos etiam in senectute transierit ille, in quo Latinitas nostra solo inuenit, quicquid insolenti Greciae eleganter opponit aut praefert, Ciceronem loquor, Romani auctorem eloquii, ouem ad eos quasi in calce uitae diuertisse liber De Natura Deorum inscriptus docet. Efferant Stoici inopinabiles sententias suas, quas paradoxas uocant, ueras quidem praeclaras et admirabiles; nos pingui (ut dicitur) Minerua agentes nichil eorum approbamus, quae omnibus aut pluribus aut sapientibus singulis in facultate sua probabilioribus falsa esse uidentur. Nec, si Cicero ipse aut Aristotiles impossibile ex possibili producant, adquiescendum censeo, me potius aliqua fallaciae nube deceptum uerisimiliter opinabor.
Hac ergo uia tendiculas tuas egredior, ut dicam prouidentiam falli non posse, rem tamen quae prouisa est, posse non euenire. Sed quid inferre consueueris scio. Ergo possibile est eam non esse praeuisam. Esto, inquam. Quo ultra progrederis? Ergo, inquis, reclamante philosophia, et quod est non esse, et quod fuit possibile est non fuisse, et quae iam praeterierunt, reuocari possunt ne fuerint. Equidem infinitam potentiam Dei scientiolae et ratiunculae meae legibus non eoarto; nec ei finem, quem non habet, impono. Scio enim quia omnia potest; sed tamen quia mendose colligis patenter uideo.
Primo quia diuinae maiestatis immensitatem paruitatis humanae modulo circumscribis, et etemitatis immutabilem statum labentium rerum imagine et succedentium sibi temponmi uarietate distinguis. Sed longe secus esse hic, atque in his ex praecedentibus oportuit concipi, cum etemitatis statum nuUus omnino motus attingat, et creatura quaelibet accessu uel decessu accidentium moueatur. Homo siquidem si quid prouidet futurorum, statim mentem eius quidam motus aggreditur, ut animus quadam applicatione sui ad aliud apud se futuri operis speciem pra figuret, eandemque plerumque nunc quasi in archiuis memoriae depositam reponit, nunc quasi in speculo natiuae puritatis replicat et reuoluit. Facilius enim est motum hunc ab animo omnino deficere quam contemplatione iugi animo inherere. Et quidem hic motus, si non prouidentia est, aut prouidentiam parit aut ei cuiuscumque federis notitia uicinatur. Cum uero motus praecedens et ex ea concepta species futuri operis sequela frustratur, inanis est agitatio mentis, et quasi umbra in sompnis sine ueritatis corpore euanescit. Motus tamen, quia reipsa fuit in ajiima, non potest non fuisse in anima, et anima, quae motus agitatione mota est, non mota non fuisse non potest. Porro diuinae simplicitatis status a longe alia conditio est.
Ea siquidem imo simplici et indiuiduo aspectu, ut praedictimi est, quae sunt, quae fuerunt, et quae futura sunt, omnia contemplatur, nulloque rerum mutabilium lapsu mouetur, sed in seipsa semel et simul contuens uniuersa subsistit inuariabihs, stabilisque manens dat cuncta moueri. Et licet ei interdum praeteriti temporis aut futuri uerba aptentur, non ei quicquam ex hoc subtrahi uel impendere, sed rerum subiectarum mutabilitas, si quid proprie dicitur, ueraciter indicatur. Cum ergo ipsum aliquid praenouisse audimus, minime intelligimus fluxu temporis eius praeteriisse scientiam, sed (si uerborum naturam sequimur) praecessisse tempus, quo ueraciter credatur eius quod futurum erat habuisse notitiam. Sic utique eum ab etemo certum est omnia prouidisse, non quod uisui eius motu suo quicquam subtrahat tempus, sed quia qui uniuerso tempore natnra prior est, suus omnia semper comprehendat aspectus. Eius ergo prouidentia in sui dispositione non fallitur, quia eam semper sequela operis comitatur. Sed nec falli potest, quia nec ex mutabiHtate rerum nec ex temporis fuga aut uersibilitate potest aliquid absconditum esse ab oculis eius. Hominis uero falli potest, et fallitur dispositio, et res, cuius apud se praefigurauit speciem, processu temporis aut omnino non euenit, aut in alia specie in publicum procedit. Nec tamen quaecumque praeteriti uerbi significatione clauduntur, rebus sunt aggreganda praeteritis.
Nec si me uixisse profitear florente Peripatetico Palatino, ideo michi uitam elapsam aut praeteritam esse confiteor. Aut si ab Arrianis Eugenio praesidente dissensi, non ob praeteriti temporis gratiam a fidei et confessionis illius integritate diuerti. Ceterum, quia quandoque uerum fuit dicere, Nunc uiuo, Sic sentio, eleganter et uere fateor in sequentibus quia Tunc uixi, et Sic sensi, nec tamen uitam praeteriisse uel sensum. Scio tamen quis dixerit quia in hoc erramus, quod mortem prospicimus; magna pars eius iam praeteriit; quicquid etatis retro est, mors tenet. Sed certe si ei semel fuisset uita elapsa, aut hoc omnino non diceret aut diceret rediuiuus. Non est ergo necesse praeteriisse quiequid praeteriti temporis significatur uerbo, et licet praedestinati sint multi, non ideo qua electi sunt praeteriit praedestinatio. Et quamuis non praedestinati esse possint, poterit aliquid quod praeteritum sit ne praeterierit reuocari. Nota siquidem praedestinationis, quocumque uerbi casu utaris, quantum in eo est, futurum quam praeteritum potius signat, et eum de quo dicitur, nisi iam fore euaserit, indicat esse saluandum.
Est enim, ut dici solet, uerbum fecundum, et in se semper uerbi alterius intelligentiam claudit. Non itaque motum aliquem praedestinanti ingerit, sed ei qui saluandus est, primitiua disponentis Dei gratia, patere asserit ostium salutis et ianuam misericordiae, qua procedente tempore. possit saluari, immo saluabitur, licet possit et non saluari. Nec michi illud Aristotilis tui obicias, quia fuisse quod fuit et esse quod est, quando est, necesse est; ut colligas enuntiationes, quae praeteriti temporis habent copulam, ueras esse praecise uel praecise et ex necessitate falsas. Minime namque hac obiectione iuuaberis, cum et ipsa Aristotilis uerba faciant quaestionem, et articulo discutiendo nullum aut paruum ferant sufiragium. Regulae siquidem integritatem subuertunt enimtiationes, quae praeteritis uim futuri contingentis adiungunt; puta uerum fuit heri te cras esse lecturum, aut te Plato quandoque sciuit dormiturum. In quibus ex adiunctione futuri praeteriti temporis fides uacillat. Dum enim tu poteris non dormire, et hoc Plato poterit nesciuisse, non quod motus, qui in anima eius fuit, non fuisse possit, sed quod quae fuit scientia mutabilitate rerum et temporis lubrico in opinionem poterit deuocari.
Si tamen contingentium futurorum ulla potest esse scientia, quamuis sit indubitata opinio, quae scientiam probabiliter imitatur; item quod heri uerum fuisse praediximus, non fuisse poterit uerum, non quod res praeterita reuocetur, quae in eo nulla praeteriit, sed quod res futura expeetatur, quae ab insidiis fortunae pendet ut sit. Deinde tu ipse potes prouidisse aliquod bonum, quod forte futurum est bonum, et potest non fore bonum; et idem potes non prouidisse bonum, non quia possis non prouidisse quod prouidisti, sed quia potest non bonum esse quod prouidisti. Item potes quid promisisse uel stipulatus esse utiliter, idemque potes non promisisse, aut non stipulatus esse utiliter; quod tamen promisisti uel stipulatus es, non promisisse aut non stipulatus esse non potes. Praeterea, tu in fundum Sempronianum illum qui te sequitur praeeessisti; et si alium praeeessisti, te alius aut secutus est aut sequitur aut sequetur. Cum ergo consequentis euacuari possit euentus, antecedentis quoque ueritas potest infirmari, ut et tu qui praecesseras non praecessisse possis. Quo tamen ingressus es, non potes non fuisse ingressus, neque quod factum est connumerari potest infectis, neque quod praed teriit, ne fuerit, poterit reuocari. In his enim omnibus quae mente concepta uel uerbis expressa uel actu completa transierunt, non possunt nec poterunt exinde non fuisse, etsi qualia futura erant, dum eadem sui natura certus non fixit euentus, ualeant non fuisse. Talium uero clauduntur ambitu omnia, quae cuiuscumque generis imminentis appellatione clauduntur, licet familiarius ad quantitatem aut ad aliquid aut ad quodlibet aliorum naturaliter applicentur.
Quid ergo mirum, si ille qui omnia potest, et quae praeuidit, non praeuidisse potest? cum constet fidei quod ea quae praeuisa sunt non euenire possunt, et quae non praeuisa sunt euenire, nec tamen citra conspectum prouidentiae ualeant euenire. Ait enim Ysaias: Si uolueritis ambulare in praeceptis meis et audieritis me, a bona terrae comedetis; quod si nolueritis, et me ad iracundiam concitaueritis, gladius deuorabit uos, quia os Domini locutum est. Ecce quia liberum hic seruatur II, fundum Sempronianum: exemplum apud iurisconsultos arbitrium, dum 'si uolueritis' et si nolueritis' dicens in utramque partem non ex iudicio irretractabili fatoue Dei sed ex merito singulorum omnibus penam uel praemiura repromittit. Esset utique in uolunt-atem collata conditio promerendi inutilis, si faciendi uel non faciendi necessitas esset prouidentiae uel fatorum nexibus illigata. Quod si istud non sufficit contentiosis, an non ex euangelico testimonio poterat in passione Filius rogare Patrem suum ut exhiberet ei plusquam duodecim legiones angelorum, cum tamen liqueat ex post facto non hoc, sed oppositum eius, quod contigit, fuisse prouisum. Nec perspicacioris ingenii moueat sensum, si in tantae maiestatis scrutinio exemplis deficimus, nec rationibus habundamus, cum admirationem ratio tollat et exemplorum inductio singularitatem excludat. Ipsa uero ineffabili singularitate mirabilis et mirabili immensitate singularis omnem sensum exuperat non modo hominum sed angelorum.
Scio equidem quia scrutator maiestatis opprimetur a gloria, et ex edicto Altissimi bestiam, si montem tetigerit, lapidibus obruendam. Vnde quae in talibus praeponuntur, sine praeiudicio meliorum inuestigantis animo potius dicta sunt quam temeraria contentione ad impugnationem ueri aliquid statuentis. Sed nec illud me scire confiteor, cur hoc reprobato alium praeelegerit, nisi quod cum patribus sentio in illo occultam Dei iustitiam uenerandam, in hoc manifestam gratiae misericordiam amplectendam. Nam et ille, qui raptus ad tertium celum audiuit archana uerba, quae non licet homini loqui, huius difficultatis articulum non tam discutiens quam admirans altitudinem diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei confessione humili ueneratus iudicia eius incomprehensibilia et uias imperuestigabiles esse pronuntiat. Incerta et occulta sapientiae Dei, qui sibi manifestata esse congratulatur, opera eius supra sensum hominis magnifieata asserit et, dum scrutatur omnia, cogitationes Altissimi nimis profundas agnoscit. Huic ueritati consonat quod in Ecelesiaste sanctus Salomon in auditu fidelium concionatur: Est homo qui diebus et noctibus non capit oculis sompnum, et intellexi quodomnium operum Dei nuUam inuenire possit homo rationem eorum quae sunt sub sole. Et quanto plus laborauerit ad quaerendum, tanto minus inueniet; etiamsi dixerit sapiens se nosse, non poterit reperire. Si ergo inueniri non potest ratio subsolarium, quis plene suprasolarium redditurus est rationem?
Quis enim cognouit sensum Domini, aut quis prouidentiae non impletur effectus, quod futurum est et non euenire potest, potest etiam non fuisse praeuisum. Non tamen, ut praedictum est, inuestigationis audacia omnipotentiam minuo aut immensitati eius quamcumque praescribo mensuram. Hoc autem cum multis sentio, quia si quid Deus praeuidit, eueniet; et si non euenerit, non praeuidit. Vnde probabiliter ad minus colligitur quia, si potest non euenire, potest etiam non fuisse praeuisum. Quid enim ex quo ueraciter consequatur, ipsa ueritas nouit, iuncturamque rationum plene et perfecte primitiua ratio pensat. Hanc autem humano generi indulget Academia antiqua licentiam ut, quicquid unicuique probabile occurrit, suo iure defendat. Solebat nostri temporis Peripateticus Palatinus omuibus his conditionibus obuiare, ubi non sequentis intellectum antecedentis conceptio claudit, aut non antecedentis contrarium consequentis destructoria ponit, eo quod omnes necessariam tenere consequentiam uelint, etsi nonnuUae sola dum tamen magna sint probabilitate contentae. Sicut enim scientiae assistit euidentior pro sui perspicuitate opinio, sic et singula quo probabiliora sunt, eo necessariorum fideliorem imaginem praeferunt.
Et ne me solius opinionis lubrico fluctuare putes, auctorem quo me tueor magnum profero Augustinum, qui locum illum exponens Euangelii, ubi de multis mansionibus, quae in domo Patris sunt, a Saluatore fit mentio, ait: Si quo minus dixissem uobis, quia uado parare uobis locum, id est, si non essent praedestinati, dixissem, ibo et praedestinabo. Diuersitatem etenim nmnsionum quae in domo patris electis suis praeparatae sunt, diuinae praedestinationi coaptat, quae saluandis pro bene placito disponentis parit diuersa carismata gratiarum et munerum. Cum ergo tantus pater hunc apprehenderit interpretationis sensum, ut dixerit, Si non essent praedestinati, dixissem uobis, ibo et praedestinabo, credibile est dum rerum pendet euentus, si Omnipotenti placeat, eos qui nondum praedestinati sunt, posse praedestinari ad uitam, et qui iam scripti sunt in libro uitae, exigentibus meritis ab eodem a posse deleri. Hinc est forte: Deleantur de libro uiuentium, et cum iustis non scribantur. Itemque: Aut dimitte eis hanc noxam, aut dele me de libro tuo quem scripsisti. Qui natus est, inquit Euangelista, ex Deo, non peccat, quoniam generatio celestis seruat eum. Generatio utique celestis est eterna praedestinatio, cuius omnes filii ingrediuntur ad uitam, etsi possibile sit eosdem praeuaricationis merito a iustitia, quae uia uitae est, aberrare. Si mihi non credis, audi uel illum, cui si angelus de celo contradixerit, dignissimo anathemate condempnabitur.
Pater, inquit, ex eis quos dedisti mihi non perdidi quemb quam, sed serua eos. Nonne quaeso iam illos perdiderat, qui retrorsum abierant? Nonne etiam quodammodo iam ludam perdiderat? Sed certe non acceptauerat eum in archano consilii Filius, nec Pater seruandum inter conscriptos Filio dederat illum, qui non fuerat praedestinatus ad uitam. Si uero alii praeordinati erant, si labi non poterant, quare pro eis tanta sedulitate Filius intercedit? Saluandi ergo erant; et tamen dum peregrinabantur a Domino mortem poterant promereri, ad uitam nulla necessitate praedestinationis artati. Gloriatur quis quod eum nichil separabit a caritate Christi, et tamen castigat corpus suum et in seruitutem redigit, ne forte cum aliis praedicauerit, ipse reprobus inueniatur. In Apocalipsi quoque monentur angeli ecclesiarum nunc agere penitentiam et prima opera facere ne moueatur candelabrum eorum, nunc tenere locum suum ne eundem alteri cedant.
Cur ita, si quae futura erant mutari non poteranf? Haec quoque sententia nec gentilium philosophos latuit, qui fatorum seriem dicunt immobilem, non quia moueri non possit, sed quia moueri omnino non contingit. Hinc est iliud: Exire a mediis potuit Pharsalia fatis. Itemque poeticum, quo senex Camotensis in angustiis fortunae frequentius utebatur: Fata uiam inuenient: et cetera. Quae uero elapsa sunt, et secundo dispositionis effectu completa, naturaliter quidem non possunt non fuisse; licet nichil asserere in alterutro audeam in iniuriam disponentis. Ait tamen doctorum doctissimus (leronimum loquor): Audenter loquar, licet Deus omnia possit, uirginem tamen post ruinam suscitare non potest; potest tamen coronare corruptam. Et quidem diffinitionem uirginis eodem interpretante Apostolus ponit, ut sit uirgo quae sancta est corpore et spiritu. Sed proculdubio Deus et sanctificare animam uirtutibus et carnem potest redintegrare corruptam, ut tota substantia sui uideri possit, quae ceciderat, suscitata.
Quod si oratorio tropo usus intellexit quae fuerunt non posse non fuisse, non necesse fuit ad uirginem prostratam recurrere, cum in praeteritis omnibus simili sententia uel errore hoc idem potuerit inueniri. Sententiam uero ab errore scienter diuido, eo quod sententia a semper habere debet ueritatis significationem, Sicut apud sanctum lob inuenis: Quis est iste inuoluens sententias sermonibus imperitis? Sed forte uirginitas aliquis gradus est, quem impossibile est a quacumque corrupta apprehendi. Quod autem possibile dicitur, interdum ad facilitatem quae singulis inest uel ex fortunae calculo uel ex aptitudine dispositionis refertur, quandoque ad ipsam rerum naturam respicit, nunc ad fontem omnium diuinam reflectitur maiestatem, a qua omnis non modo personarum potentatus sed rerum omnium, quae uideri uel cogitari possunt, potestas est. Hinc illud Salomonis: Omnis potestas a Domino Deo est. Aduersus hanc nuUa me umquam contumacia erigam, certus quia ipsa sola est, quae potest animam et corpus mittere in gehennam.
Scripture echoes
- ↩Job.38.2 — Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge?
- ↩Rom.13.1 — Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except by God, and the authorities that exist have been appointed by God.
- ↩Matt.10.28 — And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather, fear the one who can destroy both soul and body in Gehenna.
Policraticus companion
Study the argument weekly; pray the tradition daily
Pair the outline with the Chosen Portion app, which serves short daily portions from the same royal devotional tradition — free on iOS.
John of Salisbury argued that rulers must keep the law of God before their eyes daily; Chosen Portion gives modern readers that same daily discipline in five minutes a morning.
- 8 weeks, one book per week, with the 3-4 key chapters flagged in each
- Discussion questions usable for a reading group from week one
- A daily 5-minute companion portion in the app alongside your weekly study