An posdnt a Deo sciri quae non sciurdur ; et
The Immutability of Divine Knowledge
The author argues that God's knowledge remains fixed and immutable, even when the objects of that knowledge are subject to change.
The mutability of things shouldn't be attributed to Him at all; the same applies to knowledge, foreknowledge, disposition, providence, and predestination. It's true that these are infinite, so their number can neither be increased nor diminished, and providence doesn't impose necessity upon things. But look, the horns of another difficulty are emerging, and wherever I turn, I seem to be caught in error. For if things that do not exist and will not exist can nevertheless be, then surely God can know what He does not know, or something can happen without His knowledge. A naval battle that won't happen can be known by those who would fight it, just as it can be known that it won't happen. If this can certainly both exist and be known by a human, can it not be known by God? If, therefore, God can know what He does not know, He could certainly also not know what He does know, because there can be no simultaneous knowledge of contradictory things, since one of them is always subject to falsehood, as it lacks the substance of truth. Furthermore, there is no knowledge of lies. How, then, is knowledge immutable if things can be added to it or taken away, and if it can ignore what it knows or know what it doesn't know? But if we accept that He is changeable—as James would protest—then variation and the shadow of turning already exist in Him, and He ceases to be the Father of lights if what He foreknew slips away. Indeed, not even the errors of the pagans regarding their gods—or rather, their demons—would admit this, for they denied that the Stygian marsh was passable to the gods, claiming it was to be revered by all and was in every way forbidden to the heavenly beings. For forgetfulness does not touch the minds of the heavenly beings. Could faith, therefore, accept what even perfidy itself abhors regarding God? It is agreed by all, however, that God knows that a thing will not happen, even if many do not accept that He can know—or cannot know—that it will happen, lest they seem to brand Him with the mark of changeability or powerlessness. But suppose that God—since many accept this—could know what He does not know (provided you don't err in your phrasing or logic); no one proves Him changeable on this account, for nothing is added to or taken away from His knowledge, since it only happens to be true in the nature of things that which He fixed from the beginning at the point of His own stability. Yet while this is accepted, one must take the most careful precautions so that the connection of terms that Apollonius introduces doesn't bring in any perfidy or falsehood. This very possibility of happening is rightly ascribed not to the fickleness of Him who does not move, but to the ease of things that, by their nature, can move without indignation. The integrity of God's knowledge remains entirely immovable; and if there is any change in anything, it is not so much a change in the Knower as it is a change in the things known. For although the things that God's knowledge embraces are subject to change, He Himself is unaware of the shifts of alteration, and with one singular and individual gaze, He closes and contains the totality of all things that can be spoken of or thought of in any sense; indeed, He comprehends them so uniformly without motion—local things without place, things being born without a beginning, things dying without an end, fluctuating things without alteration, temporal things without mutability and motion—that for Him, neither do past things pass away nor do future things succeed them. This is no wonder in the state of eternity, except that everything there is wonderful, since even in us, the mind's gaze—while resting to some extent—comprehends the motion of mutable things and the course of those that are hastening. The intellect also contemplates a great thing without stretching or contracting itself, and it contemplates a small thing as well. It needs no place to contain local things, nor intervals of space to embrace distance. In this, it follows the Father of lights, though not with equal steps, since the intellect is subject to many motions, while He is subject to none at all. When, however, the gaze of divine simplicity embraces innumerable things, the substance of the One who foreknows is only one and individual, and essentially one to Him, since for Him, to be and to be wise are the same. Otherwise, let anyone imagine who has joined these diverse things together; it will not be the first cause of all things, which, in order to exist, needs the support of a joining. The knowledge of a creature, however, is of a far different condition. For the spirit and the soul, to be and to be knowing are not the same, since the soul is disposed toward the knowledge of things by the first motion of affection. If that knowledge has been rooted in such a way that it cannot be torn away either entirely or without injury to nature, it informs the soul with its habit and makes it knowing.
The Unity and Multiplicity of Wisdom
Divine wisdom is simple and singular in its essence, yet it encompasses an infinite variety of truths and works.
This habit is most accurately called knowledge, although the things themselves are sometimes referred to by the name of knowledge. As a result, names are often swapped back and forth, and what belongs to one passes to the other. In this way, knowledge is indeed called 'many,' even though that multitude belongs more to the things themselves than to knowledge. If, therefore, we consider the immensity and simplicity of God's wisdom, it is one, simple, and indivisible; but if we look at the multitude of things subject to it, it is manifold and multiform. Likewise, if you consider the substance of the One who wills or the One who has the power to do what He wills, His will and power are one. If you consider what He wills and what He can do, the number of all things is infinite; as the prophetic word says: 'Great is the Lord, and great is His power, and of His wisdom there is no number.' And again: 'Great are the works of the Lord, exquisite in all His purposes.' And that other word: 'Who shall declare the mighty acts of the Lord?' This reality, however, is both uniform and varied; though it is unaware of the whole of that variety, it is still called by various names, but for various reasons. It is named knowledge, indeed, as well as foreknowledge, disposition, providence, and predestination. It is the knowledge of things that exist, the foreknowledge of things to come, the disposition of things to be done, the providence of things to be governed, and the predestination of those to be saved. Predestination is the eternal preparation of grace, by which everyone is called to life, just as the Apostle says: 'Those whom he predestined, he also called; and those whom he called, he also justified; and those whom he justified, he also glorified.' And another says: 'With you,' he says, 'is the fountain of life, and in your light we shall see light.' So that we may, with a certain reverent boldness, find an end to the knowledge of God—which knows no end—or at least find an end in our speech; the knowledge of God is the true comprehension and full awareness of all things that are, have been, and are to be. For it knows all true things, and it alone knows them, and it deigns to acknowledge no falsehood. Yet it judges and condemns it. Therefore, it is necessarily infinite, encompassing all that is true, of which there is no number, or so infinite that it cannot find an end except in the wisdom of God, which alone knows how great it is. Nothing that it knows vanishes, since all its knowledge is true; everything that is ordered, whether past, present, or future, is true. The psalmist indeed says: "The beginning of your words is truth; they will pass away without any defect of their own."✦ Yet heaven and earth will pass away, because this is also true of the words of truth; then, when the deformity of the world is purified, a new heaven and a new earth will be restored. Let everyone feel that faith or reason persuades them; I, without prejudice to a better opinion, consider that the truth is infinite in every way, since in all things that are and that are not, it must either necessarily be or not be from the beginning, and of those things that are opposed, one must always necessarily be true. Therefore, due to such a multitude of truths, the number of truths cannot be diminished or increased, and it must remain infinite everywhere unless it is within the infinite wisdom of God. Thus, the knowledge that is unchanging is one from which nothing escapes, and it does not receive any increase, as it comprehends all things; but the reason for those things which God has ordered from eternity in wisdom, that is, in the only-begotten Word, creates all things there at once, which afterward it produces in works according to the prescribed order, bringing forth each thing from the generation by which they begin to exist, through the sort by which they seem to fluctuate in cases, to the corruption which, like a thread of existence, leads back to non-being. Hence, the Stoic believes that all things are necessary, fearing that immutable knowledge might be lost.
Providence Without Necessity
God's providence governs all things without imposing necessity, preserving the distinction between divine foreknowledge and human contingency.
Epicurus, on the other hand, thinks that nothing of what happens is arranged by the reason of providence, lest he perhaps introduce necessity into mutable things. They are both equally mistaken, as one subjects everything to chance, while the other subjects everything to necessity. The arrangement of changing things is therefore immutable; the unchangeable nature of eternal providence encompasses the entire course of all things that change. Yet, because it cannot be moved from its own eternal state, it frees the sequence of contingent events from any bond of necessity. And although the inaccessible light of God's wisdom is incomparably beyond the darkness of human knowledge, there is still a point where the eye of our limited understanding is, in a way, made equal to the clarity of that light. For just as something I see approaching will not happen out of necessity simply because I see it, it is not necessary for what His eye contemplates to happen. I know indeed that a stone or an arrow which I have thrown into the clouds will, by the requirement of nature, fall back to the earth toward which all weights are carried by their own impulse, yet it does not fall back to the earth simply, nor is it necessary that it fall back just because I know it will. It could either fall back or not; yet one or the other—even if not necessarily—is nonetheless true: specifically, that which I know will happen. For if a thing isn't going to happen, even if it's thought that it will, it isn't actually known; because regarding what doesn't exist, it's not knowledge but opinion. Furthermore, even if it cannot exist, nothing prevents there being knowledge of it—knowledge that belongs not only to necessary things but to anything that exists—unless, perhaps, you also agree with the Stoics that existing things should be compared to necessary ones. Likewise, everything He has foreseen will undoubtedly come to pass. Yet it's also possible for all contingent things not to happen. This is true to the extent that, regarding the things we foresee will happen with Him, they are constrained no more by His will than by our own, even though all things derive their form of existence from His providence, insofar as they are good. Other things, however, don't bear the image of a form of existence, but rather testify to a defect through the vice of their own enormity. Foreknowledge, therefore, isn't the cause of things happening, nor is the outcome of things the cause of His foreknowing them; otherwise, the movement of temporal things would be the cause of eternal providence, or the streams of evil would flow from the purest fountain of goodness. God, however, is the author only of good things. The common objection you hear everywhere—that if something is foreseen, it must necessarily happen—has no real truth to it, unless you argue that things are free from all necessity yet still force a logical structure upon them, so the truth of the statement depends more on the necessity of the conclusion than on the necessity of the event itself. You won't force me to say that just because created things are changeable, the knowledge of the One who disposes them is also changeable; for according to the mystery of Truth itself—I’m speaking of John, the son of thunder—it’s a matter of faith that, however unstable created things may be, 'what was made in Him was life, through whom all things were made.' His disposition, therefore, thrives and lives in such secure stability that it can't be shaken by any movement of things, nor can it be torn apart by any change of time or circumstance.
Read the original Latin
quod rerum mutabilitas ei nequaquam est infiigenda; et quod idem eat scieiitia, praescientia, dispositio, prouidentia, praededinatio; et quod uera infinUa sunt, ut numerus eorum lura queat augeri uel minui; et quod jyrouidentia nuUam necessitatem rebus inducit. Sed ecce iam alterius difficultatis succrescunt comua, et quocumque me uertam, errore uideor inuolutus. Si enim quae non suut nec erunt, esse possunt, profecto et Deus potest scire quod non scit, aut eo ignorante potest aliquid euenire. Bellum namque nauale quod non erit, sicut et geri, sic et a gerentibus sciri potest. Quod utique et esse et sciri potest ab homine, numquid a Deo sciri non potest? Si ergo potest Deus scire quod non scit, potest a utique et non scire quod scit, eo quod contraiacentium simul nulla possit esse scientia, cum alterum eorum semper, eo quod ueritatis substantia careat, sit obnoxium falsitati. Porro mendaciorum nulla scientia est. Quomodo ergo scientia immutabilis est, cui decessus rerum potest fieri et accessus, quae potest ignorare quod scit aut scire quod nescif?
Quod si eam uariabilem esse recipimus, lacobo reclamante, iam apud eum est uariatio et uicissitudinis obumbratio, et pater luminum esse desistit, si elabitur quod praenouit. Hoc equidem nec gentilium error circa sua non tam numina quam demonia dignabatur admittere, qui Stigiam paludem diis peruiam esse negabant, dicentes eam omnibus uenerandam et usquequaque illicitam a celestibus praeteriri. Mentes namque celestium obliuio non contingit. Numquid ergo fides recipiet quod de Deo et ipsa perfidia abhorret? Constat autem apud omnes quia Deus scit illud non esse futurum, etsi plerique non recipiant illum posse scire aut non posse scire hoc esse futurum, ne eum mutabilitatis nota uel impotentia inurere uideantur. Sed esto ut Deus, quoniam hoc plerique recipiunt, possit, dum tamen (si fieri potest) positione aut coniunctione non pecces, scire quod non scit, non ob hoc eum esse mutabilem quis conuincit, cuius scientiae non decedit aliquid uel accedit, cum illud solum in rerum natura uerum esse contingat, quod ille ab initio stabilitatis suae puncto praefixit. Dum tamen hoc recipitur, exactissima diligentia praecauendum est, ne cognatio modorum uerbi quam Apollonius inducit, quicquam perfidiae ingerat aut falsitatis. Haec ipsa quoque possibilitas eueniendi non leuitati illius qui non mouetur, sed rerum facilitati, quae natura non indignante moueri possunt, conuenienter ascribitur.
Manet itaque usquequaque immobilis integritas scientiae Dei, et si quid uarietatis alicui inest, non tam scientis quam scitorum mutabilitas est. Licet enim quae scientia Dei complectitur, mutabilitati subiaceant, ipsa tamen alterationis uices ignorat, et uno singulari aspectu et indiuiduo, omnium quae dici aut quocumque sensu excogitari possunt, uniuersitatem claudit et continet; adeo equidem sine motu ut localia sine loco, nascentia sine initio, decedentia sine fine, fluctuantia sine alteratione, temporalia sine mutabilitate et motu sic uniformiter comprehendit, ut ei nec praeterita transeant nec futura succedant. Nec mirum hoc in etemitatis statu, nisi quia quicquid ibi est, mirabile est, cum et in nobis mutabilium motum et festinantium cursum aliquatenus quiescens comprehendat aspectus. Intellectus quoque rem magnam sine distensione et sine contractione sui rem modicam contemplatur, nec loco indiget ut localia claudat aut spatiorum interstitiis ut distantia complectatur, in eoque patrem luminum sequitur sed non passibus aequis, cum hic multis ille uero omnino nulli motui obnoxius sit. Cum uero diuinae simplicitatis aspectus innumerabilia claudat, una tantum est et indiuidua substantia praescientis, eique essentialiter una, a cum sibi sit idem esse et sapientem esse. Alioquin fingat qui potest, quis haec diuersa coniunxerit, nec prima rerum omnium causa erit, quae, ut sit, coniunctionis adminiculo eget. Creaturae uero scientia longe disparis conditionis est. Spiritui siquidem et animae non est idem esse et scientem esse, cum anima primo affectionis motu in ualescens disponatur ad cognitionem rerum, eaque si radicata fuerit, ut aut omnino aut sine iniuria naturae conuelli non possit, habitu suo informat animam facitque scientem.
Hic ergo habitus rectissime scientia appellatur, licet et res subiectae interdum scientiae nomine censeantur. Vnde et uicissim nominibus mutuatis quod unius est transit ad alterum. Sic utique et scientia dicitur multa, cum tamen multitudo rerum potius quam scientiae sit. Si ergo sapientiae Dei immensitas et simplicitas attendatur, una est simplex et indiuidua; si subiacentium multitudo multiplex est et multiformis. Sic etiam si substantiam uolentis aut potentis qua uult aut potest attendas, una est uoluntas et potestas. Si quae uult et quae potest, infinitus omnium numerus est; iuxta iUud propheticum: Magnus Dominus (uel motu) et magna uirtus eius, et sapientiae eius non est numerus. Itemque:' Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius. Et illud: Quis loquetur potentias Domini?
Haec autem res uniformis et uaria, licet totius uarietatis ignara sit, uariis tamen nominibus appellatur, sed ex uariis causis. Scientia siquidem et praescientia, dispositio, prouidentia, et praedestinatio nominatur. Sed scientia existentium, praescientia futurorum, dispositio faciendorum, prouidentia gubernandorum, praedestinatio saluandorum est. Et est praedestinatio ab eterno gratiae praeparatio, per quam unusquisque uocatur ad uitam, sicut ait Apostolus: Quos praedestinauit, hos et uocauit, hos et iustificauit, hos et glorificauit. Et alius: Apud te est, inquit, fons uitae, et in lumine tuo uidebimus lumen. Vt ergo reuerenti quadam audacia scientia Dei quae finem nescit, uel sermone finem inueniat; scientia Dei est omnium, quae sunt, fuerunt, et futura sunt, uera comprehensio et plena notitia. Omnia siquidem uera nouit et sola, nullamque dignatur agnoscere falsitatem. Eam tamen diiudicat et condempnat.
Est igitur necessario infinita, quae uniuersa uera complectitur, quorum utique non est numerus, aut adeo infinitus ut finem non inueniat nisi in sapientia Dei, quae sola seipsam quanta sit nouit. Nichil igitur eorum quae nouit, quoniam uera sunt, euanescit, omniumque dispositorum, praesentia sint praeterita an futura, initium et causa ueritas est. Psalmista siquidem ait: Principium uerborum tuorum ueritas; quae nullo defectu sui transibunt. Transibunt tamen celura et terra, quoniam et hoc de uerbis ueritatis a est; tunc utique cum deformitate mundi purgata reformabitur celum nouum et terra noua. Sentiat unusquisque quod ei fides uel ratio persuadet; ego sine praeiudicio sententiae melioris uera modis omnibus arbitror infinita, cum in omnibus, quae sunfc et quae non sunt, ab initio esse necesse sit uel non esse, et eorum quae contradicfcoriae opponunfcur alterum semper ex necessitate sit uerum. Tanta ergo numerositate semel et simul uerorum excreuifc aufc pofcius exfcifcit numerus, ut omnino minui nequeat uel augeri, et usquequaque in euum maneat infinitus nisi apud infinitam sapientiam Dei. Indeficiens ergo scientia est cui nichil eorum elabitur, et omnino augmentum non recipit quae ea omnia comprehendit, Rationem uero eorum, quae Deus ab eterno in sapientia, id est in unigenito Verbo, disposuit, creans ibi omnia simul, quam postmodum consequenter producit in opera secundum prouisum ordinem singula traducens a generatione, qua incipiunt esse, per sortem qua fluctuare uidentur casibus, ad corruptionem quae quasi existendi filum praescidens retrudit ad non esse, Parcas uel Fata antiquis placuit appellari, eo quod constitutiones prouidentiae Dei, quin efiectui mancipentur, nemini parcant, et a Verbo Dei, quo etemaliter omnia dixit et facta sunt, executionis firmamentum accipiant. Vnde Stoicus omnia necessaria credit, timens euacuari posse scientiam immutabilem.
E contra Epicurus eorum quae eueniunt nichil prouidentiae ratione dispositum, ne forte necessitatem mutabilibus rebus inducat, opinatur. Pari ergo errore desipiunt, cum alter casui alter necessitati uniuersa subiciat. Mutabilium igitur rerum dispositio immutabilis est; et etemae prouidentiae immutabilis status omnium mutabilium continet cursum. Cum uero ipsa ab etemitatis suae statu moueri non possit, contingentium seriem ab omni nexu necessitatis absoluit. Et licet lux inaccessibiKs sapientiae Dei humanae scientiae tenebras incomparabiliter antecedat, est tamen in quo claritati illius caliginis nostrae oculus quod ad aliquid coaequatur. Sicut enim quod uideo imminere, nuUa ex eo quia uidetur necessitate proueniet, sic et quod illius oculus contemplatur non est necessarium euenire. Scio equidem lapidem uel sagittam, quam in nubes iaculatus sum, exigente natura recasuram in terram, in quam feruntur omnia nutu suo pondera, nec tamen simpliciter recidere in terram aut, quia noui, recidere necesse est. Potest enim recidere et non recidere; alterum tamen, etsi non necessario, uerum tamen est; illud utique quod scio futurum.
Si enim futurum non est, etsi fore putetur, non scitur tamen, quoniam illius quod non est, non scientia sed opinio est. Ceterum etsi non esse possit, nichil impedit esse scientiam, quae non necessariorum tantum sed quorumlibet existentium est, nisi forte et tu cum Stoicis existentia censeas necessariis comparanda. Sic et quae ille praenouit, omnia proculdubio implebuntur. Contingentia tamen omnia et non euenire possibile est. Adeo quidem ut ad eUeniena dum res, quas cum eo futuras praenouimus, non magis ipsius quam noster uisue astringat, licet ab illius dispositione subsistendi formam omnia sortiantur, quatenus bona sunt. Alias autem non formae existendi imaginem gerunt, sed defectum illius enormitatis suae uitio protestantur. Praescientia ergo rebus causa eueniendi non est, aut euentus rerum ei causa est praesciendi, ne aut temporalium motus etemae prouidentiae causa sit, aut a purissimo fonte bonitatis malorum profluant riuuli. Deus uero bonorum dumtaxat auctor est.
Quod uero in compitis uulgo obicitur, quia necessario si quid praescitur eueniet, nullo ueritatis robore subnixum est, nisi forte rebus ab omni necessitate absolutis modum complexioni quis tribuat, ut potius necessitate consequendi quam consequentis propositae enuntiationis ueritas constet. Nec me artabis, ut licet dispositarum rerura mutabilem fatear esse naturam, scientiam disponentis ob hoc dicam esse mutabilem; cum secundum ipsius ueritatis archanum (lohannem filium tonitrui loquor) fidei constet quia, quantacumque sit labiHtas subiectorum, quod factum est in eo uita erat, per quem facta sunt uniuersa. Eius itaque dispositio tanta suae stabilitatis incolumitate uiget et uiuit, ut nullo rerum motu concuti, nulla possit temporis aut casus mutabilitate conuelli.
Scripture echoes
- ↩Ps.119.160 — The sum of your word is truth, and every one of your righteous judgments endures forever.
Policraticus companion
Study the argument weekly; pray the tradition daily
Pair the outline with the Chosen Portion app, which serves short daily portions from the same royal devotional tradition — free on iOS.
John of Salisbury argued that rulers must keep the law of God before their eyes daily; Chosen Portion gives modern readers that same daily discipline in five minutes a morning.
- 8 weeks, one book per week, with the 3-4 key chapters flagged in each
- Discussion questions usable for a reading group from week one
- A daily 5-minute companion portion in the app alongside your weekly study