Liber III, Pars II — Quod non cuiuslibet est ferre leges, et quod vi leges vim obliganda habeant oportet eas promulgatas esse. Cap. XXVII.
Liber III, Pars II — Quod non cuiuslibet est ferre leges, et quod vi leges vim obliganda habeant oportet eas promulgatas esse. Cap. XXVII.
Laws (as is clear from what has been stated) are certain rules of action that guide us toward the common good and have a coercive power. Therefore, we can pursue this in two ways: it is not for just anyone to create laws. The first way is derived from the fact that laws direct us toward the common good. The second way is based on the fact that they have coercive power. This first way is clear, for whoever has the authority to order and direct others toward some good has the right to create laws and rules of action according to which we aim for that good: therefore, since the common good is primarily intended by the whole community, whether by the entire people or by a leader who must be a common person, all laws that guide us toward the common good must be established by the prince who has the authority to order and direct others toward such good, or they must be established by the whole people if the entire populace is in charge and has the power to choose a leader. Therefore, there is no law that is not enacted by the one whose role it is to direct toward the common good; for if it is a divine and natural law, it is established by God, who directs everything toward Himself, who is the ultimate common good, as He is the good of all good things; but human and positive law is established by a prince or by the whole people if the entire populace is in charge; for a prince or the whole people, when they are in charge, have the authority to direct and order others toward the common good. The second way to investigate this same matter is derived from the fact that laws have coercive power. For anyone from the people can move and persuade another to do good, but such admonitions and persuasions are not called laws, because they have no coercive power. By extending the name of law, any mandates and any admonitions can be called laws. According to the way of speaking (as the Philosopher states), the Philosopher.) Thus, since the safety of the kingdom and the city depends on laws that are just and right, it is fitting for kings and rulers to be very concerned about what laws they impose on the people they govern. After they have devised the laws to be imposed, in order for such laws to have the power to bind, they must be promulgated and observed, as the Philosopher states. There should be a twofold concern regarding laws: first, that the laws are well established; second, that they are well kept, or (which is the same) that obedience is given to the laws that have been established well. It is clear that it is not for just anyone to create laws; it can be seen that a law does not have the power to bind unless it is promulgated. For since a law is a certain mandate of a superior, by which we are bound and regulated in our actions: because a superior's mandate does not bind unless it has reached or can reach the knowledge of those subject to it, in order for a law to have the power to bind, it must be promulgated. But since there is one natural law and another positive law, these are proclaimed in different ways. For the natural law is instilled by God in our hearts; therefore, it is proclaimed and made known in every person when they begin to use reason, through which they understand what should be followed and what should be avoided, according to what pertains to natural law. But human law is proclaimed when it is presented externally and recorded in writing. Therefore, when laws are established, if they are just and right and determined by natural laws, the safety of the kingdom and the city should be ensured; it is fitting for kings and princes to be greatly concerned about which laws they impose on the people they govern. And after they have devised laws to be imposed, so that such laws may have the force of obligation, they must promulgate them and ensure they are observed: because according to the Philosopher. In political matters concerning laws, there should be a twofold concern: first, that laws are well established; second, that they are well maintained, or (which is the same) that the laws so established are obeyed.
Read the original Latin
Leges (ut patet per habita) sunt quaedam regulae agibilium, ordinantes nos in commune bonum, habentes coactivam potentiam. Duplici ergo via venari possumus, quod non cuiuslibet est leges condere. Prima via sumitur ex eo quod leges nos ordinant ad commune bonum. Secundo ex eo quod habent potentiam coactivam. Prima via sic patet, nam cuius est ordinare et dirigere aliquos in aliquod bonum, eiusdem est condere leges, et regulas agibilium secundum quas intendimus in bonum illud: quare cum bonum commune principaliter intendatur a tota communitate ut a toto populo, vel a principante, quae debet esse persona communis: omnes leges, quae ordinant nos in commune bonum, condendae sunt a principe cuius est ordinare et dirigere alios in tale bonum, vel condendae sunt a toto populo, si totus populus principetur, et sit in potestate eius eligere principantem: Nulla est ergo lex, quae non sit edita ab eo cuius est dirigere in bonum commune: nam si est lex divina et naturalis, condita est a Deo cuius est omnia dirigere in seipsum, qui maxime est commune bonum, quia est bonum omnis boni, lex vero humana et positiva condita est a principe, vel a toto populo, si totus populus principetur; princeps enim aut totus populus cum principatur, habet dirigere et ordinare alios in commune bonum. Quaelibet ergo persona particularis, quae est pars multitudinis alicuius, debet esse observativa legum, sed non cuiuslibet est leges condere. Secunda via ad investigandum hoc idem, sumitur ex eo quod leges coactivam habent potentiam. Potest enim quilibet ex populo movere et persuadere alteri ut bene agat, sed huiusmodi monitiones et persuasiones non dicuntur leges, quia nihil habent coactivum.
Extendendo autem nomen legis, quaelibet mandata, et quaelibet monitiones leges dici possunt. Secundum quem modum loquendi (ut recitat Philosophus I. Politicor.) dicebat Homerus quod unusquisque statuit legis pueris et uxoribus: volebat enim Homerus quod monitiones et praecepta, quae facit paterfamilias uxori, filiis, et aliis existentibus in domo, leges nominari possent: sed hoc non est secundum propriam acceptionem legum; nam sicut una persona singularis ordinatur ad bonum domesticum, quod est bonum totalius et communius: sic bonum domesticum ordinatur ad bonum civile, et ad bonum regni, quod est etiam totalius et perfectius. Quare si a bono perfectiori quod magis habet rationem finis sumendae sunt leges et regulae agibilium, sequitur quod non a bono privato et domestico sed a bono quod intenditur in regno et civitate sumendae sunt leges et regulae agibilium. Immo quia vim agendi et potentiam exterminandi maleficos non habet proprie paterfamilias nec persona privata, sed princeps et persona publica, quae praeest regno aut civitati, aut alii multitudini, ideo leges habentes coactivam potentiam non sunt condendae nisi ab eo qui preaest ipsi multitudini, vel a multitudine, si tota huiusmodi multitudo principetur. Viso quod non est cuiuslibet leges condere, de levi potest patere legem non habere vim obligandi, nisi sit promulgata. Nam cum lex sit quoddam mandatum superioris, per quod ligamur et regulamur in agibilibus nostris: quia superioris mandatum non ligat nisi pervenerit vel pervenire potuerit ad notitiam subditorum, ad hoc quod lex habeat vim obligandi, oportet eam promulgatam esse.
Sed cum alia sit lex naturalis, alia positiva: aliter propalatur haec, aliter illa. Nam lex naturalis est a deo indita in cordibus nostris: ideo in quolibet homine haec promulgatur et propalatur, quando incipit habere rationis usum, per quam cognoscit quid sequendum et quid fugiendum, secundum quod haec pertinent ad ius naturale. Sed lex humana tunc promulgatur, quando exterius profertur, et prolata in scripto redigitur. Quare cum in legibus, si sint rectae et iustae et a legibus naturalibus determinatae, consistat salus regni et civitatis; decet reges et principes non modicum solicitari quas leges imponant populo cui dominantur. Et postquam excogitaverunt leges imponendas, ut huiusmodi leges vim obligandi habeant, debent eas promulgare, et promulgatas custodire et observaret: quia secundum Philosophum 4. Politicorum circa leges duplex cura esse debet: primo ut leges bene instituantur: secundo, ut bene custodiantur, vel (quod idem est) ut legibus sic institutis bene obediantur.
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