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Chapter 168GilesRP.1.168

Liber III, Pars II — Quales consiliarios assumere deceat regiam maiestatem. Cap. XVIII.

Liber III, Pars II — Quales consiliarios assumere deceat regiam maiestatem. Cap. XVIII.

A ruler should convincingly possess all those qualities that are necessary, and it is essential that he has good advisors. For from this, someone can persuade in councils and is believed in his words, because he is considered to be a good advisor for persuasion. But for someone to be considered trustworthy, it is not necessary for him to actually be such; it suffices that he is thought to be or appears to be such, for a person judges what is evident and based on appearances. Therefore, it is sufficient for a person to have faith, and he is regarded as trustworthy if he is thought to be a good advisor. However, for a good advisor to exist, it is not enough for him to merely appear to be such; it is required that he actually is such. Thus, it is rightly said that whoever is a good persuader must apparently possess the qualities of a good advisor. Therefore, if we want to know what kind of advisors the royal majesty should have, and what is required in councils: it is important to know in how many ways people are persuaded, or in how many ways they have faith, and are inclined to believe the words they hear. These are three things to consider in every discourse. That is, the speaker who is speaking, the listener to whom he is speaking, and the matter about which he is speaking. First, therefore, it can happen that the audience is persuaded, and they are inclined to believe the words they hear based on the speaker's part, which occurs if the speaker is good or is believed to be good. For good people, even if they can assign no reasons, are believed, and they create faith in their listeners; but this kind of faith takes its origin from the speaker's part, for because the speaker is believed to be good, since such people do not wish to lie, their words are easily believed. Secondly, the audience's credulity can arise from the part of the listeners themselves: this happens if the speaker of the words is kind and a friend. For it is common that people are generally deceived about themselves, believing they are worth more than they are, and that they are wiser than they are, and in matters to be done, people generally believe they see more than they do, and speak more to the point than they actually do. For as it is said in the first of the Rhetorics, we do not judge lovers and haters equally. It is common, indeed, that we often defer to the good deeds of friends for good, and to the bad deeds of enemies for evil. For we are passionate about friends just as we are about ourselves, so that we believe them to be worth more than they are, and to be better than they are. Therefore, if listeners believe that the speakers are kind and friendly, or if they think that those they consider friends are such, this kind of credulity arises from the listeners themselves, to whom the speech is directed, who are emotionally invested and inclined to have faith in those they think are friends. Thirdly, credulity can arise from the nature of the things being discussed. This happens if the speaker is wise or is believed to be wise. For it is the mark of a wise person to know and understand the matters at hand and the affairs that can be managed; because, as it is said in the first book of Ethics, everyone judges well about what they know: thus, from the very affairs and matters about which the wise person speaks, because they know how to understand and judge them, they instill faith in their listeners. This credulity and persuasion is in itself significant; for to present oneself as credible and to persuade well is based on the very matters and affairs about which one speaks, knowing how to take up reasons and arguments through which faith can be established in the listeners. Thus, since wise people know how to act, and those who are considered wise are thought to act accordingly, it follows that for someone to establish faith based on the matters they discuss, they must either be wise or be believed to be wise. Therefore, anyone who persuades well, or anyone whose words are trusted and to whom faith is given, must either be good, or a friend, or wise; and if they are not genuinely so, at least they should appear to be. Thus, since it is stated that anyone who persuades well, and the one to whom faith is given, should have an apparent quality, it is necessary that a good advisor must genuinely possess this quality: it is clear what kind of advisors the royal majesty should seek; for they must seek those who are good, friends, and wise. If they are good, they shouldn't lie for their own sake, because everything evil and detestable displeases good people; as it is said, lying is evil. Ethic. For lying is inherently evil and detestable. Secondly, advisors should not only be good but also friends, so that those who speak and offer counsel do not lie for their own sake. Moreover, they should also consider the person to whom they are speaking and to whom they are giving counsel, because it is the duty of friends to offer true and good advice. Thirdly, advisors should be wise, for they will not lie about the matters they discuss; they will understand the issues at hand and know how to act. Therefore, these three qualities should be sought in advisors: namely, goodness, friendship, and wisdom. For, in order to advise rightly, as is clear from what has been said, they must be good, and friends, and wise.

Read the original Latin

Omnia autem illa quae habere debet bene persuadens et bene creditivus apparenter, expedit ut habeat bonos consiliarios existenter. Nam ex hoc aliquis persuadet in consiliis et creditur dictis eius, quia existimatur bonus consiliarius esse ad persuadendum. Sed ad hoc quod aliquis sit bene creditivus, non oportet ipsum esse existenter talem, sed sufficit quod vodeatur vel appareat talis esse: nam homo iudicat quae foris patent, et ex apparentibus. Ideo sit sufficienter homini fides, et redditur ei aliquis creditivus, si exsistimet illum bonum consiliatorem esse. Sed ad hoc quod bonus consiliator existat, non sufficit quod sit apparenter talis, sed requiritur existenter talem esse. Bene igitur dictum est quod quicumque bene persuadens, habet apparenter, bonus consiliator existenter habere debet. Quare si scire volumus quales consiliarios habere deceat regiam maiestatem, et quae et quot sunt in consiliis requirenda: scire expedit quot modis persuadetur hominibus, vel quot modis sit eis fides, et inclinantur ad credendum sermones auditos. Haec autem sunt tria, secundum quod in omni locutione tria sunt consideranda.

videlicet dicentem qui loquitur, auditorem ad quem loquitur, et rem de qua loquatur. Primo ergo potest quod persuadetur auditoribus, et inclinatur ad credendum sermones auditos ex parte dicentis, quod contingit, si dicens si bonus, vel credatur bonus. Nam bonis hominibus etiam si nullas rationes assignare sciant, creditur eis, et faciunt fidem auditoribus: sed huiusmodi fides sumit originem ex parte dicentis; nam quia dicens creditur esse bonus, cum tales mentiri nolint, de facili creditur eorum dictis. Secundo potest fieri credulitas auditoribus ex parte ipsorum auditorum: quod contingit si proferens sermones sit benivolus et amicus. Nam sicut homines communiter et ut plurimum decipiuntur circa seipsos, et credant se plus valere quam valeant, et esse magis sapientes quam sint, et in negotiis fiendis communiter credunt homines plus videre quam videant, et magis loqui ad propositum quam loquantur: sic quia amicus reputatur alter ipse, communiter decipiunt homines circa amicos. Nam ut dicitur primo Rhetoricorum amantes et odientes non pariter iudicamus. Commune est enim ut amicorum facta ut plurimum deferamus in bonum, et inimicorum in malum. Passionamur enim circa amicos sicut circa nos ipsos, ut credamus eos plus valere quam valeant, et esse meliores quam sint.

Quare si audotores credunt benivolis et amicis, vel eis quos existimant tales esse, huiusmodi credulitas sumit originem ex parte ipsorum auditorum, ad quos est sermo, qui ex se passionantur, et inclinantur ut fidem adhibeant eis, quos putant amicos esse. Tertio sit credulitas ex parte ipsarum rerum. quod contingit, si dicens sit prudens vel credatur esse prudens. Nam prudentis est, scire et cognoscere ipsas res, et ipsa negocia agibilia: quia ut dicitur primo Ethicorum unusquisque bene iudicat de his quae novit: ex ipsis ergo negotiis et ex ipsis rebus de quibus loquitur prudens, quia ea scit cognoscere et iudicare, facit fidem autitoribus. Haec autem credulitas et haec persuasio est per se: nam reddere se credibilem et bene persuadere per se, est ex ipsis rebus, et ex ipsis negotiis de quibus loquitur scire assumere rationes et argumenta, per quae fides fiat audientibus. Et quia prudentes sciunt facere, et qui existimantur prudentes, existimantur talia facere: ideo ad hoc quod aliquis ex rebus de quibus loquitur fidem faciat, vel oportet quod sit prudens vel quod credatur esse prudens. Omnis ergo bene persuadens, vel omnis ille cuius dictis creditur et adhibetur fides, vel oportet quod sit bonus, vel quod amicus, vel quod prudens: et si non existenter, apparenter saltem. Itaque cum dictum sit quod qui bene persuadens, et ile cui fides adhibetur, debet habere apparenter, oportet quod bonus consiliator habeat existenter: satis apparet quales consiliatores deceat quaerere regiam maiestatem; quia debet quaerere tales sint boni, et amici, et sapientes.

Ut si boni sint, non mentiantur ratione sui, quia bonis displicet omne malum, et omne detestabile: mendacium autem ut dicitur 4. Ethic. per se est malum et detestabile. Secundo consiliarii debent esse non solum boni sed amici, ut non solum non mentiantur ratione sui qui loquuntur et qui consilium praebent. sed etiam ratione eius ad quem loquuntur et cui consilium praebent: quia amicorum est amicis vera et bona consulere. Tertio consiliarii debent esse sapientes, quia non mentientur ex parte rerum de quibus loquuntur; quia cognoscerent negocia agibilia, et scient qualiter sit agendum. Haec ergo tria quaerenda sunt in consiliariis: videlicet, bonitas, amicitia, et sapientia. Nam, ut recte consulant, sicut patet ex dictis, debent esse boni, et amici, et sapientes.

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