Liber II, Pars III — Quomodo reges et principes erga suos ministros debent se habere. Cap. XIX.

Liber II, Pars III — Quomodo reges et principes erga suos ministros debent se habere. Cap. XIX.

It has been shown what kind of ministers kings and princes should have, because they ought to be noble and courteous. For just as it is fitting for citizens to be just and lawful in fulfilling their civic duties, so it is fitting for the ministers of their lords to maintain the dignity of the court and the honor of their status; therefore, if we know what kind of ministers ought to be, it remains to show how kings and princes, and all those in authority, should conduct themselves toward them. The proper way to relate to them seems to consist of five points. First, that they be entrusted with their duties appropriately. Second, that they be duly attentive to the duties assigned to them. Third, that it be known how to interact with them. Fourth, how to communicate advice to them and how to reveal secrets. Fifth and finally, it is necessary to understand how to benefit them and how to bestow favors upon them. First of all, it seems necessary to establish a proper way of relating to them. For if a minister is to be appointed to any office or magistracy, he must be faithful so that he does not defraud, and prudent so that he is not defrauded; the more he is known for his faithfulness and prudence, the greater the offices he should be entrusted with. However, no one can fully test another's goodwill and faithfulness except through a long period of time. Ethi. Hence, as it is said in the proverb, 'It is not known how to understand one another until they have consumed many measures of salt together.' Similarly, one cannot fully ascertain someone's prudence unless we have seen them act wisely over a long period. Therefore, in this way, offices should be entrusted to ministers, because they should first be appointed to lower magistracies so that their faithfulness and prudence can be tested; if they prove themselves well in those, they can be entrusted with greater responsibilities. However, it must be considered carefully that the morals of the recent dictators and of those newly ascending to high status are, as it is said. Rhetoric. For the most part, people are worse in their morals than others: if those in charge of offices are taken from a lowly background, even if they seem to act wisely and faithfully in some minor positions, they shouldn't be immediately promoted to higher offices; rather, they should be gradually advanced and tested over a long period of time before being elevated to greater responsibilities. Having seen how offices should be assigned to ministers, it remains to consider how they should be engaged in their assigned duties. It is not fitting for great lords, nor for kings and princes, to take personal care and concern for their ministers. For as it is said in the first book of Politics. And this does not have any significant consequence from which it is concluded that some have the power to avoid this; a procurator receives this honor, but they themselves live civilly or philosophize. Therefore, kings and princes, who ought to be magnanimous, should engage in both minor and major matters, as it is fitting for them to be concerned about those things that directly pertain to the common good and to the kingdom. What those matters are will be made clear in the third book. It's not fitting for them to concern themselves with certain ministers or to involve themselves with any enemies. Having seen this, it remains to show the third point. That is, how to converse with them. What the philosopher teaches about this will be discussed. This is noted in the Ethiopic tradition. However, it is fitting for great leaders to behave moderately towards their humble ministers, but they should show themselves as great to those who hold higher positions. Therefore, kings and princes, who ought to be magnanimous towards their own ministers, who are inferior and humble in relation to them, should show themselves as moderate: for wanting to have excessive superiority over them (as the philosophers clearly teach) is not virtuous, but burdensome. What it means to hold a middle ground in such matters and to be moderate can be drawn from what is said. It is said that a ruler should not appear overly familiar with their ministers. For it is stated that the person of a ruler should not appear severe, but rather reverent. Therefore, it is not fitting for a ruler to be so familiar with their ministers that they are held in contempt, and that their reverent persona does not appear; nor should they present themselves in such an excellent manner that they appear harsh and austere. In all things, as is said in the Ethiopics, the middle ground is praised, while extremes are criticized. However, it should be noted that some familiarity may be commendable in a citizen or soldier, which would not be commendable in a king; for it is entirely fitting for kings and princes to exhibit themselves less familiarly than others, and to show themselves as more serious and reverent figures than others, not for the sake of ostentation, but to avoid the contempt of royal dignity. It remains to show how duties should be entrusted to ministers, how they should be approached, and how one should interact with them; the remainder is to demonstrate how counsel should be communicated to them, and how benefits should be bestowed upon them. For it was previously stated that there are different kinds of servants, as some are natural servants, some are servants by law, and some serve primarily for wages, while others are moved to serve primarily by love and affection for the prince more than by any wages they might receive. Since secrets and counsel should not be shared with servants by nature, because (as was said above) no one is a natural servant unless they are ignorant and lacking in reason. Speaking of these matters, the Philosopher says near the end of the first book of Politics that a woman has an invalid counsel, a boy has an imperfect one, but a servant has absolutely no counsel at all. Likewise, counsel should not be shared with servants according to the law, because such people generally serve more out of fear than out of love. Nor should secrets be shared with mercenaries, because they care more for the payment than for the person of the prince. However, those who serve out of love, if over time they prove to be well-disposed, faithful, and prudent, will be able to reveal secrets more and less, depending on their fidelity and prudence. As for how benefits should be given to ministers for their labors, that is another matter. It was said above that this matter should be addressed, and it can be approached lightly. For kings and princes, who have the power to grant many things, should not withhold the wages of their ministers; rather, they should give them greater and lesser benefits, depending on how much they appear to have deserved.