Liber II, Pars III — Quod usura est simpliciter detestabilis, et quod eam decet reges, et principes prohibere. Cap. XI.

Liber II, Pars III — Quod usura est simpliciter detestabilis, et quod eam decet reges, et principes prohibere. Cap. XI.

The fourth type of financial gain, which the philosopher calls usury, can be shown to be detestable in two ways, as it is named in two different terms. It is first called the offspring of money, from which name the philosopher argues. It is called usury. Usury is contrary to nature. For it is necessary to understand that although a thing is one, the use of a thing is another; for example, a house is one thing, and inhabiting it is another: however, in some cases, the granting of use cannot be separated from the granting of the substance. Therefore, wherever the use of a thing can be granted without granting its substance, a fee can be taken from it, provided that the thing does not deteriorate in any way. But if the use cannot be granted without the granting of the substance, then no fee can be taken for such use; because if it is taken, there will be usury, that is, the robbery of use. For the natural things, such as animals, generate and give birth, and they increase themselves. This is called usura. Usury is something detestable and against nature. Secondly, we can show that this kind of financial practice is detestable by another name it is called, since it is referred to as usury, which is almost the same as the robbery of use. In usury, the use is seized and usurped, whether the same thing is sold twice, or the use is sold there which is not its own. To clarify this, it should be understood that although something may be a thing. One thing is the use of a thing, as another is a house, and another is to inhabit it: in some cases, however, the concession of use can never be separated from the concession of substance. In any case, therefore, the use of a thing can be granted without conceding its substance; a payment can be received from it, provided that the thing does not deteriorate in any way. But if the use cannot be granted without the concession of the substance, then for such use no payment can be received; because if payments are received, there will be usury there, that is, the robbery of use. Since the use of a house is to inhabit it, not to sell it; the owner of the houses can grant the use of the house for habitation without conceding its substance: and because whoever owns the substance owns the use: as long as the substance belongs to him, the use pertains to him. Therefore, selling what belongs to him and what pertains to him. He can do so lawfully, and he does no one any harm. Therefore, he takes nothing away, and he usurps nothing, if, while retaining the ownership of the house, he sells the habitation and its use. However, it is not the same with money. For the proper use of money is to spend and to alienate it. Therefore, the proper use of money can never be granted unless its substance is also granted: since to such a use it is necessary to alienate the very substance. For since an accident depends on the substance, and the use derives from the thing itself, it is rightly said that whoever owns the substance owns the use. If someone willingly accepts payment for the use of money, it is said that they commit usury or that they are stealing the use of that money, because by granting the use of the money, they are also granting its substance; however, if they grant the substance, the use no longer pertains to them. Therefore, if someone receives payment for the use of something, they are selling what is not theirs, or they are accepting payment for something that does not pertain to them, since the use of that money no longer pertains to them after they have already granted its substance. It should be noted, however, that (as the philosopher says). I. In the philosopher's view, there are two types of use regarding any matter. One is proper use, and the other is improper use. The proper use of money is to exchange it or spend it and to transfer ownership. On the other hand, the improper use is to display it: many indeed show their money not for spending but to appear wealthy and to be seen as rich. Thus, the proper use of a house is to inhabit it. The improper use is to sell or exchange it; many people build houses not to live in, but to sell. However, regarding any use, whether proper or improper, a fee can be accepted if that use could be granted without conceding the substance. For this reason, it is quite clear. On the contrary, it is different with money and other things. For with the proper use of money, a fee cannot be accepted without usury, because such a use cannot be granted without conceding its substance. But with improper use, it can be. For if someone wants to use money not for spending, but for showing off—something merchants often do to appear wealthy, and so that others might more quickly deposit money with them—they have a multitude of money before them; thus, if someone can grant money for such a use, namely for showing off, without conceding their substance, if in this way they were to accept a fee for the money, they might sin in another way, but they would not commit usury. In other matters, it often happens the opposite, that in the proper use, no usury is committed. For the reason that the dwelling, which is the proper use of a house, can be granted without the concession of its substance; if a payment is received for this, no usury is committed. If someone were to sell or exchange a house; which is not its proper use, given that they would not immediately receive money, if they wanted to receive additional money for the use of the house, they would commit usury: because the use would no longer pertain to it after they had granted its substance through the sale. Therefore, usury is entirely wrong, because there the use is sold, which does not pertain to the lender, and is against nature. Thus, it is fitting for kings and princes, if they truly wish to rule, to prohibit usury so that it does not occur, because it contradicts natural law.