De opponendi et respondendi cautela et moderacione.
Two Kinds of Caution
The one opposing must avoid useless questions, illustrated by Jerome and Hilary, since such quarrels have the appearance of knowledge but profit no one.
It's important to know that some cautions apply to the person raising objections and others to the person responding. The person raising objections should beware, first of all, of posing pointless questions. As Jerome writes on the letter to Titus: 'What good does it do me to know how many years Methuselah lived, or at what age Solomon took a wife?' Arguments like these are useless and vain. . . And yet they carry the appearance of knowledge, but they profit neither those who speak nor those who hear. Hence also Hilary, on the Trinity, book one: 'Steadfast faith rejects the captious and useless questions of philosophy.'1
Guarding Against Superfluous and Obscure Propositions
One must avoid proving what is already evident, raising obscure propositions, and building arguments on false or implausible premises, following Quintilian's rhetorical wisdom.
. . Neither clinging to God according to the sense of common understanding, nor deciding about Christ according to the elements of the world.✦ Again, one should beware of offering superfluous proofs of things that are already evident. Whence Quintilian, in the fifth book on oratorial instruction: 'In matters already evident, it is as foolish to argue as to bring a mortal light to the brightest sun.' Again, obscure propositions. Whence the same author in the same place: 'A thing taken up for the sake of illustrating something else ought to be clearer than that which it illuminates.' Likewise, false and improbable assumptions.
The Danger of Sophistry
Drawing on Quintilian, Ecclesiasticus, and Seneca, the text warns against sophistical arguments that rest on human authority rather than truth, illustrating the danger with a wordplay fallacy.
As the same author says in the Book of Causes, cause 17: 'The less you can prove your point, the more contentiously you're bound to argue, and any claim a person bases on human authority rather than on truth is built on shaky ground.' Likewise, avoid sophistical arguments, because anyone who argues in a sophistical manner will be held in contempt, as we read in Ecclesiasticus 27. Hence Seneca, writing to Lucilius in letter 48: 'Unless I construct the most cunning questions and build up a false conclusion — a lie born from truth — I won't be able to distinguish what should be sought from what should be avoided.' I'm ashamed — here we are, grown men, playing games in a serious matter. 'Mus' is a syllable. But a mouse gnaws cheese — therefore a syllable gnaws cheese. Do you think I can't refute that one right now? What danger threatens me from this kind of learning — this thing that's nothing but a liability?
A Lament Over Childish Disputation
The text breaks into an exclamation against boyish foolishness and trivial games played in serious matters of disputation.
. . . O boyish foolishness! . . What are you composing for me — these childish games? .
Plain Speech Over Worldly Eloquence
In divine matters one must reject the subtle arguments of philosophers and the colored reasonings of orators, embracing instead the plain speech commended by Jerome.
. . This is no place for jesting. . . Let what is open be fitting, and let what is simple reflect goodness. Likewise, in divine matters one must beware of the subtle arguments of philosophers and the colored reasonings of orators. Hence Jerome, in his book of three questions to Damasus: 'When disputing about divine Scriptures, it is not fitting to seek out Aristotle's arguments, nor should a stream be drawn from the river of Ciceronian eloquence, nor should one's ears be soothed with Quintilian's little flowers and scholastic declamation — but let speech be plain and everyday, of the kind that explains the meaning of the matter.'
Keeping Sacred Things Sacred
The text exhorts modesty, simplicity, and restraint in speech, warning against jesting, mockery, and ornate words, and calling the speaker to imitate the simplicity of Scripture.
This is no place for joking. It's not fitting for you to say clever things there, or to make others laugh. Holy things aren't to be dragged through the streets, or offered to dogs, or tossed to pigs under the table. When you're in a crowd, keep quiet, and stay in your seat. Be modest, and don't mock anyone. Don't let your speech bloom with made‑up words. Let others be eloquent, and be praised as much as they like, and puff themselves up with swollen cheeks as they weigh their frothy words. For my part, it's enough to speak simply, so that I can be understood, and so that in debating the Scriptures I can imitate the Scriptures' simplicity.
The Art of Responding
Turning to the one responding, Aristotle's twofold rule is given, and the text distinguishes how to deal with different kinds of questioners: the nosy, the schemer, the truth-seeker, and the heretic.
These remarks concern opposing and responding. Now when it comes to responding, as Aristotle says, two things must necessarily be avoided — namely: putting forward what one shouldn't, and failing to uphold what has been put forward as one should. Elsewhere he also says that the task of a learned person is not to lie about the things they know, and to be able to expose a liar. The person responding must proceed differently against a nosy questioner, differently against a schemer or tempter or false accuser, differently against a seeker of truth, and differently against a heretic and deceiver. With the nosy questioner, one must deal with their curiosity or rashness by prudently sidestepping it. Hence Clement, in his letter to all the faithful: 'If anyone,' he says, 'entangled in sins and defiled — .
Evading the Nosy and Withholding Truth
With the nosy questioner one must prudently evade, yet not remain silent lest listeners' faith be harmed; Bede explains when truth should be withheld, and with tempters one must block their cunning as the Lord did with the Jews.
. If someone has pushed himself forward and provoked us to say that he, acting improperly, ought not to be listened to, we should prudently evade him. For to give no answer at all doesn't seem helpful to the listeners' cause, lest they think that we're shrinking from the contest out of a lack of an answer, and their faith is harmed. Hence also Bede on Mark, book three: 'For two main reasons the knowledge of the truth should be withheld from those who seek it, namely:' When the one who asks is either less capable of understanding what he seeks, or is unworthy, through contempt or hatred of the truth itself, to have opened to him what he seeks. With a schemer or tempter, one must act by blocking his cunning or the paths of his traps. When the Jews were laying traps for the Lord, they said, 'By what authority do you do these things?'✦ He answered, 'And I [will ask you]…' etc.✦
The Lord's Prudent Evasions
Chrysostom and Jerome explain how the Lord moderated His responses to hostile questioners, using counter-questions to stymie their malice and avoid exposing sacred truth to those who sought to trap Him.
—as is read in Matthew 21. Chrysostom explains this in his second book on Matthew: "Knowing," he says, "their unchangeable malice, the Lord proposed to them a question hedged in on every side, not so that the listeners might answer, but so that, being stymied, they might not question him." For when someone questions you, you need to teach; but when someone tempts you, you must beat back their cunning by whatever means, confound the cleverness of their objection with a reasoned blow, and not expose the truth of the mystery to them. Likewise, as Jerome says in his third book on Matthew, "The Pharisees tempted him, asking whether it was permitted to a man to dismiss his wife for any reason whatever, . . namely so that they might corner him with a syllogism as if he were a horned animal, and that whatever he answered, a snare would be open to catch him.
Passing Through the Trap
The Lord moderates His responses to pass through traps, as when He answered the priests' crafty question about His authority with a counter-question about John's baptism.
. . He himself moderates his response in this way, so that he may pass through the trap. . . . Elsewhere also, when the priests treacherously put a crafty question to him about his authority, he answered: "Was John's baptism from heaven, or from men?"✦ .
Answering Crookedly but Prudently
A proverb warns against forcing arguments on the perverse; Jerome's gloss explains that the Lord answered His crooked questioners obliquely yet prudently, following Solomon's counsel, while with genuine truth-seekers one should engage peacefully as Ambrose teaches.
. . There's a common saying that goes like this: "You shouldn't drive a nail or a wedge into a bad knot in a tree." Jerome says this. And there's a gloss on Mark 10 that says: "When they had answered Him with a cornered syllogism, saying 'We don't know,' the Lord replied, 'Neither do I tell you by what authority I do this.'"✦2 And in the same place Jerome's gloss says: "Here, when God is twisted by a perverse argument."3 Here's what this means: just as they were looking for a fight in a crooked way, so He, in turn, answered them crookedly — that is, obliquely — yet not deceitfully, but prudently, following Solomon's words in Proverbs 26: 'Answer a fool according to his foolishness, lest he think himself wise in his own eyes.'✦4 When you're dealing with someone who's genuinely searching for the truth, you should engage peacefully — talking things through with them, or conferring together, rather than arguing. As Ambrose says in his commentary on the second epistle to Titus: 'Among God's servants there should be conference, not disputation.'5
Resisting Heretics and Concluding
With heretics one must resist vigorously, speaking from conscience, while among the faithful there should be conference rather than disputation; the chapter concludes with a summary of the manner of disputing.
. . For it is not fitting for men of one faith to contend with one another, but rather to bear with each other in discussion and to agree with good words. But if something seems disreputable, let it be passed over in peace. These are Ambrose's words. Moreover, one must deal with a heretic or deceiver vigorously, by resisting him. Whence in the same place: 'If, however,' he says, 'a Catholic argues against a heretic, let him always speak from conscience, and let him not allow impious words to be brought forth in his presence.' So much for the manner of disputing; and let what has been said about the literal instruction of beginners and the practice of those advancing suffice.
Read the original Latin
Sciendum preterea, quod alie sunt cautele opponentis et alie respondentis. Cauere debet opponens primo quidem, ne proponat inutiles questiones. unde ieronimus super epistolam ad tytum: ‘quid michi prodest scire, quot annis matusalem uixerit, quoto etatis anno salomon coniugem duxerit. De huiusmodi rixe sunt inutiles et vane . . . que tamen speciem habent sciencie, sed nec dicentibus nec audientibus prosunt.’ Hinc et hylarius de trinitate libro io: ‘Capciosas et inutiles philosophie questiones fides constans respuit .
. . nec secundum sensum conmunis intelligencie deum retinens, nec de christo secundum elementa mundi decernens.’ Iterum cauere debet superfluas rerum apertarum probaciones. unde quintilianus libro quinto de oratoria institucione: ‘In rebus apertis tam stultum sit argumentari quam in clarissimum solem mortale lumen afferre.’ Iterum obscuras proposiciones. unde idem ibidem: ‘Quod rei alterius illustrande gracie assumitur, clarius esse debet eo, quod illuminat.’ Item falsas et improbabiles assumpciones.
ut enim ait idem in libro causarum causa xviia: ‘necesse est contenciosius loquaris, quicquid probare non possis, et affirmacionem sumit ex homine, quicquid non habet ex veritate.’ Item sophisticas conclusiones, quia, qui sophistice loquitur, odibilis erit, ut legitur in ecclesiastico xxvii. Hinc et seneca ad lucilium, epistola xlviiia: ‘Nisi uaferrimas interrogaciones struxero et conclusione falsa mendacium a uero nascens astruxero, non potero a fugiendis petenda secernere. Pudet me in re seria senes ludimus. “Mus sillaba est. Mus autem caseum rodit, ergo sillaba caseum rodit.” Putas me nunc istud non posse soluere. Quid michi ex ista sciencia periculum imminet, quod inconmodum est?
. . . O pueriles inepcias . . . quid michi lusoria ista conponis? .
. . Non est iocandi locus . . . aperta decent et simplicia bonitatem.’ Item in diuinis cauere oportet subtiles philosophorum et fucatas oratorum raciones. unde ieronimus in libro de tribus questionibus ad damasum: ‘De scripturis diuinis disputantem non decet aristotilis argumenta conquirere, nec ex flumine tulliane eloquencie ducendus est riuulus, nec aures quintiliani flosculis et scolari declamacione mulcende, sed sit loquucio pedestris et cotidiane similis, que sensum rei edisserat, .
. . non . . . uerborum conposicione frondescat. Sint alii diserti, laudentur, ut uolunt, et inflatis buccis spumancia uerba trutinent. Michi sufficit sic loqui, ut intelligar et ut de scripturis disputans, scripturarum imiter simplicitatem.’
Hec de opposicione. In responsione autem, ut dicit aristotiles, duo necessario vitanda sunt, sc. ponere, quod non oportet, et positum non seruare, sicut oportet. Alibi quoque dicit, quod opus scientis est non mentiri, de quibus nouit, et posse manifestare mencientem. Aliter autem respondenti agendum est contra curiosum inquisitorem, aliter contra insidiatorem uel temptatorem siue calumpniatorem, aliter contra veritatis inuestigatorem, aliter contra hereticum et deceptorem. Cum curioso siquidem agendum est eius curiositatem uel temeritatem prudenter eludendo. unde clemens in epistola ad omnes fideles: ‘Si quis,’ ait, ‘peccatis inuolutus et inquinatus . .
. ingesserit se et prouocauerit nos dicere, que illum minus recte agentem non oporteat audire, prudenter eum debemus eludere.’ Nam nichil omnino respondere auditorum cause utile non videtur, ne forte estiment nos responsionis penuria declinare certamen et fides eorum ledatur. Hinc et beda super marcum libro iiio: ‘Duas ob causas maxime sciencia veritatis est ocultanda querentibus, videl. cum is, qui querit, aut minus capax est ad intelligendum, quod querit, aut contemptu uel odio ipsius veritatis indignus est, cui debeat aperiri, quod querit.’ Cum insidiatore uel temptatore agendum est eius uersucias uel insidiarum uias obstruendo. unde cum iudei domino insidiantes dicerent: ‘in qua potestate hec facis?’ respondit: ‘uos et ego etc.
,’ ut legitur mathei xxio. quod sic exponit crisostomus in secundo libro super matheum: ‘Sciens,’ inquit, ‘dominus inconuertibilem eorum maliciam, proposuit eis questionem undique cathenatam, non ut audientes respondeant, sed ut impediti non interrogent.’ Interrogantem enim oportet docere, temptantem autem quocumque modo retundere et obiectionis illius astuciam racionabili percussione confundere et non ei ueritatem mysterii publicare. Sic eciam, ut dicit ieronimus super matheum iiio libro, ‘pharisei temptauerunt eum querentes, si liceret homini dimittere uxorem suam quacumque ex causa, . . . ut sc. quasi cornuto eum teneant sillogismo et quodcunque responderit, capcioni pateat .
. . Ipse autem responsionem sic temperat, ut decipulam transeat. . . . Alibi quoque sacerdotibus insidiosam ei questionem de potestate sua respondit: “Baptismus iohannis e celo erat an ex hominibus?” .
. . Hoc est quod uulgo dicitur: “Male arboris nodo clauus aut cuneus infigendus est.” ’ Hec ieronimus. Hinc et glosa super marchum xio, ‘cum,’ inquit, ‘cornuto sillogismo coartati respondissent, “nescimus,” ait dominus, “neque ego dico uobis, in qua potestate hoc facio.” ’ Ibique dicit glosa ieronimi: ‘Hic cum peruerso peruertitur deus.’ Hoc est: sicut illi peruerse querebant, sic et ipse econtra peruerse respondit, id est oblique, non tamen dolose, sed prudenter, iuxta illud salomonis in prouerbiis xxvio: ‘Responde stulto iuxta stulticiam suam, ne sibi sapiens esse videatur.’ Cum veritatis inuestigatore agendum est in pace, cum eo tractando uel conferendo pocius quam altercando, iuxta illud ambrosii super IIam epistolam ad tytum: ‘Collacio debet inter seruos dei esse, non altercacio .
. . Nec enim congruit unius fidei uiros contendere, sed in tractatu se inuicem pati et bonis dictis consentire. Si quid autem improbabile uidetur, cum pace dissimuletur.’ Hec ambrosius. Porro cum heretico uel deceptore agendum est viriliter ei resistendo. unde ibidem, ‘Si uero,’ inquit, ‘catholicus contra hereticum disputat, semper de consciencia uerba emittat, nec impia uerba coram se depromi paciatur.’ Ecce de modo disputandi et hec de litterali erudicione incipiencium et exercitacione proficiencium dicta sufficiant.
Scripture echoes
- ↩Col.2.8 — See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deception, according to human tradition, according to the elemental forces of the world, and not according to Christ.
- ↩Matt.21.23;Mark.11.28;Luke.20.2 — And when he came into the temple, the chief priests and the elders of the people came to him as he was teaching, saying, 'By what authority are you doing these things? And who gave you this authority?' Mark.11.28 — And they said to him, 'By what authority are you doing these things? Or who gave you this authority to do them?' Luke.20.2 — And they spoke to him, saying, "Tell us by what authority you do these things, or who it is who gave you this authority."
- ↩Matt.21.24;Mark.11.30;Luke.20.3 — Jesus answered them, "I will also ask you one question, and if you answer me, I will tell you by what authority I do these things. Mark.11.30 — Was the baptism of John from heaven or from men? Answer me. Luke.20.3 — He answered them, "I also will ask you a question, and tell me:
- ↩Matt.21.23-Matt.21.27 — And when he came into the temple, the chief priests and the elders of the people came to him as he was teaching, saying, 'By what authority are you doing these things? And who gave you this authority?' Matt.21.24 — Jesus answered them, "I will also ask you one question, and if you answer me, I will tell you by what authority I do these things. Matt.21.25 — The baptism of John—where was it from? From heaven or from men? And they discussed it among themselves, saying, 'If we say, "From heaven," he will say to us, "Why then did you not believe him?"' Matt.21.26 — But if we say, 'From men,' we fear the crowd, for all hold John as a prophet. Matt.21.27 — And they answered Jesus, "We do not know." He said to them, "Neither am I telling you by what authority I am doing these things."
- ↩Matt.21.23-Matt.21.27;Mark.11.27-Mark.11.33 — And when he came into the temple, the chief priests and the elders of the people came to him as he was teaching, saying, 'By what authority are you doing these things? And who gave you this authority?' Matt.21.24 — Jesus answered them, "I will also ask you one question, and if you answer me, I will tell you by what authority I do these things. Matt.21.25 — The baptism of John—where was it from? From heaven or from men? And they discussed it among themselves, saying, 'If we say, "From heaven," he will say to us, "Why then did you not believe him?"' Matt.21.26 — But if we say, 'From men,' we fear the crowd, for all hold John as a prophet. Matt.21.27 — And they answered Jesus, "We do not know." He said to them, "Neither am I telling you by what authority I am doing these things." Mark.11.27 — And they come again to Jerusalem. And as he was walking in the temple, the chief priests and the scribes and the elders come to him Mark.11.28 — And they said to him, 'By what authority are you doing these things? Or who gave you this authority to do them?' Mark.11.29 — But Jesus said to them, "I will ask you one question, and you answer me, and I will tell you by what authority I do these things." Mark.11.30 — Was the baptism of John from heaven or from men? Answer me. Mark.11.31 — And they discussed among themselves, saying, 'If we say, "From heaven," he will say, "Then why did you not believe him?"' Mark.11.32 — But if we say, 'From people'—they feared the crowd, for all of them really considered John to be a prophet. Mark.11.33 — And they answered Jesus, "We do not know." And Jesus said to them, "Neither do I tell you by what authority I am doing these things."
- ↩Prov.26.5 — Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes.
Notes
- 1 ↩The reading 'libro io' is uncertain; rendered here as 'book one' on the assumption that 'io' stands for 'primo' (first).
- 2 ↩The passage echoes Matthew 21:23–27 (and parallels Mark 11:27–33, Luke 20:1–8), where the chief priests challenge Jesus' authority and He responds with a counter-question about John's baptism. The Latin cites 'Mark 10' but the content matches the Synoptic temptation narrative more commonly placed later in Mark; the chapter reference may reflect a different division or a scribal error.
- 3 ↩The gloss plays on the idea that a perverse syllogism ('cornutus sillogismus') perverts even God — i.e., the questioners' logic is so twisted that it distorts the truth itself.
- 4 ↩Proverbs 26:5 — 'Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes.' The Latin renders the Vulgate wording closely.
- 5 ↩The Latin cites 'the second epistle to Titus' (super IIam epistolam ad tytum), but the Pastoral Epistles to Titus contain only one chapter in the standard canon. This may refer to a section division in the Vulgate or a conflation with 2 Timothy.
De eruditione filiorum nobilium (On the Education of Noble Children) companion
Formation starts with the parents' own practice
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