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Chapter 21Erud.1.21

De contencione vitanda in disputacione.

The Widespread Disease of Contentious Disputation

Contentious disputation is rightly condemned by mature men because it reveals a lack of modesty, and its root causes are vainglory and the concealment of ignorance, in contrast to the humble wisdom that comes from above.

Contentious disputation is therefore something mature men rightly reprove and find hateful, because it shows a lack of modesty. And yet today, out of many thousands, you'll scarcely find one person who's modest in disputation; nearly everyone contends and fights, and so they disturb the truth rather than shed light on it. What especially causes this is the pursuit of empty glory or the hiding of ignorance. As Hugh says in his book on the instruction of novices: 'While we want to appear wise before others in a proud way, we're ashamed either to have our ignorance exposed by others or to have another's wisdom confirmed — as if it were a humiliation to us.' And so we sometimes shamelessly defend against our own conscience, or our own error, or maliciously attack the truth held by another. This is the wisdom that's carnal and diabolical — crafty and malicious, seeking only the paths of cunning by which it can cover up its own error and twist someone else's truth, however plain it is, in the opinion of fools and the foolish. But it's not like the wisdom that comes from above, which doesn't even know how to love itself against the truth — always ready either to share humbly the good it has with those who lack it, or to seek willingly the good it doesn't have from those who do, or to accuse truthfully before others the evil it suffers along with them.✦1 That's what Hugh says.

Authorities on Modest Inquiry and the Love of Truth

Blessed Peter, Aristotle, and Jerome are cited to show that the truly knowledgeable wish to share truth, that litigious questioning is perverse, and that modest disputation seeks to teach rather than to conquer.

And so, blessed Peter says in the third letter of Clement, 'It is the mark of a fault of ignorance not to bear that someone else, when confuted, has the light of truth concerning his neighbor.' . . . But those who receive the knowledge of truth — because it is full of goodness, as something given by a good God — if possible, want to share it with everyone. Those things are his. And Aristotle, in the eighth book of the Topics, says, 'Whoever asks in a litigious manner disputes perversely, and whoever does not concede what seems right when responding.' Jerome, on the other hand, in the epitaph of Neopotianus especially commends him for the modesty of his asking and responding, saying, 'His conversation and every gathering was about the Scriptures: to propose something, to listen gladly, to respond modestly, to accept what is right, not to refute what is perverse sharply, and to teach rather than conquer the one disputing against him.'

Defining Contention and Its First Three Evils: Pride, Vainglory, and Foolishness

Contention is defined as a wicked, litigious altercation, and its first three evils—pride, vainglory, and foolishness—are exposed through the testimonies of Augustine, Quintilian, Ambrose, Jerome, and Sidonius.

So says Jerome. Therefore in disputing, contention must be avoided, and it is described as follows: Contention is a wicked, litigious, or shameless altercation against another person. Seven evils are found in contentious disputation. The first is pride, which is the appetite for one's own excellence. For as Augustine says in the fourth book of On Christian Doctrine: 'To contend with words is not to care how error is overcome by truth, but how your own speech is preferred over the speech of another.' The second is vain glory, because, as Quintilian says in the second book: 'The reward is not a good conscience, but the victory of the litigant.' Hence Ambrose also says in his book On the Incarnation of Christ: 'This is the glory of dialecticians — if they seem to conquer and refute the truth with words.' On the contrary, the definition of faith is this: that truth, not words, should be weighed. In the end, the plain truth of the fishermen shuts out the words of the philosophers.✦ This is from Ambrose. The third is foolishness, because, as Clement says above, 'it is a characteristic fault of ignorance that it cannot bear to have the light of truth close at hand, refuting it.'✦2 Jerome likewise, against the Luciferian: 'Certain people,' he says, 'are talkative rather than eloquent; since they do not know how to argue properly, they nevertheless do not stop quarreling.' And Sidonius, in his fifth book of letters, on ignorant people:3 .4 .5 '…it is as easy to be conquered as it is difficult to be restrained.'6

Cato and Horace on Avoiding Quarrels

Cato warns against arguing with lovers of verbal combat, and Horace illustrates how trivial disputes reveal the folly of those who mistake speech for wisdom.

As Cato says: Don't argue with people who love to fight with words. Speech is given to everyone, but wisdom of the soul to few. And as Horace says in his book of letters: One person quarrels about wool, often about goat's wool.

The Fourth and Fifth Evils: Impudence and Disturbance of Conscience

The fourth evil of contention is impudence—rash and unrestrained speech—and the fifth is the inner disturbance of conscience it produces, as warned by the apostle through Ambrose.

The fourth is impudence, which is described this way: 'Impudence is to burst forth into thrown-out words by a sudden movement and without reason.' Against which the philosopher says: 'I order you to be, in the highest discipline of all, slow of speech, sparing of words, speaking with a subdued voice.' For to move your head, to twist your arms, to spread your fingers, to stamp your feet, and to shake your whole body — what is that except a likeness of madness, showing you to be like a brawler? That is what he says. The fifth is disturbance of conscience. Hence Ambrose on the first epistle to Titus, chapter two: 'Do not, says the apostle, contend with words,' etc. . .

The Sixth and Seventh Evils: Assault on Truth and Darkened Understanding

The sixth evil is that contention attacks truth itself through confident shouting, and the seventh is that excessive disputing darkens the understanding and loses the truth, as Lactantius and Seneca warn; Augustine therefore chose to dispute with himself to preserve peace and clarity.

. The thing is, an argument always twists something out of you — or rather, many things get said against your conscience — so that inside, in your own mind, you lose hold of the truth, and yet outwardly you walk away looking like the winner. Nobody tolerates being beaten, even when they know what they're hearing is true. . . So conversation among God's servants should be a sharing together, not a quarrel. This from Ambrose. The sixth is an attack on truth, because, according to Ambrose, 'Contention is an attack on truth through confidence in shouting.' From here also Lactantius, in his book On the Blessed Life: 'Those who are mad with the zeal of contradicting,' he says, 'defend their own even false positions and overturn the very words of others.' The seventh is the darkening of understanding, because, as it is said in the Proverbs of Seneca, 'through excessive disputing truth is lost.'7 On account of all these evils that frequently occur in disputation, Augustine in the Soliloquies chose to dispute with himself, as if through a dialogue, rather than with another. Whence he says in the same book, book two: 'Since truth cannot be better sought than by asking and answering, and there is scarcely anyone whom it does not shame to be convicted in disputation, and for that reason it almost always happens that a matter well introduced for discussion is driven out by the unrestrained shouting of obstinacy, even with the tearing apart of souls — generally disguised, sometimes open; most peacefully, as I think, and most conveniently it pleased me, having been asked by myself and answering to myself, to seek the truth, so that there is nothing I need fear, if anywhere I have rashly entangled myself, in going back and resolving it.'8 This is Augustine.

Read the original Latin

Disputacio ergo contenciosa uiris maturis ac modestia reprobabilis est et odiosa. et tamen uix hodie inuenitur e multis milibus unus in disputacione modestus, sed omnes fere contendunt et dimicant et ideo pocius veritatem turbant quam elucidant. Quod maxime facit inanis glorie sectatio vel ignorancie dissimulacio. ut enim dicit hugo in libro de institucione nouiciorum: ‘dum pre aliis superbe sapientes uolumus uideri, erubescimus uel ignoranciam nostram ab aliis argui uel aliorum sapienciam quasi ad nostram depressionem approbari. Sicque non nunquam contra conscienciam nostram uel nostrum errorem impudenter deffendimus uel alterius ueritatem maliciose impugnamus. Hec est sapiencia carnalis et dyabolica, que uersuta est atque maligna, illas solum astucie uias exquirens, quibus possit suum errorem tegere et alienam veritatem quamuis manifestam in opinione stultorum et insipientium hominum deprauare. Sed non talis sapiencia, que desursum uenit, que nescit semetipsam eciam contra veritatem diligere, semper parata uel bonum, quod habet, non habentibus humiliter impendere, uel bonum, quod non habet, ab habentibus libenter petere, uel malum, quod sustinet cum aliis, coram aliis ueraciter accusare.’ Hec hugo.

Hinc et beatus petrus in epistola clementis IIIa, ‘Proprium,’ inquit, ‘est ignorancie uicium, ut confutantem se ueritatis lucem habere non ferat de proximo. . . . Qui uero scienciam ueritatis accipiunt, quia bonitatis plena est, tanquam a bono deo datam, si fieri potest, cum omnibus eam conmunem habere cupiunt.’ Hec ille. hinc et aristotiles in libro topycorum viiio, ‘Qui litigatorie,’ inquit, ‘interrogat, praue disputat, et qui eciam in respondendo non concedit, quod videtur.’ Econtra ieronimus in epytafio neopociani specialiter conmendat eum de modestia interrogandi ac respondendi, dicens: ‘Sermo eius et omne conuiuium erat de scripturis aliquid proponere, libenter audire, uereconde respondere, recta suscipere, praua non acriter confutare, disputantem contra se magis docere quam vincere.’

Hec ieronimus. Itaque in disputando uitanda est contencio, que sic describitur: Contencio est improba et litigiosa uel proterua contra aliquem altercacio. In disputacione contenciosa inueniuntur vii mala. Primum est superbia, que est appetitus proprie excellencie. ut enim dicit augustinus in libro de doctrina christiana iiiio, ‘uerbis contendere est non curare quomodo error ueritate vincatur, sed quomodo tua dictio dictioni alterius preferatur.’ Secundum est inanis gloria, quia, ut dicit quintilianus libro iio, ‘non bona consciencia, sed victoria litigantis est premium.’ Hinc et ambrosius in libro de incarnacione christi: ‘Hec est dyaleticorum gloria, si videantur expugnare uerbis et refellere veritatem. Econtra uero definicio fidei est, ut ueritas, non uerba pendantur.

Denique uerba philosophorum excludit simplex ueritas piscatorum.’ Hec ambrosius. Tercium est stulticia, quoniam, ut ait clemens, ubi supra, ‘proprium est ignorancie uicium, ut confutantem se ueritatis lucem non ferat habere de proximo.’ Item ieronimus contra luciferianum: ‘Quidam,’ inquit, ‘loquaces pocius quam facundi, cum disputare nesciant, tamen litigare non desinunt.’ Hinc et sydonius in epistolari suo libro vo: ‘ydiotarum . . . est sicut facile vinci, ita difficile conpesci.’

ut ergo dicit cato:

Contra uerbosos noli contendere uerbis. Sermo datur cunctis, animi sapiencia paucis.

Et ut ait horacius in libro epistolarum:

Alter rixatur de lana sepe caprina.

Quartum est proteruia, que sic describitur: ‘proteruia est subitaneo motu et absque racione in uerba obiecta prorumpere.’ Contra quod dicit philosophus: ‘ad summam tocius discipline tardiloquum, rariloquum, submissa uoce loquentem iubeo te esse. Caput enim mouere, brachia torquere, digitos extendere, pedes supplodere, totumque corpus concutere, quid aliud est nisi similitudo insanie teque pugili similem ostendere.’ hec ille. Quintum est consciencie turbacio. unde ambrosius super epistolam primam ad tytum iio: ‘Noli, inquit apostolus, uerbis contendere etc. . .

. Necesse est enim, ut contencio aliquid extorqueat, immo multa, que dicantur contra conscienciam, ut intus in animo veritatem perdat, foris uictor abscedat. Nemo enim patitur se uinci, licet sciat vera esse, que audit . . . Collacio ergo inter seruos dei debet esse, non altercacio.’ Hec ambrosius. Sextum est ueritatis impugnacio, quia, iuxta ambrosium, ‘contencio est impugnacio veritatis per confidenciam clamoris.’

Hinc et lactancius in libro de beata uita, ‘Qui contradicendi,’ ait, ‘studio insaniunt, dum sua eciam falsa defendunt et aliorum eciam uerba subuertunt.’ Septimum est intelligentie obscuracio, quia, sicut in prouerbiis senece dicitur, ‘nimium altercando ueritas amittitur.’ Propter hec omnia mala, que frequenter incidunt in disputacione, uoluit augustinus in soliloquiis secum quasi per dyalogum pocius quam cum alio disputare. unde dicit ibidem libro iio: ‘Cum veritas melius queri non possit quam interrogando et respondendo et vix inueniatur aliquis, quem non pudeat conuinci disputacione, eoque pene semper eueniat, ut rem bene inductam ad discuciendum inconditus peruicacie clamor explodat eciam cum laceracione animarum plerumque dissimulata interdum et aperta; pacatissime, ut opinor, et comodissime placuit a me ipso interrogatum michique respondentem uerum querere, ut nichil sit, quod verear, sicubi me temere illigaui redire atque resoluere.’ hec augustinus.

Scripture echoes

  1. ↩Jas.3.17 — But the wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, open to reason, full of mercy and good fruits, impartial, and sincere.
  2. ↩1Cor.1.20-1Cor.1.27 — Where is the wise one? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? 1Cor.1.21 — For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through its wisdom, God was pleased to save those who believe through the foolishness of the proclaimed message. 1Cor.1.22 — For Jews demand signs, and Greeks seek wisdom, 1Cor.1.23 — but we proclaim Christ crucified: to Jews a stumbling block, and to Gentiles foolishness, 1Cor.1.24 — but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. 1Cor.1.25 — For the foolishness of God is wiser than human wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than human strength. 1Cor.1.26 — For consider your calling, brothers and sisters: not many of you were wise by human standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth. 1Cor.1.27 — But God chose the foolish things of the world to shame the wise, and God chose the weak things of the world to shame the strong.
  3. ↩John.3.19-John.3.20;Eph.5.13 — And this is the judgment: the light has come into the world, and the people loved the darkness rather than the light, for their deeds were evil. John.3.20 — For everyone who practices wicked things hates the light and does not come to the light, so that his deeds may not be exposed. Eph.5.13 — But all things that are exposed by the light are made visible, for everything that is made visible is light.

Notes

  1. 1 ↩'desursum venit' (comes from above) echoes James 3:17; the threefold portrait of heavenly wisdom parallels the structure of James 3:17–18.
  2. 2 ↩The rare verb confuto ('to refute, confute') is rendered here in its participial form; the construction confutantem se is reflexive: 'refuting it [i.e., itself, the ignorant person].'
  3. 3 ↩The source text is fragmentary here — the quotation from Sidonius breaks off after the introductory clause. The translation preserves the incomplete state.
  4. 4 ↩This sentence consists of a single period in the source, likely a placeholder or lacuna in the manuscript.
  5. 5 ↩This sentence consists of a single period in the source, likely a placeholder or lacuna in the manuscript.
  6. 6 ↩This sentence appears to be the continuation of the fragmentary Sidonius quotation begun in s5. The Latin is complete and coherent, but its attribution depends on resolving the lacuna in s5–s7.
  7. 7 ↩The quoted saying is attributed to Seneca's Proverbs (a medieval florilegium), not to the biblical book of Proverbs.
  8. 8 ↩The phrase 'tearing apart of souls' (laceracione animarum) captures the spiritual harm Augustine attributes to contentious debate.

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