Comme la volonté gouverne l'appétit sensuel
The Will's Authority Over the Senses
The will governs the sensual appetite through authority rather than force, allowing us to master our temptations by withholding consent.
So the will, Theotimus, rules over memory, understanding, and imagination—not by force, but by authority—so that it is not always infallibly obeyed, any more than the father of a household is always obeyed by his children and servants. It's the same with the sensual appetite, which, as Saint Augustine says, is called concupiscence in us sinners; it remains subject to the will and to the spirit just as a wife is to her husband. Because, just as it was said to the woman, "You will turn toward your husband, and he will master you," so it was said to Cain that his appetite would turn toward him and he would rule over it—and to turn toward the man means nothing other than to submit and subject itself to him.1 "O man," says Saint Bernard, "it is in your power, if you will, to make your enemy your servant, so that everything turns out for your good: your appetite is under you, and you will rule over it." Your enemy can stir up in you the feeling of temptation, but you can, if you will, either give or refuse consent."2 If you allow the appetite to carry you into sin, then you will be under it and it will master you, because whoever commits sin is a slave of sin. But before you commit the sin, while the sin is not yet in your consent but only in your feeling—that is, while it is still in your appetite and not in your will—your appetite is under you, and you will master it. Before an Emperor is created, he is subject to the electors who rule over him, able either to choose him for the imperial dignity or to reject him; but once he has been elected and raised up by them, they are from then on under him, and he rules over them. Before the will consents to the appetite, it rules over it; but after consent, it becomes its slave. In short, this sensual appetite is a truly rebellious, seditious, and restless subject. We have to admit that we can never fully undo it so that it won't rise up, take the offensive, and assault reason. Yet the will stands so firmly above it that, if the will chooses, it can put it down, break its plans, and drive it back—since it's enough to repel it simply by refusing to consent to its suggestions. We can't stop concupiscence from conceiving, but we can certainly stop it from giving birth and bringing sin to completion.
The Twelve Movements of the Heart
The sensual appetite manifests through twelve distinct passions, all of which remain subject to the will's power to refuse consent.
This covetousness, or sensual appetite, has twelve movements; like twelve mutinous captains, they stir up rebellion within the human person. Because these movements typically trouble the soul and agitate the body, Saint Augustine notes that they are called perturbations when they affect the soul, and passions when they unsettle the body.3 They all focus on either good or evil: the former to obtain it, the latter to avoid it. If we consider a good in itself, according to its natural goodness, it stirs up love, the first and principal passion. If we view that good as absent, it prompts us to desire. If we judge that we can obtain it, we enter into hope; if we think we cannot, we feel despair. But when we possess it as present, it gives us joy. Conversely, as soon as we recognize evil, we hate it. If it is absent, we flee from it; if we think we cannot avoid it, we fear it; if we judge that we can avoid it, we grow bold and take courage. But if we feel it as present, we grow sad, and then anger and wrath rush in to reject and drive off the evil, or at least to avenge ourselves. If we cannot, we remain in sadness; but if we have driven it off or avenged ourselves, we feel satisfaction and contentment—a pleasure of triumph. Just as possessing the good gladdens the heart, victory over evil satisfies the spirit.4 And over this whole people of sensual passions the will holds its empire, rejecting their suggestions, repelling their attacks, preventing their effects, and finally at least firmly refusing them its consent, without which they cannot harm it, and by the refusal of which they remain defeated, and even in the long run beaten down, enfeebled, wasted, repressed, and if not wholly dead, at least deadened or mortified.5
The Folly of Stoic Apathy
The Stoic claim to be free from all passions is a prideful delusion, as demonstrated by the fear experienced by a Stoic philosopher during a storm.
It's so we can train our wills in virtue and spiritual courage that this multitude of passions is left in our souls, Theotimus. The Stoics were badly mistaken to deny that these passions exist in a wise person—especially since, as Saint Augustine notes in his charming account, they practiced in reality what they denied in words. Aulus6 When Gellius had gone on board with a famous Stoic, a great storm arose, and the Stoic, terrified by it, began to turn pale, blanch, and tremble so visibly that everyone on the ship noticed and watched him closely, even though they were in the same dangers with him.7 Meanwhile the sea finally grew calm, the danger passed, and safety, giving everyone back the freedom to talk—and even to joke—a certain Asian pleasure-seeker, mocking the Stoic, reproached him for having been afraid and for having gone gaunt and pale in the danger, while he himself, on the contrary, had stayed steady and without terror; to which the Stoic replied by recounting what Aristippus, a Socratic philosopher, had answered a man who, for the same reason, had stung him with the same reproach: "For," he said to him, "you had good reason not to worry about the life of a wicked, worthless scoundrel; but I would have been wrong not to fear losing the life of Aristippus"; and the best part of the story is that Aulus Gellius, an eyewitness, tells it.8 As for the retort, the Stoic favored his quick wit more than his cause. By citing a companion in his fear, he left it proved by two irreproachable witnesses that the Stoics were indeed touched by fear—the kind of fear that shows in the eyes, on the face, and in one's bearing, and is therefore a passion.
Christian Passions and the Example of Christ
Unlike the Stoics, Christians acknowledge the reality of passions, looking to Christ who experienced 'propassions' in perfect order and submission to his will.
It's a great folly to try to be wise with a wisdom that's impossible. The Church has certainly condemned the folly of that wisdom which certain presumptuous hermits once tried to introduce—against whom all of Scripture, but above all the great Apostle, cries out that we have a law in our bodies that fights against the law of our spirit. "Among us Christians," says the great Saint Augustine, "according to the Holy Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the sacred City of God, living according to God on the pilgrimage of this world, fear, desire, grieve, and rejoice." Yes, even the sovereign King of this City has feared, desired, grieved, and rejoiced—even to the point of weeping, growing pale, trembling, and sweating blood—though in him these movements weren't passions like ours. That's why the great Saint Jerome, and after him the School, didn't dare call them passions, out of reverence for the person in whom they were found, but used the respectful name of propassions, to show that the sensible movements in Our Lord stood in the place of passions, though they weren't passions; for he suffered or endured nothing from them except what seemed good to him and as it pleased him, governing and handling them as he willed—something we other sinners don't do, who suffer and endure these movements in disorder, against our will, with great harm to the good condition and governance of our souls.910
Read the original Latin
La volonté donques, Théotime, domine sur la mémoire, l'entendement et la fantasie, non par force, mais par authorité en sorte qu'elle n'est pas tous-jours infalliblement obéie, non plus que le père de famille ne l'est pas aussi tous-jours par ses enfans et serviteurs. Or, c'en est de mesme de l'appétit sensuel, lequel, comme dit saint Augustin, est appellé convoitise en nous autres pécheurs,et demeure sujet à la volonté et à l'esprit comme la femme à son mari: parce que, tout ainsi qu'il fut dit a la femme: Tu te retourneras à ton mari, et il te maistrisera, aussi fut-il dit à Cain que son appétit se retourneroit à luy, et qu'il domineroit sur iceluy: et se retourner à l'homme ne veut dire autre chose que se sousmettre et s'assujettir à luy. " O homme, dit saint Bernard," il est en ton pouvoir,si tu veux,de faire que ton ennemi soit ton serviteur, en sorte que toutes choses te reviennent à bien:ton appétit est sous toy, et tu le domineras. Ton ennemi peut exciter en toy le sentiment de atentation, mais tu peux, si tu veux, ou donner ou refuser le consentement." Si tu permetz à l'appétit de te porter au péché,alhors tu seras sous iceluy et il te maistrisera, parce que quicomque fait le peché, il est serf du péché; mais avant que tu faces le péché, tandis que le péché n'est pas encor en ton consentement, mays seulement en ton sentiment, c'est à dire qu'il est encor en ton appétit et non en ta volonté, ton appétit est sous toy, et tu le maistriseras. Avant que l'Empereur soit créé;il est sousmis aux électeurs qui dominent sur luy, pouvans ou le choisir à la dignité impériale ou le rejeter; mays s'il est une fois esleu et eslevé par eux, ilz sont dès lhors sous luy,et il domine sur eux. Avant que la volonté consente à l'appétit, elle domine sur luy; mais après le consentement, elle devient son esclave.
En somme, cet appétit sensuel est à la vérité un sujet rebelle, séditieux,remuant; et faut confesser que nous ne le sçaurions tellement desfaire qu'il ne s'eslève, qu'il n'entreprenne et qu'il n'assaille la rayson; mays pourtant la volonté est si forte au dessus de luy, que, si elle veut,elle peut le ravaler, rompre ses desseins et le repousser,puisque c'est asses le repousser que de ne point consentir à ses suggestions. On ne peut empescher la concupiscence de concevoir, mais ouy bien d'enfanter et de parfaire le péché.
Or,cette convoitise ou appétit sensuel a douze mouvemens, par lesquelz, comme par autant de capitaines mutinés, il fait sa sédition en l'homme. Et parce que pour l'ordinaire ilz troublent l'ame et agitent le cors, entant qu'ilz troublent l'ame, on les appelle pertubations, entant qu'ilz inquietent le cors,on les appelle passions,au rapport de saint Augustin. Tous regardent le bien ou le mal; celuy là pour l'acquérir, celuy ci pour l'éviter. Si le bien est considéré en soy, selon sa naturelle bonté,il excite l'amour, première et principale passion; si le bien est regardé comme absent, il nous provoque au désir; si, estant desiré, on estime de le pouvoir obtenir, on entre en esperance; si on pense de ne le pouvoir pas obtenir, on sent le desespoir; mais quand on le possède comme présent,il nous donne la joye. Au contraire, si tost que nous connoissons le mal,nous le haïssons;s'il est absent, nous le fuyons; si nous pensons de ne pouvoir l'éviter, nous le craignons; si nous estimons de le pouvoir éviter, nous nous enhardissons et encourageons; mais si nous le sentons comme présent, nous nous attristons, et lhors l'ire et le courroux accourt soudain pour rejetter et repousser le mal,ou du moins s'en venger; que si l'on ne peut,on demeure en tristesse; mais si l'on l'a repoussé ou que l'on se soit vengé,on ressent la satisfaction et assouvissement,qui est un playsir de triomphe, car comme la possession du bien res-jouit le coeur, la victoire contre le mal assouvit le courage. Et sur tout ce peuple des passions sensuelles la volonté tient son empire, rejettant leurs suggestions, repoussant leurs attaques, empeschant leurs effectz, et en fin moins, leur refusant fortement son consentement, sans lequel elles ne peuvent l'endommager, et par le refus duquel elles demeurent vaincues, voire mesme à la longue, abbattues, allangouries, efflanquées, réprimées, et, sinon du tout mortes,au moins amorties ou mortifiées.
Et c'est affin d'exercer nos volontés en la vertu et vaillance spirituelle, que cette multitude de passions est laissée en nos ames, Théotime; de sorte que les Stoïciens, qui nièrent qu'elles se treuvassent en l'homme sage, eurent grand tort; mays d'autant plus, que ce qu'ilz nioyent en paroles ilz le prattiquoyent en effect, au récit de saint Augustin qui raconte cette gracieuse histoire. Aulus
Gellius s'estant embarqué avec un fameux Stoïcien, une grande tempeste survint, de laquelle le Stoïcien estant effrayé il commença à paslir, blesmir et trembler si sensiblement, que tous ceux du vaysseau s'en apperceurent et le remarquerent curieusement, quoy qu'ilz fussent es mesmes hazars avec luy. Cependant la mer en fin s'apaise, le danger passe, et l'asseurance redonnant a un chacun la liberté de causer, voire mesme de railler,un certain voluptueux asiatique, se moquant du Stoïcien, luy reprochoit qu'il avoit eu peur et qu'il estoit devenu have et pasle au danger et que luy au contraire estoit demeuré ferme, sans effroy; a quoy le Stoïcien repartit par le recit de ce que Aristippus, philosophe socratique, avoit respondu a un homme qui pour mesme sujet l'avoit piqué d'un mesme reproche: " Car," luy dit-il," toy, tu as rayson de ne t'estre point soucié pour l'ame d'un meschant broüillon; mais moy j'eusse eu tort de ne point craindre la perte de l'ame d'Aristippus;" et le bon de l'histoire est que Aulus Gellius, tesmoin oculaire, la recite. Mais quand a la repartie qu'elle contient, le Stoïcien qui la fit favorisa plus sa promptitude que sa cause, puisque, alleguant un compaignon de sa crainte, il laissa preuvé, par deux irreprochables tesmoins, que les Stoïciens estoyent touchés de la crainte, et de la crainte qui respand ses effectz es yeux, au visage et en la contenance,et qui par consequent est une passion.
Grande folie de vouloir estre sage d'une sagesse impossible! L'Eglise, certes, a condamné la folie de cette sagesse que certains anachoretes presomptueux voulurent introduire jadis,contre lesquelz toute l'Escriture, mays sur tout le grand Apostre, crie que nous avons une loy en nos cors qui repugne a la loy de nostre esprit. "Entre nous autres Chrestiens, " dit le grand saint Augustin, " selon les Escritures Saintes et la doctrine saine, les citoyens de la sacree Cité de Dieu, vivans selon Dieu au pelerinage de ce monde, craignent, desirent, se deulent et se res-jouissent." Ouy mesme le Roy souverain de cette Cité a craint, desiré,s'est doulu et res-joui jusques a pleurer, blesmir, trembler et suer le sang, bien qu'en luy ces mouvemens n'ont pas esté des passions pareilles aux nostres; dont le grand saint Hierosme, et après luy l'Escole, ne les a pas osé nommer du nom de passions, pour la reverence de la personne en laquelle ilz estoyent, ains du nom respectueux de propassions, pour tesmoigner que les mouvemens sensibles en Nostre Seigneur y tenoyent lieu de passions, bien qu'ilz ne fussent pas passions;d'autant qu'il ne patissoit ou souffroit chose quelconque de la part d'icelles, sinon ce que bon luy sembloit et comme il luy plaisoit, les gouvernant et maniant a son gré; ce que nous ne faysons pas, nous autres pecheurs, qui souffrons et patissons ces mouvemens en desordre contre nostre gré, avec un grand prejudice du bon estat et police de nos ames.
Notes
- 1 ↩French convoitise rendered as concupiscence (Augustinian/sensory-appetite sense), not mere covetous greed.
- 2 ↩Source reads atentation; translated as tentation (temptation), the only plausible intended reading.
- 3 ↩Source reading «pertubations» taken as «perturbations» (typographical omission of r).
- 4 ↩«courage» here is older French for the heart/spirit (paired with «coeur»), not modern 'courage' as bravery alone.
- 5 ↩«en fin moins» rendered as «finally at least» (last and minimal act of the will: firm refusal of consent).
- 6 ↩Source sentence is only the proper name “Aulus,” almost certainly an orphaned fragment of the Aulus Gellius anecdote that continues in the next section (AmourDieu.1.3.5). Left as the proper name; not expanded.
- 7 ↩Early French paslir and blesmir both mean to grow pale; rendered as turn pale and blanch to keep the paired intensity of the source.
- 8 ↩âme in the Aristippus retort is rendered life, not soul: the classical anecdote turns on fear for one's life, not the theological soul; meschant broüillon is rendered wicked, worthless scoundrel.
- 9 ↩propassions: Jerome's and the scholastic technical term for Christ's ordered, voluntary sensible movements, kept as a term of art rather than paraphrased.
- 10 ↩police: early-modern French for ordered governance/polity of the soul, not modern 'police'.
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