Disputatio contra cujusdam epistolam, de monachorum regula et professione
The Letter on the Substance of Monastic Profession
William introduces a letter that identifies stability, conversion of manners, and obedience according to the Rule of Saint Benedict as the substance of monastic profession, while treating other observances as supportive but dispensable.
Furthermore, even though the subject may not seem entirely on point, I still think it's worth examining more carefully — especially since we who are called monks are looking out for the good of our Rule. And since many things are discussed there regarding spiritual matters and many regarding bodily matters, which are precisely where the force of that Rule and the standard of our profession are found, let us trace them out through more careful inquiry. I have read a letter from a certain person, who responded to someone asking about this question as follows. I am not afraid to say that the Rule belongs to the monastic condition, but the virtue of the monastic order — or rather, the substance of monastic profession — consists in those things which, when everything else is set aside, make a monk; and without which the rest — I'm not saying they don't make a monk, but they don't even make sense. But what are these things? Those things which we have sworn to, and in whose stability and observance we have called God and his saints to witness. And what are these things? Stability, he says, in our monastery; conversion of our manners, and obedience according to the Rule of Saint Benedict. And further below: I want to hand over the volume of the Blessed Benedict to the monks, and I have recognized that those things which we have prescribed as the substance of his Rule — or rather, of monastic profession — are found in it, so that I may embrace the essentials with my whole mind; so that I may strive to render the vows, and what I swore to, as the Lord gives to me, with total devotion.
The Accidental Observances and the Question of Dispensation
The letter's author enumerates cloister, manual labor, food, clothing, and similar practices as non-essential observances, arguing that because dispensations are permitted in these matters, they cannot belong to the substance of profession.
As for the rest, I will try to carry them out in practice — not as though they were the body of our Rule, but as things that support and nourish it. We might well have wondered what those other things were, if he hadn't made them clear later on. They are: staying within the cloister and not going out, practicing manual labor; the quantity or variety — or at least the differing kinds — of food and drink, the bedding of one's bed, and the use of breeches only when on a direct journey.1 What does he mean? Surely if these things belonged to the substance of the monastic profession, it wouldn't be permissible to dispense with any of them even for a moment, or to change any of them at all? Otherwise, if the substance doesn't exist, I won't even be found a monk — I who will have destroyed the substance of monastic life in myself.2 And at the end of the treatise he says: 'Thus, beloved brother, thus — because in these things it is permitted to make dispensations, just as blessed Benedict himself makes a dispensation regarding the eating of meat entirely for the weak, and regarding the use of breeches at least when on a direct journey.' So I say: because in these things it is possible to make dispensations and changes, therefore they are not part of the substance of the profession.3 So much from him.
Where Is the Body of the Rule to Be Found?
William challenges the letter's framework by arguing that nearly the entire Rule consists of the very dispensable practices the author excludes from its substance, making it impossible to locate the Rule's body within the three vows alone.
But as for what he said about the use of women's garments and the use of meat — whether it should be called a dispensation of blessed Benedict or an institution — let him see to it himself. Granted, he commanded that mercy be shown to the old and to infants — but by the authority of the Rule, not by way of dispensation. Let the Rule, he says, provide the authority for them. But let's return to the earlier points. It's clear what the Rule meant by the body and substance of monastic profession: namely, stability in one place, the conversion of life, and obedience according to the Rule of holy Benedict. But I'm puzzled that he was speaking about things that support the Rule rather than being the Rule itself, and yet said nothing about reading. For since it admits dispensation, it's clear that it doesn't belong to the body of the Rule according to the author himself. Since, then, manual labor, the quantity of bread and drink, the number of side dishes, the manner of dressing, the length of vigils, the quality of bedding, the weight of silence, the length of reading, the singing of psalms, the duration of fasting, the reception of guests, and anything else of this kind are not considered the body of the Rule or the substance of monastic profession — especially since many dispensations and changes are found in these matters, so that across many monasteries nothing is practiced everywhere exactly as prescribed in the Rule — where, I ask, am I to find, within the Rule, the body of the Rule and the substance of monastic profession?
The Instability of Stability
William argues that stability of place cannot be the inviolable substance of monastic profession because Benedict himself dispensed with it by sending Maurus to Gaul, and abbots routinely transfer monks between monasteries.
Isn't it the case that the whole Rule is composed of these things — indeed, almost of these things alone? But you'll say — for I'm speaking of only those things we profess — that the body of the Rule and the substance of monastic profession consist in those three things we've set down. Therefore no dispensation can be made regarding a change of place. What then are we to make of the fact that after the Rule had already been composed and published, Father Benedict himself sent Maurus into Gaul? Now if I had read that such a change was described in the Rule, I certainly would have considered it not a dispensation but rather an institution of the Rule. But now, since I find that this was not prescribed by the Rule but was made after the Rule's institution, why shouldn't I freely call it a dispensation — especially since the authority that the Rule grants to the weak regarding the eating of meat assigns that very thing to dispensation? Don't we see dispensations of this kind being made daily by our abbots? How often — and I don't mean just from one monastery to another, but even from one region to another — monks are transferred at the discretion of their abbots.
Further Challenges to Stability and the Clerical Exception
William presses further: if stability can be broken without destroying one's monastic identity, and if monks are released from obedience to their abbot upon entering the clergy, then neither stability nor obedience can be the inviolable substance of profession.
How, then, will stability of place — so liable to manifold dispensation — pertain to the body of our Rule and the substance of monastic profession, which admits no dispensation? What of the fact that those who are received into the clergy — I do not say from that stability of place, but even from the obedience of their own abbot — are released by ecclesiastical authority? Does such a great exchange destroy the substance of a monk? What dispensation is it, then, that, if it is made concerning stability of place, will destroy a monk? Someone will perhaps say that if one were to move from one monastery to another without the consent of his own abbot, with no compulsion of danger to his own salvation, it would be a case of transgression. Is this a dispensation, and not rather a transgression? But if it isn't a transgression, I say firmly — because such a change doesn't destroy a monk. Perhaps, then, he will repent of his argument, and for that reason he will affirm that these three things are not the substance of monastic profession because they admit no dispensation, but because a monk professes these things alone.
Examining the Three Vows and the Benedictine Distinctive
William provisionally grants the three-vow framework and begins a careful examination of what stability, conversion of manners, and obedience according to the Rule actually mean, noting that some profess only obedience according to the Rule while promising the other two without reference to it.
Meanwhile, let's grant this much ourselves as well. Let it be granted, then, that the body of the Rule and the substance of the monk consist in stability of place, conversion of morals, and obedience according to the Rule of Saint Benedict.4 I ask — let's set the debate aside for now and examine more carefully just what this stability of place is, this conversion of morals, this obedience.5 Still, I'd like to know whether he thinks the monk professes the first two items according to the Rule just as he does this last one — or simply, without any qualification at all.6 I wouldn't consider this line of inquiry worth pursuing at all, unless I'd come across certain people who say they made their profession in such a way that obedience alone was professed according to the Rule, while the two prior items — they assert — were promised without any reference to the Rule at all.7 But since the Rule of Saint Augustine, to which the canons are subject, is one thing, and the Rule of Saint Benedict, to which the monks submit themselves by their profession, is another —8 I ask what distinction there is between these two professions. For both groups profess stability of place, conversion of morals, and obedience.
Is Obedience to Benedict's Rule Different from All Other Obedience?
William asks whether obedience according to the Rule of Benedict differs from obedience under any other rule or in the broader church hierarchy, and whether Benedictine obedience has a unique character not shared by canons, clerics, or bishops.
But if those two earlier vows are made without any specific determination, it seems that the Rule of Saint Benedict differs from other rules only in the profession of obedience. So will there be one kind of obedience under the Rule of Benedict, and another under the Rule of Augustine? Blessed Benedict commends an obedience that is neither slow nor lukewarm — not gloomy, not murmuring — one that does not grow weary under injuries or adversity, and does not fail before death. Will obedience under the Rule of Saint Augustine be something different? Or will it be the same obedience that a cleric owes a bishop, a bishop an archbishop, and an archbishop of bishops owes to a bishop? Can that obedience be slow or lukewarm, gloomy or murmuring, growing weary under injuries and adversities, or failing before death? In what respects, then, does the difference between these professions lie? Or perhaps obedience under the Rule means being subject to the precepts of that same Rule — precepts to which the professed members of other rules are not bound?
The Precepts of the Rule and the Universality of Virtue
William argues that the virtues commended in the Rule—love, humility, patience—are Christ's own precepts binding all Christians, so the only distinctively Benedictine elements are external observances like food, clothing, reading, and fasting, which vary across rules.
What, then, are these precepts? If the things that anyone teaches about love, humility, patience, and the other virtues — who, I don't mean a canon, but even a Christian, is not bound by these precepts?9 Or does Benedict commend one kind of love in his Rule, and Augustine another in his? Surely each one commends the same love that Christ commends in the Law and the Gospel?✦ The same question can be raised about the other virtues. For who in their right mind, when exhorting others to the virtues, would say these precepts are their own and not rather Christ's?10 What difference, then, will there be in the precepts found in different rules? Surely it comes down to this: eating in one way, dressing in another, reading in one manner, singing psalms in another, correcting and being corrected in a particular fashion, and other matters of this sort — things that are found to differ across the various rules.
Conversion of Manners and the Penitent Life
William argues that if obedience according to the Rule means following its precepts, and those precepts are either universal Christian virtues or variable external practices, then conversion of manners cannot be uniquely Benedictine either—penitents and all Christians profess it equally.
So why are certain precepts specially attributed to Augustine or Benedict? Because they are not imposed on all Christians by the authority of the Gospel, but proposed to them; yet to those who profess the rules, they are no longer merely proposed — they are imposed. Or if these aren't the ones, then which are? Surely, whatever they set down in their rules about love, humility, and the other virtues, they commend these not as their own precepts but as the Lord's; and they invite — not only monks but any Christians — to pursue these things, not as though they were their own (who would trust them on that account?) but as the precepts of Christ.11 If, therefore, obedience according to the Rule of Saint Benedict means obeying the precepts of that Rule, and the precepts of the Rule consist in the things we mentioned above, since the obedience we profess is the substance of monastic profession, how can someone preserve the substance of monastic profession without obeying those precepts? But someone may say — and this really must be addressed — that the former two things [stability and obedience] are not professed according to the Rule, and may claim that the diversity among the Rules does not consist in stability of place or in obedience (which is enjoined to monks, clerics, canons, and bishops alike), but only in the conversion of morals. Now as to stability of place — doesn't the same necessity apply to everyone? Lest, namely, someone should change location on rash presumption without the consent of the one in authority over them. Furthermore, if we profess the conversion of morals not according to the Rule but simply, without any specification, then so do those in the Church who are called penitents, fleeing to the harbor of marriage from the shipwreck of sexual immorality. Which of these does not profess the conversion of manners? It remains, then, to ask what the conversion of manners according to the Rule of Saint Benedict is. But if we flee to the virtues here — so that someone who has been proud until now may henceforth be humble, and someone who has been irascible until now may henceforth be gentle — we truly say that this conversion of manners is enjoined upon all Christians not so much by the Rule of Saint Benedict as by the Gospel. So then, since among the conversions of manners professed according to diverse rules some diversity may be found, there is nowhere for us to flee except to those things that alone are established as diverse in diverse rules — about which enough has now been said. How, then, does someone keep his own profession if he does not keep these things?
The Rule as Instrument and the Danger of Abuse
William poses a dilemma: if someone keeps all external observances yet remains proud and impatient, does he keep the Rule? He answers that the Rule is an instrument for cutting away vices, and one who keeps the letter but not the spirit abuses the instrument to his own destruction.
But someone will say: If someone has been proud, stubborn, and impatient, yet has nevertheless kept all those things mentioned above, is he to be said to keep the Rule of Saint Benedict? I say firmly that if a monk has committed any of these things against the Rule of God, and if he has corrected them in the manner prescribed in the Rule, he will not be guilty of his profession. But what if someone understands the Rule of Saint Benedict as a kind of instrument by which vices may be more easily cut away and evangelical precepts more diligently fulfilled — and it could happen that someone, abusing this best instrument, does not by it cut away his own vices or acquire virtues, and so, to his own destruction, he may indeed have the Rule of Christ yet not fulfill the precepts of Christ?
Benedict's School of the Lord's Service
William examines Benedict's prologue, arguing that the severity Benedict warns beginners against consists not in virtues like humility and patience but in the external hardships of monastic life—scant food, rough clothing, fasting, vigils, and manual labor.
Isn't blessed Benedict himself hinting at this very thing? "A school of the Lord's service is to be established by us, in which we intend to set up nothing harsh, nothing burdensome. "But if anything more severe, etc. Here I first ask: what is the severity that he urges beginners not to fear? Surely he affirms that his instruction lies in this severity. If patience, if humility, if the other virtues are meant — is he going to establish these as though he were saying something new? There is simply nowhere we can flee except to the new things he himself established — not the law, or the prophet, or Christ himself commanded these. To beginners, no doubt, no small severity seems to be present in these things, when they consider the small and cheap quantity of food and drink, the roughness of clothing, the affliction of fasts and vigils, the weariness of daily work, and other such things that are found in the Rule itself as established by him.
The Cause of the Institution: Love and the Correction of Vices
William argues that Benedict himself distinguishes between the external institution and its cause—the safeguarding of love and the correction of vices—and that both virtues and observances must be kept, since the Rule was established for the sake of love.
But if anyone hasn't accepted that the Rule consists in these things alone, let him at least grant that our profession and the Rule are not denied out of mere stubborn obstinacy, but consist in both—that is, in virtues and in observances—and therefore both must necessarily be kept by us. Although the founder of the Rule himself, in those words we have begun to examine, seems to prove something else: 'And if anything,' he says, 'proceeds more strictly, dictated by the reason of equity, for the safeguarding of love and the correction of vices.' I ask: why do we look for darkness in the light? Why look for a knot in a rush? Why do we grope at midday as if it were night? Isn't it true that in every institution one thing is the institution itself, and another is the cause of the institution? Doesn't he himself here distinguish most clearly between the institution and the cause of the institution? Doesn't he here bear witness that the safeguarding of love and the correction of vices are the cause of his institution?
The Claim That Love Fulfills the Rule
William confronts the objection that possessing love is sufficient to fulfill the Rule, arguing that many holy non-monks possess love without professing the Rule, and that for those who have professed it, love naturally leads to fulfilling one's vows.
But look — here's someone else, rising up from the other side: "What are you throwing the Rule at me for?" he says. Have love, and do whatever you wish.12 So let's eat and drink — not because tomorrow we shall die (Wis.✦13 ii) — but because we are full of love.14 Is it with love, I ask you, or with vanity? What then? you say. Doesn't the one who has love fulfill the Rule? How many holy canons, holy priests, holy bishops — and even holy married people — feel certain that they possess love, yet they are well aware that they have neither promised nor kept the Rule and profession of monks.15
Dispensation, Destruction, and the Safeguarding of Love
William concludes that dispensations in the Rule are permissible because they concern human precepts, not divine ones, provided they serve the purpose of safeguarding love and correcting vices; but if dispensation nourishes vice, it violates love and becomes dangerous.
If, however, this is said about those who profess the Rule itself, it is truly said — if only it is understood in the sense in which it is said. What then? You say I'm using authority to force you toward those harsh demands of the Rule? On the contrary — if you have love, there's no need for you to be compelled to fulfill the vows your own lips have spoken. But if you disdain to render what you vowed — with a written pledge interposed, calling on God and the saints as witnesses — you are plainly convicted of not having love.16 For how can you love the one you mock? If, he says, he has done otherwise than he promised, let him know he is to be condemned by God — the very one he mocks. What then? Do we condemn the dispensations that have been made — or are still being made — within the Rule itself by the fathers? On the contrary, we maintain that from this very point such changes can reasonably be made, because they concern human precepts, not those of God. For it is not right for anyone to change or diminish anything in the divine precepts. This much must surely be provided for: that any change or variation be a dispensation, not a destruction. Since the guarding of love, the correction of vices, and the very purpose of the institution are the reason for it, then any dispensation will indeed be reasonable, so long as the dispensation itself serves this purpose.17 But if vices are nourished more by dispensation than by the rule itself, love is violated; and even if the dispensation is not plainly harmful, it is certainly shown to be dangerous.18
Read the original Latin
Porro licet ad materiam non omnimodis pertinere videatur, consultum tamen arbitror, quatenus nobis, qui monachi dicimur, consulentes, ipsius regulae nostrae vim diligentius inspiciamus ; et cum ibi multa de spiritualibus, multa de corporalibus disserantur, in quibus maxime ipsius regulae vis, ac professionis nostrae norma consistat, diligentiori inquisitione vestigemus. Legi cujusdam litteras, qui super hanc quaestionem, cuidam sciscitanti ita respondit. Non timeo dicere, monasticae conditionis regulam esse, sed virtutem monastici ordinis, imo substantiam monasticae professionis ea, quae aliis cessantibus monachum faciunt ; et sine quibus cetera, non dico non faciunt, sed nec sapiunt. Sed quae sunt haec ? Illa quae juravimus, in quorum stabilitatem et observantiam Deum et sanctos ejus attestati sumus. Et quae sunt haec? Stabilitas, inquit, in nostro monasterio ; conversio morum nostrorum, et obedientia secundum regulam Sancti Benedicti. Et infra : Cupio Beati Benedicti volumen ad monachos revolvere; et quae ejus, quae nostrae Regulae, imo monasticae professionis substantiam praescripsimus, in eo esse cognovero, ut necessaria mente complectar ; ut vota, et in quae juravi, reddere, prout mihi Dominus dederit, tota devotione contendam.
Cetera vero, non ut Regulae nostrae corpus, sed tanquam ipsam juvantia, ipsam nutrientia, opere complere tentabo. Dubitaremus forte quae essent ista cetera, nisi postmodum ipse insinuasset. Claustrum scilicet non exire, opus manuum exercere ; quantitas vel multiplicitas, vel certe varietas cibi et potus, lecti stratura, feminalium usus nonnisi in viam directis. Quid enim, inquit? Nunquid si de substantia monasticae professionis essent, vel ad momentum in ea aliquid liceret dispensari, vel aliquid ex eis permutari? Alioqui non existente substantia, nec monachus invenior : qui monachi substantiam in me destruxero. Et in fine tractatus : Sic, inquit, frater diligende, sic quia in his dispensari licet, ut et ipse beatus Benedictus dispensat in esu carnium omnino debilibus; in feminalium usu saltem in viam directis; sic, inquam, quia in his dispensari et mutari potest, ergo non sunt de substantia professionis. Haec ille.
Verum, quod de usu feminalium, de usu carnium dixit : utrum beati Benedicti dispensatio vel institutio dici debeat, ipse viderit. Sane senibus et infantibus misericordiam impendendam, non ex dispensatione, sed ex Regulae auctoritate praecepit. Regula, inquit, auctoritas eis prospiciat. Sed ad priora redeamus. Manifestum est, quid dixerit Regula corpus, ac monasticae professionis substantiam : loci scilicet stabilitatem, conversionem morum, et obedientiam secundum Regulam Sancti Benedicti. Sed miror, quod cum de his, quae non tam Regulam, quam ipsam juvantia asserit, loqueretur ; de lectione tacuerit. Nam cum ipsa dispensationem admittat, manifestum est secundum ipsum ad Regulae corpus non pertinere. Cum igitur opus manuum, panis potusque quantitas; pulmentariorum numerus, modus induendi, quantitas vigiliarum, lectisternii qualitas, silentii gravitas, lectionis prolixitas, psalmorum modulatio, jejunii protelatio, hospitum susceptio, et si qua alia hujusmodi sunt; nec Regulae corpus, monasticae professionis substantia habeantur ; quippe cum in eis dispensationes et mutationes multae inveniantur; ita ut per plura monasteria nihil per omnia secundum quod in Regula praefinitum est, exerceant; ubi, quaeso, in Regula Regulae corpus inveniam, monasticae professionis substantiam?
Nonne de his omnibus, imo pene his solis Regula tota compacta est? Sed enim, inquies, ea sola quae profitemur, Regulae corpus, ac monasticae professionis substantiam dico : tria videlicet illa praescripsimus. De loci ergo mutatione nulla fieri potest dispensatio. Quid est igitur, quod jam Regula facta et promulgata, ipse Pater Benedictus Maurum misit in Gallias? Quod si ejusmodi mutationem descriptam in Regula legissem, utique non eam dispensationem, sed potius Regulae institutionem nominandam arbitrarer. Nunc vero, cum eam non Regula praescriptam, sed post Regulae institutionem factam invenio, cur non eam libere dispensationem appellem ; cum ille esum carnium, quem omnino debilibus Regulae concedit auctoritas, dispensationi assignet? Nonne hujusmodi dispensationes quotidie ab abbatibus nostris fieri cernimus? Quam saepe non dico de monasterio ad monasterium, sed et de regionibus ad regiones abbatum suorum dispensatione monachi transferuntur.
Quomodo ergo ad Regulae nostrae corpus, ac monasticae professionis substantiam, quae dispensationem non admittit, loci stabilitas tam multiplici dispensationi obnoxia pertinebit? Quid quod plerumque in clericatum assumpti non dico a loci illius stabilitate, sed et ab ipsius abbatis sui obedientia auctoritate ecclesiastica absolvuntur? Tantane permutatio monachi substantiam destruit? Quae est igitur dispensatio, quae si de loci stabilitate fiat, monachum destruet? Dicet fortasse, si de monasterio ad monasterium sine abbatis sui consensu, nullo salutis suae periculo compellente, transmigraret. Haeccine est dispensatio, et non potius praevaricatio? Quod si praevaricatio non est; constanter dico, quia nec talis mutatio monachum destruit. Forte ergo poenitebit eum argumenti sui; nec ideo tria haec monasticae professionis substantiam, quod dispensationem non admittant; sed quod ea sola monachus profiteatur, affirmabit.
Interim et nos hoc ipsum concedamus. Sit ergo Regulae corpus ac monachi substantia loci stabilitas, morum conversio; obedientia secundum Regulam S. Benedicti. Rogo, demus interim dextras, et qualis sit haec loci stabilitas, haec morum conversio, haec obedientia, diligentius inquiramus. Vellem tamen scire, utrum sicut hoc ultimum, ita duo illa priora secundum Regulam : an simpliciter sine determinatione monachum profiteri existimet. Quod nullo modo quaesitu dignum arbitrarer, nisi quosdam comperissem qui sic se professos dicant, ut scilicet solam obedientiam secundum Regulam, duo autem priora, non secundum Regulam, sed sine aliqua determinatione se promisisse affirment. Sed cum alia sit Regula D. Augustini, cui canonici; alia S. Benedicti, cui monachi interposita se professione submittunt, quaero inter horum professiones quae habeatur distinctio. Utrique enim et loci stabilitatem, et morum conversionem, et obedientiam profitentur.
Sed si duo illa priora sine determinatione promittuntur, videtur quod in obedientiae tantum professione, a ceteris regulis Regula discrepet S. Benedicti. Ergone alia erit obedientia secundum Regulam Benedicti, alia secundum Regulam Augustini? Commendat beatus Benedictus obedientiam, quam nec tardam vult esse, nec tepidam; non tristem, nec murmurantem ; non injuriis vel contrariis lassescentem, nec ante mortem deficientem. Aliane erit illa secundum Regulam S. Augustini? Aliane erit illa, quam clericus episcopo, episcopus archiepiscopo, archiepiscopus episcoporum debet episcopo? Illane aut tarda potest esse vel tepida, aut tristis, aut murmurans, aut in injuriis contrariisve lassescens, aut ante mortem deficiens? In quibus ergo istarum professionum constat diversitas? An forte obedientia secundum Regulam est ipsius Regulae praeceptis subdi ; quibus aliarum regularum professores non sunt obnoxii?
Quae sunt igitur ista praecepta ? Si ea quae de charitate, de humilitate, de patientia ceterisque virtutibus disserit; quis, non dico canonicus, sed etiam Christianus his praeceptis non est obnoxius? An aliam charitatem in sua Benedictus, aliam in sua commendat Augustinus? Annon potius uterque illam, quam commendat in lege et Evangelio Christus? Quod de ceteris virtutibus similiter quaeri potest. Quis enim sani capitis ad virtutes cohortans, sua haec, et non potius Christi dicat esse praecepta? Quae ergo erit in diversis regulis praeceptorum diversitas? Profecto sic vesci, sic indui, sic legere, sic psallere, sic corripere et corripi, et cetera hujusmodi, quae in diversis regulis diversa inveniuntur.
Quae idcirco vel Augustini, vel Benedicti specialiter dicuntur, quia non evangelica auctoritate Christianis omnibus imponuntur, sed proponuntur, ipsis autem regularum professoribus non jam proponuntur, sed etiam imponuntur. Aut si ista non sunt, quae sunt? Profecto quidquid in suis regulis de charitate, de humilitate, ceterisque virtutibus ponunt, non hoc quasi sua, sed quasi Dominica praecepta commendant; nec ad ea, quasi ad sua (quis enim illis crederet), sed quasi ad Christi praecepta, non solum monachos, sed quoslibet Christianos invitant. Si ergo obedientia secundum Regulam Sancti Benedicti est ipsius Regulae praeceptis obedire; ipsius autem praecepta Regulae, in his quae supra commemoravimus constant, cum illa quam profitemur obedientia, monastica sit professionis substantia, quomodo substantiam monasticae professionis servat, qui non illa servat? Sed dicat fortasse, quod utique dici debet, etiam priora illa duo non secundum Regulam profiteri, affirmetque quod non in loci stabilitate, vel obedientia, quae monachis, clericis, canonicis, episcopis eaedem injunguntur, Regularum constet ista diversitas, sed in morum tantum conversione. Nam de loci stabilitate nonne omnibus una incumbit necessitas? ne videlicet sine ejus qui sibi praeest consensu, temeraria praesumptione locum mutet. Porro si morum conversionem non secundum Regulam, sed simpliciter sine determinatione profitemur; hoc et hi, qui in Ecclesia dicuntur poenitentes, hoc ad conjugii portum de fornicationis naufragio fugientes.
Quis enim horum non profitetur morum conversionem? Restat ergo inquirere, quae sit secundum Regulam Sancti Benedicti morum conversio. Si autem hic ad virtutes confugimus, ut verbi gratia, qui hactenus superbus, deinceps humilis; qui hactenus iracundus, deinceps lenis inveniatur; dicimus profecto quia haec morum conversio, non tam Regula Sancti Benedicti monachis, quam ex Evangelio omnibus indicitur Christianis. Proinde ut inter conversiones morum quae secundum regulas diversas, diversae profitentur, aliqua inveniatur diversitas, non est quo fugiamus nisi ad illa, quae sola in diversis regulis diversa constituuntur, de quibus jam satis dictum est. Quomodo ergo professionem suam servat, qui ista non servat? Sed dicet aliquis : Si ergo quis superbus, contumax, impatiens fuerit, omnia tamen illa, quae supra commemorata sunt, servaverit, Regulam Sancti Benedicti servare dicendus est? Constanter dico quia si quaelibet ista contra Dei Regulam monachus commiserit, si secundum modum in Regula praescriptum ista correxerit, professionis suae reus non erit. Sed quid si quis Regulam Sancti Benedicti, quasi quoddam instrumentum intelligat, quo vitia facilius resecentur, praecepta evangelica sollicitius impleantur; posseque contingere ut optimo hoc instrumento abutens quis, non eo vitia sua resecet, nec virtutes acquirat, ideoque in sui perniciem Regulam quidem habeat, Christi tamen praecepta non impleat?
Nonne ipse beatus Benedictus hoc ipsum insinuat? « Constituenda est, inquit, a nobis Dominici schola servitii, in qua nihil asperum, nihil grave nos instituros speramus. Quod si quid districtius, » etc. Hic primum quaero, quae sit districtio, quam ne incipientes formident, hortatur. Profecto in hac districtione institutionem suam esse confirmat. Si patientia, si humilitas, si ceterae virtutes cogitentur ; haeccine instituturum quasi novi aliquid diceret ? Profecto non est, quo fugiamus, nisi ad illa, quae ipse nova instituit; non lex, aut propheta, aut ipse Christus praecepit. His nimirum incipientibus non modica videtur inesse districtio, considerantibus cibi potusque parvam vilemque quantitatem, vestium asperitatem, jejuniorum ac vigiliarum afflictionem, quotidiani operis contritionem, et cetera talia, quae in ipsa Regula ab eo instituta inveniuntur.
Si quis autem Regulam in solis his constare non acquieverit, saltem concedat, quod non nisi obstinatia pertinaci negatur, professionem nostram et Regulam in utrisque, virtutibus scilicet observantiisque constare, ac proinde utraque a nobis necessario servanda non neget. Quanquam ipse Regulae institutor in illis verbis, quae considerare coepimus, aliud probare videtur : « Quod et si quid, inquit, districtius, dictante aequitatis ratione, propter custodiam charitatis, et emendationem vitiorum, processerit. » Rogo, quid tenebras in luce quaerimus? Quid nodum in scirpo? Quid in meridie, quasi in nocte palpamus? Nonne in omni institutione aliud est ipsa institutio; aliud causa institutionis? Nonne ipse hic manifestissime inter institutionem, causamque institutionis, divisit? Nonne hic custodiam charitatis, ac vitiorum emendationem, suae institutionis causam testatur ?
Sed ecce alius e latere surgens : Quid mihi, inquit, de Regula objicis? Habe charitatem, et fac quidquid vis. Ergo manducemus et bibamus, non quia cras moriemur (Sap. ii) ; sed quia charitate pleni sumus. Charitate, rogo, an vanitate? Quid ergo, inquis? Qui charitatem habet, Regulam non implet? Quam multi canonici sancti, sacerdotes sancti, episcopi sancti, sed et conjugati sancti, charitatem se habere sentiunt, qui tamen se monachorum Regulam et professionem nec promisisse, nec servare non nesciunt.
Si autem de ipsius Regulae professoribus dicitur, verum dicitur; si tamen intelligatur quo dicitur. Quid ergo, inquis, me ad illa aspera Regulae auctoritate compellis? Imo si charitatem habes, non est necesse, ut compellaris reddere vota tua, quae distinxerunt labia tua. Quod si ea quae vovisti inscriptione interposita Deo et sanctis in testimonium vocatis, reddere contemnis; profecto charitatem non habere convinceris. Quomodo enim eum diligis, quem irrides ? Ut si aliter, inquit, fecerit, videlicet quam promisit, a Deo se damnandum sciat, quem irridet. Quid igitur? Dispensationes quae in ipsa Regula a patribus factae sunt, vel fiunt, damnamus?
Imo hinc eas rationabiliter fieri posse; quod de hominis, non de Dei praeceptis fiunt, astruimus. Non enim de divinis praeceptis, aut mutare aliquid aut minuere, ulli hominum fas est. Hoc sane providendum est ut ipsa mutatio vel variatio, dispensatio sit non destructio. Cum enim custodia charitatis, vitiorum emendatio, ipsius institutionis causa sit ; sic profecto ipsa dispensatio rationabilis erit, si causae huic dispensatio ipsa profecerit. Si autem dispensatione magis quam institutione nutriuntur vitia, charitas violatur; si forte non damnosa, certe periculosa ipsa dispensatio comprobatur.
Scripture echoes
- ↩Deut.6.5;Matt.22.37-Matt.22.40 — And you shall love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength. Matt.22.37 — And he said to him, 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.' Matt.22.38 — This is the great and first commandment. Matt.22.39 — And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. Matt.22.40 — On these two commandments the whole Law hangs, and the Prophets.
- ↩1Cor.15.32 — If I fought wild beasts in Ephesus for merely human reasons, what good is it to me? If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.
Notes
- 1 ↩directis (from dirigere): morphology uncertain; rendered as 'on a direct journey' following the gloss 'directed, on a direct route,' i.e., when traveling straight to a destination.
- 2 ↩destruxero: form ambiguous between future perfect indicative and perfect subjunctive; rendered as future perfect ('will have destroyed') to convey the logical force of the argument.
- 3 ↩directis: same morphological uncertainty as in s3; rendered consistently as 'on a direct journey.'
- 4 ↩The Latin lists three elements (stabilitas loci, conversio morum, obedientia) as the 'corpus Regulae' and 'substantia monachi.' The translation preserves the compressed appositional structure.
- 5 ↩Demus interim dextras: an idiomatic expression meaning to yield or set aside contention. Rendered here as 'set the debate aside for now.'
- 6 ↩The three monastic vows in view are stability, conversion of morals, and obedience. The question is whether all three are professed 'secundum Regulam' (with explicit reference to the Rule) or whether only obedience is.
- 7 ↩The sentence reports a claimed distinction: obedience is professed 'secundum Regulam' while stability and conversion of morals are promised 'sine aliqua determinatione' (without any specification). The translation preserves this contrast.
- 8 ↩The sentence is incomplete in the source, breaking off with a dash. The translation preserves the fragmentary structure.
- 9 ↩obnoxius rendered as 'bound by' to convey the sense of obligation/subjection to precepts.
- 10 ↩sani capitis rendered idiomatically as 'in their right mind' to capture the Latin idiom of sound judgment.
- 11 ↩charitate rendered as 'love' per default policy; could also be 'charity' in this theological-virtue context.
- 12 ↩The Latin 'charitatem' is rendered 'love' per lexeme policy default for charitas/caritas. The echo of Augustine's famous maxim (In Ioann. tract. 7.8: 'Dilige et quod vis fac') is noted but not resolved here.
- 13 ↩The quotation 'manducemus et bibamus, cras moriemur' echoes Isaiah 22:13 and 1 Corinthians 15:32. The parenthetical 'Sap.' with chapter 'ii' suggests the editor may also intend Wisdom 2:1–6 (the ungodly who say 'let us enjoy good things'). Both candidates preserved; final resolution deferred to tx-08.
- 14 ↩The adversative 'sed' signals a deliberate correction of the preceding hedonistic reading: the author reclaims 'eating and drinking' as an image of charity, not indulgence.
- 15 ↩The double negative 'nec servare non nesciunt' (= 'they are not unaware of not keeping') is rendered positively as 'they are well aware that they have neither promised nor kept' to preserve the ironic force in natural English.
- 16 ↩vocatis is ambiguous: it could mean 'having called upon' (active) or 'having been called' (passive). The translation follows the active reading ('calling on') as more natural in context, where the subject is the one making the vow.
- 17 ↩charitatis rendered as 'love' per lexeme policy default for charitas; the theological-virtue sense is clearly intended here.
- 18 ↩charitas again rendered as 'love'; the context is the theological virtue of charity as the animating principle of the rule.
Speculum caritatis (The Mirror of Charity) companion
Reorder one love at a time, daily
Use the study map with the free Chosen Portion app's daily readings to work through Aelred at a sustainable pace.
Aelred wrote the Mirror as a rule for daily interior discipline in community, and Chosen Portion carries that discipline forward as a short ordered reading each day.
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