Quid sit quod homo benevolus ac suavis, quamvis minus perfectus, majore quam austerus et perfectior et dulciori diligatur affectu, gemina comparatione probatur, et quomodo utriusque amor non sit periculosus ostenditur
Examining the Roots of Affection
The author probes his own conscience to understand why he feels drawn to a less-perfect but gentle person rather than a more austere, more virtuous one, and proposes that virtue and vice are the soul's true nourishment while outward manner is merely the vessel.
I want now, first of all, to explore the hidden places of my own conscience, so that this affection doesn't deceive me, if it should happen that I'm ignorant of its cause and origin. Since, then, the one toward whom my soul is moved by a certain sweet inclination is less than perfect, yet not vicious — indeed adorned with many virtues — why shouldn't this affection be believed to have its origin in virtue, and therefore not be feared, but rather embraced? But if I've said that its origin or cause is virtue, why isn't it directed toward that other man, whom I recognize as more virtuous, by an easier or at least a similar movement? Surely this affection isn't to be judged carnal, which is produced by some outward quality of a person? But if that's so, why don't I embrace another man, equally adorned in his outward manners, with the sweetness of that same gentleness, because I judge him to be vicious? For it happened to me at one time that someone's outward bearing — as long as virtue was hoped for in him, or his vice was unknown — drew my soul very strongly toward him; but once his vice came to light, it swallowed up all that affection and not a little horror filled my mind. What then? Perhaps virtue or vice are to be judged as the food of the soul, either helpful or harmful; but the austerity or kindness of a person's outward bearing is to be judged like certain vessels, either rough or refined.
Vessels of Truth and Falsehood
Using the analogy of food served in rough or refined vessels, and of truth spoken in harsh or eloquent style, the author shows that lesser virtue in a pleasant person is more readily received than greater virtue in a severe one.
And wholesome food is usually served in plain vessels; unwholesome food, on the other hand, isn't welcome even in precious ones. But it happens — and indeed quite often — that a somewhat humbler meal is welcomed more readily because of the beauty of the vessel; yet the most exquisite food is received with even greater eagerness because of the vessel's repulsiveness. In the same way, it sometimes happens that a vicious person, even with the finest physical appearance, is displeasing; yet virtue is deeply appealing even when accompanied by a certain roughness and austerity in outward demeanor. Still, it's clear that this also happens: a lesser virtue in a kind and pleasant person is more readily embraced; but a greater virtue in a stern and austere person is experienced less pleasantly. But it will be more fitting, I think — because the comparison is also more vivid — if virtue is understood as truth and vice as falsehood: then excessive severity of manner is like a rough and unpolished speech, while the pleasing charm of an outward demeanor is like an adorned and eloquent one. Just as falsehood has no place in eloquent speech, so truth should not be scorned in rough and unpolished speech. Likewise, let vice hold no appeal in a person outwardly adorned, and let virtue be no less appealing in a person however stern and austere. Finally, if two people set out to persuade on a given matter — one of them speaking dully, awkwardly, and coldly; the other sharply, ornately, sweetly, and passionately — as long as it's unknown which one rests on truth and which one drifts into falsehood, it's no surprise if the listener is more taken with the speech of the person who knows, through the craft of speaking, how to win over the resistant, rouse the indifferent, and make the listener receptive, attentive, and willing to learn; who makes it clear to those unaware where his words are leading and what they ought to expect.
The Agreeable Teacher and the Severe
When two teachers speak equal truth, the one whose manner is warm and agreeable is heard more gladly, while the harsh teacher's precious truths risk being rejected because of his uncultivated style; age-appropriate demeanor further illustrates this principle.
If both men are known to persuade with equally impressive truths, the wholesome message of the one is received with a certain bitterness in his words; the wholesome message of the other, because it is both wholesome and agreeable, is received more gladly and more eagerly. For the more pleasing charm is sought in a statement of truth, the more easily the wholesome message does its work. But if both speak the truth, and the less eloquent man tries to assert things more magnificent and more profound, the words of the one, though lesser, will slip more agreeably into the listeners' ears; yet no small effort is needed so that the precious truths, because of the clumsiness of the words in which they are offered, do not weary the mind from hearing them, make understanding unappealing, and finally make believing unwelcome. It is no different if two men are set before us: one warm, approachable, pleasant to look at, cheerful in speech, pouring himself into the hearts of those who observe him with a certain charm of outward manner; the other harsh, severe, striking those who look on him with a kind of dread through his excessive gravity. As long as the virtue — or the fault — of each remains hidden, who would fault the one if the inner sense receives the former more sweetly, while the latter is rejected not by the will or by reason but by sheer feeling? But if someone has come to know that the two are equal in other virtues, or even that the more agreeable one is less perfect in certain respects, it is not surprising, nor without reason, if for that person interior virtue, offered in outward charm like truth in beautiful speech, is more pleasing to receive, while virtue found in excessive severity of manner, like truth in a rough and uncultivated style, is accepted only with some mental unease or even reluctance. But just as there is a kind of eloquence that suits the young, and another that suits the old — what in a younger person is taken for passion and liveliness, in a more mature person would be judged frivolity — so too, in a young person, if there is a warmer kindness, more ready, more inclined to serve, more quick to act, and in an older person an honorable, serious cheerfulness, without any looseness, free from frivolity, full of maturity — the former should not be charged with frivolity, nor the latter with severity.
Love Governed by Reason, Not Feeling
The author concludes that affectionate preference is not sinful as long as it stays within the rule of charity, since feelings are involuntary and love consists not in the feeling itself but in directing it according to reason.
However this lover's feeling may vary, if the one whom his heart embraces with affection has given him neither access to himself nor anything beyond reason, and if that person has failed to offer anything that reason has shown ought to be offered, the feeling certainly does not exceed the rule of love. For since these feelings are by no means placed within our control — since we are sometimes moved most unwillingly toward certain people, and cannot warm to others even if we wish — then love does not consist in the feeling by which the mind is moved, but in the mind's directing that movement according to the feeling. The same must be said of the movement that arises from reason.
Read the original Latin
Volo nunc primo latebras propriae explorare conscientiae, ut non me fallat affectus iste, si ejus causam et originem contigerit ignorare. Cum igitur iste, cui animus meus dulci quadam inclinatione movetur, etsi minus perfectus, non sit tamen vitiosus, imo multis virtutibus adornatus; cur non iste affectus ex virtute credatur habere principium, ac proinde non timendus sit, sed potius amplectendus ? Sed si ejus originem vel causam dixerim esse virtutem, cur non erga istum, quem magis virtuosum agnosco, faciliori vel saltem simili motu dirigitur? Ergone carnalis judicandus est affectus iste, qui quadam exterioris hominis competentia generatur? sed si ita est, cur alium, aeque exterioribus adornatum moribus, quia tamen aestimo vitiosum, non ejusdem dulcedinis suavitate complector? Contigit enim mihi aliquando, ut alicujus exterior habitudo, quamdiu in eo vel virtus sperabatur, vel vitium ignorabatur, plurimum sibi animum inclinaverit meum; proditum autem ejus vitium totum illum affectum absorbuerit, ac non modicum menti horrorem ingesserit. Quid ergo? Forte virtus aut vitium quasi animae cibus vel utilis vel noxius aestimanda sunt; exterioris vero hominis vel austeritas vel benignitas, quasi vasa quaedam vel rusticana vel urbana judicanda.
Et utilis quidem cibus in vasis deformibus plerumque sumitur; noxius autem nec in pretiosis admittitur. Contingit autem, et quidem persaepe, ut cibus aliquanto vilior ob vasis decorem jucundius admittatur; pretiosissimus autem ob vasis horrorem insanius assumatur. Sic nonnunquam evenit, ut homo vitiosus, et in summo corporis ornatu displiceat ; virtus autem etiam in quadam exterioris hominis duritia et austeritate plurimum placeat. Nihilominus et id contingere manifestum est, ut minorem virtutem in homine benevolo quis ac jucundo libentius videat; major autem in homine duro et austero insuavius sapiat. Sed erit elegantior, puto, quia et expressior similitudo ; si virtus veritas, falsitas vitium aestimetur : nimia autem morum severitas, quasi sermo durus et rusticus; exterioris autem hominis grata suavitas, quasi sermo comptus et eloquens. Sicut ergo in suaviloquio non est falsitas admittenda; sic in duro rusticoque sermone veritas non spernenda. Simili modo nec in homine exterius ornato vitium placeat, nec in homine quanquam duro et austero virtus displiceat. Denique si duo homines incipiant aliqua persuadere, quorum alter obtuse, deformiter, frigide id faciat; alter acute, ornate, suaviter, vehementer ; donec nescitur quis eorum veritati innitatur; quis diffluat falsitate; non est mirum, si in ejus sermone magis delectatur auditor, qui novit ope sermonis conciliare adversos, remissos erigere; benevolum, intentum, docilem auditorem praemio reddere; nescientibus quo ejus tendat oratio, quid exspectare debeant, intimare.
Quod si uterque quae vera, aeque magnifica persuadere cognoscitur; in hujus verbis cum quadam amaritudine salubritas sumitur; in istius et suavis salubritas, et salubris suavitas gratius avidiusque percipitur. Quanto enim magis in vera assertione appetitur jucunda suavitas, tanto facilius salubritas prodest. Verum si uterque vera, sed ille minus eloquens magnificentiora ac profundiora conetur asserere; illa quidem quae dicuntur suaviter, quanquam minora, suavius auribus illabuntur; non modica autem vi opus est, ne illa pretiosa ob sermonum quibus proferuntur ineptiam audire animum taedeat; intelligere non placeat, credere postremo non libeat. Non secus si duo homines proponantur, quorum alter benevolus, affabilis, gratus aspectu, jucundus affatu, quadam exterioris hominis suavitate in corda intuentium sese refundat; alter durus, austerus, nimia quadam gravitate intuentibus quasi metum incutiat : quamdiu utriusque virtus latet, vel vitium, quis reprehendat, si illum dulcius interior sensus accipiat; istum non voluntas aut ratio, sed affectus rejiciat? Si vero in ceteris virtutibus pares utrosque cognoverit, vel si etiam illum jucundiorem in aliquibus imperfectiorem invenerit; non mirum, nec ratione vacuum, si cui virtus interior in exteriori oblata suavitate quasi veritas in pulchro sermone jucundius sapiat; virtutem in morum austeritate nimia, quasi veritatem in duro rusticoque sermone, cum quadam mentis anxietate vel etiam coactione suscipiat. Sed sicut est quaedam eloquentia, quae juvenilem decet aetatem, quaedam autem quae senilem et quae in juniori aetate fervor et vivacitas, in maturiori levitas arbitratur; ita profecto in adolescente si sit benevolentia hilarior, promptior, pronior ad obsequium, agilior ad actum, in seniore vero honesta, gravis, sine omni dissolutione, hilaris, vacua levitatis, plena maturitatis ; nec ille levitatis, nec iste debet argui austeritatis. Quoquomodocunque ergo varietur, istius amatoris affectus, si isti, quem animus ejus affectuose complectitur, nec sui copiam, nec aliud quid praeter rationem praebuerit, illi nihil, quod ratio impendendum esse monstraverit, praebere omiserit, charitatis utique regulam non excedit. Nam cum affectus isti nequaquam in nostro arbitrio collocentur, cum quibusdam aliquando invitissimi moveamur, nec quosdam, etiamsi velimus, experiri valeamus ; nequaquam tunc amor ex affectu est, cum mentem affectus moverit, sed cum mens ipsum motum secundum affectum direxerit.
Similiter de motu, qui ex ratione generatur, sentiendum est.
Speculum caritatis (The Mirror of Charity) companion
Reorder one love at a time, daily
Use the study map with the free Chosen Portion app's daily readings to work through Aelred at a sustainable pace.
Aelred wrote the Mirror as a rule for daily interior discipline in community, and Chosen Portion carries that discipline forward as a short ordered reading each day.
- All 3 books and 102 chapters mapped into 4 weekly themes with page-level pointers
- Aelred's choice-motion-fruit test, turned into a one-page self-examination worksheet
- 16 discussion questions ready for personal journaling or a 4-session small group