Quid sit inter gratiam, quam primi homines in paradiso, et illam quam habent praedestinati in mundo, et quod juste imputetur homini mala voluntas, licet ad bonam obtinendam liberi arbitrii non sufficiat facultas.
Grace Necessary to Mutable Natures
Both angels and humans in paradise needed grace to persevere in goodness, since both were changeable by nature, yet grace removed any excuse rooted in mutability.
And so, both to the angel in heaven and to the human being in paradise — though no weakness pressed upon them, and no wickedness held sway over them — this grace was necessary to each, because both were changeable by nature; and assuredly, if it had not been given, each would have sinned without excuse. But because, by creating grace, a good will had already been given to them, and by helping grace, the power to persevere in it — if only they were willing — there remains no excuse on the grounds of changeable nature; for sustaining and advancing that nature, divine goodness would not have been lacking, if their own wickedness had not abandoned it.
Grace Given to the Elect and the Question of the Reprobate
The author cautiously raises whether the reprobate ever receive grace, then affirms that the elect receive greater grace proportionate to their greater trials, including the grace actually to persevere.
Whether, however, such grace is at times also now bestowed on the reprobate, so that a good will is breathed into them and grace is added by which the power to persevere would not be lacking — if only they were willing — I do not dare to pronounce a hasty judgment. Certainly, to the elect — because a greater misery weighs upon them than upon the first human beings in paradise — a greater grace is also bestowed; and the greater the weakness that assails them, the more abundant the power to resist that is provided. To the former, as has been said, we know it has been given to be able to persevere, if they were willing; to the latter, moreover, the grace to persevere itself.
The Justice of Imputing Self-Caused Inability
Anticipating the objection that humans cannot be blamed for lacking a good will they never received, the author argues it is just to impute to them the inability they willingly brought upon themselves and the wrongs they freely committed.
But — you will say — what fault is it of the human being if they have not had a good will, which they could neither acquire by their own strength nor, once obtained, retain by their own power? But who was created with a good will, and yet was made worse by whose own fault? Why should that inability not be most justly imputed to them — an inability that the Creator did not impose on them, but that they willingly brought upon themselves? And if it doesn't seem fair that a person is blamed for this — that he now lacks a good will, which he can't have if he never received it — is it unjust to hold against him that he lost what he was given? Is it unjust to charge him with the wrongs he committed, when no one forced him?1
Read the original Latin
Unde et in coelis angelo, et homini in paradiso, licet nulla eos coarctaret infirmitas, quibus nulla dominabatur iniquitas, quia tamen uterque mutabilis natura, utrique haec gratia necessaria; qui utique si collata non esset, excusabiliter uterque peccasset. At, quia ex creante gratia, bona eis erat collata voluntas; ex adjuvante gratia, si ipsi vellent, in ea perseverandi facultas: nulla superest de mutabili natura causatio: cui sustentandae, ac promovendae non deesset divina bonitas, si eam propria illorum non deseruisset iniquitas. Utrum autem reprobis aliquando etiam nunc talis gratia conferatur, ut et bona eis inspiretur voluntas; addatur gratia, qua non desit, si tamen ipsi velint, perseverandi facultas, non audeo praecipitare sententiam. Sane electis, quia major quam primis in paradiso hominibus, incumbit miseria, major confertur et gratia: et quo major impugnat infirmitas, eo uberior praestatur resistendi facultas. Illis enim, ut dictum est, datum novimus posse perseverare, si vellent; istis insuper, ut perseverent. Sed quod, inquies, hominis vitium, si bonam non habuerit voluntatem, quam nec propriis viribus acquirere, nec adeptam suis poterit viribus retentare? At qui bonae voluntatis conditus, cujus est vitio pejoratus? Cur non justissime ipsa ei impotentia imputetur, quam non ei Creator imposuit, sed eui ipse se sponte submisit?
Et si forte aequum non videtur, ut hinc culpetur, si nunc bonam non habeat voluntatem, quam quidem habere non poterit si non acceperit; injustumne, ut imputetur ei, quod acceptam amisit; injustum, ut imputentur mala, quae nullo cogente deliquit?
Notes
- 1 ↩The Latin hinges on a rhetorical chain of result clauses (ut…culpetur, ut…imputetur, ut…imputentur) pressing the argument that a person can justly be held accountable for losing a good will received by grace, and for sins committed freely. The double 'injustumne…injustum' frames two sharp rhetorical questions.
Speculum caritatis (The Mirror of Charity) companion
Reorder one love at a time, daily
Use the study map with the free Chosen Portion app's daily readings to work through Aelred at a sustainable pace.
Aelred wrote the Mirror as a rule for daily interior discipline in community, and Chosen Portion carries that discipline forward as a short ordered reading each day.
- All 3 books and 102 chapters mapped into 4 weekly themes with page-level pointers
- Aelred's choice-motion-fruit test, turned into a one-page self-examination worksheet
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