Regula conuiuandi sensu etfere uerbis Macrohii
The Philosophy of the Banquet
The author introduces the classical rules for dining, emphasizing the need to discern the character of guests and adapt conversation to maintain harmony.
Taken from the book of the Saturnalia. What is offered from the sacred texts might seem a bit uncivil and overly superstitious; however, to go easier on ourselves, let's bring forward the pagan philosophers' rules for dining. Many have provided precepts for this part of our duties, but for now, a few will suffice. Among others, the first book of the Saturnalia comes to mind—a work so fitting, if viewed correctly, that there's no need to borrow from anywhere else. Therefore, I've decided to follow it in this chapter, not so much in its exact footsteps as in its general direction, and to use the wealth of its storehouse to fill the gaps in our own little cell. It is distinguished in its insights, flowery in its language, and overflows with such grace of character that, in the way it organizes and manages a dinner, it seems to offer a Socratic sweetness. It says, therefore: I know that philosophy, which is the moderator of all things, will first observe this: to weigh the characters of the guests present. If it finds many who are experts or at least lovers of philosophy in the company, it will allow the conversation to be about itself. Just as a few mute letters scattered among many vowels easily soften into the company of a voice, so the few who are unlearned, enjoying the company of the learned, either harmonize if they can, or are captivated by hearing such things. If, however, many are strangers to the discipline of its teaching, it will decree for the wise—who will be fewer in number—to keep their own counsel. It will allow the conversation to sound more agreeable to the majority, so that a rare nobility is not disturbed by a more boisterous crowd. This is a key virtue of philosophy: just as an orator is proven by nothing other than his speech, a philosopher is proven just as much by his silence at the right time as by his words. So, the few who are more learned will reach a consensus with the unrefined crowd, keeping their own questions to themselves so that any suspicion of discord vanishes. It’s no wonder if a learned man does what Pisistratus, the tyrant of Athens, once did. When he couldn't get his sons to agree with his sound advice and found himself at odds with them—at a time when he realized his rivals were taking joy in this discord, hoping for some upheaval within the ruler's house—he called the entire body of citizens together. He told them that while he had indeed been angry with his sons for not yielding to their father's will, he had later decided it was more fitting for a father's love to yield to his sons' opinion; he wanted the city to know, therefore, that the ruler's offspring were in harmony with their father. By this clever move, he took away the hope of those who were plotting against the peace of the rulers. Thus, in every walk of life, and especially in the joy of a banquet, everything that seems discordant must be brought into a single harmony of sound, while preserving innocence. For this reason, Agathon's banquet—because it included Socrates, Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Eryximachus—heard nothing that wasn't philosophical. But the table of Alcinous or Dido, being suited to such delights, had the former with Lopa and the latter with Polyphemus singing to the lyre.1 Dancers were present at Alcinous's table, as was Bitias at Dido's, drinking so much wine that he drenched himself in its overflowing abundance. If someone were to bring up wisdom during the dinner-table chatter among the Phaeacians or the Carthaginians, wouldn't he lose the favor of the group and invite well-deserved laughter at his own expense? Therefore, his first rule of observation will be to size up his fellow guests. Then, once he sees an opening, he won't talk about the secrets of his own deep philosophy over drinks; he won't bring up knotty or anxious questions, but rather ones that are useful and easy. For just as someone who challenges his companions to a race or a boxing match in the middle of a dinner party—where that sort of activity is the norm—would be cast out of the party's joy as a fool, so too, at the table, one must philosophize only when appropriate, so that the cup of wine, born for joy, is tempered not only by the Nymphs but also by the Muses. Since we must admit that one must either be silent or speak in any gathering, let's ask whether silence or appropriate conversation is better suited to dinner parties. If, as the silent judges of the Athenian Areopagus suggest, one ought to be silent during a feast, then there is no need to ask further whether one should philosophize at the table. But if the dinner party isn't meant to be silent, why, when conversation is allowed, is honest conversation forbidden, especially when words can cheer up a party just as much as the sweetness of wine?
Wisdom in Social Interaction
A wise person uses conversation to gently guide others toward virtue and adapts their questions to the interests and experiences of their companions.
“What does this have to do with philosophy?” you ask. On the contrary, nothing is more closely related to wisdom than adapting your words to the time and place, while keeping in mind the people who are present. For some people are moved by stories of virtue, others by accounts of kindness, and still others by examples of modesty, so that even those who were acting differently might often be brought to reform after hearing such things. Yet when it comes to those trapped in vice, if the flow of conversation at a dinner party requires it, philosophy will strike them without them even realizing it—much like Liber Pater strikes with his thyrsus hidden beneath the ivy, because he doesn't act like a dinner-table censor who openly rebukes their faults. Otherwise, those caught in their ways will resist, and the dinner party will become such a scene that the guests might seem to be acting under this edict: 'For the rest, you men, enjoy your well-earned feast and prepare for battle.' Therefore, if an opportunity for a necessary rebuke arises, a philosopher should handle it in a way that is both subtle and effective. Why is it surprising if a wise person strikes those who don't realize it, when they sometimes rebuke in such a way that the person being rebuked is actually cheered, and they show the power of philosophy—not just through their stories, but through their questions—without saying anything inappropriate? Therefore, no honorable action, place, or gathering should exclude this wisdom, which adapts itself so well that it always appears necessary, as if it would be a sin to be without it. A little later, he distinguishes between mockery and wit, which a wise person sometimes uses in a way that not only lacks bitterness but actually brings a timely sweetness. Next, he teaches the civility or charm of asking questions. So, if you want to be a pleasant conversationalist, ask things that are easy for the other person to answer and that you know they have learned through diligent practice. Everyone enjoys being prompted to share their own knowledge, because they don't want what they've learned to stay hidden—especially if it's knowledge they worked hard to gain, and which is familiar to only a few while unknown to most, like astronomy, dialectic, or other similar subjects. They seem to reap the fruit of their labor when they get the chance to share what they've learned without any hint of showing off; the person who doesn't force it, but is invited to share, avoids that trap. On the other hand, it's quite bitter if you question someone in front of many people about something they haven't gained through deep knowledge. They are forced either to admit they don't know—which they consider the ultimate embarrassment—or to answer rashly and leave themselves at the mercy of whether they are right or wrong, which often leads to the exposure of their ignorance; and they blame all this misfortune and shame on the person who asked them. Furthermore, those who have traveled across seas and lands enjoy being asked about places or bays unknown to many, and they gladly respond and describe the locations—sometimes with words, sometimes with a pointer—thinking it glorious to display to others' eyes what they themselves have seen. What about leaders or soldiers? They are always eager to talk about how bravely they’ve acted, yet they stay silent for fear of appearing arrogant. Don't they consider the reward for their labor fully paid if they're invited to recount these things, thinking it a fair return to tell their stories to those who want to listen? Yet this kind of storytelling has such a flavor of glory to it that if envious people or rivals happen to be present, they will disrupt such questions with their own noise and, by inserting other tales, prevent the telling of things that usually bring praise to the speaker. Anyone who has escaped past dangers or finished with hardships is also very happy to be invited to talk about them. For anyone still caught up in them, or even just a little bit, shrinks from the reminder and fears the account, as Virgil says: 'Perhaps one day it will be a joy to remember even these things.' It's a pleasure if you ask someone to speak about the sudden good fortune of a friend, which they weren't bold enough to mention or keep quiet about on their own, for fear of either boasting or malice. If someone enjoys hunting, ask them about the layout of the forest, the winding paths of the thickets, and the outcome of the hunt.
The Bounds of Wit and Mockery
The author discusses the proper use of wit and the dangers of malicious mockery, advocating for moderation and respect in social gatherings.
If a religious person is present, give them the chance to recount which observances earned them divine help and how much fruit they found in those ceremonies; they believe this kind of practice requires them not to stay silent about the benefits of the divine, and besides, they want to be seen as friends of the gods. If, however, an old man is also present, you have an opportunity to seem to have contributed a great deal to him if you ask him about things that don't concern him at all; for talkativeness is common to that age. But to return to jibes: those with more wit and less bitterness should be sprinkled into conversation—specifically those that cause little or no pain regarding a physical defect. For instance, you might comment on someone's baldness, their nose, a crooked posture, or a Socratic snub nose. The less misfortune these things involve, the more pleasantly they sting. Conversely, mocking the eyes or their sockets is not done without stirring up trouble. In fact, King Antigonus killed Theocritus of Chios, whom he had sworn to spare, because of a jibe the man had made about him. For when he was being dragged to Antigonus as if to be punished, and his friends were comforting him and promising him hope that he would surely experience the king's mercy once he came before his eyes, he replied: 'Then you are telling me there is no hope of salvation.' Antigonus, you see, was blind in one eye; that ill-timed wit cost the mocker his life. I wouldn't deny that philosophers have sometimes resorted to this kind of mockery out of indignation. For instance, when a king’s freedman, recently puffed up by his new wealth, hosted a banquet for some philosophers, he mocked them by asking why a stew made from both black and white beans tastes like a single color. The philosopher Aridices, taking offense, replied, “You tell us, then, why similar stains are produced from both white and black leather.” A mockery is also enhanced by the status of the speaker if they share the same situation—for instance, if a poor person mocks another poor person about poverty, or someone of obscure birth mocks another of obscure birth. For when the Tarsean Amphias, who had become wealthy after being a gardener, made some remarks about a friend as if he were a degenerate, he immediately added: “But we are from the same seeds,” and he made them all equal in their joy. But those mockeries that are delivered with good humor actually pour joy into the person they are directed at, such as if you were to tease a brave man for being reckless with his own safety and willing to die for others, or if you were to tease a generous person for spending their resources by caring less for themselves than for others. In this way, Diogenes used to praise his teacher, the Cynic Antisthenes, through what seemed like mockery. “He turned me from a rich man into a beggar,” he would say, “and instead of a spacious house, he made me live in a tub.” He said this much better than if he had said: “I am grateful to him, because he made me a philosopher and a man of perfect virtue.” Therefore, even though there is only one name for this kind of mockery, it contains within it various effects. For this reason, among the Spartans, along with other customs of a disciplined life, Lycurgus also established this kind of exercise: that young people should learn both to speak mockery without malice and to endure it when spoken against them by others; but if any of them fell into anger because of such a remark, he was not permitted to speak against another further. However, because anger often lies in wait for the joy of social gatherings, one must be moderate with such remarks, and any questions raised at a meal should be proposed to everyone or resolved by them. The ancients did not consider this kind of thing to be merely a game, so much so that Aristotle wrote something about it, as did Plutarch, Apuleius, and Fronto. It shouldn't be dismissed, since it has earned the attention of so many philosophers. Yet in the practice of rhetoricians and orators, mockery has a far more convenient place in the forum, since the opponent's agitation often contributes to one's own triumph; this is why it is said to have been very familiar to Cicero. There is a place for such mockery even in the frequent disputes of the forum, provided it does not descend into insults; even if these do not cease due to the favor of the litigant, they should nevertheless stop out of respect for the judge and the audience. For those who have a horse, a father, and property are offended if anyone rushes into insults without the most evident reason. But anyone who bears such things patiently is seen to have earned everyone's favor through their self-control. Gatherings therefore exclude insults, so that the entire sweetness of the meal is not turned bitter by their gall. But whatever brings about cheerfulness while remaining mindful of modesty should be sought after everywhere. A pleasant and graceful atmosphere for the laughter of those dining is more enjoyable than any side remarks; indeed, as the moralist elegantly says—even if in the persona of a mocker—'Just as with a leader, adversity tends to reveal the character of a host, while prosperity conceals it.'
Temperance and the Dangers of Excess
While some philosophers argue that wine can sharpen the intellect, the author warns of its dangers, citing biblical examples of those who fell through excess.
Yet even the indulgence of wine—though it's often said that God has set all hard things before the sober—has its limit, even if some have believed, on the authority of Plato, that it should be consumed freely. Homer is accused of being a wine-lover by his own praise of wine, and Plato is likewise convicted by the same of having been a wine-lover. It's certain that both of them praised the use of wine because it strengthens nature, sharpens the intellect, and rouses a sluggish spirit to get things done. But it's more reliably reported that Plato approved of a more pleasant and generous invitation among small and modest cups, provided it took place under certain quasi-arbiters and sober masters of the feast. This is what he declares in the first and second books of the Laws is not useless for men. He believed that moderate and honest relaxation while drinking refreshes the mind and restores it to take up the duties of sobriety again. As it gradually becomes more cheerful, it's made more capable of returning to its intentions. At the same time, if there were any deep-seated errors of affection or desire that a reverent sense of shame would otherwise hide, all those things are brought to light without serious danger through the freedom that wine provides, making them easier to correct and heal. In the same place, Plato says that such exercises for repelling the violence of wine shouldn't be avoided, and that no one has ever seemed truly continent or temperate whose life hasn't been tested amidst the very dangers of error and the enticements of pleasure. For if someone is unfamiliar with the pleasures and graces of social gatherings and is entirely inexperienced in them, should chance, necessity, or his own will lead him to participate in such pleasures, he is soon beguiled and captured, and his mind and spirit cannot hold their ground. One must therefore engage with these pleasurable things as if in a battle, and confront this license of wine head-on, so that we are not kept safe from them by flight or absence, but rather protect our temperance and continence through the vigor of our spirit, a constant presence, and moderate use; and once the spirit is warmed and refreshed, we may wash away whatever cold sadness or sluggish shame may have been within it. Plato's authority may move many, but to me, engaging with Bacchus—or indeed with any pleasure—seems too arduous and reckless for weaker spirits. If Lot, a just man worthy of being snatched from the fire of Sodom, fell into incest under the impulse of wine's sting; if Noah, the other father of the human race and the architect of our salvation, who was saved from the flood by his faith and perseverance in goodness, uncovered his thighs—who can engage with these things safely, unless he happens to think himself better than those fathers? Yet, so as not to resist Plato's decree, it may be stronger to engage with pleasure, while it's still safer to flee and avoid its conflict. Nor do I recall having found anyone among those who provoke pleasure whom I haven't read to have fallen.
Order and Hospitality
The chapter concludes with practical advice on managing a household, avoiding secret whispers, and maintaining clarity in speech and guest numbers.
Poetic inventions point to this, as they neither recall orgies that took place without frenzy, nor do they blush to stain the sacred rites of Bacchus with bloodshed, parricide, and various shameful acts. Furthermore, it should be noted that at dinner parties, the responsibility for instructing the household, managing the house, and overseeing the staff should be delegated to one person. This ensures that nothing seems awkward or unprepared, nothing shocking or shameful occurs, and the host isn't forced to shift his attention to managing these details—or, as the saying goes, carrying the guests on his shoulders. Anyone who wants to be a pleasant guest should also avoid the habit of whispering and the custom of holding secret conversations. At dinner parties—that is, in the joyful gathering of friends dining together—everything ought to be open, and in love and trust, nothing should be hidden. If it were possible, one should look into the hearts of others as if looking into one's own. For there is no place, or hardly any, more unsuitable for conducting business, since secret words are usually annoying to those sitting nearby who are excluded; for the exclusion itself carries the appearance of distrust. But even in what is said openly, one must faithfully follow what Gaius Claudius Caesar, a man of excellent intellect and great prudence, wrote in the first book of his Analogia. He says: 'Just as sailors avoid a reef, so one must avoid an infrequent and unusual word.' Indeed, the ancients suggested the number of guests should be no fewer than the Graces, who are limited to three, nor more than the Muses, which is nine; or, in total, they would combine the number of Graces and Muses, rising to twelve. Nevertheless, it has become common among those with clearer insight that in these matters, the duty of the head of the household should be as broad as possible.
Read the original Latin
sumpta de libro SaturnAiliorum. a Videntur forte parum ciuilia et superstitiosa nimis quae de sacris apicibus proferuntur; ceterum, ut mitius agamus nobiscum, gentilium philosophorum conuiuandi regula in medium proferatur. Et quidem plures in hanc partem officiorum praecepta dederunt sed ad praesens pauci sufficiunt. Inter alios Saturnaliorum liber primus occurrit talis, si recte respiciatur, et tantus ut nichil aliunde oporteat mutuari. Eum ergo in praesenti capitulo non tam uestigiis quam passibus decreuimus imitari et ex opulentia promptuarii sui cellulae nostrae supplere angustias. Siquidem conspicuus est in sententiis, in uerbis floridus, et tanta morum uenustate redundans ut in institutione conuiuii et dispensatione Socraticam uideatur dulcedinem propinare. Ait ergo: Scio philosophiam, quae rerum omnium moderab trix est, hoc primum obseruaturam ut secum estimet praesentium ingenia conuiuarum et, si plures peritos uel saltem amatores sui in conuiuii societatem repererit, sermonem de se patietur agitari; quia, uelud paucae litterae mutae dispersae inter multas uocales in societatem uocis facile mansuescunt, ita rariores imperiti gaudentes consortio peritonim aut consonant, si qua possunt, aut reram talium capiuntur auditu. Si uero plures ab institutione disciplinae eius alieni sunt, prudentibus, qui pauciores intererunt, sanciet dissimulationem sui et patietur loquacitatem maiori parti amicitiorem sonare, ne rara nobilitas a plebe tumultuosiore turbetur.
Et haec una est de philosophiae uirtutibus, quia, cum orator non aliter nisi orando probetur, philosophus non minus tacendo pro tempore quam loquendo philosophatur. Sic ergo pauci qui aderunt doctiores in consensum rudis consortii salua et intra se quaestione migrabunt, ut omnis discordiae suspicio facessat. Nec mirum si doctus faciet quod fecit quondam Pisistratus Athenarum tirannus. Qui, cum filiis suis rectum dando consilium non optinuisset assensum et ideo esset in simultate cum liberis, ubi hoc emulis causam fuisse gaudii comperit ex illa discordia sperantibus in domo regnantis nasci posse nouitatem, uniuersitate ciuium conuocata, ait succensuisse quidem se filiis non adquiescentibus patriae uoluntati, sed hoc postea sibi uisum esse patemae aptius pietati ut in sententiam liberorum ipse concederet; sciret igitur ciuitas sobolem regis cum patre concordem. Hoc commento spem detraxit insidiantibus regnantium quieti. Ita in omni genere uitae praecipueque in letitia conuiuali omne quod uidetur absonum in unam concordiam soni salua innocentia redigendum est. Sic Agathonis conuiuium, quia Socratas Phedros Pausanias et Herisimacos habuit, uerbum nullum nisi philosophicum sensit. At uero Alcioni uel Didonis mensa, quasi 8oh's apta deliciis, habuit haec lopam, illa Poliphemum cythara canentes.
Nec deerant apud Alcionum saltatores uiri et apud Didonem Bitias sic hauriens merum ut se totum superflua eius infusione prolueret. Nonne, siquis aut inter a Pheacas aut apud Penos sermones de sapientia erutos conuiualibus fabulis miscuisset, et gratiam illis cetibus amicam perderet et in se risum plane iustum moueret? Ergo prima eius obseruatio erit estimare conuiuas. Deinde, ubi sibi patere locum uiderit, non de ipsis profunditatis suae inter pocula secretis loquetur, nec nodosas et anxias sed utiles quidem faciles tamen mouebit quaestiones. Nam sicut inter illos qui hoc exercitii genus habent in mediis saltare conuiuiis si quis, ut se amplius exerceat, sodales uel ad cursum uel ad pugillatum lacessiuerit, quasi ineptus relegabitur ab alacritate conuiuii; sic apud mensam quandoque aptis philosophandum est ut crateri liquoris ad letitiam nati adhibeatur non modo Nimpharum sed Musarum quoque admixtione temperies. Nam si, ut fateri necesse est, in omni conuentu aut tacendum est aut loquendum; quaeramus silentiumne conuiuiis an oportunus sermo conueniat. Si enim, ut apud Athenas Athicas Ariopagitae tacentes iudicant, ita inter epulas oportet sileri, non est ultra quaerendum inter mensas philosophandum sit necne. Si uero non erunt muta conuiuia, cur, ubi sermo permittitur, honestus sermo prohibetur, maxime cum non minus quam dulcedo uini hilarent uerba conuiuium?
Quid hoc, inquis, ad philosophiam? Immo nichil tam cognatum sapientiae quam locis et temporibus aptare sermones, personarum quae aderunt estimatione in medium uocata. Alios enim relata incitarunt exempla uirtutum alios beneficiorum nonnullos modestiae ut et qui aliter agebant saepe auditis talibus ad emendationem uenirent. Sic autem uitiis irretitos, si et haec in conuiuiis exegerit loquendi ordo, feriet philosophia non sentientes, ut Liber pater tyrso ferit per obliquationem circumfusae hederae ktente mucrone, quia non ita profitebitur in conuiuio censorem ut palam uitia castiget. Ceterum his obnoxii repugnabunt et talis erit conuiuii tumultus ut sub huiusmodi inuitati uideantur edicto: Quod superest, leti bene gestia corpora rebus procurate, uiri, et pugnam sperate parari. Ergo, si oportunitas necessariae reprehensionis emerserit, sic a philosopho proficiscetur ut et tecta et efficax sit. Quid mirum si feriat sapiens, ut dico, non sentientes, cum interdum sic reprehendat ut reprehensus hilaretur, nec tantum fabulis suis sed interrogationibus quoque uim philosophiae nichil ineptum loquentis ostendet? Hanc ergo nullus honestus actus locusue, cetus nullus excludat, quae ita se aptat ut ubique sic appareat necessaria tamquam abesse illam nefas fuerit.
Et post pauca ledoriae et scomatis difierentiam facit, quae sic interdum proferuntur a sapiente ut non modo amaritudine careant sed afferant tempestiuam dulcedinem. Deinde interrogandi ciuilitatem uel fascetiam docet. Qui uult ergo amenus esse consultor, ea interrogat quae sunt interrogato facilia responsu et quae scit illum sedula exercitatione didicisse. Gaudet enim quisque prouocatus ad doctrinam suam in medium prof erendam, quia non uult latere quod didicit, maxime si scientia, quam labore quaesiuit, cum paucis illi familiaris et plurimis sit incognita, ut de astronomia uel dialectica ceterisque similibus. Tunc enim uidentur consequi fructum laboris, cum adipiscuntur occasionem publicandi quae didicerant sine ostentationis nota; qua caret qui non ingerit sed inuitatur ut proferat. Contra magnae amaritudinis est, si coram multis aliquem interroges quod non opima scientia quaesiuit. Cogitur enim aut negare se scire, quod extremum uerecundiae dampnum putant, aut respondens temere se euentui ueri falsiue committere, unde saepe nascitur inscitiae proditio; et omne hoc infortunium pudoris sui imputat consulenti. Nec non et qui obierunt maria et terras, gaudent cum de ignoto multis uel terrarum situ uel sinu maris interrogantur, libenterque respondent et loca describunt, modo uerbis, modo radio, gloriosum putantes quae ipsi uiderant aliorum oculis obicere.
Quid duces uel milites? quam fortiter a se facta semper dicturiunt et tamen tacent arrogantiae metu. Nonne ii, si ut haec referant inuitentur, mercedem sibi laboris estimant persolutam, remunerationem putantes inter uolentes narrare quae feceranf? Adeo autem id genus narrationis habet quendam gloriae saporem ut, si inuidi uel aemuli forte praesentes sint, tales interrogationes obstrependo discutiant et alias inserendo fabulas prohibent illa narrari quae solent laudem creare narranti. Pericula quoque praeterita uel erumpnas penitus absolutas qui euasit, ut referat gratissime prouocatur. Nam qui adhuc in ipsis uel paululum detinetur, horret admonitionem, et formidat relatum, ut Virgilius: Forsan et haec olim meminisse iuuabit. luuat si quem dicere iusseris amici sui repentinam felicitatem, quam sponte non audebat dicere uel tacere, modo iactantiae modo malitiae metu. Qui uenatibus gaudet interrogetur de siluae ambitu, de ambage lustrorum, de uenationis euentu.
Religiosus si adest, da illi referendi copiam quibus obseruationibus meruerit auxilia deorum, quantus illic cerimoniarum fructus; quia et hoc genus religionis existimant numinum beneficia non tacere; adde quia uolunt se amicos miminibus estimari. Si uero et senex praesens est, habes occasionem qua plurimum illi contulisse uidearis, si eum interroges uel quae ad illum omnino non pertinent; est enim huic etati loquacitas familiaris. Vt uero ad scomata redeamus, illa quae plus urbanitatis et minus amaritudinis habent sunt interiacienda conuiuiis, ut sunt illa quae de nonnullis corporum uitiis aut parum aut nichil gignentia doloris, ut si in caluitium cuiusquam dicas aut nasum uel curuam erectionem seu Socraticam depressionem. Haec enim quanto minoris infortunii sunt, tanto suauius ledunt. Contra oculorum a orbitas non sine excitatione commotionis obicitur. Quippe Antigonus rex Teocritum Chium, de quo iurauerat quod ei parsurus esset, occidit propter scoma ab eodem de se dictum. Cum enim quasi puniendus ad Antigonum raperetur, solantibus eum amicis ac spem pollicentibus quod omnimodo clementiam regis experturus esset cum ad oculos eius uenisset, respondit: Ergo impossibilem michi dicitis spem salutis. Erat autem Antigonus uno orbatus oculo; et importuna urbanitas maledicacem luce priuauit.
Nec negauerim philosophos quoque incurrisse per indignationem hoc genus scomatis. Nam cum regis libertus ad nouas diuitias nuper erectus philosophos ad conuiuium congregasset et irridendo eorum minutulas quaestiones scire se uelle dixisset cur et ex nigra et ex alba faba pulmentum unius coloris edat, Aridices philosophus, indigne ferens: Tu nobis, inquit, absolue cur et de albis et de nigris loris similes maculae gignantur. Commendat scoma et conditio dicentis si in eadem causa sit, ut si aHum de paupertate pauper irrideat, si obscure natum natus obscure. Nam Tarseus Amphias, cum ex hortolano diues esset et in amicum quasi degenerem nonnuUa dixisset, mox subiecit: Sed et nos de eisdem seminibus sumus; et omnes pariter letos fecit. Illa uero scomata directa letitia eum in quem dicuntur infundunt, ut si uirum fortem uituperes quasi salutis suae prodigum et pro aliis mori uolentem aut si obieceris liberali quod res suas profundat minus sibi quam aliis consulendo. Sic et Diogenes Antistenem Cinicum magistrum suum solebat uelud uituperando laudare. Ipse me, aiebat, mendicum fecit ex diuite et pro domo ampla fecit habitare in dolio. Melius autem ista dicebat quam si diceret: Gratus illi sum, quia me philosophum et consummatae uirtutis uirum fecit.
Ergo, cum unum nomen scomatis sit diuersi in eo continentur efFectus. Ideo apud Lacedemonios inter cetera exactae uitae instituta hoc quoque exercitii genus a Ligurgo institutum est, ut adolescentes et scomata sine morsu dicerent et ab aliis in se dicta perpeti discerent; at si quis eorum in indignationem ob tale dictum prolapsus fuisset, ulterius ei in alterum dicere non licebat. Verum, quia letitiae in conuiuiis frequenter insidiatur ira, ab huiusmodi dictis temperandum est et quaestiones conuiuales in omnes proponendae sunt aut soluendae. Quod genus ueteres ita ludicrum non putarunt ut et Aristotiles de ipsis aliqua conscripserit et Plutarcus et Apuleius cum Frontone. Nec contempnendum sit quod tot philosophantium meruit curam. At in exercitio rethorum oratorumue foro longe commodiorem habent scomata locum quippe ubi motus aduersarii saepe proficit ad triumphum; unde et hoc Ciceroni perfamiliare fuisse traditur. Ipsis quoque ledoriis crebro in contentionibus a fori locus est, dum tamen ad probra non perueniant; quae, etsi non quiescant fauore litigantis, cessare tamen debent ob reuerentiam iudieis et auditorum. Offenditur enim quibus est equus et pater et res si quis nisi euidentissima ratione ad probra prosiliat.
Sed qui ea sustinet patienter, fauorem omnium a temperantia uisus est meruisse. Conuiuia ergo ledorias excludunt, ne felle earum tota conuiualis dulcedo amarescat. At id quod hilaritatem conciliat modestiae consciam undique conquirendum. locus enim comis et uenustus conuiuantium risus omnibus parenteticis iocundior est; siquidem eleganter, licet in persona derisoris, ethicus ait: Sed conuiuatoris, uti ducis, ingenium res aduersae nudare solent, celare secundae. Sed et uini indulgentia, licet dici soleat quia siccis deus omnia dura proposuit, modum habet etsi fuerint qui Platonis auctoritate ea passim crediderint haurienda. Laudibus arguitur uini uinosus Homerus; et Plato ab eisdem uinosus conuincitur extitisse. Certum est utrumque eorum uini laudasse usum quod et naturam roborat et ingenium acuit et ad res gerendas animum remissum accendit. At Platonem inter minuta et modesta pocula iocundiorem liberalioremque inuitationem probasse fidelius traditur quae fieret sub quibusdam quasi arbitris sobriisque magistris conuiuiorum.
Et hoc est quod in primo et secundo de Legibus non inutile uiris esse decemit. Nam et modicis honestisque inter bibendum remissionibus refici integrarique animos ad instauranda sobrietatis officia existimauit, redditosque sensim letiores ad intentiones rursus capessendas fieri habiliores et simul, si qui penitus in his affectionum cupiditatumque errores inessent quos celaret alioqui pudor reuerens, ea omnia sine graui periculo libertate per uinum data detegi et ad corrigendum medendumque fieri oportuniora. Atque hoc Plato ibidem dicit non diffugiendas esse huiuscemodi exercitationes aduersus uini uiolentiam propulsandam neque ullum umquam continentem prorsus aut temperantem satis fideliter uisum esse cui uita non inter ipsa errorum pericula et in mediis uoluptatum illecebris explorata sit. Nam cui libentia gratiaeque omnes conuiuiorum incognitae sint quique illarum omnino expers sit, si eum forte ad participandas huiusmodi uoluptates aut uoluntas tulerit aut casus induxerit aut necessitas impulerit, mox deliniri et capi neque mentem eius animumque consistere, Congrediendum igitur et tamquam in acie quadam cum uoluptariis rebus, cumque ista uini licentia cominus decernendum, ut aduersus eos non fuga nec absentia simus tuti, sed uigore animi et constanti praesentia moderatoque usu temperantiam continentiamque tueamur et calefacto simul refotoque animo, si quid in eo uel frigidae tristitiae uel torpentis uerecundiae fuerit, a abluamus. Poterit auctoritas Platonis mouere quam plures, sed michi nimis arduus et temerarius infirmioribus animis uidetur cum Bacho, immo et cum quauis uoluptate congressus. Si Loth uir iustus et dignus qui de Sodomorum eriperetur incendio impellente uini stimulo corruit in incestum; si Noe femora denudauit, fide et perseuerantia boni subtractus diluuio, alter humani generis pater et salutis opifex, quis tuto congreditur, nisi forte seipsum tantia ducat patribus praef erendum? Vt tamen Platonis non reluctemur edicto, congredi cum uoluptate sit fortius, dum tamen tutius sit fugere et illius declinare conflictum. Nec memini quemquam me inuenisse de prouocatoribus uoluptatum quem non legerim cecidisse.
Eo forte spectant figmenta poetica, quae orgia sine furore transacta non recolunt nec erubescunt sacra Bachi cruore parricidiis et multiplicibus flagitiis maculare. Rst praeterea in conuiuiis obseruandum ut instruendae familiae et domus regendae cura et seruilis obsequii moderatio uni alicui demandetur, ne quid ineptum et imparatum appareat, ne quid stupendum aut erubescendum emergat, ne dominum oporteat ad se gerendorum reuocare sollicitudinem et, ut dici solet, quasi in humeris portare conuiuas. Vitet etiam qui conuiua comis esse uoluerit consiliandi consuetudinem uerbique secreti faciendi morem, eo quod in conuiuiis, id est in iocundo amicorum conuiuantium cetu, debent omnia esse nuda, et in amore et fide nichil debet esse absconditum sed, si fieri posset, oculos in pectora sua inuicem mutuo transc ferre conspectu. Nullus enim locus actitandis consiliis aut uix ullus ineptior est, siquidem uerba secreta solent assidentibus exclusis esse molesta; nam ipsa exclusio habet imaginem diffidentiae. Sed et in his quae palam dicentur fideliter exequendum erit quod in primo libro de Analogia scripsit Gaius Claudius Caesar, uir excellentis ingenii magnaeque prudentiae. Ait enim: Tamquam scopulum nautae fugiunt, sic fugiendum est infrequens atque insolens uerbum. Et quidem numerum conuiuanam expresserunt antiqui ut nec pauciores essent quam Gratiae, quae clauduntur temario, nec plures quam Musae, id est nouem, aut in summa Gratiarum et Musarum explerent numerum, ad duodenarium ascendentes. Optinuit tamen apud eos qui rectius intuentur ut in his officium patrisfamilias latissime pateat.
Notes
- 1 ↩The Latin text here appears corrupt ('8oh's', 'lopam'); translated based on the likely intended contrast between philosophical and hedonistic banquet entertainment.
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