De ineptiis nugatorum qui sapientiam uerha
The Vanity of Wordy Wisdom
The author critiques those who mistake empty verbosity and intellectual posturing for true philosophical wisdom.
They think so; and they believe that divine books are read in one way, and pagan books in another. They are certainly wrong—and shamelessly so—who imagine that philosophy consists only in words; they are wrong who think that virtue is just words, as if a grove were just wood. For the value of virtue consists in action, and virtue inseparably accompanies wisdom. It's clear that those who cling only to words would rather seem wise than actually be wise. They wander the streets, wear out the doorsteps of the learned, stir up petty questions, and tangle up words to obscure their own meaning and that of others, always readier to spout off than to examine whether any real difficulty has actually arisen. Yet these braggarts of wisdom—not lovers of it—are afraid to reveal their own ignorance. Out of a perverse sense of shame, they would rather remain ignorant than ask and learn, especially if others are present who they think might know what they don't. Still, you won't be able to stand their arrogance; they speak instantly on any subject, judge everyone, criticize others, praise themselves, and boast that they've discovered something new, when it's something that has been worn thin by the ancients and by the testimony of books through many ages down to our own time. It has been handed down to our own day. They use so many words that they are often hard to understand, not because the subject is difficult, but simply because of the sheer volume of their speech. Since he’s managed to make himself unintelligible, he thinks he’s earned the right to be seen as a philosopher above all others. Often, someone who knows very little will propose a great many things that even Pythagoras himself wouldn't have been able to explain. Sometimes he repeats and turns over the same things, and because he has nowhere else to turn, he labors miserably, wearing down the same ground and circling the same empty air; when you hear him from a distance, you will marvel that a third Cato has fallen from the heavens. He will seem to have brought every kind of person with him; if you ask about his profession or art, he is a grammarian, rhetorician, geometer, painter, trainer, augur, tightrope walker, physician, or magician—he knows everything, and is far more accomplished than a starving Greek. Indeed, if you command it, he will go into the heavens, and more learned than Daedalus, he will carry you safely through the void wherever you wish. Approach him to be taught, diligently ask what the authors meant in their writings, or examine the text, and he’ll immediately rebuke your dullness, calling you slower than an Arcadian donkey. You are duller than lead while you ask what lies hidden in the letter; the letter is useless, and it is not worth caring what it says. If you persist, you'll be warned to flee, since it's destructive and deadly. Beware of being a serpent that eats dust all the days of its life. You're expected to play, chat, or argue, because whoever is wordier seems wiser. It doesn't matter where someone is coming from, what they think about a subject, or what their background is, as long as they keep talking. It doesn't matter what reasoning someone uses, as long as they manage to provide not the substance, but merely its shadow. It's a waste of time to ask what is true or false, probable or improbable, since everyone prefers the mere image of probability. State whatever you like, and some similarity will immediately empty it of meaning; for what holds true in one similar case will, whether you like it or not, hold in another. Yet it remains clear that what is merely similar to the truth is not automatically true, and what seems false is not always false.
The Futility of Endless Debate
A description of the circular and exhausting nature of debates held by those who prioritize appearance over substance.
If you try to uncover the differences between similar propositions, you're taking on a pointless task. They'll either shout you down or mock your wasted effort, since there must be some difference between things that are similar; otherwise, they wouldn't be called similar, but identical. Trying to explain why this isn't the case is considered not just frivolous, but worthy of mockery. They immediately ask if you want to give a speech; they say they came to hear a Peripatetic, not Hermagoras—though they imitate the Peripatetics more by walking around and taking circuitous routes than by any diligent investigation of things. If, however, this debate is practiced to build up a store of eloquence by seeking out both similar and dissimilar things, it's a laudable exercise—and one I wouldn't easily say is less beneficial to the young, provided they don't let their eyes be blinded by a thick cloud of fallacies. Nothing is more useful or convenient for the young in acquiring glory or wealth than the eloquence gained from this practice, provided they have a wealth of subject matter in their minds and on their tongues. Speaking about things you don't know is the mark of a fool, not someone who is teaching or learning. You'll see many of this sort who hold your attention with a long speech all day while saying absolutely nothing, or very little. You're exhausted from listening, and he could have been worn out from talking, if only he weren't so long-winded; yet you still don't understand where he's heading or what he wants. You're waiting for the end, but he hasn't even begun. Endure it, though, so you can see where he's going; finally piece together what he's woven, and it will strike you like the dreams of a sick man spinning empty fantasies, where neither head nor tail makes any sense. You'd think he was a man with a troubled brain, someone who can't hold his tongue because his reason has failed him. You might think he's been staying up all night, and that his reason is so clouded that only melancholy is driving him. If you happen to be moved by pity and try to persuade him to be modest, he'll flare up and start hurling insults at anyone in reach, railing equally at those who sympathize and those who mock him; neither friend nor foe will get away from him without being spat upon. If you've already started, you'll have to see it through, or else you'll have to put up with the insults of his brazen tongue. Stop now, unless you'd rather be stained by his filthy language. Even unclean things stink more when they're stirred up. You'll recognize the saying of a wise man: those who are sensible fear to touch a madman and flee from him, while children, being reckless, follow him around. Although such a person might seem entirely useless to private individuals or those living serious lives, he's still convenient for a crowd that enjoys material for laughter and jokes. He's an excellent tool for provoking laughter, and more effective than any mime. To avoid his poison, be patient in listening and indulge the madman who spares no one. If you happen to want to restrain him, ask him kindly to add more substance to his teaching or debating and to make up for it with a logical flow of words. For whoever tempers words to the matter at hand, and the matter to the opportunity of the moment, holds the most modest rule of all eloquence. True abundance, however, brings praise, to which truth—being a friend to virtue and all duties—consents. Speaking much and fallaciously is the mark of a trifler; it shows a total disregard for one's reputation while provoking the hatred and contempt of serious people.
The Trap of Sophistry
While acknowledging the utility of learning to detect fallacies, the author warns against becoming obsessed with empty metaphysical questions.
The Spirit is the author of wisdom, and anyone who speaks with sophistry is detestable. Still, there is no small benefit in detecting these sophistical annoyances; without knowing them, anyone who proceeds to examine the truth and sift through matters is like a useless soldier who marches out unarmed against an experienced and well-equipped enemy. It is permissible, then, to trick an opponent for the sake of practice and to engage in a kind of mock-combat among citizens in the school of drill-masters; but when the intention of those speaking rises to the sobriety of philosophy, these sophistical annoyances must be set aside. And if they do happen to emerge from either side, they are corrected by the wise, just as the deceit of the malicious is curbed among those making contracts in the public sphere. However, to temper words to facts and facts to the occasion, and to prudently argue against the fallacies that intervene, isn't the work of a few days or a light task. This is why many who approach it turn back, and by parading some small scrap of philosophy's garments, they boast before the unlearned as if they had mastered its entire jurisdiction. As someone says (the words remain, though the name has slipped my mind): 'Once a boy knows how to join two parts, he stands and speaks as if he had mastered all the arts.' He brings forward a new opinion on genera and species that escaped Boethius, which the learned Plato didn't know, and which he himself, by some happy stroke of luck, recently discovered in the secrets of Aristotle. He is prepared to solve an ancient question, one over which the struggling world has already grown old—a question on which more time has been spent than the House of Caesar spent acquiring and ruling the empire of the world, and more money poured out than Croesus ever possessed in all his wealth. This question has held many people for so long that, even though they spent their whole lives searching for this one thing, they ended up finding neither it nor anything else; and perhaps that is because what could be found was not enough to satisfy their curiosity. For just as it is futile to seek the substance of solidity in the shadow of any body, so in those things that are merely intelligible and can be conceived universally, but cannot exist universally, the substance of a more solid existence is never found. To waste one's life on these things is to do nothing and to labor in vain; they are indeed mists of fleeting things, and the more eagerly they are sought, the faster they vanish. Authors explain this in many ways and through various discourses, and because they've used words indiscriminately, they've seemed to fortify various opinions and have left contentious people with plenty of material for arguing. The reason for this is that, having grasped sensible and other individual things—since these alone are said to be truly real—they elevate them into different states, and on the basis of these, they establish the most specific and most general categories within the individual things themselves. There are those who, like mathematicians, abstract forms and refer everything said about universals to them. Others discuss concepts and confirm that they are judged by the names of universals. There were also those who claimed that these very words were genera and species; but that opinion has already been exploded, and it vanished easily along with its author. Yet there are still those who are caught following in their footsteps, even if they are ashamed to profess the author or the opinion; they cling only to the names, taking away from things and understandings what they ascribe to words. Everyone defends themselves with their own judgment, building up their own opinion or error from the words of authors who used names for things or things for names indiscriminately. From this, great breeding grounds for arguments arise, and everyone gathers whatever they can to confirm their own heresy. There is no moving away from genera and species; rather, you will apply it to whatever subject is being discussed. You'll suddenly be surprised to find a poetic painter who, for everything necessity demands, perhaps knows how to simulate a cypress tree. Rufus is so foolish about Naevia—as Coquus testifies—that no misfortune can turn him away; for whatever Rufus does, it’s nothing but Naevia to him. If he rejoices, if he weeps, if he is silent, he is speaking of her. He dines, he offers a drink, he asks, he denies, he nods—it’s all Naevia; if Naevia isn't there, he’ll be mute.
True Pedagogy vs. Intellectual Pride
The author concludes by distinguishing between the proper way to teach and the prideful display of knowledge that confuses the student.
That subject seems better suited for philosophizing where there's more freedom to invent whatever you like, and where there's less certainty due to the difficulty of the matter or the ignorance of those debating it. Often, just as a cautious soldier watches for rough patches and narrow passages to hinder an enemy, someone will stir up difficult questions—whether from the Scriptures or from logic—or, if they have another goal in mind, they'll slide into them as if by accident. And if you aren't able to satisfy them (since there is no one who can explain everything that even the ignorant might ask), they immediately nod their eyes, twist their face, wave their arms, shout, jump about, and transform themselves with gestures that would seem inept in any actor or mime. You certainly won't satisfy them unless you answer them in their own words and say only what they're used to hearing. Yet he himself, though he may be more scrupulous, is ignorant of the full solution. In one thing, however, he perhaps looked out for himself more cautiously, in that he stuffed into his purse everything that makes him feel puffed up. Yet it's easy to prick this bladder, as if with a needle, and whatever loquacity was resonating in the bellows of an ignorant throat will sometimes be quieted by a single word from a wise person. Nor would I consider those better suited for philosophizing who object to every little word with a long speech, as if they were addressing a public assembly about everything being asked. It's a standard rule that anyone who answers more or less than what they're asked doesn't know the first thing about how to argue properly. However, when someone needs to be taught, you should only say what actually helps to resolve the points at hand. It's clear that those who read everything into every single point, and try to explain everything when only one thing is being asked, don't understand the proper way to teach; either they don't know how to teach correctly, or they're just using a pretense of duty to show off their own cleverness—or, as Cicero says, they're showing off not what the subject matter requires, but what they themselves are capable of. So, those who fill the Porphiriolum with every branch of philosophy just dull the minds of those they're trying to introduce to the subject and confuse their memory. They overwhelm the person who was supposed to be instructed with such heavy material that they end up thinking the burden they've taken on is unbearable. I might perhaps grant that the books of Divine Scripture—where every single point is full of divine mysteries—should be read with such gravity, precisely because the treasury of the Holy Spirit, by whose finger they were written, can never be fully exhausted. For even if the surface of the letter is adapted to only one meaning, a multiplicity of mysteries lies hidden within, and from the same text, allegory often builds up faith, tropology builds up morals in various ways, and anagoge also leads us upward in many ways, so that it instructs the reader not just through words, but through the realities themselves. But in the liberal arts, where words signify not realities but only themselves, anyone who isn't satisfied with the primary sense of the text seems to me to be wandering away from the understanding of the truth, or else they just want to keep their listeners occupied for as long as possible. I honestly think Porphyry's work is pointless if he wrote it in a way that you can't understand it without first reading Aristotle, Plato, and Plotinus. Whoever tries to introduce me to a subject with that kind of shortcut can keep it. For my part, I'll follow the one who opens up the text and, having laid bare the surface, teaches the literal meaning, if I may put it that way.
Read the original Latin
putant; et quod aliter legetidi sunt lihri diuini, aliter gentiles. Errant utique et impudenter errant qui philosophiam in solis uerbis consistere opinantur; errant qui uirtutem uerba putant ut lucum ligna. Nam uirtutis commendatio consistit ab opere, et sapientiam uirtus inseparabiliter comitatur. Vnde constat quia illi, qui uerbis inherent, malunt uideri quam esse sapientes. Plateas circumeunt, terunt limina doctionim, quaestiunculas mouent, intricant uerba ut suum et alienum obducant sensum, paratiores uentilare quam examinare si quid difficultatis emersit. Verentur tamen prodere imperitiam suam iactatores sapientiae nec amatores, et id quod nesciunt prauo pudore nescire quam quaerere et discere malunt; praesertim si assint alii, quibus notum arbitrentur quod ipsi nesciunt. Fastum tamen eorum ferre non poteris; de omni materia loquuntur subito, diiudicant omnes, culpant alios, seipsos praedicant, iactant se inuenisse de nouo quod tritum est ab antiquis et testimonio librorum per etates multas ad temporr. nostra perductum.
Verba multiplicant ut saepe minus intellecti sint onere et multitudine uerborum quam rerum difficultate. Cum enim ne intelligeretur effecit, arbitratur se meruisse ut prae ceteris philosophus uideatur. Et saepe qui paucissima nouit, proponit plurima quae nec ipse Pitagoras sufficeret explanare. Interdum eadem replicat et reuoluit et, quia non habet quo diuertat, laborat misere, idem terit et easdem circinat auras; dum eum procul audis, tertium Catonem e celo miraberis cecidisse. Quemlibet enim hominem attulisse uidebitur; si prof essionem quaeris aut artem, est gramaticus, rethor, geometer, pictor, aliptes, augur, cenobates, medicus, magus; omnia nouit, et esuriente Greculo longe praestantior. Nam et, si iusseris, ibit in celum et Dedalo doctior teipsum quo uolueris incolumem per inane traiciet. Accede ut docearis; quid in scriptis suis auctores senserunt diligenter inquire; excute litteram; statim increpabit duritiam tuam et asino Archadiae te dicet tardiorem. Plumbo ebetior es, dum quid in littera latet interrogas; littera inutilis est, nec curandum est quid loquatur.
Si instas, moneberis fugere quoniam perniciosa est et occidit. Caue ne serpens sis qui terram comedit omnibus diebus uitae suae. Aut ludendum aut fabulandum aut disceptandum est tibi; nam qui uerbosior est, uidetur doctior. Nec curandum est unde aut quid de quo sentiat aut prof erat aliquis, dum loquatur. Nec ref ert qua quisque ratione nitatur, dum non instantiam sed umbram eius quisque dare sufRciat. Quid uerum aut falsum, quid probabile aut non probabile sit, frustra quaeritur, cum omnibus imago probabilium praeferatur. Statue quod uolueris, statim a illud aliqua similitudo euacuat; nam quod optinet in uno simili uelis nolis in alio optinebit. Constat tamen quod uero simile est non statim esse uerum et quod falsum uidetur non semper falsum esse.
Si propositorum similium dissimilitudinem niteris aperire, rem inanem aggrederis. Aut enim te uel clamore praepediet aut superfluam operam deridebit, cum omnium similium aliquam dissimilitudinem esse oporteat; alioquin non tam similia quam eadem merito dicerentur. Docere cur ita non sit non modo friuolum sed irrisione dignissimum iudicatur. Statim quaeritur an uelis concionari; dicunt se ut Peripatheticum non Ermagoram audiant conuenisse; cum tamen deambulatione et circuitione uiarum potius quam diligenti inuestigatione rerum Peripatheticos imitentur. Si tamen haec ad copiam eloquentiae comparandam exerceatur disceptatio et similia et dissimilia conquirantur, exercitium quidem laudabile est et quo aliquid esse conducibilius iuuentuti non facile dixerim, dummodo fallacianim nube multiplici sibi nequaquam perstringi oculos patiantur. Nichil enim utilius, nichil ad gloriam aut res adquirendas commodius iuuentuti quam eloquentia quae ex eo plurimum comparatur si rerum in mente et in ore copia sit uerborum. Verba namque proferre rebus incognitis desipientis potius quam docentis est aut discentis. Multos uidebis huiusmodi qui totum longo detinent sermone diem et nichil omnino dicunt aut minimum.
Tu defessus es audiendo, et is, nisi uerbosior esset, loquendo perfatigari potuerat; quo tamen tendat aut quid uelit nondum intelc ligis. Tu finem expectas, ille nondum initium fecit. Perfer tamen ut uideas qua exiturus sit; recollige tandem quae contexuit et occurrent tibi uelud egri somnia uanas fingentis species, ut nec pes nec caput uni reddatur formae. Turbati cerebri hominem credas et qui ex defectu rationis linguam continere non possit. Putes eum noctes continuare insompnes et sopita ratione melancoliam solam in eo excitatam. Si forte miseratione ductus ei modestiam persuaseris, succendetur et quaelibet in quemuis fijiget opprobria compatientibus et deridentibus aeque conuitiabitur; nec amicus nec hostis ab eo nisi consputus abcedet. Si coepisti, perferas necesse est aut procacis linguae sustinebis iniurias. Desiste ergo, nisi sordida lingua malueris inquinari.
Nam et immunda quo magis mouentur, eo amplius fetent. Viri prudentis dictum agnosces quia uesanum tetigisse timent fugiuntque poetam qui sapiunt; agitant pueri incautique sequuntur. Licet autem apud priuatos aut serio uiuentes homo huiusmodi rectissime uideatur inutilis, commodus tamen est in cetu multitudinis quae hilaritatis et iocularis letitiae materia gaudet. Optimum enim instrumentum est ad risus conciliandos et efficacior quouis mimo. Vt uenenum eius efa fugias, patientiam indicas auribus, morem geras insano qui nulli parcit et, si eum forte uis reprimere, benignissime obsecra ut in docendo aut disputando sententiae plus apponat et eam uerborum deductione compenset. Nam qui uerba rebus et res temporis opportunitati contemperat, modestissimam totius eloquentiae regulam tenet. IUa uero copia laudem parit cui ueritas uirtuti et omnibus officiis amica consentit. Multa siquidem et fallaciter loqui nugigeruli est et famam omnino negligentis et in se uirorum grauium prouocantis odium et contemptum.
Nam et Spiritus sapientiae auctor est quia qui sophistice loquitur odibilis est. Non mediocris tamen utilitas est in deprehendendis importunitatibus sophisticis, sine quarum notitia quisquis ad examinationem ueri et rerum uentilationem progreditur quasi miles inutilis est qui aduersus exercitatum et instructum hostem procedit exarmatus. Licet ergo ad exercitium colloquentem uicissim fallere et quasi in campidoctorum scola inter ciues iocularem militiam exercere; sed, ubi se colloquentium intentio ad philosophiae sobrietatem erigit, importunitates sophisticae delitescunt. Et, si forte ab alterutra parte emerserint, sic a sapientibus corripiuntur sicut in re publica inter contrahentes dolus malignantium cohercetur. Ceterum uerba rebus, res temporibus contemperare, et interuenientes fallacias prudenter arguere non paucorum dierum est aut leuis opera. Vnde plurimi accedentes retrorsum abeunt et aliquam uestium philosophiae portiunculam praeferentes gloriantur apud indoctos ac si in iurisdictionem eonim tota coneesserit. Vt enim quidam ait (uerbis namque manentibus nomen excidit): Garcio quisque duas postquam scit iungere partes, sic stat, sic loquitur uelut omnes uouerit artes. De generibus et speciebus nouam affert sententiam quae Boetium latuit, quam doctus Plato nesciuit, et quam iste felici sorte in secretis Aristotilis nuper inuenit.
Veterem paratus est soluere quaestionem in qua laborans mundus iam senuit, in qua plus temporis consumptum est quam in adquirendo et regendo orbis imperio consumpserit Cesarea domus, plus effusum pecuniae quam in omnibus diuitiis suis possederit Cresus. Haec enim tam diu multos tenuit ut, cum hoc unum in tota uita quaererent, tandem nec istud nec aliud inuenirent; et forte ideo quia curiositati non suffilciebat in eis quod solum potuit inueniri. Nam, sicut in umbra cuiuslibet corporis frustra soliditatis substantia quaeritur, sic in his quae intelligibilia sunt dumtaxat et uniuersaliter concipi nec tamen uniuersaliter esse queunt, solidioris existentiae substantia nequaquam inuenitur. In his etatem terere nichil agentis et frustra laborantis est; nebulae siquidem sunt rerum fugacium et, cum quaeruntur auidius, citius euanescunt. Expediunt hanc auctores multis modis uariisque sermonibus et, dum indifferenter uerbis usi sunt, uarias opiniones munire uisi sunt et litigiosis hominibus multam contendendi materiam reliquerunt. Inde est quod, a sensibilibus aliisque singularibus apprehensis, quoniam haec sola ueraciter esse dicuntur, ea in diuersos status subuehit, pro quorum ratione in ipsis singularibus specialissima generalissimaque constituit. Sunt qui more mathematicorum formas abstrahunt, et ad illas quicquid de uniuersalibus dicitur referunt. Alii discutiunt intellectus et eos uniuersalium nominibus censeri confirmant.
Fuerunt et qui uoces ipsas genera dicerent esse et species; sed eorum iam explosa sententia est et facile cum auctore suo euanuit. Sunt tamen adhuc qui deprehenduntur in uestigiis eorum, licet erubescant auctorem uel sententiam profiteri, solis nominibus inherentes, quod rebus et intellectibus subtrahunt sermonibus asscribunt. Magno se iudice quisque tuetur et ex uerbis auctorum, qui indifferenter nomina pro rebus uel res pro nominibus posuerunt, suam adstruit sententiam uel errorem. Oriuntur hinc magna seminaria iurgiorum et coUigit quisque quo suam possit heresim confirmare. A generibus et speciebus nequaquam receditur, sed eo applicabis undecumque institutus sit sermo. Poeticum illum te subito miraberis inuenisse pictorem qui ad omnia, quae necessitas exigit, scit fortasse simulare cupressum. Desipit ita Rufus in Neuia, a qua eum, teste Coquo, nullus casus auertit; nam quicquid agit Rufus, nichil est nisi Neuia Rufo; si gaudet, si flet, si tacet, hanc loquitur. Cenat, propinat, poscit, negat, innuit, una est Neuia; si non sit Neuia, mutus erit.
Res illa ad philosophandum uidetur aptior in qua liberior est licentia fingendi quod uolueris et minor est ex rei difficultate aut disceptantium imperitia certitudo. Saepe, sicut ad hostem impediendum facilius salebras et angustias transeundi miles cautus obseruat, sic difficiles quis aut a scripturis aut a rationibus excitat quaestiones aut, si aliud propositum est, ex industria in eas quasi ex incidenti prolabitur. Et, si satisfacere non sufficis (quia nemo est qui omnia, quae etiam ab imperitis quaeruntur, sufficiat explanare), statim annuit oculis, distorquet uultum, brachia iactat, clamat, salit et transfiguratur gestibus qui in quouis histrione uel mimo uideantur inepti. Non utique satisfacies nisi ei respondeas uerbis suis et id tantum dicas quod consueuit audire. Ipse tamen, licet scrupulosior sit, totius est solutionis ignarus. In uno tamen fortasse sibi prospexit cautius quod in marsupio omnia quibus inflatur ingessit. Facile tamen et quasi acu uesicam hanc perforando quicquid loquacitatis in foUibus imperiti gutturis resonabat interdum uno sapientis uerbulo conquiescet. Nec illos ad philosophandum crediderim aptiores qui omni uerbulo longam orationem obiciunt ac si ad omnia quae quaeruntur sermo sit ad populum faciendus.
Regulariter siquidem proditum est quod qui plus uel minus respondet quam quaeratur ab eo, lineam recte disputandi ignorat. Ceterum, cum quis docendus est, illa sunt dicenda dumtaxat quae a solutionis propositorum adminiculum praestant. Vnde illos, qui in singulis legunt omnia et, dum unum quaeritur, nituntur omnia expedire, planum est recte docentium formulam non tenere; aut enim nesciunt quis sit recte docendi modus aut dissimulatione officii uenditant forte ingenia sua et, ut ait Cicero, non quid proposita disciplina sed quid ipsi possint ostentant. Qui ergo Porphiriolum omnibus philosophiae partibus replent, introdueendorum obtundunt ingenia, memoriam turbant. Et qui instituendus erat, tanta grauitate concutiunt ut onus reputet importabile quod suscepit. Diuinae paginae libros, quorum singuli apices diuinis pleni sunt sacramentis, tanta grauitate legendos forte concesserim, eo quod thesaurus Spiritus sancti, cuius digito scripti sunt, omnino nequeat exhauriri. Licet enim ad unum tantummodo sensum accommodata sit superficies litterae, multiplicitas misteriorum intrinsecus latet et ab eadem re saepe allegoria fidem, tropologia mores uariis modis edificet; anagoge quoque multipliciter sursum ducit ut litteram non modo uerbis sed rebus ipsis instituat. At in liberalibus disciplinis, ubi non res sed dumtaxat uerba significant, quisquis primo sensu litterae contentus non est, aberrare uidetur michi aut ab intelligentia ueritatis, quo diutius teneantur, se uelle suos abducere auditores.
Plane Porphiriolum ineptum credo si ita scripsit ut sensus eius intelligi nequeat nisi Aristotile Platone et Plotino praelectis. Valeat quicumque me in aliquam disciplinam disponit introducere compendio tali. Ego siquidem illum sequar qui litteram aperit et quasi superficie patefacta sensum, ut ita dicam, historicum docet.
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