De reuerentia personarum et rerum, et quot
The Foundations of Reverence
Reverence is rooted in natural bonds of kinship and divine commands to honor one's neighbor.
There are various ways in which a person may be worthy of reverence. The reverence we show outwardly consists either in persons or in things. Regarding people, we consider their standing based on nature, office, character, social status, or fortune. By nature, we revere our parents, our children, and those to whom we are bound by blood, such as a spouse, relatives, and in-laws. This is accepted by the law of nations, as it is practiced equally among all peoples. We are also urged toward this by divine law, for we know it is written: 'Honor your father and your mother, that you may live long on the earth,' and: 'Whoever curses father or mother shall die the death.' It wasn't necessary to command much regarding children, because no one has ever hated their own flesh; nor regarding a spouse, for whom a person leaves father and mother to cling to their partner, so that the two become one flesh. Yet, the commands of divine law are not lacking in this area; even if they are inserted less frequently because of the natural instinct that already urges us strongly enough, they still extend to relatives and in-laws whom nature itself commends to us.
Public Office and Duty
Public and private offices carry weight based on their jurisdiction and the honor due to those who hold them.
An office is, in truth, the duty of carrying out what each person is required to do by established rules or custom. For it is from this that the appropriate actions for each individual person arise. Among these things that must be done in this way, some pertain to the public sphere, while others pertain to each person’s own status. It’s clear from this that some offices are fittingly called public, and others private. But the variety of private offices is as great as the diversity of the people themselves. All public offices, however, are referred to two categories; for they descend either from divine law or from human law. These matters are explained more broadly in the books on offices, but they are relevant to the present point so that reverence may be shown to public offices. For the reverence owed to them is as great as the eminence of each respective magistrate. This is established or indicated by each person's competent jurisdiction, since the reverence or contempt shown to magistrates reflects back as honor or insult upon those they govern. Therefore, in the decrees of princes, the edicts of magistrates, or public proclamations, a group of people is often treated as a single entity, so that the entire constitution seems to be the act of the community rather than of the individuals themselves or any other proclamation. This is clear enough even to those who don't know the laws or canons, simply from daily experience. Furthermore, the rationale for these duties is fulfilled not only by the decrees of canons and laws, but also by the precepts of all ethical systems.
Habit, Character, and Virtue
True character is defined by the habits of virtue, which command respect far more than external status.
A habit, however, is a mental disposition from which the consistency of individual actions flows. For if something is done once or twice, it isn't immediately added to one's habits, unless it is turned into a practice through the consistency of doing it. This term embraces both virtues and vices equally, even though many argue that vices aren't habits, but rather things that stand in opposition to habits. In this context, it's clear that only virtues are considered to be habits, yet when we speak of good or bad habits, we're distinguishing between vices and virtues. This is why we call some people 'good' or 'virtuous,' while we label others 'vicious.' The word 'fullness' itself seems to hint at this, since no one in the flesh ever reaches a state of complete moral satisfaction, while many are burdened by a surplus of vices. When someone is said to command respect because of their character, it means they possess the virtues for which honor is due. After all, who wouldn't honor and revere someone they believe to be prudent, brave, temperate, and just? This is also the wise person's advice to anyone who craves to be feared, loved, honored, and preferred: they should fear, love, and revere God, and submit themselves to Him with total devotion.
The Vanity of Fortune
Fortune is a blind and unstable master that should not be worshipped, as it leads only to destruction.
They define 'condition' as a person's accidental status, by which one is either brought low by adversity or lifted up by prosperity, and which reveals the nature of either lot by its very appearance. It is just like how we honor some as 'noble' while heaping servile insults upon others. We cultivate the riches of the former; we despise the poverty of the latter. Tullius claims that it's difficult to define nature. I think it's even harder to define fortune, because nature has some substance, while fortune has none. Nature, after all, provides the origin for things; this would be impossible if it didn't exist in truth itself. For what doesn't exist at all cannot give existence to anything else. But since fortune doesn't exist, it can't be defined. It's impossible for anyone to know what something is if it doesn't exist. Let the Epicureans bring forward their main doctrines—which they call 'kiriadoxas'—that they believe serve the entire process of philosophy, and let them, as usual, subject everything to fortune. In this matter, as in many others, I think Plutarch should be heard, who denies that the blind goddess should be worshipped, asserting that she can only be worshipped by the blind. He also provides many examples that make it clear how everyone who worships this blind goddess is eventually blinded and cast into a pit of destruction. Galba is a witness to this; he spent his whole life rising brilliantly into old age, only to be lifted up by the familiarity and worship of this goddess in a short time, and cast down in an even shorter one. As for how this happened, look it up in Suetonius. Yet the aforementioned philosopher complains, weeping into the ear of the prince already mentioned, that this goddess—shameful through the vice of blindness and recklessness, and ignominious to all the gods—has defiled the temples of all the gods and stolen their worship. He laments that, beyond the private shrines she has everywhere in the world and the city, she has even occupied the Tarpeian Rock, placing herself on an equal footing with the supreme Jupiter, and that the golden image of public fortune is publicly worshipped in the Capitol by strangers, neighbors, and citizens alike. She holds such authority over all others that, in the whole reckoning of mortals (as the saying goes), she alone seems to fill both sides of the page. You might see her there turning her spinning wheel, and what is more surprising, by the impulse of that same wheel she casts down and tramples the threads of life from the breast of Jupiter; for whoever establishes fortune tears up the fates by the roots. “The fates,” says the Stoic, “rule men; fate is in those parts which the abyss hides.” Epicurus’s doctrine protests against this paradox of the Stoics. “Do away with fatal necessity,” he says, “because if fortune wills it, a rhetorician will become consul; if this same fortune wills it, a consul will become a rhetorician.”
True Reverence in the Light of Grace
While pagan philosophy offers a flawed view of reverence, the Christian must honor God's ministers and friends as images of the Divine.
However, so that we might deal less with fortune, let there be a form for unexpected events; and although it may seem to come very close to condition—since the collision of chance events creates a state, which is the condition we previously described—it differs from it in this: condition arises now from nature, now from duty, now from character, and now from the various shapes of events, whereas fortune always consists in those things that emerge unexpectedly. Plutarch tries to empty it of meaning entirely, believing that the origin of all reverence flows from the four aforementioned sources: nature, duty, character, and condition. Yet he carries this out in a more superstitious, pagan fashion; for this reason, I have taken care to insert some of his ideas using Catholic sense and language. He asserts that in the worship of the gods, those are especially to be revered who approach him more familiarly and closely, whether by nature—like Liber, the conqueror of the Indians, or Hercules, who claimed Jupiter was in him because he strangled snakes in his cradle—or by duty, like the pontiffs and prefects of sacred rites; or by character, like the philosophers who demonstrate a breath of the divine mind through their investigation and distribution of wisdom; or by condition, like those whom the favor of a deity raised up to preside over birds, more out of a personal connection than a public office. This is truly a faithless statement, worthy of total rejection, and the meaning of these words is not something that would become a philosopher. But perhaps he did not dare to speak out in the ears of a corrupted populace what he felt about the nature of the gods, having read that the books of the philosopher Pythagoras were burned and that he himself was driven into exile by the Athenians because he had doubted whether what was commonly said about the gods was true. What, then, would he dare to assert to the contrary, when he knew that even the doubt of error did not go unpunished? It is therefore likely that he was humoring his audience and, in order to call them back from illicit things, indulged the error somewhat. For it is most clear in the teaching of morals. I agree with this opinion all the more readily because the Apostle to the Gentiles, while keeping his faith and religion intact, became all things to all people so that he might win everyone over. But we, to whom the truth has shone from heaven, believe that great reverence should be shown not to gods—who are nothing—but to the ministers and friends of the true God; and sometimes even to His enemies, since He Himself commanded it, having often granted power to the worst of men for the instruction of His own people. Hence that saying: 'Be subject to every human creature for God's sake, whether to the king as supreme, or to governors as those sent by him for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of those who do good.' And that other: 'Servants, be subject to your masters, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the harsh.' Indeed, people become friends of God either by grace, without merit—like Jeremiah and John, sanctified before they were born, or Nicholas, that jewel of priests, who as an infant in his cradle would nurse only once on Wednesdays and Fridays—or by merit through grace, like those who, by the easy path of good works (like the repentant thief) or by a difficult and happy passing, earn the kingdom of heaven, as do the chorus of apostles and martyrs. Maro hints at these three orders: 'Easy is the descent to Avernus; night and day the gate of dark Dis stands open; but to retrace one's steps and escape to the upper air, this is the work, this is the labor; few, whom kindly Jupiter has loved or whom burning virtue has raised to the heavens, born of gods, have been able to do it.' Therefore, those whom we see conformed to the divine goodness by the elegance of their character, we ought to revere as the most true and faithful image of God. Ministers, however, are those whom divine providence has called to secure their own salvation and that of others by rebuking and correcting vices, or by planting and spreading virtues. Those who serve Him in human law are as far inferior to those who serve in divine law as human things fall short of divine things.
Read the original Latin
modis persona sit uefnerahilis. Reuerentia ergo quae corporaliter impenditur, aut in personis consistit aut in rebus. Personarum uero ratio habetur aut a natura aut ab officio aut a moribus aut a conditione aut a fortuna. Natura parentes ueneramur et liberos et quos nobis caro coniunxit, utputa uxorem cognatos et affines. Vnde et gentium iure receptum est, eo quod peraeque fit apud omnes gentes. Ad hoc etiam et diuino iure urgemur qui scriptum nouimus: Honora patrem tuum et matrem, ut sis longeuus super terram; et: Qui patri uel matri maledixerit, morte morietur. Liberos non multum oportuit commendari, eo quod nemo carnem suam odio habuerit; sed nec uxorem, propter quam homo patrem relinquit et matrem, adherens uxori suae, ut sint duo in carne una. Non tamen in hac parte diuinae legis mandata desunt, etsi propter naturae stimulum, qui satis urget, rarius inserantur, protenduntur tamen ad cognatos et affines quos per se natura commendat.
Officium uero est debitum exequendi quae unicuique ex institutis aut moribus agenda sunt. Ex eo namque personis singulis proprii congruunt actus. In his autem quae sic agenda sunt, alia ad publicum, alia ad suum cuiusque pertinent statum. Ex quo liquet officiorum quaedam publica, quaedam priuata conuenienter dici. Priuatorum uero tanta multiplicitas est quanta fere est diuersitas personarum. Publica quidem omnia referuntur ad duas species; aut enim a diuino aut ab humano iure descendunt. Haec autem ex libris Officiorum latius patent, sed pertinent ad praesentem articulum ut publicis officiis reuerentia impendatur. Tanta namque debetur eis quanta est eminentia cuiusque magistratus.
Hanc quidem aut facit aut indicat uniuscuiusque competens iurisdictio, cum reuerentia magistratuum aut contemptus redundet in honorem aut contumeliam subiectorum. Vnde in constitutionibus principum, magistratuum edictis aut promulgationibus per prolemsim fit plurium conceptio personanim, ut non tam personae quam uniuersitatis tota constitutio uideatur esse uel quaeuis alia promulgatio. Hoc etiam iura uel canones ignoranti ex usu cotidiano perspicuum est. Porro rationem officiorum non modo canonum et legum scita sed et ethicorum omnium praecepta exequuntur. Mos autem est mentis habitus ex quo singulorum operum assiduitas manat. Non enim si quid fit semel aut amplius, statim moribus aggregatur, nisi assiduitate faciendi uertatur in usum. Hic autem uirtutes et uitia aeque complectitur, a licet uitia non mores esse sed a plerisque dicantur moribus obuiare. In quo planimi est solas uirtutes censeri nomine morum, cum bonos tamen aut malos dicimus mores, uitia distinguimus et uirtutes.
Vnde mwatos a bono siue raorigeroa, Tnorosos uero a uitiis nominamus. Quod et ipsum plenitudinis nomen uidetur innuere, cum nulli in came contingat adesse satietatem morum et multis assit superfluitas uitiorum. Cum itaque a moribus quis reuerentiam contrahere dicitur, ei uirtutes, quibus honor exhibendus est, inesse significatur. Quis enim non ueneretur et uereatur illum quem prudentem fortem temperantem credit et iustum? Hinc est etiam consilium sapientis ei qui timeri appetit amari honorari et praeferri, ut Deum timeat amet ueneretur et ei se tota deuotione submittat. Conditionem quidem esse diffiniunt fortuitum personae statum, quo aut aduersis deprimitur aut extoUitur prosperis, et alterutrius sortis naturam sui ipsius facie protestatur. Quale est quod alios ueneramur ingenuos, aliis seruiles contumelias irrogamus. Istorum diuitias colimus; illorum contempnimus paupertatem.
Naturam diffinire difficile esse asserit Tullius. Ego difficilius credo diffinire fortunam, eo quod huius nuUa, illius aliqua substantia est. Natura siquidem rebus originem praebet; quod nequaquam esset, si in ueritate ipsa non esset. Quod enim omnino non est, alicui praestare non potest ut sit. At fortuna cum non sit, non potest diffiniri. In eo siquidem quod non est, non potest cuiquam constare quid sit. Efferant Epicurei praecipuas sententias suas, quas kiriadoxas uocant, quibus totius philosophiae putant seruire processum, et more suo fortunae subiciant uniuersa. Ego in hoc, sicut et in plurimis, Plutarcum censeo audiendum, qui deam cecam colendam esse negat, asserens eam nisi a cecis coli non posse.
Multa quoque proponit exempla, quibus liquet omnes cecae deae cultores cecatos et praecipitatos tandem in foueam exterminii. Testatur hoc Galba, qui, totam etatem luculenter producens in senium, huius deae familiaritate et cultu in breui elatus et in breuiori praecipitatus est. Qualiter autem, apud Suetonium quaere. Queritur tamen praefatus philosophus et in aure iam dicti principis lacrimabiliter ingemiscit, quod haec uitio cecitatis et temeritatis probrosa dea et omnibus ignominiosa numinibus omnium deorum templa fedauerit et deorum omnium praeripuerit cultum, ut praeter edes priuatas, quas in orbe et urbe passim habet, nipem etiam Tarpeiam occupauerit, suppremo loui coaequata, et publicae fortunae imago aurea in Capitolio ab aduenis conuenis et indigenis publice adoretur; et tantam prae ceteris habet auctoritatem, quod in tota ratione mortalium (ut dici solet) sola utramque paginam uidetur implere. Videas eam ibi rotam uersare uolubilem, quodque magis mirere, eiusdem rotae impulsu de pectore louis soronim pensa praecipitat et conculcat; quisqms enim fortunam statuit, fata cona uellit. Fata (inquit Stoicus) regunt homines; fatum est in partibus iUis quas sinus abscondit. Huic paradoxae Stoicorum kiriadoxa Epicuri reclamat. Fatalem, inquit, tolle necessitatem, quia si fortuna uolet, fiet de rethore consul; si uolet haec eadem, fiet de consule rethor.
Ceterum,ut cum fortuna minus agamus,sit inopinatorum euentuum forma et, licet conditioni uideatur plurimum uicinari, eo quod fortuitorum concursus statum efiiciat, quam conditionem esse praediximus, in eo tamen plurimum difiert, quod conditio nimc a natura, nunc ab officio, nunc a moribus est, nunc a uariis figuris euentuum, fortuna semper consistit in his quae improuisa emergunt. Eam usquequaque nititur euacuare Plutarcus et ex praemissis quattuor locis, naturae, officii, morum, conditionis, totius reuerentiae manare credit originem. Superstitiosius tamen hoc infidelium more exequitur; unde nonnuUas sententias eius sensu et sermone catholico curaui inserere. Ille quidem in cultu deorum eos praecipue asserit uenerandos, qui ei familiarius et uicinius accedunt aut natura, ut Liber Indorum domitor, Hercules qui eo ipso in se louem protestatus est, quod angues iugulauit in cunis; aut officio, ut pontifices praefectosque sacrorum; aut moribus, ut philoc sophos, qui mentis diuinae haustum inuestigatione et to dispensatione sapientiae indicant; aut conditione, ut quos fauor numinis extulit ut aUis praeessent ex causa potius familiari quam officio publico. Sermo quidem perfidus est et omni reprobatione dignus, sensusque uerborum qui philosophum non deceret. Sed forte quid de natura deorum sentiret, in auribus corrupti populi proloqui non audebat qui legerat combustos esse libros philosophi Pitagorae et ipsum actum esse in exilium ab Atheniensibus eo quod dubitauerat an de diis uera essent quae uulgo dicebantur. Quid ergo contrarium auderet asserere qui nec ipsam dubitationem erroris nouerat impunitam? Est itaque uerisimile quod morem auditoribus gesserit et, ut eos ab illicitis reuocaret, ahquid indulsisse errori.
Nam in doctrina morum luculentissimus est. Eoque huic opinioni facilius adquiesco, quod Apostolus gentium fide tamen et religione incolumi omnibus omnia factus est, ut omnes lucrifaceret. Nos autem, quibus de celo ueritas illuxit, non deorum, qui nulli sunt, sed ueri Dei ministris et amicis magnam reuerentiam credimus exhibendam; sed et inimicis eius interdum, quoniam hoc ipse praecepit qui saepe maximam ad eruditionem suonim pessimis hominibus contulit potestatem. Vnde illud: Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum, siue regi quasi praecellenti siue ducibus tamquam ab eo missis ad uindictam malefactorum laudem uero bonorum. Et illud: Serui, subditi estote dominis uestris, non tantum bonis et modestis sed etiam a discolis. Amici quidem Dei fiunt aut gratia, cessantibus meritis, ut Hieremias et lohannes sanctificati antequam nati et gemma sacerdotum Nicholaus quarta et sexta feria semel lactens in cunis; aut meritis ex gratia, ut qui facili uia bonorum operum, sicut penitens latro, uel difficili et felici transitu merentur regna celorum, uelut apostolorum chorus et martirum. Hos autem tres ordines innuit Maro: Facilis descensus Auerni; noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis; sed reuocare gradum superasque euadere ad auras, hic opus, hic labor est; pauci, quos aequus amauit lupiter aut ardens euexit ad ethera uirtus, diis geniti potuere. Quos ergo morum elegantia diuinae uidemus bonitati conb formes, debemus tamquam uerissimam et fidelissimam Dei imaginem uenerari.
Ministri uero sunt quos dispositio diuina uocauit ut corripiendo et corrigendo uitia aut uirtutes inserendo aut propagando suam et aliorum procurent salutem. Qui uero ei in iure humano ministrant, tanto inferiores sunt his qui ministrant in diuino quantum diuinis humana cedunt.
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