De munusculariis et prortiissariis, et quod pro'
The Peril of Rash Promises
The author warns against the deceptive nature of flattery and the vanity of making promises to win favor.
It isn't helpful to send someone toward virtue. The real power of flattery lies in this: you appear to set aside your own interests to care for someone else's, never or rarely speaking of your own affairs, but always or often talking about the benefit of the person you're trying to win over. Furthermore, hold back your hand; don't accept anything even if it's forced upon you, while the Jordan flows into the mouth of the one who, in his desire for everything, thinks he's entitled to everything by right. The hungry greed of certain insatiable people envies others their common food until it is satisfied; and where the needs of others are being met, it suspects it's being cheated. In this way, a fortunate person sometimes thinks that whatever is given to someone else under any title is being taken away from him—as Crassus can attest, who, as the story goes, drank gold because he alone, or more than anyone else among the Parthians, thirsted for it. Jugurtha, too, often disarmed the Romans and broke their army, and even shook the majesty of the city itself, now by giving more, now by promising even more. But this is acceptable and often helpful for those who are accustomed to giving things away. Otherwise, a promise made to win favor is useless; instead, like a fraudulent deception, it usually extinguishes the very thing it seems to be.
Integrity in Commitment
A discussion on the necessity of prudence and the tarnishing effect that delay has on the merit of a gift.
This is all the more urgent when you're dealing with a prudent and serious person. Simplicity is easily exposed to the traps of those who would deceive, and it's more easily tripped up. That is why the man who filled not just a city but the entire world with his wanton loves—the one who coached a seducer of young women and a shameless lover—said, "Make sure you promise; for what harm is there in promising?" Anyone can be rich with promises. But a philosopher will never, or only very rarely, claim that it's helpful—and even then, only for a just cause. For if you don't have the means to fulfill a promise, it's reckless to promise what you cannot deliver. If you have the power to give but fail to follow through with the actual benefit, you don't earn gratitude for the promise; instead, you stain yourself with a lie. And if you do fulfill the promise after a long delay, the beauty of your generosity and the very nature of the gift are tarnished, because your hesitation makes it look like you didn't want to give it at all. As the great poet says: delay tarnishes the merit of the giver, because gifts given quickly earn more praise and favor. Besides, who is so certain of the future that they know they'll be able to fulfill what they're putting off? Didn't the counselor of truth, the champion of the faith, the chosen vessel—I mean the teacher of the Gentiles—disappoint the hearts of the faithful, whom he had kept in suspense waiting for his arrival? What else does his excuse accomplish—where he recalls that he wasn't with them, but is now—other than to protest that he didn't act out of fickleness? If he couldn't do what he wanted (since he certainly wanted what he promised) because the Lord hindered him, then what wise person would confidently promise what depends on the ease of nature, when it can easily be hindered by any number of causes? Furthermore, for a just cause, anyone can sometimes change their mind. For someone often seems worthy of a benefit for a time, who in the course of events is found to be unworthy. And sometimes, someone who has turned toward a better life is unworthy of the benefit they extort by their merits, even from a stranger's hand, as the common saying goes.
The Virtue of Changing One's Mind
The author argues that breaking an ill-advised oath can be a virtue rather than a crime, especially when the promise is harmful.
In such cases, changing your mind often isn't a crime, but a virtue. After all, as the myths teach us, Theseus wouldn't have lost his only son if he had been willing to change his mind. And Phoebus, driven by the grief he felt over Phaethon’s ruin, wouldn't have lived as an exile from the heavens, tending the herds of Admetus, if he had been allowed to change the vow by which he had bound himself to his ambitious son through the oath sworn by the Styx. And so you don't dismiss the lessons of the myths, consider the incredulous king from the Gospel story: it would have been more wholesome for him to break an ill-advised and treacherous oath than to pollute his table, defile his banquet, and destroy his royal majesty by extinguishing the light of the Word, removing the prelude to grace, and murdering the herald of truth, all while everything served and obeyed a dancing girl in the midst of incest.✦ It is, in fact, a rule of ethics that not all promises must always be kept, especially if they turn out to be harmful or destructive to the person receiving them or to the one who made them. Furthermore, the law of friendship prevails, by which it is only right to ask for, or to do, what is honorable among friends. It is also established by law itself that no promise which leads to a shameful or sorrowful end should be fulfilled. Finally, a prior promise either extinguishes or diminishes the grace of a subsequent favor. And just as arrows that are foreseen strike with less force, while those that aren't guarded against at all wound more deeply, so too with favors: what is expected from a promise is received with less appreciation, while what comes unexpectedly is accepted with more gratitude.
The Tribunal of Conscience
An exploration of how the internal conscience acts as the ultimate judge of one's integrity and truthfulness.
Although a bare promise may not create a legal obligation among experts in the law, as the saying goes, every person who makes a promise has pledged their word before the Truth, and even when civil law falls away, they are naturally bound by their own integrity. But what prosecutor acts more harshly than your own conscience once it begins to bring charges? If your conscience acts as the prosecutor, who can acquit you? Certainly, any evil committed by example is displeasing to the author of that example himself. This is the first form of punishment: that no guilty person is acquitted when they are their own judge. But if your conscience justifies you, who can condemn you? Without a doubt, the Lord is the one feared in that moment, when human judgment is disregarded and your conscience can find no words to speak in its own defense. But if your actions accuse your soul, and your conscience stands by as a witness, and the Truth of equity examines the case, what judge, I ask, will punish more severely than the one who is guilty and bound by their own lie?
The Law of Truth and Divine Example
The chapter concludes by distinguishing between human legalism and the eternal law of truth, citing Christ's promises as the perfect model.
While a judge may be called the living voice of the law, truth often overturns his rulings; but the ruling of truth remains unchangeable, because His justice is justice forever, and His law is equity. Conversely, in a courtroom, the strictest application of the law is often the greatest injustice. Anyone who makes a promise, therefore, becomes a debtor and is compelled by the urgent ruling of truth to keep the faith of their pledge. Furthermore, what is extorted by necessity diminishes grace. Hence that philosophical maxim I mentioned: don't be quick to promise, lest you find yourself unable to fulfill it when you want to, or unwilling to do so for a just cause when you are able, or lest you lose or diminish grace once you have done it, because you had already ensnared yourself in the words of your own mouth. It happens, however, that it's not only lawful to promise, but also beneficial. And to pass over the examples of others for the moment, Christ Himself both promised and sent the Paraclete to His disciples. To those same disciples, when they asked what would happen to them for having left everything for His sake, He promised them thrones in the regeneration and the judicial power they are to have with Him. From these things it is clear that the cause commends the intent and the work, so that it is evident from this that the philosopher's rule doesn't need to be corrupted.
Read the original Latin
mittere non expedicU ad virtutem. In eo autem adulatoriae uis magna consistit, si omissis propriis aliena commoda curare uidearis, de tuo numquam aut raro, semper aut saepe loquens de illius quem aucuparis emolumento. Praeterea manum contine, ne, si quid etiam inuito ingeratur, accipias, dum influat lordanis in os eius qui, dum omnia cupit, sibi quoque omnia de iure putat competere. Esuriens gula insatiabilium quorumdam animalium, donec satietur, communem aliis inuidet cibum; et in quo aliorum subuenitur inopiae, se fraudem perpeti suspicatur. Sic fortunatus sibi interdum subtrahi putat, a I patefecit A comunem S quicquid quocumque titulo confertur in alium, teste Crasso, qui, ut dicitur, milite dissimulante, eo quod solus aut prae ceteris apud Parthos aurum sitierat, aurum bibit. lugurtha quoque saepe Romanum exarmauit et fregit exercitum, ipsius quoque urbis concussit maiestatem, nunc dans plura, promittens interdum pluriora. Sed hoc liberum est his et saepe conducit, qui ahqua donare consueuerunt. Ahoquin promissio gratiae concihandae non proficit, sed quasi deceptio fraudulenta illam quae esse uidetur plerumque extinguit.
Tanto quidem uahdius, quo cum prudentiori et grauiori uiro negotium geritur. Simphcitas namque circumuenientium insidiis latius patet et facihus supplanb tatur. Vnde ihe qui non urbem sed orbem lasciuis impleuit amoribus, sohicitatorem pueUarum et impudicum instruens amatorem ait: Promittas facito, quid enim promittere ledit? poUicitis diues quishbet esse potest. At philosophus numquam aut rarissime, et hoc ex iusta causa, asserit conducibile. Si enim promissionis implendae facultas non suppetit, temerarium est promittere quod ac praestare non potes. Si enim potestas affuerit largiendi, nisi uoluntas beneficii producat effectum, promissor non gratiam de promisso sed de mendacio contrahit maculam. Quod si ex interuaUo promissi fidem impleuerit, hberahtatis decor et beneficii species ipsa fuscatur, eo quod qui distuht interim uisus est noluisse.
Vnde uersificator egregius: Denigrat meritum dantis mora, nam data raptim munera plus laudis plusque fauoris habent. Praeterea quis de futuro certus est, ut sciat se quandoque posse implere quod differt? Nonne consiliarius ueritatis, assertor fidei, electionis uas (doctorem gentium loquor) fidelium animos, quos aduentus sui expectatione suspenderat, frustrauit a desiderio suo? Quid aliud agit illa ipsius excusatio, qua apud se €8t et non non fuisse sed est tantum commemorat, et se leuitate non usum protestatur? Si non potuit ille, Domino impediente, quod uoluit (hoe etenim uoluit quod promisit) quis sapiens secure, quod ex facilitate naturae pendet, promittit, cum leuiter possit ex causis quam plurimis impediri? Ad haec ex iusta causa potest interdum mutare quilioet uoluntatem. Dignus etenim beneficio pro tempore uidetur aliquis, qui processu rerum eodem reperitur indignus. Et interdum indignus est qui ad frugem melioris uitae conuersus beneficium meritis etiam a manu extranea (ut uulgo dici solet) extorquet.
In his mutare propositum saepe non criminis est sed uirtutis. Nam, ut a fabulis doceamur, Theseus unico filio suo non fuisset orbatus, si uoluisset mutare propositum% Et Phebus, urgente doloris stimulo quem de Phetontis ruina conceperat, exul a celi regione Admeti non pauisset armenta, si ei uotum, quo se, Stigis interposito sacramento, filio ambitioso obligauerat, mutare licuisset. Et ne fabua larum instrumenta contempnas, rex incredulus, quod ex euangelica habes historia, salubrius incautum et perfidum soluisset iuramentum, quam in extinguenda lueema uerbi, auferendo praeambulum gratiae, ueritatis occidendo praeconem, mensam pollueret, conuiuium incestaret, regiam pessumdaret maiestatem, dum incestui cuncta seruiunt et obtemperant saltatrici. Ethicae quidem regula est quia non omnia sunt semper promissa soluenda; si forte aut accepturo dampnosa, aut perniciosa sint promittenti. Et lex amicitiae illa praeualuit, qua sola honesta peti licet ab amicis aut fieri. Ipsoque iure cautum est, ut nuUa promissio, quae turpem aut tristem habet exitum, impleatur. Postremo antecedens promissio consequentis beneficii gratiam aut extinguit aut minuit. Et sicut iacula quae praeuidentur feriunt minus, et quae omnino non praecauentur magis ledunt, ita et in beneficiis quod ex promissione conceptum est minus accipitur, et quod ex insperato prouenit gratius acceptatur.
Licet enim nuda promissio apud iuris, ut dicitur, peritos non pariat actionem, promissor omnis apud ueritatem (ut dici solet) pollicem fixit, et iure ciuili cessante fidei naturaliter obligatur. Sed quis actor durius aget quam fides, si ipsa coeperit accusare? Si agit conscientia, quis absoluet? Certe exemplo quodcumque malo committitur, ipsi displicet auctori. Prima est haec ultio, quod se iudice nemo nocens absoluitur. Si uero ipsa iustificat, quis condempnat? Proculdubio qui in illo timetur articulo Dominus est, ubi et dies contempnitur humanus, et conscientia quid obloquatur non inuenit. Si uero animam accusant opera, et illi conscientia testis assistit, et causam ueritas examinat aequitatis, quis quaeso praetor in ream obnoxiamque mendacio grauius uendicabit?
Sane praetor etsi uiua uox iuris esse dicatur, sententiam eius ueritas plerumque retractat; sed ueritatis sententia manet irretractabilis, quia iustitia eius iustitia in aeternum, et lex eius aequitas; e contra in praetorio saepe summum ius summa iniuria est. Quisquis ergo promittit debitor est, et ueritatis urgente sententia sponsionis fidem compellitur adimplere. Porro quod necessitas extorquet gratiam minuit. Vnde illud philosophicum quod praemisi: Promittere ne festines ne cum uolueris non possis, aut nolis ex iusta causa cum possis, aut cum efieceris gratiam perdas aut minuas, eo quod te ante illaqueaueras in uerbo oris tui. Fit tamen ut non modo licitum sit promittere sed et conducibile. Et ut aliorum ad praesens taceantur exempla, Paraclitum Christus ipse discipulis et promisit et misit. Eisdemque quid futurum esset illis, qui omnia pro eo reliquerant, interrogantibus sedes in regeneratione promisit et iudiciariam quam cum eo habituri sunt potestatem. Ex quibus constat quia causa propositum opusque commendat, ut liqueat ex his quia non necesse est philosophi regulam uitiari.
Scripture echoes
- ↩Mark.6.17-Mark.6.28 — For Herod himself had sent and seized John, and bound him in prison because of Herodias, his brother Philip's wife, because he had married her. Mark.6.18 — For John had been saying to Herod, "It is not lawful for you to have your brother's wife." Mark.6.19 — And Herodias held a grudge against him and wanted to kill him, but she could not. Mark.6.20 — For Herod feared John, knowing that he was a righteous and holy man, and he kept him safe. And when he heard him, he was greatly perplexed, and yet he listened to him gladly. Mark.6.21 — And when the right day came, Herod on his birthday made a feast for his courtiers and the military commanders and the leading men of Galilee. Mark.6.22 — And when the daughter of Herodias herself came in and danced, she pleased Herod and those reclining at table with him. And the king said to the girl, \"Ask me for whatever you wish, and I will give it to you.\ Mark.6.23 — And he swore to her, "Whatever you ask of me, I will give you, up to half of my kingdom." Mark.6.24 — She went out and said to her mother, 'What should I ask for?' And she said, 'The head of John the Baptist.' Mark.6.25 — And having entered immediately with haste to the king, she asked, saying, "I want you to give me at once on a platter the head of John the Baptist." Mark.6.26 — And though the king was deeply distressed, because of his oaths and his guests, he did not want to refuse her. Mark.6.27 — And immediately the king sent an executioner and commanded him to bring his head. Mark.6.28 — and he went and beheaded him in the prison, and brought his head on a platter, and gave it to the girl, and the girl gave it to her mother.
Policraticus companion
Study the argument weekly; pray the tradition daily
Pair the outline with the Chosen Portion app, which serves short daily portions from the same royal devotional tradition — free on iOS.
John of Salisbury argued that rulers must keep the law of God before their eyes daily; Chosen Portion gives modern readers that same daily discipline in five minutes a morning.
- 8 weeks, one book per week, with the 3-4 key chapters flagged in each
- Discussion questions usable for a reading group from week one
- A daily 5-minute companion portion in the app alongside your weekly study