SR
Policraticus/Book 2 · Liber Secundus
Chapter 26Polic.2.26

Qtbod sententla Dei mouerl potest, quod consUium

The Sovereignty of the Divine Will

God's will is the primary cause of all things, rendering human attempts to interpret the heavens through astrology both foolish and presumptuous.

God's nature is unchanging, and the will of God is the primary cause of all things; as for astrology, it's a path to damnation. Since the unchanging sentence of God can be moved, will the pronouncements of wandering and shifting stars remain fixed? But however that decree may be moved, the counsel of the Lord stands forever. Since a divine command or prohibition is a surer sign of God's counsel and will, wouldn't it be right to see that He wills what He commands? He clearly commanded the patriarch to sacrifice his only son, the son of the promise. Did the patriarch rightly yield to the one commanding him? He did so rightly in every respect, because a command of the will—which is the primary cause of all things and is never cheated of its effect—is the most certain proof. It is indeed so primary that if one asks about anything, 'Why is it so?', it is most correctly said that it is because He who has done all things whatsoever He has willed, has so willed it. If, however, you ask why He willed it, that’s a foolish question, because you’re asking for the cause of the First Cause—that is, of His will—which has no cause at all. It’s commonly said, and it’s true, that a ruler has the power to judge more leniently than the laws dictate, since even the one who made the law has the power to amend or repeal it. So, do you think the Author of heaven wouldn't dare to contradict the law that your 'potter' imposes on the sky? It is for the ruler alone to examine the interpretation that stands between law and equity, and he is both permitted and obligated to do so. Where the law suggests one thing and equity—which concerns itself with the public good—suggests another, one must seek the ruler’s interpretation, which is both general and necessary. When there is doubt about a written text or its meaning, the author's intention must be sought. Who, then, made you an interpreter of heavenly things? How do you know what is expedient?

The Vanity of Human Wisdom

The author critiques the pride of those who attribute worldly events to the stars, citing the failures of ancient philosophers to illustrate the limits of human knowledge.

How recklessly you attribute the works of others to your own stars—or rather, to God's. I know that subtle argument of yours: 'You who set the threatening Scorpion ablaze with its tail and scorch its claws, what great thing are you preparing, Gradivus?' But the father of lies, who taught you to attribute this to the heavens, deals with you so deceitfully that, with these same signs, Plato—the prince of all ancient philosophy—could not explain some sailor's riddle, as it is said (though this would be said more truly of Homer). And so, when he was mocked by them more impudently and at greater length, being a man of modest character, he breathed his last as if pierced by the poisoned dart of shame. He was shamed by the fact that they had reproached the prince of Greek philosophers for being ignorant of even the smallest things, as if it were a disgrace to the entire Academy. Flavian asserts this in his book, 'On the Footsteps of Philosophers,' claiming that the Xenophontines, out of envy for Plato's glory, impudently fabricated this story. However, many others claim he voluntarily gave up his soul in the year of his life that was nine squared, because from then on nothing comes to humanity but labor and sorrow. I admit that I know very little and am ignorant of most things, just like many others, yet I don't throw away the gift of life out of shame, as Homer did. If, therefore, I am not capable of resolving the dispute between providence and free will, and if I cannot reconcile the conflict between fate and the ease of nature, is it any less true that these things exist?

The Limits of Intellectual Inquiry

Human intellect is insufficient to grasp the mysteries of faith and providence, necessitating a reliance on divine revelation rather than human curiosity.

Just as in civil law the defendant is very often given the benefit of the doubt, so there are certain things in philosophical investigations where the author's side is usually seen as the stronger one. I believe this happens because of our own limitations. For the intellect fails when it comes to the first principles of things. I consider the scrutiny of providence, the investigation of matter, and many articles of our faith to be most appropriately numbered among these. While you destroy the trouble of one complaint regarding providence, more heads of questions grow back, just like the Hydra's head when it's cut off. If we venture into the forest of matter, we immediately suffer what dreamers do, caught between some substance and none at all. When the origin of the soul is sought, the intellect presents us with the theory of traducianism. Finally, accept the Trinity of Persons in the divine substance; if not by the power of faith, how will you avoid the snares of Arius? Accept the one, simple, and indivisible substance of the Divinity; how else, except through the reason of faith, will you escape the clutches of Sabellius? These things are true nonetheless, even if they can be challenged by many questions. And although the Wisdom of God made Himself visible to us through the mystery of the Incarnation, He didn't make Himself so palpable to our intellect that we can wander through it at will, knowing the length, breadth, height, and depth of all things. If, however, the way of the mathematicians were entirely praiseworthy, the great Augustine wouldn't have so deeply regretted leaning toward their consultations. To this point, that most holy doctor Gregory—who watered and drenched the whole Church with the honeyed rain of his preaching—not only banished mathematics from the court, but, as our elders have handed down, consigned to the flames the writings of the Palatine Apollo, which contained the chief things that seemed to reveal to men the mind of the heavens and the oracles of the powers above. Why say more? Isn't it enough that the Catholic and universal Church detests this vanity and strikes those who presume to practice it further with lawful penalties? But so that we don't seem to follow the error of the astrologers rather than pursue it, let our discourse now proceed to the remaining matters.

The Judgment of Curiosity

Those who persist in the vanity of astrological curiosity inevitably face the corrective judgment of the Lord.

For those who indulge this curiosity can be no more truthful than those who are humble and sober—people who crave the places of honor at dinners and feast sumptuously every day. In the end, I have heard of many of them and known many, but I recall no one who remained in this error for long without the hand of the Lord exercising fitting vengeance upon him.

Read the original Latin

Dei immutabile est, et uoluntas Dei primAZ omnium causa, et quod mathesis uia dampnationis est. Cum itaque immutabilis Dei possit moueri sententia, errantium et discurrentium siderum sermo manebit immobilis'? Sed quocumque modo sententia moueatur, consilium Domini manet in eternum. Quod autem consilii et uoluntatis Dei signum certius est praeceptione aut prohibitione diuina An non recte uidebitur uelle quod praecipit? Plane patriarcham praecepit unigenitum promissionis filium immolare. Rectene patriarcha mandanti ijadquieuit? Recte quidem per omnia, eo quod mandatum uoluntatis, quae prima omnium causa est et numquam suo fraudatur effectu, certissimum indicium sit. Adeo quidem prima est, ut si quaeratur de aliquo, cur ita sit, rectissime dicatur, quoniam ille sic uoluit, qui omnia quaecumque uoluit, fecit.

Si uero cur uoluerit inquiratur, inepta quaestio est, quia primae causae, uoluntatis scilicet, quaeritur causa, cuius nuUa est omnino causa. Equidem dici solet et uerum est, quia in manu principis est ut possit mitius iudicare quam leges, cum et qui legem tulit, derogandae uel abrogandae illius habeat potestatem. Legi ergo, quam Figulus tuus celo imponit, auctor celi contradicere non audebit? Interpositam inter ius et aequitatem interpretationem soli principi et oportet et licet inspicere. Vbi aliud ius suadet, aliud aequitas, quae in publica utilitate uersatur, principis quaerenda est interpretatio, quae generalis est et necessaria. Vbi de scripto et sententia dubitatur, mens est inquirenda auctoris. Quis ergo te celestium fecit interpretem? Vnde quid expediat nosti?

Qua temeritate aliena opera tuis, immo Dei, stellis adscribis? Teneo enim tuum illud subtilissimum argumentum: (i Tu qui flagrante minacem Scorpion incendis cauda, Chelasque peruris, quid tantum, Gradiue, paras? Sed mendacii pater, qui te hoc docuit celestibus adscribendum, fraudulenter sic agit tecum ut, cum his notis Totius denique ueteris philosophiae princeps Plato leuem, ut fertur, (quod tamen de Homero uerius diceretur) nescio quam nautarum quaestionem explieare non potuit. Vnde cum ab eisdem impudentius et protractius derideretur, ut erat uir uerecundi ingenii, quasi toxicato confusionis iaculo perfossus ad mortem spiritum nouissimum exhalauit. Puduerat enim quod quasi totius Academiae improperio exprobrauerant principem philosophorum Greciae etiam minima ignorare. Hoc autem asserit Flauianus in libro qui De uestigiis philosophorum inscribitur Xenofontinos faciente inuidia aduersus Platonis gloriam impudenter finxisse, licet quamplurimi eum ob sacramentum numeri asserant ultro animam posuisse illo etatis suae anno expleto, quem nouenarius in se ipsum ductus effecerat, eo quod exinde non accedit humanitati nisi labor et dolor. Fateor quidem me paucula scire et cum multis plurima ignorare, nec tamen uitae munus quasi Homerus pudore uictus abicio. Si ergo prouidentiae et liberi arbitrii litem componere non sufficio, si fatorum et facilitatis naturae repugnantiam nequeo concordare, numquid ideo minus uerum est ista esse?

Sicut in iure ciuili reus frequentissime fauorabilior est, ita quaedam sunt in inuestigationibus philosophicis, ubi plerumque potior pars uidetur auctoris. Hoc autem ex defectu nostro arbitror euenire. Intellectus enim circa rerum prima principia deficit. In his scrutinium prouidentiae, inuestigationemque materiae, et fidei nostrae multos articulos aptissime censeo numerari. Dum in prouidentia unius querelae molestiam perimis, uelut Ydrae praeciso capite plurium succrescunt capita quaestionum. Si in materiae siluam progredimur, ilico patimur quod sompniantes, inter aliquam efc nullam substantiam constituti. Animae quaesita origine traducem nobis intellectus opponit. Postremo in diuina substantia trinitatem recipe personarum; nisi in fidei uirtute, quomodo Arrii laqueos declinabis?

Diuinitatis unam simplicem et indiuiduam admitte substantiam; quomodo Sabellii, nisi fidei ratione, manus effugies? Haec tamen non minus uera sunt quia multis possunt quaestionibus impugnari. Et licet Sapientia Dei se incarnationis misterio nobis uisibilem fecerit, non a tamen eousque se intellectui nostro fecit palpabilem, ut cum ea possimus usquequaque discurrere, scientes rerum omnium quanta sit longitudo latitudo suUimitas et profundum. Si uero mathematicorum uia esset usquequaque laudabilis, non tantopere penituisset magnum Augustinum se eorum consultationibus inclinasse. Ad haec doctor sanctissimus ille Gregorius, qui melleo praedicationis ymbre totam rigauit et debriauit ecclesiam, non modo mathesin iussit ab aula, sed ut traditur a maioribus, incendio dedit reprobatae lectionis scripta Palatinus quaecumque tenebat Apollo, in quibus erant praecipua, quae celestium mentem et superorum oracula uidebantur hominibus reuelare. Quid multa? Nonne satis est quod hanc uanitatem catholica et uniuersalis ecclesia detestatur, et eos, qui eam ulterius exercere praesumpserint, legitimis penis percelHt? Sed ne planetariorum non tam persequi quam sequi uideamur errorem, iam ad reliqua progrediatur oratio.

Qui enim huic curiositati inseruiunt, non magis ueraces esse possunt quam humiles et sobrii, qui primos recubitus in cenis appetunt et epulantur cotidie splendide, Postremo plurimos eorum audiui, noui multos, sed neminem in hoc errore diutius fuisse recolo, in quo manus Domini condignam non exercuerit ultionem.

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