Liber I, Pars IV — Qui mores senum sunt laudabiles, et qui sunt mores eorum qui sunt in statu: et qualiter reges et principes ad huiusmodi mores debeant se habere. Cap. IIII.
Liber I, Pars IV — Qui mores senum sunt laudabiles, et qui sunt mores eorum qui sunt in statu: et qualiter reges et principes ad huiusmodi mores debeant se habere. Cap. IIII.
When the morals of the elderly are criticized, it remains to enumerate their commendable qualities. However, it seems that the philosopher speaks to this. In the Rhetoric, four qualities of the elderly are discussed that can be commendable. First, the elderly have desires that are relaxed and moderate. Second, they are compassionate. Third, they do not stubbornly assert doubtful things. Fourth, they do not act excessively. For the desires of the elderly (especially regarding sexual matters) are moderate and restrained, because (as was said earlier) when the body is warm, there is an incitement to lust and desires. Therefore, when the body is cooled, the passions of lust and desire are diminished. It is clear that those who desire sexual pleasures extend themselves into other things. This, however, is contrary to the nature of coldness. For cold things do not properly extend themselves outward, but rather contract within themselves. Therefore, the elderly are constrained within themselves due to coldness, so they have diminished and moderate desires. From this, it can be seen how the elderly are often illiberal. For it often happens that through illiberality, they sin in two ways. First, if they hold onto what they have beyond what reason dictates. Second, if someone desires to have what they do not possess, contrary to reason. Older people tend to sin more through illiberality by clinging to what they have than by improperly desiring what they do not have, because they are more constrained within themselves due to their coldness than they extend themselves to others. For when there is no action of the soul that does not use some bodily organ in some way, just as in an artificial work, if the organ is varied, the work is varied; so in the actions of the soul, when the body is transformed, the soul follows the conditions of the body, and there is a variation in its actions. Therefore, when the body is cold, the soul inclines through desire to follow the nature of the cold. And because the cold is restrained, condensed, and released within itself, therefore older people have their desires relaxed due to their coldness, as the Philosopher says in the Rhetoric. Secondly, older people are compassionate; but (as the Philosopher says) they are not compassionate for the same reason as younger people. Young people are compassionate because of friendship; older people, however, are compassionate because of their weakness. For everyone has compassion for a friend and for someone they believe is suffering unjustly. Young people, therefore, because they are lovers of friendships and measure others by their own innocence, think that everyone is good. For this reason, if they suffer, they think it unfair for others: therefore, they easily feel compassion. However, old people are not compassionate because they believe others are good, or because they are lovers of friendships; rather, it is because everyone, when in weakness or deficiency, desires that others feel compassion for them and show them mercy. For this reason, they also easily incline to feel compassion for others and to show mercy. Therefore, old people, because of their weakness, desire that others feel compassion for them and show them mercy, and they easily feel compassion for and show mercy to others. Thirdly, they assert nothing with certainty. For, as the philosopher says, the Rhetorician. Older people have lived many years and have seen that they are often deceived; therefore, they don't dare to assert anything with certainty, fearing that things may not be as they seem and that they might be misled. For this reason, the philosopher says that old people are uncertain in their judgments and always add phrases like 'perhaps' or 'maybe,' and they never make firm declarations. When something is in question regarding a matter, they say, 'It may be so,' or 'In some way, it was like that,' fearing they might be deceived, and they do not express any firm opinions. Fourth, they do not act with great intensity, but in all their actions, they seem to be moderate. For just as young people are full of desires and passions, holding extremes in everything and acting with great fervor, so old people, having weaker passions and desires, generally act to moderate everything. It can be seen what the behaviors of the young and the old are; it can be easily discerned what the behaviors are of those who are in a balanced state. For those who are in a balanced state, as the philosopher says in the second book of Rhetoric, possess whatever is commendable in the old or the young. For they are neither excessively passionate like the young nor cold like the old; they are not so bold and rash as the young, nor so timid and cowardly as the old; but they hold a middle ground between both, being timid when caution is needed and bold when courage is required. So too, because they are neither completely inexperienced like the young nor completely deceived like the old, they don't believe everything that young people do out of inexperience, nor do they entirely disbelieve what old people do because they have been deceived many times; rather, they find a middle ground. Therefore, it is said. In the Rhetoric, it is stated that those who are in a position of authority neither believe everything nor disbelieve everything; rather, they judge more according to the truth. Moreover, because they are in between the old and the young, they are neither intemperate like the young nor fearful and weak like the old; instead, they are strong with moderation and moderate with strength. Thus, to summarize, whatever is commendable in the old or in the young is fully found in those who are in a position of authority. Whatever faults exist in them are completely removed from those in authority. For (as was said above many times) extremes are always blameworthy, while the middle ground is commendable. If, therefore, there is anything commendable in the old or in the young, it is because they do not completely stray from the middle ground. If there is anything blameworthy in them, it is because they have it in extremes. Therefore, if there is anything moderate in the elderly or the young, it is found in a fuller and more perfect way in those who are in a stable position: whatever is commendable in them should be found in those who are in a stable position. Again, whatever extremes exist in them will be removed from those who are in a stable position: whatever is blameworthy in them will be removed from those who are in a stable position. Thus, it is fitting to speak about the morals of people. However, such matters should not be understood as if there were an absolute necessity that the elderly cannot be generous and magnanimous, or that the young cannot be temperate and stable: rather, they should be understood according to a certain inclination and tendency, because according to the natural course and the order we observe, the young, the elderly, and those who are in a stable position have a certain inclination and tendency toward morals that are suitable for them, as is manifest from experience. From these observations, it can be seen in a simple way how kings and princes should conduct themselves regarding such morals. For the commendable morals of the elderly (as they are of this kind) ought to be theirs. For when kings and princes ought to live more by reason than by passion, it is fitting for them to have tempered desires: because (as was said above) if desires are violent, they strike at reason. It's fitting for them to be merciful, not out of weakness or frailty, but for the good of the kingdom, so that they may be more loved by those who are in the kingdom. For the whole kingdom is drawn to the king's love if he is seen to be merciful and compassionate. Third, it's not fitting for kings and princes to stubbornly assert dubious matters in the opposite direction, lest they be judged as frivolous and indiscreet. Fourth, in their actions, they should have moderation and temperance, because (as has been said) they ought to be a model of living and a rule for others. Therefore, some behaviors of the elderly and the young are to be imitated, while others are to be avoided. But among those who are in a certain state, in a way, all behaviors are to be imitated. We say, in a way, that just as the elderly and the young have a certain natural inclination and tendency toward blameworthy behaviors, they can, however, act against that inclination to achieve commendable behaviors. Likewise, those who are in a certain state, even if they have a tendency toward commendable behaviors, can still act against that tendency, so that through the corruption of their desires they follow blameworthy behaviors. Therefore, if it is fitting for rulers to dominate according to reason and intellect, it is proper for kings and princes, who hold authority over others, to follow commendable morals in accordance with reason's guidance and order.
Read the original Latin
Positis moribus senum vituperabilius, restat enumerare mores ipsorum laudabiles. Videtur autem Philosophus 2. Rhetoricorum, circa senes tangere quatuor mores, qui possunt esse laudabiles. Primo enim senes habent concupiscentias remissas, et temperatas. Secunda sunt miserativis. Tertio dubia non pertinaciter asserunt. Quarto nihil agunt valde. Concupiscentiae enim senum (et maxime circa venerea) sunt moderatae et temperatae: quia (ut superius dicebatur) corpore existente calefacto, sit incitatio venereorum, et concupiscentiae.
ergo per locum ab oppositis, corpore existente infrigidato, sit remisso venereorum, et concupiscientiarum. Constat enim quod concupiscentes venerea per appetitum, in alia se extendit. Hoc autem est contra rationem frigidi. Nam frigidi (secundum quod huiusmodi) non proprie se extendit in alia, sed magis constringitur in seipso. Senes ergo ratione frigiditatis constringuntur in seipsis, ut habeant concupiscentias remissas, et moderatas. Ex hoc autem apparere potest, quomodo senes sunt illiberales. Nam cum per illiberalitatem contingit peccare dupliciter. Primo, si ultra quam ratio dictet, teneat quod habet.
Secundo, si praeter rationem concupiscat habere quod non habet. Senes magis peccant per illiberalitem in retinendo quae habent, quam in concupiscendo indebite quae non habent: quia per frigidatem magis contringuntur in seipsis, quam se extendant ad alia. Cum enim nulla sit actio animae, in qua non utatur aliquo modo organo corporeo: sicut in opere artificiali, variato organo sit variato operis; sic et in actionibus animae, corpore transmutato, anima sequitur complesiones corporis, et sit variatio actionum eius. Corpore igitur infrigidato, anima per appetitum inclinatur ut sequatur modum frigidi. Et quia frigidum restringitur, et condensatur, et remittitur in seipso, ideo senes ratione frigiditatis concupiscentias habent remissas, ut vult Philosophus Rhetoricorum. Secundo senes sunt miserativi: sed ( ut Philosophus ait) non propter eandem causam miserativi sunt senes, et iuvenes. Iuvenes enim miserativi sunt propter amicitiam: senes autem propter imbecillitatem. quilibet enim miseretur super amico, et super eo quem credit indigne pati.
Iuvenes ergo, quia sunt amatores amicitiarum, et quia suae innocentia alios mensurant, existimant omnes bonos esse. quare si patiantur, putant eos indigne pari: propter quod de facili miserentur. Senes vero non sunt miserativi, quia credant alios bonos esse, vel quia sunt amativi amicitiarum: sed quia quilibet cum est in imbecillitate, vel in defectu, desiderat ut alii compatiantur ei, et miserentur eius. propter quod et ipsi de facili inclinatur, ut miserantur, et compatiantur aliis. Senes ergo propter imbecillitatem, quia vellent sibi alios compati, et misereri, de facili compatiuntur et miserentur aliis. Tertio nihil dubium pertinaciter affirmant. Nam ( ut ait Philosoph 2. Rheto.)
quia senes vixerunt multis annis, et viderunt quod saepe sunt decepti: non audent pertinaciter aliquid asserere, timentes, ne ita res se habeat, et decipiantur. Ideo Philosophos ait, quod senes omnia dubie sententiant, et semper apponunt ibi Quasi, vel Forte, et nihil fixe pronunciat. cum enim ab quaeritur de aliquo negocio, dicunt Forte, sic est, vel Quodammodo ita erat timentes enim decipi, nihil firme sententiant. Quarto nihil agunt valde, sed in omnibus operibus suis videntur esse temperati. Nam sicut iuvenes, quia in eis abundant concupiscentiae et paffiones, in omnibus tenent extremum, et omnia agunt valde: sic senes, quia habent passiones, et concupiscentias remissas, ut plurimum agunt omnia moderare. Viso, qui sunt mores iuvenum, et senum: de levi apparere potest, qui sunt mores eorum, qui sunt in statu. Nam illi qui sunt in statu, et sunt medii inter senes et iuvenes, ut vult Philosophus secundo Rhetoricorum, habent quicquid laudabilitatis est in senibus, vel iuvenibus. Nam ipsi, qui nec sunt: nimis percalidi, ut iuvenes, nec infrigidati ut senes, nec sunt sic animosi, et praevolantes, ut iuvenes, nec sunt sic timidi, et pusillanimes ut senes: sed tenentes medium inter utrosque, sunt timidi ubi est timendum; et audaces, ubi est audendum.
Sic etiam, quia nec sunt omnino inexperti, ut iuvenes, nec sunt in tot decepti ut senes, nec omnibus credunt quod faciunt iuvenes propter inexperientiam, nec omnino discredunt quod faciunt senes eo quod sint in multis decepti: sed habent se medio modo. Ideo dicitur 2. Rhetoricorum, quod qui sunt in statu, nec sunt omnibus credentes, nec omnibus discredentes: sed iudicantes magis secundum veritatem. Amplius, quia sunt medii inter senes et iuvenes, nec sunt intemperati ut iuvenes, nec sunt formidolosi, et inviriles ut senes: sed sunt viriles cum temperantia, et temperati cum virilitate. Ut ergo sit ad unum dicere, quicquid laudabilitatis est in senibus, vel in iuvenibus, totum reperitur in iis qui sunt in statu. Est quicquid vituperabilitatis est in eis totum removetur ab illis. Nam (ut supra pluries dicebatur) semper extrema sunt vituperabilia, et medium est laudabile. Si ergo in senibus, vel in iuvenibus est aliquid laudabile, hoc est, quia non omnino recedunt a medio.
Si autem est in eis aliquid vituperabile, hoc est prout esse habent in extremo. Quare si quicquid medii est in senibus vel iuvenibus, totum peramplius et perfectius reperitur in iis qui sunt in statu: quicquid laudabilitatis est in eis, totum reperiri debet in iis qui sunt in statu. Rursus quia quicquid extremitatis est in eis, removetur ab eis qui sunt in statu: quicquid vituperabilitatis est in illis, removetur ab iis qui sunt in statu. Sic ergo loquendum est de moribus hominum. Non tamen intelligenda sunt talia omnino necessitatem habentia, ut quod senes non possint esse liberales et magnanimi, et quod iuvenes non possint esse temperati et stabiles: sed intelligenda sunt secundum quandam pronitatem, et inclinationem, quia secundum cursum naturalem, et secundum ordinem quem videmus, iuvenes, et senes, et illi qui sunt in statu, quandam pronitatem, et inclinationem habent ad mores eis convenientes, ut est per habita manifestum. His visis, de levi patere potest, quomodo reges et principes ad huiusmodi mores debeant se habere. Nam mores laudabiles senum (secundum quod huiusmodi sunt) eos habere decet. Nam cum reges, et principes magis debeant vivere ratione quam passione, decet eos habere concupiscentias temperatas: quia (ut supra dicebatur) concupiscentiae si vehementes sint, rationem percutiunt.
Decet etiam eos esse miserativos, non propter defectum, vel propter imbecillitatem: sed propter bonum regni, et ut magis amentur ab iis qui in regno sunt. Nam totum regnum ad dilectionem regis provocatur, si viderit ipsum esse clementem, et misericordem. Tertio, non decet reges, et principes dubia pertinaciter in alteram partem asserere, ne per hoc iudicentur leves et indiscreti. Quarto in suis actionibus debent habere moderationem et temperamentum: quia (ut dictum est) ipsi esse debent forma vivendi, et regula aliorum. Senum ergo, et iuvenum aliqui mores sunt imitandi, aliqui fugiendi. Sed eorum qui sunt in statu, quodammodo omnes mores sunt imitandi. Dicimus autem, quodammodo: quia sicut senes, et iuvenes habent quandam pronitatem naturalem, et inclinationem ad mores vituperabiles: possunt tamen contra ilam proponitatem facere consequi laudabiles mores. Sic et illi qui sunt in statu, et si de se pronitatem habent ad mores laudabiles, possunt tamen contra istam pronitatem facere, ut per corruptionem appetitus sequantur vituperabiles mores.
Quare si dignum est dominari rationi, et intellectui, decet reges, et principes, qui aliis dominantur, sequi mores laudabiles secundum dictamen, et ordinem rationis.
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