Liber III, Pars II — Quod quantum possibile est, sunt leges patriae observandae, et quod cavendum assuescere innovare leges. Cap. XXXI.

Liber III, Pars II — Quod quantum possibile est, sunt leges patriae observandae, et quod cavendum assuescere innovare leges. Cap. XXXI.

Philosopher asks. In the second book, Aristotle. He discusses whether it is beneficial for cities to innovate their laws and introduce new customs. Hippodamus had arranged that if someone found a law beneficial to the city, they would receive honor in that city; and since people are generally eager for honor, many were led to introduce new customs, claiming they were useful and beneficial to the city, thus abandoning their ancestral laws. Therefore, it is rightly questioned whether Hippodamus's position was good, and whether it is often beneficial to change laws, especially if better laws arise that seem more advantageous. Phil will be introduced. In Aristotle. There are four ways that seem to demonstrate that it is beneficial to innovate laws. The first is taken from the field of sciences and arts. The second comes from the purity of certain laws. The third is derived from the simplicity of those who create laws. And the fourth arises from the indeterminacy of particular circumstances. The first way is clear. For in other sciences, we see that if something better occurs later, the previous laws must be rejected; for example, in medicine, many ancestral principles have been discarded, and in the science of gymnastics, or in the art of wrestling that teaches how to wrestle, as the Philosopher indicates in Politics. Many things that the earlier ones handed down have been changed and innovated by the later ones; therefore, it will be in the laws that if better laws arise than those handed down by the earlier fathers, the laws of the homeland should no longer be observed. The second way to demonstrate this same point is taken from the purity of certain laws: for some laws of the homeland (as the Philosopher suggests) can indeed be bad and barbaric; for example, there was a law among the Greeks that those who carried iron and other metals could buy each other's wives: it was altogether barbaric to establish laws that allowed citizens to sell their wives. Likewise, it can happen that some laws are foolish, such as that law which (as the Philosopher recites). A certain group established that if a citizen were killed, and a relative of the deceased attacked another citizen, and that person fled from him in the presence of others, he would be considered a fugitive guilty of murder: for the legislator said that he would not flee unless he felt guilty. The third way is taken from the simplicity of those who establish laws. For if sometimes those who create laws happen to be simple, it would be unreasonable if wiser later generations could not change the laws established by simpler predecessors. The fourth way is taken from the indeterminacy of particular actions. For particular actions are indeterminate and cannot be perfectly understood; therefore, however wise the lawgivers may have been, some particular circumstances regarding human actions could have escaped their notice. If, therefore, later generations encounter something better due to their experience of particular actions, it is unreasonable not to remove the ancient and paternal laws in favor of better newly established laws. Therefore, these reasons seem to prove that whenever something better occurs, the paternal laws should be changed. But to assert this simply is very dangerous for the city and the kingdom. For it is customary to introduce new laws, as the philosopher suggests. Pol. It is customary to not obey the laws. For laws have great effectiveness based on customs; for who would act against something that has been observed for a long time? To become accustomed to not obeying the laws means to become accustomed to not obeying kings and rulers, and consequently, it means to abolish the principality and the kingdom. The extent of the evil that follows from not obeying kings and laws is shown by the philosopher. Rhetor. He says that it is more harmful to become accustomed to not obeying rulers than to not obeying doctors. For doctors aim for the good of the body; they want to restore health to the body. But true lawmakers and true kings primarily seek the good of the soul; because they aim to lead citizens toward virtue. Therefore, it should be clear what must be upheld regarding the laws; it must be understood that a positive law, if it is just, should be based on natural law and should determine the specific actions of people. Thus, such a law can have a defect in two ways. First, if it contradicts natural law. Second, if it does not sufficiently determine specific actions. If, in the first way, the paternal and positive laws are deficient, they are not laws but corruptions of laws, and therefore should not be observed; for positive laws, although they are added to natural laws, are not contrary to them unless we would call contrary to natural law that which is not induced by nature, but is added to it and applied through the art of all invention: according to this way of speaking, a man is naturally naked, and clothing is against nature; for being clothed seems to contradict being naked. According to this way of speaking, jurists say that a father, based on the Institutes of natural law, states that human laws are contrary to natural law; because by natural law, men were born free from the beginning. Therefore, servitude is against nature, inasmuch as nature did not introduce servitude; but it exists for the benefit of people through established laws. But to call something against nature in this way is to speak rudely. For that which is truly against nature is dictated by natural reason; and because servitude is established for the benefit and common good of people, it is not against natural law. 2. We show that some serve others and obey, even if they are bound and added to natural law, just as clothing is added to the naked body, which is a product of nature; yet it is not against natural law, because natural reason does not contradict this. Therefore, laws that are deficient because they are corrupt and against natural law, such as that law which allowed citizens to sell their wives, or any other laws that are similarly corrupt and unjust, should not be observed but should be eradicated. If, however, the laws are defective because they do not adequately determine actionable particulars, even if better and more sufficient laws arise, one should not become accustomed to innovating laws. First, because it sometimes happens that one is deceived regarding such matters, believing that those which are worse are better, and that those which are less sufficient are more sufficient. Even if there are newer laws that might be more sufficient in some respects, the old laws still need to be observed with care, because the more you fulfill one part by providing a better law, the more you harm the other part by removing the customs and long-standing practices that give the law its great effectiveness. Therefore, it's not the same when it comes to arts and laws: because arts and sciences derive their entire effectiveness from reason, but laws do not. In fact, they derive great effectiveness from their long-standing nature and established customs. Therefore, it's fitting for kings and leaders to observe the good customs of governance and the realm, and not to innovate the laws of their country unless they are contrary to right reason.