Liber III, Pars II — Qualiter melius regitur civitas aut regnum, utrum melius regatur optimo rege, quam optima lege. Cap. XXIX.

Liber III, Pars II — Qualiter melius regitur civitas aut regnum, utrum melius regatur optimo rege, quam optima lege. Cap. XXIX.

The Philosopher states. In the Politica, he inquires whether a kingdom or a city is better governed by an excellent king or by an excellent law. He presents two arguments for why it is better for the governance of the kingdom to be under an excellent law than under an excellent king. The first is based on the idea that a king should be like an instrument and tool of the law. The second is that it is easier for a king to be corrupted than for the law to be corrupted. The first way is thus clear. For, as it is said. The prince of ethics must be a guardian of justice, that is, of the just law; therefore, a prince is one who is rightly governed, as if he were a certain instrument of the just law, so that what the law rightly commands to be done, the king ensures is observed through civil power. Therefore, if something is more fundamental, it is preferable in governance to be an instrument and tool: it is better to be governed by the best law than by the best king. This is what the philosopher says. In the Politics, it is stated that it is preferable to be governed by law, because kings or rulers should be established in such a way that they are guardians and ministers of the law. The second way to investigate this same point is taken from the fact that it is easier for a king to be corrupted than the law. For a king, being human, does not only speak of good understanding, but speaks of understanding with desire; therefore, although a king may not be corrupted because he is intellect, he can still be corrupted because he has a desire attached. Thus it is said. Ethics. For sometimes desire and lust can destroy and corrupt even the best men. A good person can be destroyed by desire, and although not in terms of their natural existence, they can still be diminished in terms of their goodness; for when a good person begins to lose control and desires wrongly, even if they are not destroyed in their essence, they are nonetheless diminished in their goodness, because they are no longer truly good. Therefore, the king speaks of understanding with desire, but the law, because it pertains to reason, seems to speak of understanding alone. This is what the Philosopher says. Thus, whoever commands that understanding should lead, commands that God and the law should lead; but whoever commands that a human should lead, places them under the influence of desire, so that a beast may lead. Therefore, it seems to be shown that it is better for a kingdom or a city to be governed by law than by a king. But that this should not be simply admitted is shown by the Philosopher in the same work. For (as it is said) the law universally states that it is not universal: indeed, human laws, however exquisite they may be, must in some cases fail; therefore, it is better for a kingdom to be ruled by a king than by a law, so that legal defects may be corrected through the law. Therefore, to clarify what should be said about this matter, it must be understood that a king and any ruler is a medium between natural and positive law; for no one rightly governs unless they act according to what right reason dictates: for reason must be the rule of human actions. Therefore, if the name of king is derived from ruling, it is fitting for a king to govern others and to be a standard for others, and consequently to follow the natural law, because he rules rightly only to the extent that he does not deviate from that law; however, he is above positive law, since he establishes it by his own authority. Thus, just as a king never rules rightly unless he relies on natural law and acts according to what reason dictates, so positive law never binds rightly unless it is based on the authority of the law or another ruler. For, as was said above, positive and legal justice differs in principle in no way, either this way or that; however, when it is established, it differs because of the authority of the one who establishes it; therefore, positive law is below the ruler, just as natural law is above. And if it is said that some positive law is above the ruler, this is not because it is positive, but because the virtue of natural law is reserved in it. When it is asked whether it is better for a kingdom or a city to be ruled by an excellent king or by an excellent law. If we speak of natural law, it is clear that this is more fundamental in governance than the king himself, because no king is just unless he relies on that law. Therefore, it is blessed that the philosopher indicates in the third book of the Politics that in proper governance, a beast should not rule, but God and reason. For then a beast rules when someone does not rely on reason to govern others but on passion and desire, in which we share with beasts. Then God truly governs when someone, in ruling others, does not stray from right reason and from the natural law that God has impressed on the mind of every person. But if we speak of positive law, it is better to be ruled by an excellent king than by an excellent law, especially in those cases where the law falls short and universally states that it is not to be observed. According to this, reason concludes that it is better to be ruled by a king than by a law, because the law cannot determine particular cases. Therefore, it is expedient for a king or another ruler to guide positive law through right reason or natural law, which God has impressed on the mind of every person, and to be above legal justice, and not to observe the law where it should not be observed. From this, it can be seen how severity and mercy can coexist with justice, for human actions, due to particular circumstances and their changes, as the Philosopher states in the Ethics. Rigid laws cannot be measured like a rigid iron rule; rather, it is necessary that they be made more flexible, like a leaden rule that can be applied to human actions. Therefore, sometimes the law must be bent toward one side and act more leniently with the offender than the law dictates; at other times, it must be bent toward the opposite side and punish the offender more strictly than the law determines. For particular circumstances, which cannot be determined by law, sometimes lessen the offense; and then, justly and according to reason, one acts mercifully with the offender. Sometimes such circumstances aggravate the situation, and then one must proceed more strictly. Therefore, while rigor and mercy may seem to go beyond legal and positive justice, they are not outside of justice altogether if they are applied reasonably to the particular circumstances. Thus, in judgment, some matters are said to pertain to equality, some to rigor, and some to mercy. As long as the king's rule remains just and equal, not bent toward any one side, judgments measured according to such a rule are said to proceed from equality. However, if the legal rule is bent toward the side of mercy due to the conditions of the offender, then the judgment made will be said to proceed from grace or from mercy. But if the established rule is bent toward the opposite side, the judgment will proceed from rigor without severity. And because all these things can be done justly and reasonably, mercy and rigor can coexist with justice.