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Chapter 9GratL.1.9

Imaginem et similitudinem Dei, ad quam conditi sumus, in triplici libertate consistere.

The Threefold Freedom as Image and Likeness

Augustine introduces the three freedoms—choice, counsel, and consent—as the locus of God's image and likeness in the human soul, distinguishing the indelible image in free choice from the mutable likeness in wisdom and power.

I think, then, that in these three freedoms the very image and likeness of the Creator—the one we were made for—is contained: the image, in the freedom of choice, and in the other two, a certain twofold likeness is stamped. This is perhaps why free choice alone suffers no defect or diminishment of itself, because in it, above all, a certain substantial image of the eternal and unchangeable divinity is seen to be imprinted. For although it had a beginning, it yet knows no end; it receives no increase with respect to justice or glory, nor any loss with respect to sin or misery. What is more like eternity than that which is not eternity? Furthermore, in the other two freedoms, since they can be diminished in part and lost altogether, a certain accidental likeness of divine wisdom and power is recognized as overlaid on the image. And so we lost those through sin, and through grace we recovered them; and daily some make more progress, others less, either growing in them or falling away from them. They can also be lost in such a way that they can no longer be recovered, and they can be possessed in such a way that they can never be lost or diminished.

Paradise, Fall, and Restoration

Man was created nearest to God with the capacity not to sin; through Adam's fall we lost that state, and through grace we recover a lesser but real share in divine likeness, with Scripture testifying that the predestined are covered by love.

Man was created in paradise to share in this twofold likeness of God's wisdom and power — not indeed in the highest degree, but in one that would nonetheless be nearest to God himself. For what is closer to being unable to sin or be troubled — in which holy angels already stand and God is always, without question — than being able not to sin and not be troubled, the very state in which man was truly created? From that state Adam fell through sin — or rather, we fell in him and with him — and through grace we have received back, not indeed that same degree, but a certain lower one in its place. For we cannot be entirely without sin or misery here; nevertheless, with grace helping us, we can avoid being overcome by sin and by misery. Although Scripture speaks nonetheless: 'Whatever is born of God does not sin' (1✦ John 3:9).✦ But this is said of those predestined to life: not that they do not sin at all, but that their sin is not imputed to them — sin that is either punished with worthy penitence or hidden in love. For love covers a multitude of sins (1✦

The Degrees of Likeness Among Angels, Adam, and Us

Augustine orders the degrees of divine likeness: the highest angels possess it fully, Adam held it in a middle degree, we hold the lowest, and the demons have none at all, with each state described in relation to sin and misery.

Blessed are those whose wrongs are forgiven, whose sins are covered; blessed is the one the Lord does not hold guilty of sin (Ps. 31:1–2).✦ Ps. 31:1–2. So then, the highest angels hold the highest degree of the divine likeness, we the lowest, Adam held the middle, and the demons none at all. The heavenly spirits, to be sure, are given to endure without sin and without misery; Adam, for his part, could exist without them, but could not remain so; we, in truth, cannot even exist without them — yet we need not yield to them. Moreover, the devil and his members, just as they never wish to resist sin, so they can never escape its punishment.

Scripture on the Loss of Wisdom and Power in Death

The two freedoms of counsel and consent vary across realms—full in heaven, partial in paradise, absent in the underworld—while free choice remains unchanged; Scripture confirms that both wisdom and power are wholly absent among the dead.

So when these two freedoms — of counsel and of consent — through which true wisdom and power are made available to a rational creature are varied, at God's discretion, according to whatever causes, places, and times apply, so that they are found on earth only in part, in heavenly things fully, in paradise in a measure, and in the world of the dead not at all, while the freedom of choice itself is not altered from the very state in which it was created, but is possessed equally always (as far as it is in itself) whether in heaven, on earth, or in the world below: rightly, then, the former are attributed to the likeness, and the latter to the image. And indeed, that in the world below both freedoms have perished — namely, those that are said to pertain to the likeness — the authority of Scripture testifies. For that true wisdom, which is surely understood as belonging to the freedom of counsel, is entirely absent in that place, the passage itself makes clear where it is written: Whatever your hand is able to do, do it at once; for there is neither work, nor reason, nor wisdom in the world below, where you are heading (Eccl.✦ IX, 10). Furthermore, concerning the power that is given through the freedom of consent, the Gospel speaks this way: With hands and feet bound, cast him into the outer darkness (Matt.✦ XXII, 13). For what is the binding of hands and feet, if not the complete removal of all power?

The Objection: Does Torment Produce Wisdom?

An objector argues that torment compels repentance and thus wisdom; Augustine replies that mere cessation of sinful pleasure under duress is not wisdom, since an evil will persists even in punishment.

But someone says: How can there be no wisdom at all in that place, where the evils that are endured compel repentance for the evils that have been done? Surely in torments no one fails to repent? Or is it that repenting of evil cannot be a form of wisdom?1 Now this objection would have real force if only the deed of sin, and not also the evil will, were punished. For it is beyond doubt that no one placed in torments delights in repeating the deed of sin. Nevertheless, if an evil will persists even in torments, what weight does the mere denial of the act carry, that anyone should be thought wise simply because he no longer takes pleasure in wantoning amid the flames?2 Finally: Wisdom will not enter a malevolent soul (Wis.3 1, 4). So how will we prove that an evil will persists even in punishment?

Proof That Evil Will Persists in Punishment

The damned do not will what is just—they wish their punishment removed—and this unwillingness to accept justice proves their will remains unjust and evil, not truly repentant.

Certainly, to leave everything else aside, they wouldn't want to be punished at all. But it is just for those to be punished who have done what deserves punishment. Therefore they do not want what is just. But whoever does not want what is just — their will is not just. So a will that doesn't agree with justice is, for that very reason, unjust and evil. There are two things that show the will to be unjust: either when it chooses to sin, or when it's pleased to have sinned without punishment. For those who were happy to sin as long as it was permitted — and now that they can't, they want what they've done to go unpunished — what true wisdom is on display here, what good will? Grant that they're sorry they sinned — still, if they were given the choice, wouldn't they rather keep on sinning than face the punishment for it?

The Persistence of Wicked Will and the Enduring Image

A good will cannot choose the unjust over the just; the damned grieve not their sin but their powerlessness, revealing that wicked will persists as long as the body endures—yet the image of God in free choice remains immovable even among the dead.

And yet that is unjust, and this is just. When, truly, would a good will choose what is unjust rather than what is just? Besides, those who grieve not so much over having lived for themselves as over the fact that they can do so no longer — these do not truly repent. In short, what is done within is revealed without. For as long as the body lives in the flame, it is clear that the will persists in wickedness.4 Therefore, as for the likeness that consists in the freedom of counsel and of satisfaction, among the dead there is nothing of this at all, nor can there be — the image, nevertheless, remains there as well, through free choice that endures immovable.5

Read the original Latin

Puto autem in his tribus libertatibus ipsam, ad quam conditi sumus, Conditoris imaginem atque similitudinem contineri: et imaginem quidem in libertate arbitrii, in reliquis autem duabus bipartitam quamdam consignari similitudinem. Hinc est fortassis, quod solum liberum arbitrium sui omnino defectum seu diminutionem non patitur, quod in ipso potissimum aeternae et incommutabilis divinitatis substantiva quaedam imago impressa videatur. Nam, etsi habuerit initium, nescit tamen occasum, nec de justitia vel gloria capit augmentum: nec de peccato sive miseria detrimentum. Quid aeternitati similius, quod non sit aeternitas? Porro in aliis duabus libertatibus, quoniam non solum ex parte minui, sed et ex toto amitti possunt; accidentalis quaedam magis similitudo sapientiae atque potentiae divinae, imagini superducta cognoscitur. Denique et amisimus illas per culpam, et per gratiam recuperavimus; et quotidie quidem alii plus, alii minus, aut in ipsis proficimus, aut ab ipsis deficimus. Possunt etiam sic amitti, ut jam non valeant recuperari: possunt et ita possideri, ut nec amitti queant aliquando , nec minui.

Hujus bipartitae similitudinis sapientiae et potentiae Dei, non quidem in gradu summo, sed qui ipsi tamen esset proximior, homo conditus est in paradiso. Quid enim vicinius ad non posse peccare, vel turbari (in quo utique jam sanctos Angelos stare, et Deum semper esse dubium non est), quam posse et non peccare, et non turbari, in quo homo profecto creatus est? A quo illo per peccatum, imo nobis in illo et cum illo corruentibus, rursus per gratiam, non quidem ipsum, sed pro ipso quemdam inferiorem gradum recepimus. Neque enim hic possumus penitus esse sine peccato, seu miseria: possumus tamen, gratia juvante, nec peccato superari, nec miseria. Quanquam tamen Scriptura loquatur: Omne quod natum est ex Deo non peccat (I Joan. III, 9) . Sed hoc dictum est de praedestinatis ad vitam: non quod omnino non peccent, sed quod peccatum ipsis non imputetur, quod vel punitur condigna poenitentia, vel in charitate absconditur. Charitas quippe cooperit multitudinem peccatorum (I Petr.

IV, 8) ; et: Beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates, et quorum tecta sunt peccata; et: Beatus vir cui non imputavit Dominus peccatum (Psal. XXXI 1, 2) . Divinae ergo similitudinis summum gradum summi angeli tenent, nos infimum: Adam tenuit medium, porro daemones nullum. Supernis nempe spiritibus datum est sine peccato et miseria perdurare: Adae autem absque his quidem esse, sed non etiam permanere: nobis vero ne esse quidem absque his, sed ipsis tantum non cedere. Caeterum diabolus et membra ejus, sicut nunquam volunt reluctari peccato, sic nunquam possunt poenam declinare peccati.

Cum ergo istae duae libertates, consilii scilicet atque complaciti, per quas rationali creaturae vera sapientia et potentia ministratur, ita Deo, prout vult, dispensante, quibusque pro causis, locis, temporibus, varientur, quatenus in terris modice, in coelestibus plenarie, mediocriter in paradiso, apud inferos 615 nullatenus habeantur; libertas vero arbitrii de ipso, quo condita est, statu aliquatenus non mutetur, sed aequaliter semper (quantum in se est) a coelis, terris, inferis possideatur: merito illae similitudini, haec imagini deputantur. Et quidem apud inferos, quod utraque libertas perierit, illae scilicet quae ad similitudinem pertinere dicuntur, Scripturarum testatur auctoritas. Nam verum illic Sapere, quod utique de consilii libertate concipitur, omnino non esse, locus ille manifestat, ubi legitur: Quodcumque potest manus tua facere; instanter operare: quia nec opus, nec ratio, nec sapientia est apud inferos, quo tu properas (Eccle. IX, 10) . Porro de potentia, quae per libertatem complaciti datur, Evangelium sic loquitur: Ligatis manibus ac pedibus, projicite eum in tenebras exteriores (Matth. XXII, 13) . Quid enim est manuum pedumque ligatio, nisi omnimoda potestatis ablatio?

Sed dicit aliquis: Quomodo non est ibi aliquod Sapere, ubi mala quae tolerantur, cogunt poenitere malorum quae facta sunt? Nunquid aut in tormentis quispiam non poenitere; aut poenitere mali, non esse sapere potest? Hoc autem recte opponeretur, si opus tantum peccati, et non etiam voluntas mala puniretur. Nulli quippe dubium est, quod nemo in tormentis positus actum iterare peccati delectetur. Verumtamen si voluntas etiam in tormentis mala perdurat, quid ponderis habet operis abnegatio, ut ideo sapere quis putetur, quod jam in mediis flammis luxuriari non libeat? Denique: In malevolam animam non introibit sapientia (Sap. I, 4) . Unde autem probabimus quod mala et in poenis voluntas perseveret?

Certe, ut caetera omittam, nollent omnino puniri. Justum est autem puniri, qui punienda gesserunt. Nolunt igitur quod justum est. Sed qui non vult quod justum est, justa ejus voluntas non est. Eo ergo injusta, ac per hoc et mala est voluntas, quo justitiae non concordat. Duo sunt quae injustam comprobant voluntatem, vel cum peccare, vel cum impune peccasse libet. Quibus ergo peccare libuit quamdiu licuit; et cum jam non possunt, inultum manere volunt quod peccaverunt: quid in hoc sapientiae verae, quid bonae voluntatis apparet? Sed esto, poenitet eos peccasse: nunquid non tamen, si optio detur, malint adhuc peccare, quam poenam sustinere peccati?

Et tamen illud iniquum est, hoc justum. Quando vero voluntas bona magis quod iniquum, quam quod justum est eligeret? Caeterum non vere poenitent, qui non tam dolent se sibi vixisse, quam hoc ipsum jam non posse. Denique foris ostenditur quid intus agatur. Nam quamdiu corpus vivi: in flamma, tamdiu constat in malitia persistere voluntatem. Itaque de similitudine, quae in consilii, et item complaciti libertate continetur, apud inferos penitus nihil est, nec esse potest, imagine tamen etiam illic per liberum arbitrium immobili permanente.

Scripture echoes

  1. ↩1John.3.9 — Everyone who has been born of God does not practice sin, because his seed remains in him; and he cannot sin, because he has been born of God.
  2. ↩1John.3.9 — Everyone who has been born of God does not practice sin, because his seed remains in him; and he cannot sin, because he has been born of God.
  3. ↩1Pet.4.8 — Above all, keep loving one another earnestly, for love covers a multitude of sins.
  4. ↩Ps.31.1-Ps.31.2 — To the chief musician. A Psalm of David. Ps.31.2 — In you, O LORD, I have taken refuge; let me never be put to shame. In your righteousness, deliver me.
  5. ↩Eccl.9.10 — Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with all your strength; for there is no work or planning or knowledge or wisdom in Sheol, where you are going.
  6. ↩Matt.25.30 — And cast the worthless servant into the outer darkness. There will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

Notes

  1. 1 ↩The double aut…aut construction sets up two rhetorical alternatives; the second (poenitere mali non esse sapere) is compressed — 'repenting of evil is not wisdom' or 'to repent of evil is not to be wise.'
  2. 2 ↩The ut-clause (ut ideo sapere quis putetur) expresses result/purpose: 'so that for this reason someone is thought wise.' The argument is that external restraint without interior change is not true wisdom.
  3. 3 ↩Scripture citation: Sapientia (Wisdom of Solomon) 1:4. Abbreviated book title 'Sap.' with chapter and verse to be confirmed by Moses resolution.
  4. 4 ↩vivi is morphologically ambiguous (genitive of vita or form of vivo); rendered as 'the body lives' following the most plausible reading in context — the body living in the flame of concupiscence or punishment.
  5. 5 ↩complaciti is a rare lexical item (genitive of complacitus/complacitum); rendered as 'satisfaction' in the sense of self-satisfaction or pleasure in one's own counsel. The passage distinguishes between the image of God (which persists in the dead through the enduring faculty of free choice) and the likeness of God (which requires the freedom of counsel and satisfaction, lost after death).

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