Qualis libertas competat animabus sanctis carne solutis: quaeve Deo, et omni creaturae rationali communis.
The Freedom of the Blessed
Freed from the flesh, holy souls already enjoy full freedom from necessity, a freedom shared by all rational creatures in both good and evil, and the will remains free even when captive to sin.
This much must be known beyond all doubt: both freedoms — full and perfect — are present in souls that have been set free from the flesh, since they are now with God equally, and with Christ his, and with the heavenly angels.1 For holy souls, although they have not yet received their bodies, do lack something in the way of glory — but there is nothing whatsoever of misery in them.2 But freedom from necessity belongs equally and without distinction to God, and to every rational creature — to the evil as much as to the good.3 It is not lost or diminished by sin or by misery; it is no greater in the righteous person than in the sinner, no fuller in the angel than in the human being.4 For how does the consent of the human will, once turned toward the good through grace, freely make a person good and free in the good — by which that person becomes willing, not dragged against their will? In just the same way, one who has freely fallen into evil is, in that evil, nonetheless as free and as voluntary as can be — led by their own will, to be sure, not compelled from outside — so as to be wicked.56 And just as the heavenly angel — or God himself — remains freely good, by his own will, to be sure, and not by any external necessity, so indeed the devil equally fell freely into evil, and persists in it, by his own voluntary assent, and not by another's impulse.7 So the freedom of the will remains, even where the mind becomes captive — as full, indeed, in evil as in good, but more ordered in good; and as whole, in its own measure, in the creature as in the Creator, but more powerful in the Creator than in the creature.89
The Captive Will and Its Witness
Those who lament their inability to will the good reveal that the will is present but bound, grieving not its destruction but its captivity to sin.
Now it's common for people to complain and say, "I want to have a good will, and I can't." But this in no way imposes on freedom, as if the will were being subjected to force or necessity in this regard. Rather, they're clearly testifying that they lack the freedom that consists in being free from sin. For whoever wants to have a good will proves that he already has a will. After all, he couldn't want to have a good one unless he had a will through which to want it. But if they want both will and freedom — well, they want freedom from necessity, not freedom from sin. Surely the point is that a person can't have a good will even when he wants one — he indeed perceives that he lacks freedom. But clearly it's freedom from sin that he grieves being crushed in, not that his will is being destroyed. And yet, by now it's beyond doubt that he has a good will to the extent that he wants to have one. What he wants is indeed good, and he couldn't want the good except through a good will — just as he couldn't want evil except through a bad will. When we want good, our will is good; when we want evil, our will is bad. In both cases there is will, and in both there is freedom — for in the end, necessity yields to the will. Although we aren't strong enough to do what we want, we do somehow sense that our freedom itself is captive to sin, or at least wretched — yet not lost.
What Free Choice Truly Is
Free choice is the will's power to judge itself as good or evil by its own consent, and true freedom would extend this liberty to counsel and delight as well as judgment.
From this freedom alone, then — the freedom by which the will is free to judge itself, good if it has consented to the good, or evil if it has consented to evil (since it perceives that it cannot consent to either unless it wills to) — we believe free choice takes its name. For freedom from what is called sin might more fittingly perhaps be called free deliberation; and likewise freedom from what is called misery could sooner be called free pleasure than free choice. Free choice, to be sure, is judgment. Just as it belongs to judgment to discern what is permitted and what is not, so it belongs to deliberation to test what is advantageous and what is not, and likewise to pleasure to experience what is pleasing and what is not. If only we could deliberate for ourselves as freely as we judge about ourselves! So that just as we freely decide what is permitted and what is forbidden through judgment, so through deliberation we might freely choose what is permitted as advantageous for ourselves, and reject what is forbidden as harmful. For then we would be free not only in our free choice, but also, beyond any doubt, in our deliberation, and through this, free from sin as well. But what if the whole of what would be advantageous or permitted were also pleasing?
The Fractured Will in This Life
Were judgment, counsel, and delight perfectly aligned, we would be free from all misery; but in this life we neither choose nor embrace what we know to be right, proving our counsel and satisfaction are not free.
Wouldn't we also deservedly be called free with our guard up, since we'd feel ourselves freed from everything that could displease — that is, from every misery? But now, when through our judgment we decide that many things must either be admitted or omitted, yet through deliberate counsel we by no means choose or reject them according to what judgment rightly demands; and again, not all that we carefully observe as right and advantageous do we willingly embrace as pleasing to God, but on the contrary we scarcely endure with composure things that are, as it were, harsh and troublesome — it's clear that we have neither free counsel nor free satisfaction.
The Threefold Freedom to Come
The full freedom of God's kingdom—free from necessity, sin, and misery—awaits fulfillment in the saints, while now only freedom of choice remains, partial and contested, until the perfect comes and prayer is answered.
There's another question — whether we had free choice even before sin in the first man — but that will be dealt with in its proper place. But this much is certain: when God shows mercy, we will obtain what we pray for — your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven. This will certainly be fulfilled when the freedom from necessity that now seems common to every rational creature everywhere is also possessed by the chosen — as it already is by the holy angels — kept safe from sin and guarded against misery, as they experience the threefold freedom in blessed reality: God's good, pleasing, and perfect will.10 And because this is not yet fully realized, for now the freedom of choice alone remains complete and whole in human beings. For the freedom of choice is only partial, and even that only in a few spiritual people — those who have crucified their flesh with its vices and desires, so that sin no longer reigns in their mortal body. Furthermore, freedom from sin gives freedom of choice; yet so that choice is not taken away entirely, the captivity of free choice remains. But when what is perfect comes, then what is partial will be set aside — that is, when freedom of choice is complete, there will no longer be any captivity of choice. And this is what we ask for every day in prayer when we say to God: Your kingdom come.
The Kingdom Advancing in the Soul
The kingdom of grace draws near daily in the renewed inner self, diminishing sin's power, yet while the body of death remains, even the advanced stumble and must pray for the kingdom to come.
6, 10). This kingdom hasn't fully come yet. Still, every day it draws a little closer, and gradually, day by day, it stretches its boundaries wider and wider — but only in those whose inner self is being renewed, with God's help, from one day to the next. So as far as the kingdom of grace expands, to that same degree the power of sin is diminished. Yet because it's still held back by the body of death that weighs down the soul, and by the pressures of our earthly dwelling that surely burden the mind as it wrestles with many thoughts — even those who seem more advanced in this mortal life are compelled to confess and say: 'We all stumble in many ways' (James 3:2), and, 'If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us' (1 John 1:8). 1 John 1:8). Therefore they themselves also pray without ceasing, saying: 'Your kingdom come.' And this won't be fully realized in them until sin not only stops reigning in their mortal body but is no longer present at all — until it can have no place in their now immortal body.
Read the original Latin
Hoc autem indubitanter sciendum, utramque plenam atque perfectam perfectis inesse animabus carne solutis, cum Deo pariter et Christo ejus, atque Angelis supercoelestibus. Nam sanctis animabus, etsi necdum corpora receperunt, deest quidem de gloria; sed nihil prorsus inest de miseria. Verum libertas a necessitate aeque et indifferenter Deo, universaeque tam malae, quam bonae rationali convenit creaturae. Nec peccato, nec miseria amittitur, vel minuitur; nec major in justo est, quam in peccatore, nec plenior in angelo, quam in homine. Quomodo namque ad bonum per gratiam conversus humanae voluntatis consensus, eo libere bonum, et in bono liberum hominem facit, quo voluntarius efficitur, non invitus pertrahitur: sic sponte devolutus in malum, in malo nihilominus tam liberum, quam spontaneum constituit, sua utique voluntate ductum, non aliunde coactum ut malus sit. Et sicut coelestis angelus, aut etiam Deus ipse, permanet libere bonus, propria videlicet voluntate, non aliqua extrinseca necessitate: sic profecto diabolus aeque libere in malum et corruit, et persistit, suo utique voluntario nutu, non alieno impulsu. Manet ergo libertas voluntatis, ubi etiam fit captivitas mentis, tam plena quidem in malis, quam in bonis, sed in bonis ordinatior; tam integra quoque pro suo modo in creatura, quam in Creatore, sed in illo potentior.
Quod autem homines solent conqueri, et dicere: Volo habere bonam voluntatem, et non possum; nequaquam huic praescribit libertati, ut quasi vim aut necessitatem in hac parte voluntas patiatur: sed plane illa libertate, quae dicitur a peccato, se carere testantur. Nam qui vult habere bonam voluntatem, probat se habere voluntatem: non enim vult habere bonam, nisi per voluntatem. Quod si voluntatem, et libertatem; sed libertatem a necessitate, non a peccato. Nempe ut non valeat, cum velit, habere bonam, sentit quidem sibi deesse libertatem, sed profecto libertatem a peccato, quo utique dolet premi, non peremi, voluntatem. Quanquam jam procul dubio utcunque bonam habet, ubi habere vult. Bonum quippe est quod vult; nec posset bonum velle, nisi bona voluntate: sicut nec velle malum, nisi mala voluntate. Cum bonum volumus, bona est voluntas: cum malum volumus, mala est voluntas. Utrobique voluntas, et ubique libertas: cedit siquidem voluntati necessitas.
Cum autem non valemus quod volumus; sentimus quidem ipsam quodammodo libertatem peccato esse captivam, vel miseram, non tamen amissam.
Ex hac ergo tantum libertate, qua liberum est voluntati se ipsam judicare: vel bonam, si bono; vel malam, si malo consenserit (quippe quae in neutro, nisi certe volendo, consentire se sentit), liberum arbitrium credimus nominari. Nam ex illa quae dicitur a peccato, congruentius forsitan liberum consilium; et item ex illa quae dicta est a miseria, liberum potius complacitum posset dici, quam liberum arbitrium. Arbitrium quippe judicium est. Sicut vero judicii est discernere quid liceat, vel quid non liceat: sic profecto consilii probare quid expediat, vel non expediat: sic complaciti quoque experiri quid libeat, vel non libeat. Utinam tam libere nobis consuleremus, quam libere de nobis judicamus! ut quemadmodum libere per judicium licita illicitaque decernimus; ita per consilium et licita, tanquam commoda, nobis eligere; et illicita, tanquam noxia, respuere 608 liberum haberemus. Jam enim non solum liberi arbitrii, sed et liberi procul dubio consilii, ac per hoc et a peccato liberi essemus. Sed quid si totum, solumque quod expediret vel liceret, etiam liberet?
Nonne liberi quoque esse complaciti merito diceremur, quippe qui ab omni proinde, quod displicere potest, hoc est ab omni nos miseria, liberos sentiremus? Nunc autem cum multa per judicium vel admittenda, vel omittenda esse decernamus, quae tamen per consilium nequaquam pro judicii rectitudine aut eligimus, aut contemnimus; rursumque non omnia, quae tanquam recta et commoda consulte observamus, etiam ut beneplacita libenter amplectimur, sed insuper quasi dura ac molesta vix aequanimiter ferre perduramus: liquet quia liberum nec consilium habemus, nec complacitum.
Alia questio est, si vel ante peccatum in primo homine habuimus: quod loco suo discutietur. Certissime autem habituri sumus, cum Deo miserante obtinebimus quod oramus: Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in coelo, et in terra. Hoc nempe complebitur, quando in quod nunc cunctae passim rationali (ut jam dictum est) creaturae commune videtur, liberum scilicet a necessitate arbitrium, erit etiam in electis hominibus (uti jam in sanctis est Angelis) et cautum a peccato, et tutum a miseria, probantibus tandem triplicis libertatis felici experientia, quae sit bona voluntas Dei, ac beneplacens, et perfecta. Quod quia necdum est, sola interim plena integraque manet in hominibus libertas arbitrii. Nam libertas consilii ex parte tantum, et hoc in paucis spiritualibus, qui carnem suam crucifixerunt cum vitiis et concupiscentiis, quatenus jam non regnet peccatum in eorum mortali corpore. Porro ut non regnet, libertas facit consilii; ut tamen non desit ex integro, captivitas est liberi arbitrii. Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, tunc evacuabitur quod ex parte est: hoc est, cum plena fuerit libertas consilii, nulla jam erit captivitas arbitrii. Et hoc est quod quotidie petimus in oratione, cum dicimus Deo: Adveniat regnum tuum (Matth.
VI, 10) . Regnum hoc necdum ex toto pervenit in nos. Quotidie tamen paulatim adventat, sensimque in dies magis ac magis dilatat terminos suos, in his duntaxat, quorum per Dei adjutorium interior homo renovatur de die in diem. In quantum ergo regnum gratiae dilatatur, in tantum peccati potestas minuitur. In quantum vero minus est adhuc propter corpus mortis quod aggravat animam, et ob necessitatem terrenae inhabitationis utique deprimentis sensum multa cogitantem; necesse habent etiam qui perfectiores in hac mortalitate videntur, confiteri et dicere: In multis offendimus omnes (Jacobi III, 2) : et, Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est (I Joan. I, 8) . Quapropter orant et ipsi sine intermissione, dicentes: Adveniat regnum tuum. Quod non erit vel in ipsis consummatum, quousque peccatum non solum non regnet in eorum mortali corpore, sed nec sit omnino, nec esse possit in immortali jam corpore.
Notes
- 1 ↩utramque plenam atque perfectam: the two freedoms referenced are (1) freedom from sin and (2) freedom from misery, as the surrounding context makes clear. The phrase perfectis...animabus is dative/ablative plural with ambiguous case marking; read as dative with inesse.
- 2 ↩deest quidem de gloria: the sense is that holy souls in the intermediate state (before bodily resurrection) lack the fullness of glory that comes with the glorified body, though they are free from all suffering.
- 3 ↩libertas a necessitate: freedom from external compulsion or constraint, as distinct from freedom from sin (libertas a peccato). This is a natural endowment of rational creatures, not a gift of grace.
- 4 ↩libertas (understood from previous sentence) is the subject of amittitur and minuitur. The nec...nec correlative construction emphasizes that neither sin nor misery touches this freedom.
- 5 ↩The quomodo...sic structure sets up an analogy: grace-led consent produces willing goodness, while self-produced evil remains equally voluntary. The point is that freedom of will persists in both directions — it is the quality of the willing that differs, not the fact of freedom.
- 6 ↩namque rendered as 'For how does' to capture the explanatory force while maintaining the interrogative quomodo that governs the analogy.
- 7 ↩voluntario nutu: 'voluntary nod/assent' — a striking phrase emphasizing that the devil's persistence in evil is self-chosen, not imposed from outside. This parallels the angel's and God's self-determined goodness.
- 8 ↩captivitas mentis: the mind's captivity to sin does not destroy the will's freedom. The paradox is that freedom persists even in bondage — it is the will's orientation, not its existence, that changes. The comparative structure (tam...quam...sed) emphasizes that freedom is quantitatively equal but qualitatively ordered differently in good vs. evil, and in creature vs. Creator.
- 9 ↩libertas voluntatis: 'freedom of the will' — the key phrase that anchors the entire chapter's argument. Here it is shown to be indestructible, surviving even the mind's captivity to sin.
- 10 ↩The 'threefold freedom' (triplex libertas) is a theological construct; the three aspects are freedom from necessity, freedom from sin, and freedom from misery.
De gratia et libero arbitrio (On Grace and Free Choice) companion
Grace works through practice — so practice
Bernard's conclusion frees you to show up daily without anxiety. Chosen Portion makes showing up simple and free.
Bernard's teaching that grace and human consent cooperate is enacted every time a reader freely opens their daily portion in Chosen Portion.
- One 10-minute devotional portion every day, no guesswork
- Read Bernard and other classics in modern English, portion by portion
- A consistent daily rhythm that treats effort as cooperation, not earning