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← The Education of a Christian Prince (Institutio principis Christiani)/Book 1 · Institutio Principis Christiani
Chapter 6Inst.1.6

Caput sextum: De legibus condendis aut emendandis.

The Prince as Living Law

A good prince is himself a living law, and a well-ordered commonwealth under such a ruler needs few laws, just as a skilled physician uses few remedies.

The best laws under the best ruler make a country or kingdom especially blessed, and its condition is most fortunate when the ruler himself obeys the laws and everyone else obeys the ruler — laws that conform to what is just and honorable and aim at nothing other than advancing the common good. A good, wise, and uncorrupted prince is nothing other than a living law. He'll therefore take care not to establish many laws, but to establish the best ones — and above all those most beneficial to the commonwealth. A city well-ordered under a good prince and upright magistrates needs very few laws; but if things are otherwise, no number of laws, however many, will be enough. Things don't go well for the sick whenever an unskilled doctor heaps remedy upon remedy.

The True Standard of Law

Laws must be measured by justice and the common good, not by the prince's private profit or the treasury's gain, and where magistrates are corrupt even good laws are twisted to destruction.

In making laws, this must be guarded against above all else: let nothing smell of the treasury's profit, nothing of private advantage to the nobles, but let everything be directed toward the standard of what is honorable and toward public utility. And let that utility be measured not by common opinion but by the rule of wisdom, which ought to guide princes in their deliberations at all times. Otherwise, it will not truly be a law at all — as even the pagans acknowledge — unless it is just, unless it is fair, unless it serves the public good. Nor is a law simply whatever has pleased the prince, but rather whatever has pleased a wise and good prince — one who is pleased by nothing except what is honorable and serves the common good. But if the standard by which crooked things are to be made straight has itself been distorted, what can come of it except that through such laws even those things that were right will be corrupted? And Plato wants laws to be as few as possible, especially concerning more trivial matters — such as contracts, commercial transactions, and taxes. For the safety of the commonwealth does not arise from a multitude of laws any more than it arises from a multitude of remedies. Where the prince is upright and the magistrates perform their duty, there is no need for many laws. But where things are otherwise, there the abuse of laws is turned to the destruction of the commonwealth, while even well-enacted laws are twisted to another purpose by the wickedness of those men.

Tyrants Who Make Snares, Not Laws

Dionysius and Epitades show how rulers who enact laws for personal power or vengeance create not justice but traps that ultimately ruin the commonwealth.

Dionysius of Syracuse was rightly condemned. By a tyrant's strategy, he enacted a great many laws, heaping one upon another, and then — as tends to happen — let them be ignored by the people, thereby making everyone vulnerable to his power. But that is not making laws — it is setting snares. And Epitades was rightly censured, because he proposed a law allowing anyone to leave his property to whomever he wished — all so that he himself could disinherit the son he hated. But at first the people didn't understand the man's scheme; however, that policy later brought serious ruin upon the commonwealth.

Laws That Teach and Persuade

Good laws should not merely command and threaten but also instruct and persuade, deterring from sin by reasons rather than by punishments alone.

Let the Prince enact laws that don't merely threaten punishment for the guilty, but also persuade people not to sin. Accordingly, those who think laws should be comprised in very few words — so as merely to command, and not also to teach — are mistaken; indeed, laws should be concerned more with deterring from sin by reasons than by punishments.1 Even though Seneca doesn't approve this opinion of Plato, he states it boldly — indeed, more boldly than learnedly.2

Winning Approval for the Law

While the common people should not rashly judge the laws, the prince must ensure his laws can withstand the scrutiny of all good people, following the example of Marcus Antoninus Pius.

The same authority doesn't allow young men to debate the fairness of the law, but it does allow older men to do so, within limits. But just as it is not for the common people to rashly pass judgment on the laws of princes, so it is for the prince to take care that he enact laws which will please all good people — and that he remember the lowest also have a sense which is common to everyone.3 In this, Marcus Antoninus Pius is praised: that he never did anything without first trying, through letters as well, to win everyone's approval, having set forth the reasons why he judged it to be in the interest of the state.45

Rewards as Well as Punishments

Drawing on Xenophon's animal analogy, Erasmus argues that noble citizens should be led by honor and reward rather than by fear, and that laws should encourage virtue through incentives as well as penalties.

Xenophon, in his Oeconomicus, has elegantly handed down that other living creatures, too, are led above all by two things to comply: by food, if a creature is more lowly, or by coaxing, if it is more noble — for instance, a horse — and by blows, if it is more stubborn — for instance, a donkey. But man, though he is by care the most noble of all creatures, should be compelled to duty by laws not so much through threats and punishments as through rewards that invite him. Therefore laws should not only impose a penalty on offenders but also encourage with rewards those who serve the commonwealth well. We see that this practice was widespread among the ancients. If someone had fought bravely in war, he was given a reward, and if he had fallen, his children were raised at public expense. If someone had saved a citizen, if someone had driven an enemy from the walls, if someone had aided the commonwise with wholesome counsel, there was a reward for the service. Although it's the mark of an outstanding citizen to pursue what's best even when no reward is set before them, it's still useful to fire up the minds of ordinary citizens, since they're still unformed, with this kind of incentive toward honorable effort. Those who are generous in spirit are moved more by honor; those who are more base are also led by profit. Therefore, by all these means the law will stir people up — by honor and disgrace, by profit and loss. Furthermore, those who are altogether servile in character, or rather brutish, must be tamed with chains and whips.

Prevention Over Punishment

The prince's highest duty is to prevent crime before it happens by forming citizens in good principles, appointing upright magistrates, and cutting off the root causes of wrongdoing.

Citizens should be trained from early boyhood in this sense of honor and disgrace, so that they understand reward is owed not to wealth or noble birth, but to right conduct. In short, the prince's vigilance should be directed to this end by every means available: not merely that offenses be punished, but that it look to this far more and lean upon it — let this be the first concern, that it take care nothing deserving of punishment be allowed to happen at all. For just as that physician is better who shuts out disease and keeps it at bay than one who drives out what has already been contracted with drugs — so it is no small degree more excellent to see to it that crimes are never committed than to punish them once they have been carried out. This will be accomplished if the prince cuts back — where he can — the causes from which he has observed that crimes chiefly spring, or at the very least presses down on them and weakens them. First of all, then, as has been said, from corrupt opinions about things — just as from polluted springs — the greatest part of crimes gushes forth. This, therefore, must be the first order of business: that you have citizens formed by the best principles, and then magistrates who are not only wise but also uncorrupted.

The Graduated Remedy: From Persuasion to Amputation

Following Plato, the prince should try every remedy before punishment, resorting to the death penalty only as a last resort, like a diseased limb that must be cut from the body.

And Plato rightly advises that nothing should be left untried, and that every stone, as they say, should be turned before one resorts to the last measure of punishment.6 Arguments should come first, so that no one would want to sin; then evildoers are to be deterred by fear of divine power as the avenger of wrongdoers, and further by threats of punishment.7 If these accomplish nothing, then punishments must be resorted to — but lighter ones, which heal the evil rather than remove the person.8 But if none of these measures works, then at last, like a limb beyond hope of recovery and incurable, it must be cut away from the body of the laws — though the laws themselves are unwilling — lest the sound part be drawn into the corruption.✦9

The Prince as Physician of the Commonwealth

Like a skilled physician who avoids cutting unless absolutely necessary, the prince should try every remedy before capital punishment, remembering that the commonwealth is one body.

Just as a faithful and skilled physician doesn't resort to cutting or burning if the illness can be removed by a poultice or a potion, and never turns to those measures unless compelled by the disease itself, so the Prince will try every remedy before resorting to capital punishment, bearing in mind that the commonwealth is one body — and no one amputates a limb if health can be restored by a different course.10 As a conscientious physician, in preparing remedies, looks to nothing else than driving out the disease with the least possible danger to the patient, so a good Prince, in establishing laws, will look to nothing else than the public good — and will seek to heal the ills of the people with the least possible harm.

Virtue, Not Wealth, as the Measure of Worth

The prince must ensure citizens are valued for virtue and character rather than riches, and he must model this himself, lest his display of wealth corrupt the ambitions of the people.

The best part of good deeds comes especially from this: that many people everywhere grow rich, and poverty is despised. Therefore the prince should make an effort to ensure his citizens are valued for virtue and character, not for wealth.11 And let him show this first in himself and among his own household. For if people have seen the prince display his riches, and that with him the richest man is the one most highly valued, many will grow eager for magistracies, honors, and offices, with the way open through money — and there's no doubt these things stir up the minds of the multitude to acquire wealth by fair means or foul.12

The Scourge of Idleness

Idleness is the breeding ground of vice in every republic; the prince must drive the idle to work or expel them, while providing public care for those too old or sick to support themselves.

More broadly, the dregs of nearly every republic are born from idleness, which people pursue for all sorts of reasons; and those who've grown used to it, if they lack the means to keep it up, turn to evil practices. This, then, is what the prince's vigilance must accomplish: keep the number of idle people among his subjects as small as possible, and either put them to work or expel them from the city. Plato thought all beggars should be driven far from his republic. But for those broken by old age or disease who have no family to support them, public homes for the aged and public infirmaries must be provided. Whoever is healthy and content with little has no need to beg.

Monasteries, Colleges, and Parasitic Retainers

Erasmus extends his critique of idleness to monasteries, colleges, and the swarm of idle courtiers and retainers who, when luxury demands more, turn to dishonest practices.

The people of Marseille would not allow sacrificing priests into their city—priests who carried certain sacred rites from town to town for profit, so that under the pretext of religion they could pursue idleness and luxury.13 And perhaps it would be good for the commonwealth if there were some limit placed on monasteries. For this too is a kind of idleness—especially in those whose lives have scarcely been tested—and they spend their days in idleness and sloth. What I say about monasteries should be applied to colleges as well. To this class belong tax collectors, brokers, moneylenders, middlemen, pimps, stewards of country estates and fishponds, and the whole swarm of servants and attendants who, among not a few rulers, are kept on merely for the sake of show. When these people lack what luxury — the constant companion of leisure — demands, they sink into dishonest practices. Military service is also a restless kind of leisure — but a far more dangerous one, since from it there springs at once the ruin of all good things and a flood of every evil. If the prince therefore keeps these nurseries of vice out of his kingdom, there will be far less that the laws need to punish. Honor, then, should go to useful trades, and idle leisure should not be granted to the nobility as a title of rank — so that I may note this point as well in passing. Not that I would detract from the honor due to those well-born, if they live up to the portraits of their ancestors and excel in the very pursuits that first produced nobility. Otherwise, if we see most men today grown soft through leisure, enfeebled by pleasures, ignorant of every useful art, fit only for feasting in wartime and keen at gambling — not to say something still more shameful — what reason is there, I ask you, to prefer this class of men to shoemakers or farmers? For in earlier times, leisure was granted to the patricians — freed not from menial crafts to be idle, but to learn those disciplines that equip them to govern the republic.

Teaching the Nobility Useful Trades

Wealthy and patrician citizens should not consider it shameful to teach their children a practical craft, which both keeps youth from disgrace and provides a safeguard against fortune's instability.

So it shouldn't be considered shameful if wealthy or patrician citizens teach their own children a sedentary craft. First, while young men are occupied with its study, they'll be kept in check by many disgraceful acts; then, if there's no need for the skill, it burdens no one.14 But if — since human fortune is unstable — it falls short, then not only does any land sustain a craft, as the proverb has it, but any fortune also nourishes one.15

Sumptuary Laws and the Profit of Magistrates

The ancients wisely used sumptuary laws and censors to restrain luxury, and it is far more humane to compel frugality than to let vice grow until the death penalty is needed; magistrates must never profit from citizens' misdeeds.

Those ancients, since they understood that the greatest evils are born from luxury and extravagance, took action against them with sumptuary laws, having appointed censors for this purpose, whose role was to restrain excessive spending at banquets, on dress, or on buildings. If this seems harsh to anyone — that each person is not free to use and abuse his own possessions as he pleases — let him consider how much harsher it is for the morals of citizens to slide so far into the wilderness that the death penalty becomes necessary, and how much more humane it is to be compelled toward frugality than to be carried by vices into ruin.16 Nothing is more useless than for magistrates to profit from the misdeeds of citizens. For who will take care that as few evils as possible arise, when it is to his advantage for as many people as possible to be guilty?

The Distribution of Penalties

Penal fines should go chiefly to the wronged party, with portions to the public treasury and the informer, and the severity of offenses should be measured by harm to the commonwealth, not by private feeling.

And it is only right, and it was the custom among the ancients, that the money paid as a penalty should go chiefly to the person who had been wronged, with a portion going to the public treasury, and in cases that are especially hateful, something also to the informer. But the degree of hatred involved is to be measured not by anyone's private feeling, but by the advantage or disadvantage to the commonwealth.

Equal Justice for All

Laws must protect everyone equally—rich and poor, noble and obscure—and should lean further toward the weaker, punishing more sharply those who abuse their power to harm the humble.

This is what laws should ensure above all: that no one suffers injustice — not the poor, not the rich, not the noble, not the obscure, not the slave, not the free, not the magistrate, not the private citizen. But in this regard they should lean further toward the weaker, so that help is given to those less able to stand on their own — because the lot of humble people is more exposed to harm. Therefore, whatever protection fortune's lot has denied them, let the humanity of the laws make up for it. Accordingly, let them punish more sharply one who has wronged a poor man than one who has offended a rich man; a corrupt magistrate than a treacherous commoner; a criminal patrician than an obscure one.

Proportionate Punishment and the Distortion of Values

Following Plato, penalties must fit the crime, and Erasmus questions why theft of money is punished with death while adultery goes virtually unpunished, revealing how wealth distorts moral judgment.

Granting that, as Plato says, there are two kinds of punishment, in the one kind care must be taken that the penalty is not harsher than what the offense warrants, and therefore one must not rush to the ultimate punishment without good reason; nor should the gravity of the crime be measured by our own desires, but by what is fair and honorable. Why is it that everywhere simple theft is punished with death, while adultery goes virtually unpunished — and this in defiance of all the laws of the ancients — unless it's that money is valued too highly by everyone, and people measure the loss of it not by the thing itself but by their own estimation? Why adulterers are dealt with less severely today, when the laws once raged against them so fiercely, is not the question to examine here — that's another topic.

The Rarity of Exemplary Punishment

Exemplary punishments should be used exceedingly rarely, and their deterrent power lies in their unusualness rather than their severity, for citizens become desensitized when punishments are frequent.

As for the second kind, which he calls the example, one must resort to it exceedingly rarely, and the aim should not be so much to terrify everyone else by the severity of the punishment as by its unusualness. For nothing is so dreadful that it isn't made light of by familiarity, and nothing is more harmful than for citizens to become accustomed to punishments.

Reforming Bad Laws Gradually

New laws should not be enacted when existing ones suffice, and useless or harmful laws should be phased out gradually, just as medical treatment must be adapted to the body's present condition.

Just as you shouldn't try new remedies for a disease when the old ones already bring relief, so you shouldn't enact new laws when existing laws already provide what you need to remedy the ills of the state. Useless laws, if they can't be repealed without great harm, should be phased out gradually, or at least corrected. For just as it's dangerous to rashly overhaul the law, so it's necessary to adapt laws to the present condition of the commonwealth the way you'd tailor medical treatment to the condition of the body: certain measures that were once salutary are more salutary still when repealed.17

When Good Laws Are Turned to Bad Purposes

Nothing is more pernicious than a good law twisted to bad ends; the prince must reform such laws regardless of lost revenue or long-standing custom, as illustrated by the abuse of escheat law.

Many laws have been established for good reason, but the depravity of duties has twisted them to the worst uses. Nothing, however, is more pernicious than a good law turned aside to bad purposes. Therefore, in removing or amending such laws, the Prince must not be deterred by the prospect of lost revenue: for no gain is worth having if it comes at the cost of honor, especially when the laws are of such a kind that their repeal would be positively praiseworthy.18 Nor should he flatter himself if laws of this sort have gained ground in many places and have now become entrenched by long-standing custom. For the nature of what is honorable does not consist in the number of people who practice it, and the more deeply an evil has taken root, the more urgently it must be removed. And to mention one or two examples: in some places it has been the accepted practice for a king's prefect to seize the property of those who die abroad. This was established for a good reason — namely, so that the deceased's belongings would not be claimed by those to whom they had no right, and so that the property would remain in the prefect's hands until certain heirs came forward. But now it has been twisted to the point of grossest injustice, so that whether an heir exists or not, the deceased's property goes to the treasury.19

Corrupted Protections: Thieves, Merchants, and Shipwrecks

Erasmus shows how laws originally designed to protect property, merchants, and shipwreck victims have been inverted so that magistrates themselves become the plunderers.

It was once rightly established that whatever goods were found in the possession of a thief caught and discovered with them, the Prince or the Magistrate acting in his name should take possession of them — clearly, so that if everyone had an unrestricted right to reclaim them, the goods might through fraud be diverted to owners who had no rightful claim. But as soon as it was established to whom the goods belonged, they would then be restored to those rightful owners. But now certain people consider whatever they have found in a thief's possession to be no less their own, as if it had come to them through a paternal inheritance. They themselves well understand this to be shamelessly unjust, but the claim of honor is overcome by the prospect of gain. It was once established with good purpose that prefects should be stationed along the borders of territories to manage the oversight of imports and exports — so that a merchant or traveler might pass back and forth safe from banditry, and so that if anything had been stolen from anyone, the Prince would see to it, within the boundaries of each one's domain, that the merchant was not punished by loss and the robber did not go unpunished. And perhaps it was then, for the sake of civil order, that a small toll was first levied on merchants. But now, far and wide, the traveler is detained by customs duties of this kind, strangers are harassed, merchants are plundered, and even though the exaction grows daily, there is no mention of protecting those very people. And so the purpose for which the arrangement was first created has been entirely swept away, and what was wholesomely established has been utterly turned into tyranny through the fault of those administering it. It was once decreed that goods cast up by shipwreck should be seized by the prefect of the sea — not so that they would pass into his ownership or the Prince's, but so that through these officials provision would be made to prevent their seizure by unjust masters, and so that they would become public property only if no one came forward to rightfully claim them. But today in certain places, whatever has been lost at sea in any way whatsoever, the prefect seizes as if it were his own — harsher than the sea itself. For what the storm left to the wretched, that man snatches away like a second storm. See, then, how completely everything has turned out the opposite. A thief is punished for seizing another's property — and yet the magistrate does the very same thing, appointed precisely to prevent it, and through him the owner of the property is despoiled twice over, when the very thing was established to ensure that nothing would be lost to anyone. And it is especially through these officials that merchants are harassed and plundered — merchants who were brought in under this very plan, so that the traveler would not be harassed or plundered.

The Purpose of Instruction, Not Criticism

Erasmus clarifies that his review of universally condemned decrees serves the prince's instruction, and that reforming even entrenched abuses will win him honor rather than loss.

And through these officials it happens that goods do not return to their rightful owner — the very people the law had appointed them to protect — lest those goods end up in the hands of someone else's master. There are very many decrees of this kind among many nations, no less unjust than injustice itself. But it's not the purpose of this work to criticize any particular commonwealth. We've reviewed these decrees — as they're practically universal and condemned by the judgment of all — for the sake of instruction. And there are perhaps some that can't be abolished without great upheaval. But doing away with them would even win favor for the Prince, and by a course of action in which no gain should be seen as greater than an honorable reputation.

Laws as Spider Webs

Laws should be shared and fair; otherwise they become like spider webs that trap only the weak while the powerful break through.

As with a prince, so with a law: nothing should be more shared or more fair. Otherwise what that famous Greek sage said comes true — that laws are nothing other than spider webs, which larger birds easily break through, trapping only the flies.20

The Law's Bias Toward Mercy

The law, like the prince, should be more inclined to forgive than to punish, reflecting God's slow-moving vengeance, and the prince should pardon personal offenses more readily than public ones, unlike tyrants who measured crimes by their own losses.

Just as a prince ought always to be, so the law too ought always to lean more toward forgiveness than punishment — whether because it is in itself kinder, or because it more closely reflects the character of God, whose anger moves very slowly toward vengeance; or because someone who has not properly escaped punishment can be reclaimed, while someone wrongly condemned cannot be helped. Even if that person has not perished, who, after all, will take another's pain seriously? We read that there were once men of this sort — not princes but tyrants — from whose conduct a Christian prince must stay as far as possible. They would weigh the crimes they had committed by their own private losses, so that driving a poor man stripped of his goods, along with his wife and children, to the noose or to beggary would count as a minor theft, while defrauding the royal treasury or a rapacious quaestor of even a small coin would be a most serious offense, worthy of many crosses. Likewise, they would have cried out that majesty had been injured if anyone had murmured even about a very bad prince or spoken a little too freely about a pestilential magistrate — yet the pagan emperor Adrian, who otherwise would not be counted among good princes, never admitted a charge of injured majesty, and not even the cruellest Nero, of all people, eagerly pursued accusations of this kind. And another man, having entirely neglected charges of this kind, said, 'In a free city, tongues too ought to be free.' Therefore a good prince will more easily and more willingly forgive offenses that do not touch his own personal injury than those that do. For to whom is it easier to despise things of this sort than to a prince? But to avenge himself, however easy it is, is just as invidious and unseemly for him.

Revenge Befits No Prince

Revenge marks a petty mind and is unseemly in a prince, who must consider not only what an offender deserves but what the public will judge, sometimes pardoning the undeserving for the sake of his reputation.

Since revenge is the mark of a petty and lowly mind, it's the last thing that befits a prince, who ought to be lofty and great in spirit. It's not enough for a prince to be free of every crime — he must also clear himself of even the suspicion and appearance of crime. So he won't weigh only what the offender against him deserves, but what others are going to judge about the prince; and out of regard for his own dignity he'll sometimes pardon the undeserving, and mindful of his reputation, he'll extend pardon even to those who don't deserve it.

True Majesty Serves the Commonwealth

The prince's true majesty is secured not by weakening the laws but by being vigilant, wise, and merciful; the commonwealth is greater than the prince, and those who diminish the people's welfare truly injure his majesty.

And let no one immediately object on this point that too little is being provided for the majesty of princes — which is sacrosanct and inviolable, especially when it concerns the commonwealth. On the contrary, there is no other way to provide more rightly for that greatness than if the people understand the prince to be so vigilant that nothing escapes him, so wise that he understands in what matters the true majesty of the prince consists, and so merciful that he will avenge none of his own wrongs unless the consideration of public utility compels him. The majesty of Caesar Augustus was rendered both more illustrious and more secure when pardon was granted to Cinna, after so many punishments had accomplished nothing. Only that person truly injures the majesty of the prince who diminishes that in which the prince is truly great. But the prince is great through the good qualities of his mind, and he is great through the affairs of the people flourishing by his wisdom. Whoever wears away at these things ought to be charged with diminishing majesty. For they err greatly, and do not altogether understand the true majesty of the prince, who think it is increased if the laws and public freedom have as little force as possible — as if the Prince and the Commonwealth were two separate things. But if a comparison must be made between things that nature has joined together, let the king not set himself alongside any one of his subjects, but alongside the whole body of the Commonwealth. In this way he will see how much more valuable that is — embracing so many distinguished men and women — than the single head of the prince. The Commonwealth, even if the prince is absent, will nevertheless still be the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth Before the Prince

Great empires have flourished without princes, but no prince can exist without a commonwealth; true loyalty calls the prince back to better things, while flattery that drives him to vice is the real treachery.

For the most splendid empires have flourished without any prince at all, as in the democracies of the Romans and the Athenians; but a prince cannot exist in any way without a commonwealth. In fact, the commonwealth embraces the prince, not the other way around. For what is it that makes someone a prince, if not the consent of those who submit to him? But the one who is great through his own gifts — that is, through his virtues — will still be great even if power is taken away from him. So it's clear that those judge most perversely who measure the prince's dignity by things that are unworthy of a prince's greatness. They call that person a traitor — for they want that word to be the most hateful of all — who calls the prince back, through frank counsel, to better things, when the prince is turning toward pursuits that are neither fitting for him nor safe nor advantageous to the fatherland.21 But the one who corrupts him with common opinions, who hurls him into sordid pleasures, into revels, into gambling, and into other disgraces of that kind — does that person really have the prince's dignity at heart? They call it loyalty whenever flattery is practiced on a foolish prince through sycophancy; they call it treachery if anyone resists his shameful undertakings. In truth, no one is less a friend to the prince than the one who shamefully drives him mad through flattery and leads him away from what is right, who entangles him in wars, who urges the plundering of the people, who teaches him the art of tyranny, who makes him hated by everyone. This is true treachery, and it's not deserving of just one punishment.

Guardians of the Laws

Following Plato, Erasmus calls for incorruptible guardians of the laws, demands that the prince punish corrupt administrators most severely, insists on clear and publicly displayed laws, and warns against the legal profession's corruption.

Plato wants the so‑called guardians of the laws — that is, those appointed to preserve the laws — to be completely incorruptible. And a good prince ought to take notice of no one more severely than of those who administer the laws corruptly, even though the prince himself is first among the guardians of the laws. It's best, therefore, for there to be as few laws as possible, then for them to be as fair as possible and beneficial to the public good, and furthermore as well known to the people as can be. That's why the ancients used to write them on tablets and on a white surface and display them publicly, so they'd be visible to everyone. It's a shameful thing for some people to use empty laws as a substitute — and make no mistake, their purpose is to ensnare as many as they can, not to serve the commonwealth, but instead to hunt for plunder. Finally, laws should be written in clear and straightforward language, so there's no great need for that most profitable class of men who call themselves legal experts and lawyers — a profession that once belonged to the best and most distinguished men, one that held great dignity and very little profit, but which now gain has corrupted entirely, leaving nothing unspoiled. Plato denies that any enemy could arise more destructive to the fatherland than the person who submits the laws to the judgment of a single man — laws that under the best prince carry the greatest force.

Read the original Latin

Optimae leges sub optimo Principe, praecipue beatam reddunt ciuitatem aut regnum, cuius tum felicissimus est status, cum Principi paretur ab omnibus, atque ipse Princeps paret legibus, leges autem ad archetypum aequi et honesti respondent, nec alio spectant, quam ad rem communem in melius prouehendam.

Bonus, sapiens et incorruptus Princeps, nihil aliud est quam uiua quaedam lex. Dabit igitur operam, non ut multas condat leges, sed ut quam optimas, maximeque Reipublicae salutares. Nam bene institutae ciuitati, sub bono Principe, et integris magistratibus, paucissimae leges sufficient; sin secus fuerit, nullae quamlibet multae satis erunt. Non optime agitur cum aegrotis, quoties indoctus Medicus pharmaca pharmacis accumulat.

In condendis autem legibus illud in primis cauendum erit, ne quid oleant fisci lucrum, ne priuatam Procerum commoditatem, sed ad exemplar honesti, et ad publicam utilitatem referantur omnia, et eam utilitatem non ad uulgarem opinionem, sed ad sapientiae regulam exigant, quam oportet ubique Principibus in consilio esse: alioqui ne lex quidem erit, fatentibus et Ethnicis, ni iusta sit, ni aequa, ni publicis commodis consulens. Nec protinus lex est, quod Principi placuit, sed quod sapienti bonoque Principi placuit, cui nihil placet, nisi quod honestum et e Republica sit. Quod si distorta fuerit regula, ad quam exaequanda fuerant praua, quid futurum est, nisi ut per huiusmodi leges, etiam quae recta fuerant, deprauentur. Et Plato uult leges esse quam paucissimas, maxime de rebus leuioribus, ueluti de pactis, commerciis, uectigalibus. Nec enim ex multitudine legum nasci salutem Reipublicae non magis, quam ex multitudine pharmacorum. Ubi Princeps integer est, et officio suo funguntur magistratus, nihil opus multis legibus: ubi secus habet, ibi legum abusus in perniciem uertitur Reipublicae, dum et bene conditae leges horum improbitate alio detorquentur.

Iure notatus est Dionysius ille Syracusanus, qui tyrannico consilio plurimas tulit leges, alias super alias ingerens, easque ut fit a populo negligi patiebatur, quo cunctos ad hunc modum sibi redderet obnoxios. At istud non est leges condere, sed laqueos tendere.

Et merito reprehensus est Epitades, qui legem tulit, ut liberum esset cuique cui uellet sua relinquere, hoc interim agens ut ipse filium quem oderat, posset exhaeredare. At primum non intelligebat populus hominis technam, uerum ea res deinde grauem perniciem attulit Reipublicae.

Eiusmodi leges proponat Princeps, quae non solum poenam denuncient sontibus, uerum etiam quae persua- deant non esse peccandum. Proinde elrant, qui putant, leges paucissimis uerbis esse comprehendéndas, ut tantum iube- ant, non etiam doceant, imo magis in hoc sint occupatae, ut deterreant a peccando rationibus quam poenis. Etiamsi hanc Platonis sententiam non approbat Seneca, sed audac- ter hoc quidem magis, quam erudite.

Idem non permittit iuuenibus disputare de aequitate legis, senioribus permittit moderate. Verum ut non est uulgi, temere censere leges Principum, ita Principis est curare, ut eas ferat leges, quae bonis omnibus placeant, ut meminerit infimis etiam sensum esse communem. Laudatus est in hoc M- Antoninus Pius, quod nihil umquam egerit, quod omnibus per litteras etiam non conatus sit approbare, redditis causis cur id iudicarit expedire Reipublicae.

Eleganter Xenophon in Oeconomicis prodidit, caetera quoque animantia duabus rebus potissimum adduci ad obtemperandum: cibo, si quod fuerit abiectius, aut delinimento, si generosius, uelut equus: et plagis, si contumacius, uelut asinus. At homo cura sit animal omnium generosissimum, non tam minis ac suppliciis cogi, quam praemiis oportebit ad officium inuitari legibus. Leges igitur non solum poenam irrogent delinquentibus, sed praemiis quoque prouocent ad bene merendum de Republica. Quod genus multas fuisse uidemus apud ueteres. Si quis fortiter fecisset in bello, optabat praemium, et si cecidisset, liberi ex publico alebantur. Si quis ciuem seruasset, si quis hostem a moenibus depulisset, si quis salubri consilio succurrisset Reipublicae, erat officio praemium.

Quamquam auteur egregii ciuis est uel nullo proposito praemio, quod optimum est, sequi, tamen expedit huiusmodi illectamentis, rudium adhuc ciuium animos ad honesti studium inflammare. Qui generoso sunt animo, honore magis capiuntur: qui sordidiore, lucro quoque ducuntur. Omnibus igitur hisce rationibus lex sollicitabit, honore et ignominia, lucro ac damno. Porro qui prorsus seruili sunt ingenio, uel potius belluino, hi uinculis ac flagris domandi sunt.

Ad huiusmodi honoris et ignominiae sensum iam inde a pueritia adsuescant ciues, ut intelligant non opibus aut stemmatis deberi praemium, sed recte factis. In summa, huc modis omnibus spectet Principis uigilantia, non ut tantum puniantur admissa, sed illo multo magis respiciat et incumbat, hoc in primis agat, ut caueat, ne quid admittatur supplicio dignum. Ut enim melior Medicus qui morbum excludit et arcet, quam qui pharmacis expellat acceptum: Ita non paulo praestabilius est efficere, ne facinora patrentur, quam si perpetrata puniantur. Id autem fiet, si causas ex quibus animaduerterit potissimum nasci flagitia, uel recidat si queat, uel certe premat et attenuet. Primum igitur ex uitiosis de rebus opinionibus, ut dictum est, uelut e corruptis fontibus maxima pars facinorum scatet. Id igitur in primis agendum, ut ciues habeas optimis institutos rationibus: deinde magistratus non solum sapientes, uerum etiam incorruptos.

Ac recte monet Plato, nihil non tentandum, et omnem, quod aiunt, mouendum esse lapidem, priusquam ad ultimum ueniatur supplicium. Agendum argumentis, ne quis peccare uelit, deinde deterrendi metu Numinis malefactorum uindicis, praeterea minis supplicii. Quibus si nihil proficitur, ad supplicia ueniendum, sed leuiora, quae medeantur malo, non quae tollant hominem. Quod si nihil horum procedit, tum denique ceu membrum deploratum et immedicabile, ab inuito legibus resecandum, ne pars sincera trahatur in uitium.

Quemadmodum fidus ac doctus medicus non adhibet sectionem aut ustionem, si malagmate, aut potione tolli malum possit, nec umquam ad illa descendit nisi morbo coactus. Ita Princeps omnia tentabit remedia, priusquam ad capitale supplicium ueniat, cogitans Rempublicam unum esse corpus: at nemo membrum amputat, si diuersa uia possit sanitati restitui. Ut probus medicus in apparandis remediis haud alio spectat quam ut quam minimo aegrotantis periculo morbus pellatur: ita bonus Princeps in condendis legibus, non alio respiciet quam ad publicam utilitatem, utque populi malis quam minimo medeatur incommodo.

Bona facinorum pars hinc potissimum nascitur, quod ubique plurimi fiant diuitiae, contemta sit paupertas. Dabit igitur Princeps operam, ut sui ciues uirtute ac morbus aestimentur, non censu. Idque primum in se ipso ac suis exhibeat. Quod si conspexerint Principem ostentare diuitias, et apud illum ut quisque ditissimus est, ita plurimi fieri, ad magistratus, ad honores, ad officia nummis patere uiam, istis nimirum rebus incitantur animi multitudinis ad opes per fas nefasque parandas.

Et ut magis in genere loquamur, pleraque Rerumpublicarum omnium sentina, ex otio nascitur, quod diuersis rationibus affectant omnes, cui qui semel assueti sunt, si desit quo alant illud, ad malas artes confugiunt. Hoc igitur aget Principis uigilantia, ut quantum potest minimam habeat inter suos turbam otiosorum, et aut ad opus adigat, aut expellat e ciuitate. Plato mendicos omnes procul e sua Republica pellendos putat. Quod si qui senio morboue fracti, suos non habent a quibus aluntur, iis, gerontotrophiis, et nosuntotrophiis publicis consulendum erit. Qui ualet et paruo contentus est, non eget mendicitate.

Sacrificulos qui ad quaestum sacra quaedam circumferebant oppidatim, quo religionis praetextu sectarentur otium ac luxum, Massilienses in ciuitatem suam non recipiebant. Et fortassis expediat Reipublicae Monasteriorum esse modum. Est enim et hoc otii genus quoddam, praesertim quorum uita parum probata fuerit, et otiosam ignauamque transigant uitam. Quod de Monasteriis dico, idem de Collegiis sentiendum.

Ad hoc genus pertinent, redemptores, institores, foeneratores, proxenetae, lenones, custodes uillarum, ac uiuariorum, grex ministrorum, ac stipatorum, qui apud nonnullos tantum ambitionis aluntur gratia. His cum non suppetit, quod luxus otii comes efflagitat, ad malas artes degenerant. Est et militiae negotiosum otii genus, sed multo pestilentissimum, ex quo semel omnium bonarum rerum exitium, et omnium malarum rerum colluuies proficiscitur. Haec igitur flagitiorum seminaria si Princeps arcebit e suo regno, multo minus erit, quod legibus puniat. Habendus igitur honos utilibus artificiis, nec iners otium nobilitatis titulo donandum, ut obiter et hoc indicem. Non quo bene natis suum honorem detraham, si respondeant maiorum imaginibus, et iis rebus praecellant, quae primum nobilitatem pepererunt. Alioqui si tales hodie plerosque uidemus, molles otio, uoluptatibus effoeminati, omnium bonarum artium imperiti, tantum belli comessatores, strenui aleatores, ne quid dicam obscoenius, quid est, obsecro, cur hoc hominum genus calceariis aut agricolis praeferatur? Nam olim patriciis otium datum est a sordidioribus opificiis non ad nugandum, sed discendas eas disciplinas, quae ad Rempublicam administrandam faciunt.

Ne sit igitur turpe si ciues opulenti aut patricii suos liberos artem doceant sedentariam. Primum dum eius studio detinentur adolescentuli, coercebuntur a multis flagitiis: deinde si nihil erit opus arte, ea neminem onerat. Sin (ut est instabilis rerum humanarum fortuna) deerit, tum artem non modo quaeuis terra, sicut habet prouerbium, sed quaeuis etiam alit fortuna.

Veteres illi quoniam intelligebant plurimum malorum nasci ex luxu et profusione, sumtuariis legibus occurrerunt, creatis in hoc Censoribus, qui immodica impendia, in conuiuiis, in uestitu, aut in aedificiis cohiberent. Id si cui durum uidetur, non licere cuique suis rebus pro sua uti et abuti libidine, cogitet multo durius esse ciuium mores per lucum eo delabi, ut capitis supplicio sit opus: et humanius esse, cogi ad frugalitatem, quam uitiis ferri in perniciem. Nihil inutilius quam ex admissis ciuium, lucrum redire ad magistratus. Nam qui dabit operam, ut quam minimum exsistat malorum, cui expedit quam plurimos esse nocentes?

Et par est, et apud priscos fieri consueuit, ut multatitia pecunia potissimum ad eum rediret, qui laesus esset, nonnulla portio ad aerarium publicum, in uehementer odiosis nonnihil etiam ad delatorem. Verum hoc odii, non priuato cuiusquam affectu, sed Reipublicae commodo aut incommodo metiendum.

Illud in uniuersum spectent leges, ne cui flat iniuria, nec pauperi, nec diuiti, nec nobili, nec obscuro, nec seruo, nec libero, neque magistratui, nec priuato. Verum in hanc partem magis propendeant, ut imbecillioribus subueniatur, quod humiliorum fortuna magis exposita sit iniuriis. Quod igitur in fortunae praesidiis diminutum est, id legum exaequet humanitas. Proinde acrius puniant uiolatum pauperem quam offensum diuitem, corruptum magistratum quam perfidum plebeium, facinorosum patricium quam obscurum.

Cum, iuxta Platonem, duplex sit poenae genus, in altero uidendum est, ne supplicium acerbius sit quam pro re commissa, ideoque non erit temere ad ultimum supplicium ueniendum: neque facinoris ratio nostris erit aestimanda cupiditatibus, sed aequo atque honesto. Cur enim passim simplex furtum capite punitur, et adulterium pene impunitum est, idque contra ueterum omnium leges, nisi quod apud omnes nimium in pretio est pecunia, et huius iacturam non ex re, sed ex suo metiuntur animo? Cur autem hodie minus saeuiatur in adulteros, in quos olim uehementer saeuiebant leges, non est huius loci, rationem reddere.

Ad alterum genus, quod ille uocat exempli, perquam raro ueniendum erit, nec tam agendum, ut immanitate poenae deterreantur caeteri, quam nouitate. Nihil est enim tam horrendum, quod non contemnatur adsuetudine: nec aliud inutilius, quam ciues suppliciis adsuescere.

Ut in morbis non sunt tentanda noua remedia, si ueteribus succurri malo possit: ita non sunt condendae nouae leges, si ueteres ministrent aliquid, quo malis Reipublicae medearis.

Leges inutiles si sine magno malo non queant abrogari, paulatim sunt antiquandae, aut certe corrigendae. Nam ut periculosum est temere nouare leges, ita necesse est ut curationem pro corporum ratione, sic leges ad praesentem Reipublicae statum accommodare: quaedam salubriter instituta, salubrius abrogantur.

Multae leges recte quidam sunt institutae, sed eas officiorum prauitas ad pessimos usus detorsit. Nihil autem perniciosius bona lege, ad malas res deflexa. Ab his igitur tollendis aut emendandis, non oportet Principem fisci factura deterreri: Nec enim compendium est, quod sit cum honesti dispendio coniunctum, maxime cum sint eius generis, ut plausibilis etiam sit earum abrogatio. Neque uero sibi blandiatur, si leges huiusmodi compluribus in locis inualuerunt, ac diutina iam consuetudine inueteratae sunt. Nec enim hominum numero constat honesti natura, et hoc diligentius est tollendum, quo magis inueterauit malum. Et ut unam atque alteram exempli gratia commemorem, receptum est nonnullis in locis, ut peregre mortui bona occupet Praefectus aliquis Regis nomine: id cum salubriter sit institutum, nempe, ne hospitis res sibi uindicent, ad quos iure non pertinent, et tantisper sint in manibus Praefecti, donec exstent haeredes certi: nunc iniquissime huc detortum est, ut siue exstet haeres, siue non exstet, hospitis bona ad fiscum pertineant.

Recte quondam institutum, ut quod apud furem deprehensum repertum esset rerum, id Princeps aut huius nomine Magistratus occuparet, nimirum, ob id, ne si passim eas uindicandi ius esset, per fraudem ad alienos dominos aberrent, uerum simul atque constaret cuius essent, tum illi restituerentur. At nunc quidam, quidquid apud furem compererint, id non minus suum esse ducunt, ac si ex paterna haereditate obuenisset. Quod et ipsi satis intelligunt impudenter iniquum esse, sed honesti ratio, lucri ratione uincitur.

Olim bono consilio fuit inductum, ut in confiniis ditionum essent Praefecti, qui importationum aut exportationum curam agerent, nimirum, quo negociator aut uiator tutus a latrociniis commearet: ut si quid cui foret ereptum, Princeps intra suae quisque ditionis limites curaret, uti nec damno plecteretur negociator, nec praedo esset impunitus: et fortasse tum ciuilitatis gratia dari coeptum est nonnihil a negociatoribus. At nunc passim huiusmodi portoriis retinetur uiator, uexantur hospites, expilantur negociatores, et cum indies crescat exactio, tamen de tuendis illis nulla mentio est: Ita cuius gratia primum constitutio nata fuit, penitus sublatum est, et res salubriter instituta, uitio administrantium prorsus in Tyrannidem uersa est. Constitutum est olim, ut res naufragio eiectae, Praefecto maris occuparentur, non ut in illius aut in Principis ius caderent, sed ut per hos caueretur, ne ab iniustis dominis occuparentur, et ita demum publicae fierent, si nullus exstaret, qui iure uindicaret. At hodie quibusdam in locis, quidquid quocumque modo periit in mari, id ueluti suum occupat Praefectus, ipso mari immitior. Nam quod tempestas reliquum fecit miseris, id ille uelut altera tempestas eripit. Vide igitur ut omnia in diuersum exierint. Fur punitur, quod rem alienam occuparit: atqui idem facit Magistratus, in hoc adhibitus ne fieret, et per hunc bis spoliatur dominus rei, in hoc ipsum constitutum, ne quid cui periret. Et per hos maxime uexantur ac spoliantur negociatores, qui hoc consilio sunt inducti, ne uexaretur aut spoliaretur uiator.

Et per hos fit, ne bona redeant ad iustum dominum, quos lex in hoc adhibuerat, ne penes alienum dominum essent. Sunt huiusmodi plurimae constitutiones, apud multas nationes non minus iniquae quam ipsa iniquitas. Verum non est huius instituti rem publicam ullam taxare, has ut omnium fere communes, et omnium iudicio damnatas, docendi gratia recensuimus. Et sunt fortasse quae citra tumultum antiquari non possint: at horum antiquatio fauorem etiam conciliat Principi, et qua nullum lucrum oportet uideri maius, honestam opinionem.

Ut Principe, sic lege nihil oportet esse communius aut aequius: alioqui fit, ut quod egregie Graecus ille sapiens dixit; Nihil aliud sint leges quam casses aranearum, quos maiores aues facile perrumpunt, muscis dumtaxat irretitis.

Quemadmodum Princeps, ita et lex semper esse debet propensior ad ignoscendum quam ad puniendum, siue quod per se benignius, siue quod magis respondet ad mores Dei, cuius ira lentissime ad uindictam procedit: siue quod non recte elapsus, ad poenam repeti potest, iniuste damnato succurri non potest. Is etiam si non periit, quis tamen alterius aestimabit dolorem? Legimus olim huiusmodi fuisse non Principes, sed Tyrannos, a quorum factis oportet Christianum Principem, quam longissime abesse, qui scelera commissa, suis priuatis incommodis aestimarent, ut iis leue furtum esset, si quis pauperculum bonis nudatum, una cum uxore et liberis ad laqueum aut mendicitatem adigat grauissimum uero et multis dignum crucibus, si quis Principalem fiscum, aut rapacem Quaestorem uel nummulo fraudasset. Item maiestatem laesam clamitarent, si quis de pessimo quoque Principe mutiret, aut de pestilente Magistratu paullo liberius loqueretur, cum Adrianus Imperator Ethnicus, alioqui nec inter bonos habendus Principes, laesae maiestatis crimen numquam admiserit: et ne crudelissimus quidem Nero delationes huiusmodi admodum affectarit. Et alius quidam, neglectis in totum huiusmodi criminibus, dixerit, In ciuitate libera, linguas item liberas esse oportet. Nullis igitur commissis facilius ac libentius ignoscet bonus Princeps, quam quae ad priuatam suam iniuriam pertinent. Nam cui facilius est eiusmodi contemnere quam Principi? At huic ulcisci quam facile est, tam est inuidiosum et indecorum.

Cum enim ultio pusilli et humilis animi sit argumentum, nihil minus competit in Principem, quem oportet animo esse excelso magnoque. Non satis est Principem ab omni crimine abesse, ni criminis etiam suspicione specieque uacauerit. Quamobrem non solum perpendet quid mereatur is qui deliquit in Principem, sed quid alii iudicaturi sint de Principe, et suae dignitatis respectu nonnumquam ignoscet immerenti, et suae consulens famae, ueniam dabit uenia indignis.

Neque statim illud occlamet aliquis, hac ratione parum consuli Principum maiestati, quam sacrosanctam et inuiolatam esse, e Republica potissimum est. Imo non alia uia rectius consulitur illius magnitudini, si populus intelligat eum tam uigilantem, ut nihil eum fallat: tam sapientem, ut intelligat quibus in rebus sita sit uera Principis maiestas: tam clementem, ut nihil suarum iniuriarum ulturus sit, nisi cogeret utilitatis publicae ratio. Caesaris Augusti maiestatem, et clariorem et tutiorem reddidit Cinnae donata uenia, cum tot suppliciis nihil profecisset. Is demum Principis maiestatem laedit, quisquis id imminuit, quo uere magnus est: at animi bonis magnus est, et populi rebus sua sapientia florentibus magnus est. Haec qui deterit, maiestatis est accusandus. Plurimum enim aberrant, nec prorsus intelligunt ueram Principis maiestatem, qui sic eam putant augeri, si quam minimum ualeant leges et publica libertas, quasi duae quaedam res sint, Princeps et Respublica. Quod si facienda est collatio inter ea quae natura coniunxit, ne componat se Rex cum quolibet suorum, sed cum uniuerso Reipublicae corpore: Ita uidebit quanto pluris sit illa, tot egregios uiros ac foeminas complectens, quam unicum Principis caput. Respublica, etiam si Princeps desit, tamen erit Respublica.

Floruerunt enim etiam amplissima imperia, nullo Principe, uelut in Democratia Romanorum et Atheniensium: at Princeps esse nullo modo potest sine Republica, denique Respublica Principem complectitur, non contra. Quid est enim quod Principem tantum facit, nisi consensus obsequentium? At qui suis bonis, hoc est, uirtutibus, magnus est, is etiam adempto imperio magnus erit. Proinde palam est istos peruersissime iudicare, qui Principis dignitatem his rebus metiuntur, quae Principis amplitudine sunt indignae. Proditorem uocant (nam id uocabulum odiosissimum esse uolunt) qui Principem ad ea deflectentem, quae nec ipsi decora sunt aut tuta, nec patriae conducibilia, liberis consiliis ad meliora reuocat. At qui illum plebeiis opinionibus corrumpit, qui in uoluptates sordidas, qui in comessationes, in aleam, et alia id genus dedecora praecipitat, num is dignitati Principis consulit? Fidem uocant, quoties per assentationem stulto Principi mos geritur: proditionem, si quis turpibus coeptis obsistat. Imo nemo minus amicus est Principi, quam qui turpiter assentando dementat et abducit a recto, qui bellis inuoluit, qui persuadet expilationes populi, qui tyrannidis artem docet, qui illum bonis omnibus facit inuisum: haec est uera proditio, et non uno supplicio digna.

Plato uult g-nomophulakas, hoc est, eos qui seruandis legibus praefecti sunt, incorruptissimos esse. Et bonus Princeps in nullos debet seuerius animaduertere, quam in eos qui corrupte leges administrant, quamquam ipse Princeps g-nomophulakohn primus est. Expedit igitur ut leges sint quam paucissimae, deinde quam aequissimae et ad publicam utilitatem conducibiles, praeterea populo quam maxime notae, unde ueteres eas in tabulis et albo descriptas publicitus exhibebant, quo cunctis essent conspicuae. Foedum est enim quosdam legibus cassium uti uice, nimirum, hoc agentes, ut quam plurimos irretiant, non consulentes Reipublicae, sed ueluti praedam captantes. Postremo ut uerbis apertis minimeque perplexis descriptae, ut ne magnopere sit opus quaestuosissimo isto hominum genere, qui se Iureconsultos uocant, et Aduocatos: quae sane professio quondam Optimatibus uiris fuit peculiaris, et dignitatis habebat plurimum, lucri quam minimum, nunc et hanc corrupit quaestus, nihil non uitians. Plato negat ullum hostem exsistere posse pestilentiorem patriae, quam eum qui leges arbitrio subiiciat hominis, quae sub optimo Principe ualent plurimum.

Scripture echoes

  1. ↩1Cor.12.23-1Cor.12.26 — and the parts of the body that we consider less honorable, we clothe with greater honor; and our unpresentable parts receive greater propriety, 1Cor.12.24 — but our presentable parts have no such need. Rather, God has composed the body, giving greater honor to the part that lacked it, 1Cor.12.25 — so that there may be no division in the body, but that the members may have the same care for one another. 1Cor.12.26 — And if one member suffers, all the members suffer with it; if one member is honored, all the members rejoice with it.

Notes

  1. 1 ↩The form 'elrant' is uncertain/corrupt in the source; the sentence is translated on the basis of the surrounding relative clause and the overall argument, taking the main assertion to be the contrast between commanding and teaching/deterring.
  2. 2 ↩The referent of Plato's opinion is the view expressed in the preceding sentence — that laws should do more than command, but should teach and deter by reasons.
  3. 3 ↩The correlative ut…ita construction is rendered as 'just as…so' to preserve the comparative logic. The two ut clauses after curare are purpose clauses ('that he enact…that he remember').
  4. 4 ↩Both instances of quod are causal ('because'). The causal cur ('why') introduces the content of the reasons given.
  5. 5 ↩The abbreviation 'M-' for Marcus is expanded in translation.
  6. 6 ↩The proverbial phrase omnem lapidem mouere ('to move every stone') is rendered idiomatically; the Latin preserves the Greek-origin saying about leaving nothing untried.
  7. 7 ↩Numinis malefactorum uindicis rendered 'the divine power as the avenger of wrongdoers' — numen here carries the sense of divine authority/majesty rather than a personal deity in the Christian sense, consistent with Erasmus's humanist register.
  8. 8 ↩The distinction between healing (medeantur) and removing (tollant) reflects Erasmus's preference for corrective over destructive punishment; the contrast is preserved.
  9. 9 ↩The body-politic metaphor (membrum resecandum, pars sincera) echoes Pauline language (1 Cor 12:23–26) but is rendered here as Erasmus's own political analogy; no direct quotation is marked.
  10. 10 ↩The commonwealth-as-body metaphor echoes Pauline ecclesial language (1 Cor 12:12–27), though here applied to political governance rather than the Church.
  11. 11 ↩The source reads 'morbus' (disease), but the context and sense require 'mores' (character/manners). The translation renders the intended sense 'character' rather than the literal 'disease'.
  12. 12 ↩'per fas nefasque' (through right and wrong) is rendered 'by fair means or foul' to capture the moral indifference of the means; the phrase carries the force of 'by any means necessary'.
  13. 13 ↩oppidatim (rare word): 'from town to town,' i.e., wandering between towns.
  14. 14 ↩The Latin says study of the craft restrains youth from flagitia (shameful acts); the English renders the logic plainly: engagement in learning keeps young people from going astray.
  15. 15 ↩The parenthetical 'ut est instabilis rerum humanarum fortuna' is explanatory: the instability of human affairs is the premise for why any station in life can support a craft. Rendered as a natural aside.
  16. 16 ↩per lucum ('through a grove/thicket') is used metaphorically for moral wilderness or unchecked degeneracy; the image evokes a tangled, trackless place into which one slips.
  17. 17 ↩The ut…ita correlative construction is rendered with 'just as…so' to preserve the logical parallel. The second ut (after necesse est) functions as a complementizer introducing the infinitive clause, rendered here as a colon break for readability.
  18. 18 ↩honesti dispendio: literally 'with the loss of what is honorable' — rendered as 'at the cost of honor' to capture the moral weight of honestum as a public and ethical good, not merely financial loss.
  19. 19 ↩hospes here means 'guest' or 'stranger' — someone traveling or residing away from home. The law originally protected the property of such a person from being seized by unauthorized claimants.
  20. 20 ↩The Greek sage is likely Solon or another early lawgiver; the spider-web analogy criticizes laws that catch the weak while the powerful escape.
  21. 21 ↩liberis consiliis rendered as 'through frank counsel' to capture the sense of 'free/unrestrained advice' in this political context.

The Education of a Christian Prince (Institutio principis Christiani) companion

Erasmus said the prince's day should begin with sacred reading. Yours can too.

Chosen Portion delivers a short historic devotional reading every morning — the same discipline Erasmus prescribed, sized for a working day.

Erasmus prescribed daily sacred reading as the antidote to flattery and self-deception; Chosen Portion turns that prescription into a scheduled daily portion on your phone.

  • A structured 5-minute reading each morning instead of an improvised scroll
  • Daily portions drawn from texts that formed rulers for 500 years
  • Finish your first complete historic devotional work within 60 days of installing
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