The thre and sixty chapitre. Of the mightes of a soule in general; and how minde in special is a principal might, comprehending in it alle the other mightes and alle thoo thinges in the whiche thei worchen.
The Mind as the Containing Power
Mind is a principal power that contains reason, will, imagination, and sensuality, and their works, without itself actively working.
Mind is such a power in itself that, properly speaking and in a manner of speaking, it doesn't itself work. But reason and will—they are two working powers, and so are imagination and sensuality also.1 And mind contains and encompasses within itself all these four powers and their works. And it is said that the mind works in no other way, except if such an encompassing is a work.
Principal and Secondary Powers
The soul's powers are distinguished as principal (reason and will) and secondary (imagination and sensuality), based on their spiritual or bodily objects.
That is why I call some of the soul's powers principal and others secondary. This isn't because a soul can be divided—it can't—but because the objects those powers work upon can be divided: some are principal, like all spiritual things, and some are secondary, like all bodily things.2 The two principal working powers, reason and will, operate purely within themselves on all spiritual things, without help from the other two secondary powers. Imagination and sensuality work in an animal way on all bodily things—whether those things are present or absent to the body—and they do so using the bodily senses.3 But by themselves, without the help of reason and will, a soul can never come to know the nature and qualities of bodily creatures, nor the cause of their being and their making.4
The Mind's Comprehensive Role
Mind is called a principal power because it contains all other powers and their objects, as demonstrated by experience.
And for this reason, reason and will are called the principal powers, because they work in pure spirit without anything physical; and imagination and sensuality are called secondary, because they work in the body using bodily instruments, which are our five senses. Mind is called a principal power because it spiritually contains within itself not only all the other powers, but also all the things in which they operate. See this by the proof.5
Read the original Middle English
Mynde is soche a mighte in itself, that properly to speke and in maner it worcheth not itself. Bot reson and wille, thei ben two worching mightes, and so is ymaginacion and sensualité also. And alle thees foure mightes and theire werkes mynde conteneth and comprehendeth in itself. And on none other wise it is seide that the mynde worcheth, bot yif soche a comprehencion be a werke.
And herfore it is that I clepe the mightes of a soule, som principal, and som secundary. Not for a soule is departable, for that may not be; bot for alle thoo thinges in the whiche thei worchen ben departable, and somme principal, as ben alle goostly thinges, and som secundary, as ben alle bodily thinges. The two principal worching myghtes, reson and wille, worchen purely in hemself in alle goostly thinges, withouten help of the other two secundary mightes. Ymaginacion and sensualité worchin beestly in alle bodely thinges, whether thei be present or absente in the body, and with the bodely wittes. Bot by hem, withouten helpe of reson and of wille, may a soule never come to for to knowe the vertewe and the condicions of bodely creatures, ne the cause of theire beynges and theire makynges.
And for this skyle is reson and wille clepid principal mightes, for thei worchen in pure spirit withouten any maner of bodelines; and ymaginacion and sensualité secondary, for thei worchen in the body with bodely instrumentes, the whiche ben oure five wittes. Minde is clepid a principal myghte, for it conteneth in it goostly not only alle the other mightes, bot therto alle tho thinges in the whiche thei worchen. Se by the profe.
Notes
- 1 ↩Middle English sensualité here names the sensory/appetitive faculty of the soul, not sensuality in the modern sense of lust or indulgence.
- 2 ↩ME 'departable' = divisible/separable. The point is not that the soul itself splits into parts, but that the objects on which its powers work fall into distinct classes.
- 3 ↩ME 'beestly' here means according to the animal/sensitive nature, not 'brutishly' in a moral sense. 'Sensualité' is the sensitive faculty, kept as 'sensuality'.
- 4 ↩ME 'vertewe' here is rendered as 'nature' (distinctive property/power of a creature), not moral virtue. 'Condicions' as 'qualities'.
- 5 ↩Elliptical transitional cue (Se by the profe); likely points forward to the demonstration that follows in the next chapter.
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