Sermo 80
Returning to the Bed of Night
Bernard apologizes for his recent focus on sacramental allegory and promises to return to the moral sense, taking up again the scriptural starting point from Song of Songs 3:1.
Some of you, I've learned, are upset that for some days now — while it's been a joy to linger in wonder at the Sacraments — the discourse I've been offering has been either absent or seasoned with very little moral salt. That is certainly unusual. But surely we can go back over what's been said? I won't move on until I've gone back over everything. Come now — tell me, if you remember, from what passage of Scripture this cheating began, so that I may take it up again from there. It's my job to make up the loss — or rather, the Lord's, from whom we have received everything. So then, from what starting point must we return to? From there? 'On my bed at night I searched for the one my soul loves.'✦
Why the Soul Belongs with the Word
Bernard explains that applying the allegory of Christ and the Church to the Word and the soul is fitting because of their deep kinship and likeness.
If I'm not mistaken, from there. From then on, my only concern was to dispel the thick darkness of these allegories and bring the hidden delights of Christ and the Church into the light.1 So let's go back to exploring the moral sense. And it won't be a burden to me, because it will be useful to you. And this will fit perfectly, if we also apply the same things said about Christ and the Church to the Word and the soul.
The Image and the Soul
Bernard develops the distinction between the soul and the image of God, arguing that the image consists in truth, wisdom, and justice, while the soul is not the image but is capable of these things.
But someone says to me: Why are you joining these two things together? What does a soul have to do with the Word? Very much, in every way. First of all, because there is so great a kinship of natures that the one is the image, and the other is made for that image. Second, because likeness bears witness to that kinship. Surely it was made not only for the image, but for likeness. You ask in what way it is like him? Listen first about the image. The Word is truth, is wisdom, is justice — and this is the image. Of what? Of justice, of wisdom, and of truth. For this is an image: justice from justice, wisdom from wisdom, truth from truth — as it were light from light, God from God. The soul is none of these things, because it is not the image. Yet it is capable of them, drawn toward them, and perhaps thereby moving toward the image. It is a lofty creature, bearing in its capacity a mark of majesty, and in its desire a mark of uprightness. We read that God made man upright — which, as was said, is something great, and capacity proves it.
Christ the Image and the Upright Soul
Using Philippians 2:6 and the Psalms, Bernard shows that Christ as the image is both great and upright, and that the soul made in his image shares in these two goods.
For it's necessary that what exists in the image agree with the image itself, and not share in the name of image emptily, just as the image itself isn't called an image by a mere or empty name. You indeed have an example in him who is the image, because when he was in the form of God, he didn't consider equality with God something to be grasped.✦ Here surely his rectitude is intimated to you in the form of God, and his majesty in equality: so that, while rectitude is compared to rectitude and greatness to greatness, it may appear that what is in the image and the image harmoniously correspond to each other on both sides; just as the image, nevertheless, also corresponds in both respects to him whose image it is. Surely he is the one about whom you've heard holy David singing in the psalms, now: 'Great is the Lord our God, and great is his power'; but now: 'Upright is the Lord our God, and there is no iniquity in him.'✦✦ From this upright and great God his image has it, that it too may be upright and great: the soul, which is in the image, has this.
The Soul's Greatness Beyond Its Own Measure
Bernard argues that the soul's participation in the image far exceeds the soul itself, since the image is consubstantial with God and communicates what is substantial, not accidental.
But I ask: does the image have nothing more beyond the soul that is made in its image, since we also attribute greatness and righteousness to that soul? And that by a great deal. The one receives according to measure, the other according to equality. Or isn't this so much more? Notice something else too. To the one both creation and dignity were granted; to the other, generation. And there's no doubt that this is the more magnificent thing. But so that no one should deny that this is the more eminent thing — since what belongs to the one and what belongs to the other both come from God, that is, from God's own substance.
Greatness and Rectitude United in the Image, Divided in the Soul
Bernard contrasts the unity of greatness and rectitude in the divine image with their separation in the soul, where they are distinct from each other and from the soul itself.
For the soul's own image is consubstantial with God, and whatever seems to be imparted to that same image of its own is substantial for both, not accidental. Here is something else to consider: there's one respect in which the image stands out in no small way. It is great and right — and who doesn't know that these two differ from each other by nature? In the image, the two are one. And not only that: they are one, and one with the image. For to the image, it is not only right to be great, but also to be great and right to simply be. The soul is not like this. Its greatness and its rectitude are distinct from it, and distinct from each other.
The Bent Soul Still Passing as an Image
Even when the soul loses its uprightness, its greatness and capacity for eternity remain, so that it still passes through as an image, though bent and limping.
For if, as I showed above, the soul is great to the extent that it is capable of eternal things, and upright to the extent that it reaches for the things of heaven — then whatever neither seeks nor savors what is on high, but only what is on earth, is not truly upright, but bent, even though it does not on that account cease to be great, since even in this bent state it remains capable of eternity. For it will never at any point be incapable of that, even if it has never actually laid hold of it, so that what is written may be fulfilled: Yet man passes through in an image; yet only in part, so that the greatness of the Word may shine forth from its fullness. For from what great and upright Word could it fall, since it already possesses in such a way that it is what it has? Or is it only in part, so that if it were not wholly taken away, the hope of salvation would not survive? For if it ceases to be great, it also ceases to be capable. For the greatness of the soul is judged, as I said, by its capacity. And what could hope for anything, if it were capable of nothing?
Estranged Sons Who Limp Through Life
Drawing on Psalms, Bernard paints the soul that clings to earthly things as an estranged son who limps, hoarding wealth in vain and knowing not for whom he gathers.
And so, through the greatness it still holds even when its uprightness is lost, the soul passes through like an image — like someone limping on one foot, and turned into a stranger.✦2 For I think this is what was said about such people: 'Estranged sons have lied to me; estranged sons have grown old and limped from their paths.'3 Beautifully they are called 'estranged sons': sons, because of the greatness they kept; estranged, because of the uprightness they lost. Nor would he have said 'they limped' — but 'they collapsed,' or something like that — if people had put off the image entirely.4 But now, as far as greatness is concerned, the soul still passes through in the image; but as far as uprightness, like someone limping, it is troubled and thrown down by the image — Scripture saying this: 'Yet man passes through in an image, but also is troubled in vain.'✦5 Entirely in vain. For it follows: 'He hoards, and does not know for whom he will gather it.'✦6 Why doesn't he know — unless it's because, bending himself down toward these lowest, earthly things, he hoards up earth for himself? He simply doesn't know about the things he entrusts to earth — for whom he will gather them: is it to the moth that demolishes, or to the thief that digs through; to the enemy that snatches away, or to the fire that devours?✦7
The Wretchedness of the Bent Soul
Bernard laments the soul that is bowed down to earth, verifying Ecclesiastes 7:29, and hears the mocking voice telling it to bow even lower.
And from there, for the wretched person bowing down and lying low over the things that belong to the earth, comes that tearful voice from the psalm: I have been made wretched, and I am bent down to the very end; all day long I walked about weighed down with sorrow. In their own experience, such people verify the truth of that saying of the Wise One: God made humanity upright, but they have entangled themselves in many sorrows.✦ And at once a mocking voice comes at them: Bow down so that we can pass through.
The Soul Differs from Its Greatness
Bernard argues that the soul is distinct from its own greatness, just as it is distinct from its uprightness, since greatness is found outside the soul in angels.
But how did we get here? After all, when we wanted to teach, we defined the right and the great — by which two goods we had marked off the image — as neither being one within the soul, nor being one with the soul, just as we taught with equally firm conviction that in the Word and with the Word it is one. And as for uprightness, it's clear from what's been said that it is distinct both from the soul and from the soul's greatness — since even when it doesn't exist, the soul still remains, and remains great. But where will the difference between the soul and its greatness be taught from? For it cannot come from the source from which the soul and its greatness were shown — since the soul can be deprived of uprightness, but not of its greatness. Its greatness, however, is not the soul itself. For even though the soul is never found without its greatness, greatness itself is found outside the soul. You ask, where?
Greatness as the Form of the Soul
Bernard clarifies that greatness is the form of the soul, inseparable yet distinct, just as blackness is to a raven or whiteness to snow.
In angels. This is precisely where the greatness of angels comes from — and it's also how the greatness of the soul is proven: from its capacity, that is, for eternity. So if it's been established on these grounds that the soul differs from its own rectitude, because it can lack it — why shouldn't it be equally clear that the soul also differs from its own greatness, since it can't claim that greatness as its own? Since, then, neither the one nor the other belongs to the soul in and of itself, it's clear that both differ from the soul in the same way. Likewise, no form is the thing of which it is the form. And greatness is the form of the soul. Nor is it any less a form for being inseparable from it. All substantial differences are precisely this: not only what is properly and strictly proper to it, but also certain things that are proper, and yet countless other forms besides.
The Simplicity of God
Bernard exalts the unique simplicity of the divine nature, in which there is no composition, no change, and no succession of times, unlike all created things.
So the soul is not its own greatness, any more than the raven is its own blackness, or snow its own whiteness, or a human being its own capacity for laughter or rational thought — and yet you'll never find a raven without blackness, snow without whiteness, or a human being who is neither rational nor capable of laughter. And so both the soul and the soul's greatness, though inseparable, are nevertheless distinct from each other. How could they not be distinct, since the one is in the subject and the other is the subject and the substance? Only the highest and uncreated nature — which is God the Trinity — claims for itself the pure and unique simplicity of its own essence, so that it is not one thing and another, not in one place and in another, and not even in one mode and then another. For remaining in itself, what it has it is, and what it is, it is always and in a single mode. In God, both many things are brought back into one, and diverse things into the same, so that it takes no plurality from the multiplicity of things, and perceives no alteration from their variety. It contains all places and orders each in its own place, yet is nowhere contained by places. Times pass under it — but it does not pass. It doesn't wait for the future, doesn't dwell on the past, and doesn't fully experience the present.
Against the New Heretics
Bernard denounces heretics who impiously separate God's attributes from his essence, arguing that divinity itself is God and nothing greater than God can exist.
Withdraw from us, beloved; let these newcomers withdraw — not scholars of logic, but heretics, who argue most impiously that God does not exist, questioning the greatness by which God is great, likewise the goodness by which he is good, also the wisdom by which he is wise and the justice by which he is just, and finally the divinity by which God is God. They say, 'By divinity God exists, but divinity is not God.' Perhaps God does not deign to be something so great that it can make God. But if God does not exist, what is there? For either God exists, or something that is not God exists, or nothing exists. Indeed, you won't grant that God exists — but you won't grant that he is nothing either, in my view; you admit that the existence you speak of is so necessary to God that not only can God not exist without it, but that it is God himself. But if there is something that is not God, it will be either less than God, greater than God, or equal to God. But how can it be less, when it is that by which God is God?
All God's Attributes Are One in God
Bernard insists that greatness, goodness, justice, wisdom, and divinity are all one in God and identical with his essence, not separate attributes.
It remains for you to confess that it is either greater or equal. But if greater, then the highest good is not God; if equal, there are two highest goods, not one — both of which the Catholic instinct recoils from.8 Now concerning greatness, goodness, justice, and wisdom, we hold the same view in every case as we do about divinity: they are one in God, and together with God. For God is not good from any source other than that from which he is great, nor just or wise from any source other than that from which he is great and good, nor finally is he all these things at once from any source other than that from which he is God — and this too only from himself.9
Augustine's Hammer Against Heresy
Bernard cites Augustine's formulation that God is greatness, goodness, justice, and wisdom rather than merely great or good, as the definitive refutation of heretical division.
But the heretic says: What? Do you deny that God is divine in his divinity? No, but I still affirm that the very divinity by which he exists is God, so that I wouldn't concede anything greater than God. For I also say that he is great in greatness, but the greatness that he himself is, so that I wouldn't place anything greater than God; and I confess that he is good in goodness, but not a goodness other than what he himself is, so that I wouldn't seem to have found anything better than he is; and so on for the rest in the same way. Confidently and willingly I proceed, as they say, with a sure step toward the view of the one who said: 'God is great only by the greatness that is what he himself is.' Otherwise that greatness would be greater than God. This is Augustine, the mightiest hammer of heretics. So if anything can properly be said about God, it will be said more correctly and fittingly this way: God is greatness, goodness, justice, wisdom, rather than: God is great, good, just, or wise.
The Council of Reims and Gilbert of Poitiers
Bernard recounts the recent Council of Reims and critiques Gilbert of Poitiers's Trinitarian language, arguing that the catholic faith cannot tolerate any substance in God that is not God himself.
And so it's no wonder that recently, at the council Pope Eugenius held at Reims, that interpretation — so utterly perverse and altogether suspect — was seen that way both by him and by the other bishops, in the book by Gilbert, bishop of Poitiers, where he was commenting on Boethius's words about the Trinity, most soundly and catholicly indeed, in this way: 'The Father is truth, that is, true; the Son is truth, that is, true; the Holy Spirit is truth, that is, true.' And these three together are not three truths, but one truth, that is, one true one. Oh, how obscure and perverse an explanation! How much more truly and soundly could he have said, on the contrary: 'The Father is true, that is, truth; the Son is true, that is, truth; the Holy Spirit is true, that is, truth.' And these three are one true one, that is, one truth. Which indeed he would have done, if he had seen fit to imitate holy Fulgentius, who says: 'The one truth of the one God — indeed, the one truth, the one God — does not suffer the service and worship of Creator and creature to be joined together.' A good corrector would speak most truly about truth, and would think piously and catholically about the true and pure simplicity of the divine substance, in which there can be nothing that it itself is not, and it itself is God. Although in not a few other places that book of the aforementioned bishop has seemed to diverge more plainly from the uprightness of faith; of which, by way of example, I'll set down one instance here. For as the author says, 'When it is said, God, God, God, it pertains to substance,' our commentator added, 'Not what it is, but by which it is.'10 God forbid that the catholic Church should agree that there is, clearly, a substance, or anything at all by which God is, and which is not God!11
A Necessary Digression and a Pure Fountain
Bernard justifies his digression against heresy as a spiritual antidote and sends his listeners to the pure fountains of the Savior with a doxological conclusion.
But we're not speaking against him now—after all, he humbly submitted to the bishops' judgment in that very assembly and condemned these things, along with everything else found worthy of censure, with his own mouth. But because there are still those said to be transcribing and repeatedly reading that book, which was in fact forbidden by apostolic decree in that same place, stubbornly persisting in following a bishop in whom he himself did not stand, and preferring to have a teacher of error rather than of correction. Not only for that reason, but also for your sake—taking the occasion from the distinction between the image and the soul, which was made according to the image—I thought it worth the effort to make this digression: so that if any of you have perhaps at some point drunk something from hidden waters, which seem sweeter, having taken the antidote you may vomit it up, and with the stomach of your mind cleansed, as you approach what remains to be said according to our promise concerning the likeness, you may now draw purer things in joy not from our own sources, but from the fountains of the Savior, the bridegroom of the Church, Jesus Christ our Lord, who is God over all, blessed forever. Amen.
Read the original Latin
Quidam vestrum, ut comperi, minus aequo animo ferunt, quod ecce iam per aliquot dies, dum stupori et admirationi sacramentorum inhaerere delectat, sermo quem ministramus, aut nullo fuerit, aut exiguo admodum moralium sale conditus. Id quidem praeter solitum. Sed num quae dicta sunt, revisere licet? Non procedo, nisi prius revolvam omnia. Eia, dicite, si recordamini, a quonam Scripturae loco coeperit defraudatio haec, ut rursum inde adoriar. Meum est resarcire damna, imo Domini, de quo totum praesumimus. Quo itaque repetendum principio? An inde: In lectulo meo quaesivi per noctes quem diligit anima mea?
Ni fallor, inde. Abhinc tantum et deincps cura una fuit mihi, harum allegoriarum densa discussa caligine, ponere in lucem Christi et Ecclesiae secretas delicias. Igitur redeamus ad indaganda moralia. Nec enim mihi poterit esse pigrum, quod vobis commodum fuerit. Atque hoc ita congrue fiet, si quae dicta sunt in Christo et in Ecclesia, Verbo animaeque eadem nihilominus assignemus.
Sed dicit mihi aliquis: Quid tu duo ista coniungis? quid enim animae et Verbo? Multum per omnem modum. Primo quidem, quod naturarum tanta cognatio est, ut hoc imago, illa ad imaginem sit. Deinde, quod cognationem similitudo testetur. Nempe non ad imaginem tantum, sed ad similitudinem facta est. In quo similis sit quaeris? Audi de imagine prius.
Verbum est veritas, est sapientia, est iustitia: et haec imago. Cuius? Iustitiae, sapientiae et veritatis. Est enim imago haec iustitia de iustitia, sapientia de sapientia, veritas de veritate, quasi de lumine lumen, de Deo Deus. Harum rerum nihil est anima, quoniam non est imago. Est tamen earumdem capax, appetensque et inde fortassis ad imaginem. Celsa creatura, in capacitate quidem maiestatis, in appetentia autem rectitudinis insigne praeferens. Legimus quia Deus hominem rectum fecit, quod et magnum capacitas, ut dictum est, probat.
Oportet namque id quod ad imaginem est, cum imagine convenire, et non in vacuum participare nomen imaginis, quemadmodum nec imago ipsa solo vel vacuo nomine vocitatur imago. Habes vero de eo qui imago est, quia cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo. Ubi tibi utique eius et in forma Dei innuitur rectitudo, et in aequalitate maiestas: ut dum rectitudini rectitudo, et magnitudo magnitudini comparatur, consonanter sibi altrinsecus respondere appareat quod ad imaginem est, et imaginem; sicut imago quoque nihilominus in utroque respondet illi cuius imago est. Nempe ipse est, de quo sanctum David audistis in psalmis canentem, nunc quidem: Magnus Dominus noster, et magna virtus eius; nunc vero: Rectus Dominus Deus noster, et non est iniquitas in eo. Ab isto recto et magno Deo habet imago eius, ut et ipsa recta, et magna sit: habet anima, quae ad imaginem est.
Sed dico: Nihilne ergo amplius habet imago ab anima quae ad imaginem est, quia et huic magnum rectumque assignamus? Et plurimum. Haec ad mensuram accepit, illa ad aequalitatem. An non plus hoc? Adverte et aliud. Huic utrumque aut creatio, aut dignatio contulit; illi generatio. Atque id magnificentius esse non dubium est. Sed ne hoc quidem eminentius esse quis abnuat, quod cum a Deo huic, illi et de Deo utrumque sit, id est de Dei substantia.
Est enim consubstantialis Deo imago sua, et omne quod eidem suae imagini impertiri videtur, ambobus est substantiale, non accidentale. Adhuc unum attende, in quo imago non parum eminet. Magnum et rectum (ista duo natura a sese discrepare quis nesciat?) in imagine unum sunt. Neque hoc solum: unum sunt et cum imagine. Imagini enim non modo id rectum est esse, quod magnum esse, sed etiam id magnum rectumque esse, quod esse. Animae non ita. Et magnitudo eius, et rectitudo ipsius diversae ab ea, diversae ab invicem sunt.
Si enim, ut supra docui, eo anima magna est, quo capax aeternorum; eo recta, quo appetens supernorum: quae non quaerit nec sapit quae sursum sunt, sed quae super terram, non plane est recta, sed curva, cum tamen pro huiusmodi magna esse non desinat, manens utique etiam sic aeternitatis capax. Neque enim illius aliquando non capax erit, etiamsi nunquam capiens fuerit, ut sit quomodo scriptum est: Verumtamen in imagine pertransit homo; ex parte tamen, ut eminentia Verbi appareat de ipsa integritate. Quo enim a magno rectove Verbum cadat, quod sic ea utique habet, ut sit quae habet? Vel ideo ex parte, ne si toto privaretur, non superesset spes salutis. Nam si desinat magna esse, et capax. Quippe de capacitate, ut dixi, aestimatur animae magnitudo. Quid vero sperare posset, cuius capax non foret.
Itaque per magnitudinem, quam retentat etiam perdita rectitudine, in imagine pertransit homo, uno quasi claudicans pede, et factus filius alienus. De talibus enim reor dictum: Filii alieni mentiti sunt mihi, filii alieni inveterati sunt, et claudicaverunt a semitis suis. Pulchre appellati sunt filii alieni: nam filii, propter retentam magnitudinem; alieni, propter amissam rectitudinem. Nec dixisset, claudicaverunt, sed: Corruerunt, aut quidpiam simile, si ex toto homines imaginem exuissent. Nunc vero secundum magnitudinem quidem in imagine pertransit homo; quantum vero ad rectitudinem, veluti claudicans, conturbatur et deturbatur ab imagine, Scriptura ita dicente: Verumtamen in imagine pertransit homo; sed et frustra conturbatur. Frustra omnino: nam sequitur: Thesaurizat, et ignorat cui congregabit ea. Cur ignorat, nisi quia inclinans se ad haec infima et terrena, thesaurizat sibi terram? Prorsus ignorat de his quae terrae committit, cui congregabit ea, tineaene demolienti, an furi effodienti; hosti diripienti, an igni devoranti.
Et inde misero homini incurvanti se, et incubanti his quae in terra sunt, flebilis vox illa de psalmo: Miser factus sum, et curvatus sum usque in finem; tota die contristatus ingrediebar. In semetipso siquidem experitur veritatem illius sententiae Sapientis: Deus rectum hominem fecit, ipse autem se implicuit doloribus multis. Et continuo vox ludibrii ad eum: Incurvare ut transeamus.
Sed unde venimus huc? Nempe inde, cum docere vellemus, rectum magnumque (quo gemino bono definieramus imaginem) nec in anima esse unum, nec cum anima, quemadmodum in Verbo et cum Verbo ea unum esse fideli aeque assertione docuimus. Et de rectitudine quidem ex his quae dicta sunt, liquet quod diversa et ab anima sit, et ab animae magnitudine: quandoquidem ea etiam non existente, et anima manet, et magna. Verum magnitudinis animaeque diversitas unde docebitur? Non enim inde potest, unde rectitudinis animaeque monstrata est, cum non sicut rectitudine, ita et magnitudine sua privari anima possit. Non est tamen sua magnitudo anima. Nam etsi anima non invenitur absque magnitudine sua, ipsa tamen et extra animam reperitur. Quaeris ubi?
In angelis. Inde quippe magni sunt angeli, unde animae magnitudo comprobatur, ex captu videlicet aeternitatis. Quod si eo constitit animam discrepare a rectitudine sua, quod ea carere possit: quidni aeque liqueat esse diversam et a sua magnitudine, quam sibi propriam vindicare non possit? Cum itaque nec illa in omni, nec ista in sola sit anima, patet utramque indifferenter differre ab ea. Item, Nulla forma est id cuius est forma. Est autem magnitudo forma animae. Nec enim ideo non forma, quia inseparabilis est illi. Hoc siquidem sunt substantiales differentiae omnes, hoc non modo proprie propria, sed et propria quaedam, hoc etiam aliae innumerabiles formae.
Non igitur sua magnitudo anima, non magis quam sua nigredo corvus, quam suus candor nix, quam sua risibilitas seu rationalitas homo: cum tamen nec corvum sine nigredine, nec sine candore nivem, nec hominem, qui non et risibilis sit et rationalis, unquam reperias. Ita et anima, et animae magnitudo, etsi inseparabiles, diversae tamen ab invicem sunt. Quomodo non diversae, cum haec in subiecto, illa subiectum et substantia sit? Sola summa et increata natura, quae est Trinitas Deus, hanc sibi vindicat meram singularemque suae essentiae simplicitatem, ut non aliud et aliud, non alibi quoque et alibi, sed ne modo quidem et modo inveniatur in ea. Nempe in semet manens, quod habet est, et quod est, semper et uno modo est. In ea et multa in unum, et diversa in idem rediguntur, ut nec de numerositate rerum sumat pluralitatem, nec alterationem de varietate sentiat. Loca omnia continet, et quaeque suis ordinat locis nusquam contenta locorum. Tempora sub ea transeunt, non ei.
Futura non exspectat, praeterita non recogitat, praesentia non experitur.
Recedant a nobis, charissimi, recedant novelli, non dialectici, sed haeretici, qui magnitudinem, qua magnus est Deus, et item, bonitatem, qua bonus, sed et sapientiam, qua sapiens et iustitiam, qua iustus, postremo divinitatem, qua Deus est, Deum non esse impiissime disputant. Divinitate, inquiunt, Deus est, sed divinitas non est Deus. Forsitan non dignatur Deus esse, quae tanta est ut faciat Deum. Sed si Deus non est, quid est? Aut enim Deus est, aut aliquid quod non est Deus, aut nihil. Equidem non das Deum esse, sed ne nihilum quidem, ut opinor, dabis, quam usque adeo necessariam Deo esse fateris, ut non modo absque ea Deus esse non possit, sed ea sit. Quod si aliquid est quod non est Deus: aut minor erit Deo, aut maior, aut par. At quomodo minor, qua Deus est?
Restat ut aut maiorem fatearis, aut parem. Sed si maior, ipsa est summum bonum, non Deus; si par, duo sunt summa bona, non unum: quod utrumque catholicus refugit sensus. Iam de magnitudine, bonitate, iustitia, sapientiaque, idem per omnia, quod de divinitate, sentimus: unum in Deo sunt, et cum Deo. Nec enim aliunde bonus quam unde magnus, nec aliunde iustus aut sapiens quam unde magnus et bonus, nec aliunde denique simul haec omnia est quam unde Deus, et hoc quoque nonnisi se ipso.
Sed dicit haereticus: Quid? Deum divinitate esse negas? Non, sed eamdem divinitatem, qua est, Deum nihilominus assero, ne Deo excellentius aliquid esse assentiar. Nam et magnitudine dico magnum, sed quae ipse est, ne maius aliquid Deo ponam; et bonitate fateor bonum, sed non alia quam ipse est, ne melius ipso aliquid mihi videar invenisse; et de caeteris in hunc modum. Securus et libens pergo inoffenso, ut aiunt, pede in eius sententiam qui dicebat: 'Deus nonnisi ea magnitudine magnus est quae est quod ipse. Alioquin illa erit maior magnitudo quam Deus.' Augustinus hic est, validissimus malleus haereticorum. Si quid itaque de Deo proprie dici possit, rectius congruentiusque dicetur: Deus est magnitudo, bonitas, iustitia, sapientia, quam: Deus est magnus, bonus, iustus aut sapiens.
Unde non immerito nuper in concilio quod papa Eugenius Remis celebravit, tam ipsi quam caeteris episcopis perversa visa est et omnino suspecta expositio illa in libro Gilleberti episcopi Pictavensis quo super verba Boetii de Trinitate, sanissima quidem atque catholica, commentabatur hoc modo: 'Pater est veritas, id est verus; Filius est veritas, id est verus; Spiritus sanctus est veritas, id est verus. Et hi tres simul non tres veritates, sed una veritas, id est unus verus.' O obscuram perversamque explanationem! Quam verius saniusque per contrarium ita dixisset: Pater est verus, id est veritas; Filius est verus, id est veritas; Spiritus sanctus est verus, id est veritas. Et hi tres unus verus, id est una veritas. Quod quidem fecisset, si sanctum dignaretur Fulgentium imitari, qui ait: 'Una quippe veritas unius Dei, imo una veritas unus Deus non patitur servitium atque culturam creatoris creaturaeque coniungi.' Bonus corrector, qui veracissime de veritate loqueretur, qui pie catholiceque sentiret de vera et mera divinae simplicitate substantiae, in qua nihil esse possit, quod ipsa non sit, et ipsa Deus. Quanquam manifestius in nonnullis locis aliis a rectitudine fidei liber ille praefati episcopi visus est discrepare; quorum, verbi causa, adhuc unum pono.
Nam dicente auctore, 'Cum dicitur, Deus, Deus, Deus, pertinet ad substantiam:' noster commentator intulit, 'Non quae est, sed qua est.' Quod absit, ut assentiat catholica Ecclesia, esse videlicet substantiam, vel aliquam omnino rem qua Deus sit, et quae non sit Deus!
Sed haec minime iam contra ipsum loquimur; quippe qui in eodem conventu sententiae episcoporum humiliter acquiescens, tam haec quam caetera digna reprehensione inventa proprio ore damnavit; sed propter eos qui adhuc librum illum, contra apostolicum utique promulgatum ibidem interdictum, transcribere et lectitare feruntur, contentiosius persistentes sequi episcopum, in quo ipse non stetit, et erroris quam correctionis magistrum habere malentes. Non solum autem sed et propter vos, occasione accepta de differentia imaginis et animae, quae ad imaginem facta est, operae pretium credidi excursum hunc facere: ut si qui forte ex aquis furtivis, quae dulciores videntur, aliquando aliquid biberint, sumpto antidoto, evomant illud, et purgato mentis stomacho, ad id quod secundum promissionem nostram dicendum de similitudine superest accedentes, puriora iam in gaudio non de nostris hauriant, sed de fontibus Salvatoris, sponsi Ecclesiae Iesu Christi Domini nostri, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Amen.
Scripture echoes
- ↩Song.3.1 — On my bed, night after night, I sought the one my soul loves; I sought him, but I did not find him.
- ↩Phil.2.6 — who, existing in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to exploit,
- ↩Ps.146.5 — Blessed is the one whose help is the God of Jacob, whose hope is in the LORD his God.
- ↩Ps.92.15 — They shall still bear fruit in old age; they shall be fresh and flourishing.
- ↩Ps.68.9 — The earth quaked; the heavens also poured down — before God, this Sinai, before God, the God of Israel.
- ↩Ps.38.7 — I am bent over, I am bowed down greatly; all day long I go about in mourning.
- ↩Luke.12.21 — So it is with the one who stores up treasure for himself and is not rich toward God.
- ↩Matt.6.19 — Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust destroy, and where thieves break in and steal.
- ↩Eccl.7.29 — See, this is what I have found: God made humanity upright, but they have devised many schemes.
Notes
- 1 ↩Normalized 'deincps' to 'deinceps' (thereafter/from then on) for translation.
- 2 ↩The Latin shifts from the impersonal subject (the greatness retained by the soul) to the image of a person; the translation preserves that shift. 'Filius alienus' (estranged son/stranger) carries the scriptural echo of Psalm 68:9 (Vulg.).
- 3 ↩The quoted passage ('Filii alieni mentiti sunt mihi... et claudicaverunt a semitis suis') is a candidate allusion to Psalm 17:46–47 (Vulg. 16:46–47) or a related psalm text; final resolution belongs to a later stage.
- 4 ↩The conditional ('si ex toto homines imaginem exuissent') explores a hypothetical complete stripping away of the divine image; 'corruerunt' (they collapsed/fell) intensifies 'claudicaverunt' (they limped), suggesting total ruin rather than partial impairment.
- 5 ↩The quoted 'Verumtamen in imagine pertransit homo' is a candidate allusion to Psalm 38:7 (Vulg. 37:8); 'sed et frustra conturbatur' may be a continuation of the same psalm or a composite citation. Final resolution belongs to a later stage.
- 6 ↩The quoted 'Thesaurizat, et ignorat cui congregabit ea' is a candidate allusion to Luke 12:21 (the parable of the rich fool); final resolution belongs to a later stage.
- 7 ↩The four agents of destruction (moth, thief, enemy, fire) form a rhetorical series drawn from scriptural and wisdom traditions about the insecurity of earthly treasure. The disjunctive 'an' questions ('tineaene... an furi... hosti... an igni') are rendered as 'is it... or' to preserve the open, questioning force.
- 8 ↩sensus rendered as 'instinct' to capture the intuitive, pre-rational judgment of catholic faith; alternatives: 'sense,' 'perception,' 'mind.'
- 9 ↩nonnisi se ipso rendered as 'only from himself' to preserve the exclusivity of divine self-sufficiency.
- 10 ↩The Latin distinguishes between 'quae est' (what God is / the substance that He is) and 'qua est' (that by which God is / the mode of being). The commentator's distinction is theologically suspect in this context, implying a separation between God and His substance.
- 11 ↩The phrase 'qua Deus sit' (by which God is) versus 'quae non sit Deus' (which is not God) targets the Gilbertine error: the idea that God has a substance or 'that-by-which-He-is' distinct from Himself. Orthodox theology holds that God is identical with His essence.
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