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← On Kingship, to the King of Cyprus (De regno ad regem Cypri)/Book 1 · De Regno — Liber 1
Chapter 8DeRegno.1.8

Quid praecipue movere debeat regem ad regendum, utrum honor, vel gloria. Opiniones circa hoc, et quid sit tenendum

The Question of the King's Reward

The burdens of kingship demand a fitting reward, and some have proposed honor and glory, yet this path leads to tyranny and other serious problems.

Now, as we've said, a king's duty is to seek the good of the people, and yet the office of a king seems excessively burdensome unless some personal good should come to him from it. We must therefore consider what would be the fitting reward for a good king. Therefore, some have thought that there is nothing else but honor and glory, and so Cicero, in his book On the Republic, defines the leader of the state as one who is to be sustained by glory; and for this reason Aristotle in his Ethics…1 Ethics.2 This seems to be assigned as a reason, because a ruler for whom honor and glory are not enough consequently becomes a tyrant. For it is in the hearts of all people that they should seek their own good. So if a ruler is not content with glory and honor, he will seek pleasures and riches, and in this way he will turn to plundering and outraging his subjects. But if we accept this opinion, many difficulties follow.

The Fragility and Slavery of Human Glory

Human glory is too fragile and fickle to reward a king, and pursuing it enslaves the soul and undermines the greatness proper to a ruler.

First, then, this would be a real burden for kings: if they were to endure so many labors and anxieties for so fragile a reward. Nothing in human affairs seems more fragile than glory and the favor of men's praise, since it depends on the opinions of people — and nothing is more changeable in human life. That is why the prophet Isaiah calls this kind of glory a flower of grass.✦ Then too, the craving for human glory robs the soul of its greatness. For whoever seeks the favor of others is bound, in everything he says or does, to cater to their will; and so, while he strives to please people, he becomes a slave to each one of them. For this reason Tully himself, in his book On Duties, says that the desire for glory must be guarded against. For this reason Tully himself, in his book On Duties, says that the desire for glory must be guarded against. For it robs the soul of the freedom for which every great-hearted person ought to be striving. Nothing, however, is more fitting for a ruler who has been appointed to accomplish good works than greatness of soul.

Glory Both Harmful and Unfitting

Glory is unfit for kings and harmful to peoples; the virtuous mind despises glory for justice's sake, yet the desire for glory breeds dangerous evils and pretense.

A reward of human glory, then, is unfit for the office of a king. At the same time, it's harmful to the people at large if such a reward is established for rulers: for it belongs to the duty of a good man that he despise glory, just as he despises other temporal goods. For it's the mark of a virtuous and strong mind to despise glory for the sake of justice, even as one despises life itself: whence something remarkable follows — because glory attends virtuous deeds, that very glory is virtuously despised, and from the contempt of glory a person is made truly glorious, according to the saying of Fabius: 'Whoever has scorned glory will possess the true kind'; and Sallust said of Cato: 'The less he sought glory, the more he actually attained it'; and the disciples of Christ themselves presented themselves as ministers of God through honor and dishonor, through ill repute and good report.✦ Glory, then, is not a fitting reward for a good person — the very glory that good people despise. If, then, this alone is established as the good reward for rulers, the consequence will be that good people will not take up the office of rule, or if they have taken it up, they will go unrewarded. Furthermore, dangerous evils spring from the desire for glory. For many, while they excessively seek glory in military affairs, have destroyed themselves and their own armies, with the freedom of their country brought under enemy power: hence Torquatus, a Roman commander, as an example of avoiding this danger, put to death his own son, who, provoked by the enemy, had fought against his father's command — though he had won — lest there be more harm in the example of presumption than advantage in the glory of a slain enemy. The desire for glory also has another vice closely attached to it — namely, pretense.

The Rise of Pretense and the Cloak of Virtue

Because true virtue is rare, the love of glory drives many to fake goodness, yet glory is still a lesser evil than money or pleasure and bears some trace of virtue.

Because it's difficult, and it happens for only a few people, to attain true virtues — the only qualities honor is owed to — many who want glory become fakers of virtue. Because of this, as Sallust says, ambition has forced many mortals to become false. To keep one thing locked in the heart and have another ready on the tongue, and to rely more on appearances than on character. And our Savior calls those who do good works so that people will see them hypocrites — that is, fakers.✦ So just as it's dangerous for the people if a ruler seeks pleasures and wealth as his reward — lest he become a plunderer and an abuser — it's likewise dangerous when he's held by glory as his reward, lest he turn presumptuous and a faker. But as far as appears from the intention of the wise men's sayings, they didn't assign honor and glory as a ruler's reward on the grounds that a good king's intention should principally be directed toward them, but because it's more tolerable if he seeks glory than if he covets money or pursues pleasure. This vice is closer to virtue, because the glory that people desire is, as Augustine says, nothing other than the judgment of people who think well of others. For the desire for glory does bear some trace of virtue, since at least it seeks the approval of good people and refuses to displease them.

Fear of Judgment and the Worse Alternative

Since few attain true virtue, fear of human judgment may keep a ruler from open crime, but without that fear even glory-seeking gives way to brazen cruelty, as in Nero.

So then, since few arrive at true virtue, it seems more tolerable that the one who is preferred to govern be someone who, perhaps out of fear of human judgment, holds back from obvious wrongdoing. For whoever longs for glory either strives to be approved by others through virtuous deeds done in the true way, or at least struggles and resorts to tricks and deceptions to get there. But the one who longs to be in power, if free from the desire for glory yet unafraid to displease those who judge well, will usually seek to gain what he wants through the most brazen crimes, and so he surpasses wild beasts in the vices of cruelty or of lust, as is clear in the case of Nero Caesar, whose luxury, as Augustine says, was so extreme that nothing manly was thought to be feared from him, and whose cruelty was so extreme that nothing gentle was thought to remain in him.3 This point is sufficiently expressed by what Aristotle says about the great-souled man in the Ethics. He says that the great-souled man does not seek honor and glory as though they were something great enough to be a sufficient reward for virtue, but demands nothing further beyond this from people. For among all earthly things, this seems to be the chief good: that a person receive from others a testimony to their virtue.

Read the original Latin

Quoniam autem, secundum praedicta, regis est bonum multitudinis quaerere, nimis videtur onerosum regis officium nisi ei aliquod proprium bonum ex hoc proveniret. Oportet igitur considerare, in qua re sit boni regis conveniens praemium. Quibusdam igitur visum est non esse aliud nisi honorem et gloriam, unde et Tullius in libro de republica definit principem civitatis esse alendum gloria; cuius rationem Aristoteles in Lib. Ethic. assignare videtur, quia princeps, cui non sufficit honor et gloria, consequenter tyrannus efficitur. Inest enim animis omnium, ut proprium bonum quaerant. Si ergo contentus non fuerit princeps gloria et honore, quaeret voluptates et divitias, et sic ad rapinas et subditorum iniurias convertetur. Sed si hanc sententiam receperimus, plurima sequuntur inconvenientia.

Primo namque hoc regibus dispendiosum esset, si tot labores et sollicitudines paterentur pro mercede tam fragili. Nihil enim videtur in rebus humanis fragilius gloria et honore favoris hominum, cum dependeat ex opinionibus hominum, quibus nihil mutabilius in vita hominum: et inde est quod Isaias propheta huiusmodi gloriam nominat florem foeni. Deinde humanae gloriae cupido animi magnitudinem aufert. Qui enim favorem hominum quaerit, necesse est ut in omni eo quod dicit aut facit eorum voluntati deserviat, et sic dum placere hominibus studet, fit servus singulorum. Propter quod et idem Tullius in Lib. de officiis, cavendam dicit gloriae cupidinem. Eripit enim animi libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nihil autem principem, qui ad bona peragenda instituitur, magis decet quam animi magnitudo.

Est igitur incompetens regis officio humanae gloriae praemium. Simul etiam est multitudini nocivum, si tale praemium statuatur principibus: pertinet enim ad boni viri officium ut contemnat gloriam, sicut alia temporalia bona. Virtuosi enim et fortis animi est pro iustitia contemnere gloriam sicut et vitam: unde fit quiddam mirabile, ut quia virtuosos actus sequitur gloria, ipsa gloria virtuose contemnatur, et ex contemptu gloriae homo gloriosus reddatur, secundum sententiam Fabii dicentis: gloriam qui spreverit, veram habebit; et de Catone dixit Salustius: quo minus petebat gloriam, tanto magis assequebatur illam; ipsique Christi discipuli se sicut Dei ministros exhibebant per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam. Non est igitur boni viri conveniens praemium gloria, quam contemnunt boni. Si igitur hoc solum bonum statuatur praemium principibus, sequetur bonos viros non assumere principatum, aut si assumpserint, impraemiatos esse. Amplius: ex cupidine gloriae periculosa mala proveniunt. Multi enim dum immoderate gloriam in rebus bellicis quaerunt, se ac suos perdiderunt exercitus, libertate patriae sub hostili potestate redacta: unde Torquatus, Romanus princeps, in exemplo huius vitandi discriminis, filium, qui contra imperium suum provocatus ab hoste iuvenili ardore pugnavit, licet vicisset, occidit, ne plus mali esset in praesumptionis exemplo, quam utilitatis in gloria hostis occisi. Habet etiam cupido gloriae aliud sibi familiare vitium, simulationem videlicet.

Quia enim difficile est paucisque contingit veras virtutes assequi, quibus solis honor debetur, multi gloriam cupientes, virtutum simulatores fiunt. Propter quod, sicut dicit Salustius: ambitio multos mortales falsos fieri coegit. Aliud clausum in pectore, aliud promptum habere in lingua, magisque vultum quam ingenium habere. Sed et salvator noster eos, qui bona opera faciunt, ut ab hominibus videantur, hypocritas, id est simulatores, vocat. Sicut igitur periculosum est multitudini si princeps voluptates et divitias quaerat pro praemio, ne raptor et contumeliosus fiat; ita periculosum est cum detinetur gloriae praemio, ne praesumptuosus et simulator existat. Sed quantum ex dictorum sapientium intentione apparet, non ea ratione honorem et gloriam pro praemio principi decreverunt, tanquam ad hoc principaliter ferri debeat boni regis intentio, sed quia tolerabilius est si gloriam quaerat, quam si pecuniam cupiat, vel voluptatem sequatur. Hoc enim vitium virtuti propinquius est, cum gloria, quam homines cupiunt, ut ait Augustinus, nihil aliud sit quam iudicium hominum bene de hominibus opinantium. Cupido enim gloriae aliquod habet virtutis vestigium, dum saltem bonorum approbationem quaerit et eis displicere recusat.

Paucis igitur ad veram virtutem pervenientibus, tolerabilius videtur si praeferatur ad regimen qui, vel iudicium hominum metuens, a malis manifestis retrahitur. Qui enim gloriam cupit, aut vera via per virtutis opera nititur ut ab hominibus approbetur, vel saltem dolis ad hoc contendit atque fallaciis. At qui dominari desiderat, si cupiditate gloriae carens non timeat bene iudicantibus displicere, per apertissima scelera quaerit plerumque obtinere quod diligit, unde bestias superat sive crudelitatis sive luxuriae vitiis, sicut in Nerone Caesare patet, cuius, ut Augustinus dicit, tanta luxuria fuit ut nihil putaretur ab eo virile metuendum, tanta crudelitas ut nihil molle habere putaretur. Hoc autem satis exprimitur per id quod Aristoteles de magnanimo in Ethic. dicit, quod non quaerit honorem et gloriam quasi aliquid magnum quod sit virtutis sufficiens praemium, sed nihil ultra hoc ab hominibus exigit. Hoc enim inter omnia terrena videtur esse praecipuum, ut homini ab hominibus testimonium de virtute reddatur.

Scripture echoes

  1. ↩Isa.40.6 — A voice says, "Cry out!" And I said, "What shall I cry?" All flesh is grass, and all its faithfulness is like the flower of the field.
  2. ↩2Cor.6.4 — Use a colon rather than an em dash to launch the hardship catalogue: "But in every way we commend ourselves as servants of God: in great endurance, in afflictions, in hardships, in distresses,
  3. ↩Matt.6.1-Matt.6.2 — Beware of practicing your righteousness before people, to be seen by them; otherwise you have no reward with your Father who is in the heavens. Matt.6.2 — So whenever you give alms, do not sound a trumpet before you, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, so that they may be praised by people. Truly I tell you, they have received their reward.

Notes

  1. 1 ↩The Latin breaks off mid-sentence with 'in Lib.' followed by 'Ethic.' in the next ref; the source text appears incomplete, likely a truncated reference to Aristotle's Ethics. The translation preserves the fragmentary character.
  2. 2 ↩This is a bare book-title fragment ('Ethic.') standing as a separate sentence in the source, likely a marginal gloss or abbreviated citation that became embedded in the text. It completes the truncated reference to Aristotle's Ethics begun in s3.
  3. 3 ↩The phrase 'bene iudicantibus' is rendered 'those who judge well' to capture the idea of discerning, upright judges; the sense is that such a ruler does not fear the disapproval of right-thinking people.

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