Quod in regimine plurium magis saepe contingit dominium tyrannicum, quam ex regimine unius; et ideo regimen unius melius est
Choosing the Lesser Harm
When both options are dangerous, the lesser harm must be chosen, and tyranny from many rulers is worse than from one.
But when you have to choose between two options, each of which carries some danger, the one that should be picked above all is the one that brings the lesser harm. If a monarchy, however, turns into a tyranny, the harm that follows is less than when a government of many leading citizens becomes corrupt.1
Dissent Against the Common Peace
Dissent under collective rule undermines the chief good of peace, whereas tyranny at least leaves communal peace partially intact.
For dissent, which very often follows from the rule of many, works against the good of peace, which is the chief good in a community of people living together; and that good is not removed by tyranny, but certain private advantages of particular individuals are obstructed, unless the excess of tyranny rages against the whole community.2
The Case for One Ruler
Monarchy is preferable to rule of many because dangers arise more frequently under collective governance, rulers more easily abandon the common good, and their disagreement breeds dissension among the people.
Therefore the rule of one is more to be preferred than the rule of many, even though dangers may follow from either. Furthermore, that from which great dangers can more frequently follow seems all the more to be avoided. But the greatest dangers to the people follow far more often from the rule of many than from the rule of one. For it generally happens that among many rulers someone will fall away from the pursuit of the common good more readily than a single one would. And when anyone presiding over many turns away from the pursuit of the common good, the danger of dissension threatens the body of subjects, because when rulers disagree, the inevitable result is that dissension spreads among the people.3
The Temptation of Tyranny in Single Rule
Even if a single ruler turns from the common good, this does not immediately become the worst excess of tyranny, so dangers from many rulers remain more to be avoided.
But if one person is in charge, for the most part at least they look to the common good; or if they do turn their aim away from the common good, it doesn't immediately follow that they aim at crushing their subjects — which is the excess of tyranny and occupies the highest degree of wickedness in ruling, as was shown above. Therefore the dangers that come from the governance of many are more to be avoided than those that come from the governance of one.
How Shared Rule Breeds Tyranny
Rule of many turns into tyranny even more often than single rule, since dissension among rulers leads one person to seize sole power, as history repeatedly shows.
Furthermore, the rule of many turns into tyranny no less than that of one — but perhaps even more often. For once dissension arises through the rule of several, it often happens that one person overcomes the others and usurps dominion over the whole multitude for himself alone — something that can be clearly seen from events that have occurred from time to time. For nearly every rule by many has ended in tyranny, as is plainly clear in the Roman republic, which after being governed by several magistrates for a long time, fell into the most cruel tyrants when feuds, dissensions, and civil wars broke out. And in general, if anyone carefully considers past events and those happening now, they will find that tyranny has been exercised more often in lands ruled by many than in those governed by one.
The Final Verdict for Monarchy
Since tyranny arises more often under rule of many than under one king, it is more advantageous to live under monarchy than under collective governance.
If, then, royal rule — which is the best form of government — seems especially to be avoided because of tyranny; yet tyranny tends to occur no less, but rather more, in the rule of several than in that of one, the conclusion simply remains that it is more advantageous to live under one king than under the rule of several.
Read the original Latin
Cum autem inter duo, ex quorum utroque periculum imminet, eligere oportet, illud potissime eligendum est ex quo sequitur minus malum. Ex monarchia autem, si in tyrannidem convertatur, minus malum sequitur quam ex regimine plurium optimatum, quando corrumpitur. Dissensio enim, quae plurimum sequitur ex regimine plurium, contrariatur bono pacis, quod est praecipuum in multitudine sociali: quod quidem bonum per tyrannidem non tollitur, sed aliqua particularium hominum bona impediuntur, nisi fuerit excessus tyrannidis quod in totam communitatem desaeviat. Magis igitur praeoptandum est unius regimen quam multorum, quamvis ex utroque sequantur pericula. Adhuc: illud magis fugiendum videtur, ex quo pluries sequi possunt magna pericula. Frequentius autem sequuntur maxima pericula multitudinis ex multorum regimine, quam ex regimine unius. Plerumque enim contingit ut ex pluribus aliquis ab intentione communis boni deficiat, quam quod unus tantum. Quicumque autem, ex pluribus praesidentibus, divertat ab intentione communis boni, dissensionis periculum in subditorum multitudine imminet, quia dissentientibus principibus consequens est ut in multitudine sequatur dissensio.
Si vero unus praesit, plerumque quidem ad bonum commune respicit; aut si a bono communi intentionem avertat, non statim sequitur ut ad subditorum depressionem intendat, quod est excessus tyrannidis et in malitia regiminis maximum gradum tenens, ut supra ostensum est. Magis igitur sunt fugienda pericula quae proveniunt ex gubernatione multorum, quam ex gubernatione unius. Amplius, non minus contingit in tyrannidem verti regimen multorum quam unius, sed forte frequentius. Exorta namque dissensione per regimen plurium, contingit saepe unum super alios superare et sibi soli multitudinis dominium usurpare, quod quidem ex his quae pro tempore fuerunt, manifeste inspici potest. Nam fere omnium multorum regimen est in tyrannidem terminatum, ut in Romana republica manifeste apparet; quae cum diu per plures magistratus administrata fuisset, exortis simultatibus, dissensionibus et bellis civilibus, in crudelissimos tyrannos incidit. Et universaliter si quis praeterita facta et quae nunc fiunt diligenter consideret, plures inveniet exercuisse tyrannidem in terris quae per multos reguntur, quam in illis quae gubernantur per unum. Si igitur regium, quod est optimum regimen, maxime vitandum videatur propter tyrannidem; tyrannis autem non minus, sed magis, contingere solet in regimine plurium, quam unius, relinquitur simpliciter magis esse expediens sub rege uno vivere, quam sub regimine plurium.
Notes
- 1 ↩optimatum (genitive plural of 'optimates') is rendered 'leading citizens' to keep the political sense without importing a technical Roman title.
- 2 ↩multitudo socialis rendered 'community of people living together' to capture the social-political sense of the collective body.
- 3 ↩divertat rendered 'turns away' as the most plausible sense of the subjunctive verb in a generic/conditional relative clause; the lemma is uncertain.
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