Quod, sicut dominium unius optimum est, quando est iustum, ita oppositum eius est pessimum, probatur multis rationibus et argumentis
The Worst of All Governments
Because kingship is the best form of government, its opposite, tyranny, must be the worst, and unified power working toward evil is more harmful than divided power.
Just as the rule of a king is the best form of government, so the rule of a tyrant is the worst. Now, democracy is set opposite to polity, since both, as appears from what has been said, are forms of government exercised by the many; oligarchy is opposite to aristocracy, since both are exercised by the few; and kingship is opposite to tyranny, since both are exercised by one. That kingship is the best form of government was shown earlier. If, then, the worst is set opposite to the best, it must be that tyranny is the worst form of government. Furthermore, power united is more effective at producing a result than power scattered or divided. For many people gathered together can pull what could not be pulled separately, part by part, by each individual alone. So just as it is more useful for power working toward the good to be more unified, so that it is more effective at doing good, so too it is more harmful if power working toward evil is unified rather than divided. The power of an unjust ruler, however, works toward the harm of the community, since he turns the common good of the people entirely to his own private good.
How Injustice Grows with Concentration of Power
Injustice increases as rule departs from the common good, so tyranny is the most unjust government, and divine providence shows that good flows from a unified cause while evil arises from many defects.
So therefore, in a just government, the more the ruler is one, the more useful the government is — so that a kingdom is better than an aristocracy, and an aristocracy than a polity; and the opposite will hold in an unjust government, so that clearly, the more the ruler is one, the more harmful it will be. Therefore tyranny is more harmful than oligarchy; oligarchy, however, than democracy. Furthermore, a government becomes unjust through this: that, once the common good of the multitude has been spurned, the private good of the ruler is sought. Therefore, the more one withdraws from the common good, the more unjust the government is. One withdraws further from the common good in an oligarchy, in which the good of the few is sought, than in a democracy, in which the good of the many is sought; and one withdraws even further from the common good in a tyranny, in which the good of only one is sought. For the good of the many is closer to the good of the whole than the good of the few, and the good of the few than that of one alone. Therefore the government of a tyrant is the most unjust. Similarly, it becomes clear to those who consider the order of divine providence, which arranges all things most excellently. For good comes about in things from one perfect cause, as though from all united forces that can help toward the good; but evil comes about one by one, from individual defects.
Beauty, Ugliness, and the Weakening of Evil
Just as beauty requires perfect order while ugliness arises from any single defect, so good is stronger when unified and evil weaker when divided, making democracy more bearable than tyranny among unjust regimes.
For there's no beauty in a body unless all its parts are arranged becomingly; but ugliness results from any single part being out of place. And so ugliness arises from many causes in different ways, but beauty in just one way from a single perfect cause: and this holds for all good and evil alike, as though God so ordered it that good from one cause is stronger, while evil from many causes is weaker.1 It's better, then, that a just rule belong to one alone, so that it may be stronger. But if rule tilts into injustice, it's better that it belong to many, so that it may be weaker and they may restrain one another. So among unjust forms of rule, democracy is more bearable, but tyranny is the worst. This is also especially clear if anyone considers the evils that flow from tyranny: because once a tyrant despises the common good and pursues his own, the result is that he oppresses his subjects in different ways, driven by whatever different passions he's subject to in pursuit of the things he desires. For whoever is gripped by the passion of greed seizes the goods of his subjects: hence Solomon says, "A just king upholds the land, but a greedy man will destroy it."✦2 But if he's subject to the passion of anger, he sheds blood as though it were nothing — hence through Ezekiel:3
The Tyrant's War Against the Common Life
A tyrant oppresses his subjects according to his own passions, lives in constant insecurity, and deliberately destroys virtue, trust, and social bonds among his people to secure his own rule.
At Ezekiel 22:27 it is said: 'Its rulers are in its midst like wolves seizing prey, to shed blood.'✦ Therefore the wise man warns that this kind of rule must be shunned, saying: 'Keep far away from a man who has the power to kill,' since clearly he kills not for justice, but through power, to satisfy his own will's desire. And so there will be no safety, but everything is uncertain when one departs from what is lawful, and nothing can be made secure that rests on another person's will — not to say, on another's lust. And they burden their subjects not only in bodily matters but also hinder their spiritual good, because those who want to rule more than to serve block every advance of their subjects, suspecting that any excellence among their subjects is a threat to their own unjust domination. Indeed, tyrants are suspected more when good men are around than when evil men are, and for them, another person's virtue is always something to fear. So the tyrants just mentioned try to keep their own subjects from becoming virtuous and growing in courage and from enduring their unjust domination — and to keep friendship, alliance, and the benefits of peace from being established among their subjects, so that, while no one trusts anyone else, no one can plot anything against their rule. Because of this they sow discord among them, nourish it once it arises, and forbid the things that build alliances among people — such as marriages and banquets — and everything else of that kind, through which familiarity and trust are usually formed among people. They also try to keep their subjects from becoming powerful or rich, because, judging their subjects by the standard of their own malice, they suspect that, just as they themselves use their power and wealth to harm others, so the power and wealth of their subjects might be turned against them to do them harm.
The Ruin of Virtue Under Tyranny
Because tyrants hinder virtue and rule without reason, few virtuous people are found under them, subjects become servile and fearful, and Solomon compares an unrighteous ruler to a savage beast.
Hence it is said of the tyrant in Job 15:21: the sound of terror is always in his ears, and even when there is peace — with no one, that is, threatening him with harm — he is always suspicious of ambushes.✦ From this it follows that when those in power — who ought to lead their subjects toward virtue — instead begrudge their subjects' virtue and do everything they can to hinder it, few virtuous people are found under tyrants. For as the philosopher's saying has it, strong men are found among those who honor the very strongest; and as Cicero says, the qualities that are disapproved by those in power always lie neglected and barely thrive. It is likewise natural that people raised under fear degenerate into a servile spirit and grow cowardly toward every vigorous and manly endeavor — which is evident from experience in provinces that have long been under tyrants. Hence the Apostle, Colossians. Colossians 3:21 says: fathers, do not provoke your children to anger, so that they do not become discouraged.✦ King Solomon, therefore, considering these harms of tyranny, says: when the godly reign, it is the ruin of men — because, clearly, through the wickedness of tyrants their subjects fall away from the perfection of virtue; and again he says: when the godly seize power, the people groan, as though dragged back into servitude; and again: when the godly rise up, people hide themselves, so as to escape the cruelty of tyrants.✦ No wonder, since a person who rules without reason, according to the desire of his own soul, differs nothing from a beast — whence Solomon: a roaring lion and a hungry bear is an unrighteous ruler over a poor people. And so people hide from tyrants as from cruel beasts, and to be subject to a tyrant seems the same as being thrown before a savage beast.✦
Read the original Latin
Sicut autem regimen regis est optimum, ita regimen tyranni est pessimum. Opponitur enim politiae quidem democratia, utrumque enim, sicut ex dictis apparet, est regimen quod per plures exercetur; aristocratiae vero oligarchia, utrumque enim exercetur per paucos; regnum autem tyrannidi, utrumque enim per unum exercetur. Quod autem regnum sit optimum regimen, ostensum est prius. Si igitur optimo opponitur pessimum, necesse est quod tyrannis sit pessimum. Adhuc: virtus unita magis est efficax ad effectum inducendum, quam dispersa vel divisa. Multi enim congregati simul trahunt quod divisim per partes singulariter a singulis trahi non posset. Sicut igitur utilius est virtutem operantem ad bonum esse magis unam, ut sit virtuosior ad operandum bonum, ita magis est nocivum si virtus operans malum sit una, quam divisa. Virtus autem iniuste praesidentis operatur ad malum multitudinis, dum commune bonum multitudinis in sui ipsius bonum tantum retorquet.
Sicut igitur in regimine iusto, quanto regens est magis unum, tanto est utilius regimen, ut regnum melius est quam aristocratia, aristocratia vero quam politia; ita e converso erit et in iniusto regimine, ut videlicet quanto regens est magis unum, tanto magis sit nocivum. Magis igitur est nociva tyrannis quam oligarchia: oligarchia autem quam democratia. Amplius: per hoc regimen fit iniustum, quod spreto bono communi multitudinis, quaeritur bonum privatum regentis. Quanto igitur magis receditur a bono communi, tanto est regimen magis iniustum. Plus autem receditur a bono communi in oligarchia, in qua quaeritur bonum paucorum, quam in democratia, in qua quaeritur bonum multorum; et adhuc plus receditur a bono communi in tyrannide, in qua quaeritur bonum tantum unius: omni enim universitati propinquius est multum quam paucum, et paucum quam unum solum. Regimen igitur tyranni est iniustissimum. Similiter autem manifestum fit considerantibus divinae providentiae ordinem, quae optime universa disponit. Nam bonum provenit in rebus ex una causa perfecta, quasi omnibus adunatis quae ad bonum iuvare possunt, malum autem singillatim ex singularibus defectibus.
Non enim est pulchritudo in corpore, nisi omnia membra fuerint decenter disposita; turpitudo autem contingit, quodcumque membrum indecenter se habeat. Et sic turpitudo ex pluribus causis diversimode provenit, pulchritudo autem uno modo ex una causa perfecta: et sic est in omnibus bonis et malis, tanquam hoc Deo providente, ut bonum ex una causa sit fortius, malum autem ex pluribus causis sit debilius. Expedit igitur ut regimen iustum sit unius tantum, ad hoc ut sit fortius. Quod si in iniustitiam declinat regimen, expedit magis ut sit multorum, ut sit debilius, et se invicem impediant. Inter iniusta igitur regimina tolerabilius est democratia, pessimum vero tyrannis. Idem etiam maxime apparet, si quis consideret mala quae ex tyrannis proveniunt, quia cum tyrannus, contempto communi bono, quaerit privatum, consequens est ut subditos diversimode gravet, secundum quod diversis passionibus subiacet ad bona aliqua affectanda. Qui enim passione cupiditatis detinetur, bona subditorum rapit: unde Salomon: rex iustus erigit terram, vir avarus destruet eam. Si vero iracundiae passioni subiaceat, pro nihilo sanguinem fundit, unde per Ezech.
XXII, 27, dicitur: principes eius in medio eius quasi lupi rapientes praedam ad effundendum sanguinem. Hoc igitur regimen fugiendum esse, sapiens monet, dicens: longe esto ab homine potestatem habente occidendi, quia scilicet non pro iustitia, sed per potestatem occidit pro libidine voluntatis. Sic igitur nulla erit securitas, sed omnia sunt incerta cum a iure disceditur, nec firmari quidquam potest quod positum est in alterius voluntate, ne dicam libidine. Nec solum in corporalibus subditos gravat, sed etiam spiritualia eorum bona impedit, quia qui plus praeesse appetunt quam prodesse, omnem profectum subditorum impediunt, suspicantes omnem subditorum excellentiam suae iniquae dominationi praeiudicium esse. Tyrannis enim magis boni quam mali suspecti sunt, semperque his aliena virtus formidolosa est. Conantur igitur praedicti tyranni, ne ipsorum subditi virtuosi effecti magnanimitatis concipiant spiritum et eorum iniquam dominationem non ferant, ne inter subditos amicitiae foedus firmetur et pacis emolumento ad invicem gaudeant, ut sic dum unus de altero non confidit, contra eorum dominium aliquid moliri non possint. Propter quod inter ipsos discordias seminant, exortas nutriunt, et ea quae ad foederationem hominum pertinent, ut connubia et convivia, prohibent, et caetera huiusmodi, per quae inter homines solet familiaritas et fiducia generari. Conantur etiam ne potentes aut divites fiant, quia de subditis secundum suae malitiae conscientiam suspicantes, sicut ipsi potentia et divitiis ad nocendum utuntur, ita timent ne potentia subditorum et divitiae eis nocivae reddantur.
Unde et Iob XV, 21, de tyranno dicitur: sonitus terroris semper in auribus eius, et cum pax sit (nullo scilicet malum ei intentante), ille semper insidias suspicatur. Ex hoc autem contingit ut, dum praesidentes, qui subditos ad virtutes inducere deberent, virtuti subditorum nequiter invident et eam pro posse impediunt, sub tyrannis pauci virtuosi inveniantur. Nam iuxta sententiam philosophi apud illos inveniuntur fortes viri, apud quos fortissimi quique honorantur, et ut Tullius dicit: iacent semper et parum vigent, quae apud quosque improbantur. Naturale etiam est ut homines, sub timore nutriti, in servilem degenerent animum et pusillanimes fiant ad omne virile opus et strenuum: quod experimento patet in provinciis quae diu sub tyrannis fuerunt. Unde apostolus, Col. III, 21, dicit: patres, nolite ad indignationem provocare filios vestros, ne pusillo animo fiant. Haec igitur nocumenta tyrannidis rex Salomon considerans, dicit: regnantibus impiis, ruinae hominum, quia scilicet per nequitiam tyrannorum subiecti a virtutum perfectione deficiunt; et iterum dicit: cum impii sumpserint principatum, gemet populus, quasi sub servitute deductus; et iterum: cum surrexerint impii, abscondentur homines, ut tyrannorum crudelitatem evadant. Nec est mirum, quia homo absque ratione secundum animae suae libidinem praesidens nihil differt a bestia, unde Salomon: leo rugiens et ursus esuriens princeps impius super populum pauperem; et ideo a tyrannis se abscondunt homines sicut a crudelibus bestiis, idemque videtur tyranno subiici, et bestiae saevienti substerni.
Scripture echoes
- ↩Prov.29.4 — A king establishes the land by justice, but a man of bribes tears it down.
- ↩Ezek.22.27 — Her princes within her are like wolves tearing prey, shedding blood, destroying lives, in order to seize unjust gain.
- ↩Job.15.21 — The sound of terrors is in his ears; while he is at peace, a destroyer comes upon him.
- ↩Col.3.21 — Fathers, do not provoke your children, so that they do not become discouraged.
- ↩Prov.28.2 — Because of a land’s transgression, its princes are many, but with a man of understanding and knowledge, its stability endures.
- ↩Prov.28.15 — Like a roaring lion or a prowling bear is a wicked ruler over a poor people.
Notes
- 1 ↩tanquam hoc Deo providente rendered with 'as though God so ordered it' to preserve the analogy's force without overclaiming the construction's grammatical mood.
- 2 ↩Proverbs 29:4 (Vulg. 29:4). Candidate allusion preserved; final reference resolution deferred to scripture-reference stage.
- 3 ↩The Latin ends abruptly with 'per Ezech.' (abbreviated reference to Ezekiel). The specific verse is unresolved; candidate allusion preserved for scripture-reference stage.
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