Quod rex et princeps studere debet ad bonum regimen propter bonum sui ipsius et utile quod inde sequitur; cuius contrarium sequitur regimen tyrannicum
The Crown Set Before Kings
A king must rule with careful diligence because a great heavenly reward awaits just rulers, while tyrants forfeit it by choosing fleeting advantages over justice, and among all earthly goods nothing is more worthy than true friendship.
Since so great a reward awaits kings in heavenly blessedness if they have governed well, they must watch over themselves with careful diligence so that their rule is not turned into tyranny. For nothing ought to be more welcome to them than this: that from the royal honor by which they are exalted on earth, they may be brought into the glory of the heavenly kingdom. But tyrants go astray: they abandon justice for the sake of certain earthly advantages, and they are stripped of so great a reward, which they could have attained by ruling justly. But that it is foolish to lose the greatest and everlasting goods for the sake of such small and temporary ones — no one is unaware of this, except a fool or a faithless person. It must also be said that these very temporary advantages, for the sake of which tyrants abandon justice, come to kings more as profit while they keep justice. First of all, among all worldly things, there is nothing that seems worthy to be preferred to a worthy friendship. For it is friendship herself who brings the virtuous together into one, preserves virtue, and advances it. She is the one whom everyone needs in whatever affairs must be carried out — who does not intrude unseasonably upon prosperous circumstances, nor abandon us in adverse ones.
The Story of Damon and Pythias
Through the famous story of Damon and Pythias, the text shows that friendship sweetens even the harshest sufferings, yet tyrants, who pursue their own good rather than the common good, can never attain this bond.
It is friendship that brings the greatest pleasures, so much so that whatever delights you might have turn to weariness without friends. Love makes all things—even harsh things—easy and almost nothing; nor is any tyrant's cruelty so great that friendship cannot take delight in it.1 For Dionysius, once tyrant of the Syracusans, when he wanted to kill one of two friends who were called Damon and Pythias, the one who was to be killed obtained a truce so that he might go home and settle his affairs; but the other friend gave himself up to the tyrant as surety for his return.2 But when the promised day arrived and the other still did not return, each one accused the surety of folly. But he declared that he had nothing to fear from the steadfastness of his friend. And in the very hour in which he was to be killed, he returned. Marveling at the spirit of them both, the tyrant remitted the punishment on account of the faithfulness of their friendship, and even asked that they receive him as a third into the ranks of their friendship. This good of friendship, though tyrants long to attain it, they nevertheless cannot achieve.
Why Tyrants Cannot Be Loved
Because tyrants do not seek the common good, no true friendship can exist between them and their subjects, whereas good kings who zealously pursue the welfare of their people earn deep love and willing devotion, as shown in the examples of Caesar and Augustus.
For when they don't pursue the common good but their own, their bond with those under them becomes small or nonexistent. Every friendship is built on some shared foundation. For we see that those who come together are bound by friendship, whether through their shared origin in nature, a similarity of character, or some common bond of association. Therefore the friendship between a tyrant and his subject is small — or rather, it doesn't exist at all. At the same time, while subjects are being crushed by tyrannical injustice, they don't feel that they're loved but rather despised, and they certainly don't love him in return. Nor do tyrants have any grounds for complaining about their subjects if they aren't loved by them, since the tyrants themselves don't show themselves to be the kind of people who ought to be loved by them. But good kings, as they zealously pursue the common welfare and their subjects come to see through their efforts that many benefits are flowing to them, are loved by many—because they show that they themselves love their subjects. This is a greater wickedness than what commonly occurs among the masses: that friends come to be regarded with hatred and evil is repaid in return for good. And from this love comes the result that the reign of good kings is stable, since their subjects don't refuse to put themselves at risk in any danger on their behalf. We see an example of this in Julius Caesar. Suetonius tells us that he loved his soldiers to such a degree that when he heard of a massacre, he didn't cut his hair or beard until he had avenge them. By doing so he made his soldiers utterly devoted to himself and fiercely eager, so that many of them, even after being captured, refused the life offered to them on condition that they would fight against Caesar. Octavian Augustus too, who used his power with the greatest restraint, was loved so deeply by his subjects that many who were on their deathbeds ordered that the sacrificial victims they had vowed be sacrificed, because they would have to leave him behind alive.
The Throne That Endures
A just king's throne is established forever, but tyrannical rule cannot last because it is hateful to the people, and in times of adversity the oppressed will seize any opportunity to rise up.
So it's not easy for a ruler's power to be shaken when the people love him with such great consensus — which is why Solomon says: "The king who judges the poor with justice, his throne will be established forever."✦ But the rule of tyrants cannot last long, since it's hateful to the multitude. For what goes against the wishes of many can't be preserved for long. For the present life is hardly passed through by anyone without suffering some adversities. But in a time of adversity, there's no lack of opportunity to rise up against a tyrant; and where the opportunity is present, there won't be lacking someone among the many — or even just one person — who won't seize it. The people eagerly pursue the one who rises up, and it won't easily lack the result that's attempted with the favor of the multitude. So it can scarcely happen that a tyrant's rule is extended far into the future. This too becomes clearly evident if anyone considers how a tyrant's rule is preserved.
Fear Is a Weak Foundation
Tyrants sustain their rule through fear alone, but fear is an unreliable foundation because the oppressed will eventually rebel, and pent-up resentment bursts forth all the more violently once an opening appears.
For it's not preserved by love, since there is little or no friendship in a populace subjected to a tyrant — as is clear from what people have already experienced. As for the loyalty of subjects, however, you can't rely on it to sustain a tyranny. For you won't find such strength in most people that they are held back by the power of faithfulness, lest they shake off the yoke of undeserved servitude if they can. Perhaps, though, opposing a tyrant's wickedness in any way won't be seen as faithfulness's opposite in most people's estimation. So it comes down to this: the rule of a tyrant is sustained by fear alone — which is precisely why they strive to be feared by their subjects with their whole heart. But fear is a weak foundation. For those who are kept in submission by fear will rise up against their rulers, if an opening arises in which they can hope to act with impunity — and all the more fiercely, the more they were held in check against their will by fear alone. It's like water that's been forcibly dammed up: once it finds an opening, it rushes through all the more violently.
Despair and the Fall of Tyrants
Fear can drive subjects to despair, which in turn makes them reckless and willing to attempt anything against the tyrant; history confirms that scarcely any tyranny has lasted, and Aristotle himself noted that even longer-lasting tyrants only survived by imitating royal moderation.
But fear itself isn't without danger, since excessive fear has driven many into despair. Despair of salvation, moreover, hurls a person headlong and boldly into anything they might attempt.3 A tyrant's dominion, therefore, can't last. This is clear from examples no less than from reasons. For if you consider the deeds of the ancients and the events of modern times, you'll scarcely find any tyrant's dominion to have lasted. And so Aristotle, in his Politics, after enumerating many tyrants, shows that the dominion of all of them ended in a short time—though some ruled longer because they didn't go far beyond the bounds of tyranny, but in many respects imitated royal moderation. Furthermore, this becomes even more evident from a consideration of divine judgment. For as it is said in Job: 'He makes a man a hypocrite to reign because of the sins of the people.'
God Raises and Removes Tyrants
A tyrant is the truest hypocrite, playing the role of king while ruling wickedly; God permits such rulers as punishment for the people's sins, called in Scripture the wrath of God, but divine mercy ensures their overthrow and the restoration of calm.
No one deserves the name 'hypocrite' more than the person who takes on the role of king and shows himself to be a tyrant. A hypocrite is someone who plays the part of another, as is customary in theatrical spectacles. And so God allows tyrants to be set over people in order to punish their sins. In Scripture such punishment is customarily called the wrath of God. Hence through Hosea the Lord says: I will give you a king in my fury. Unhappy, then, is the king who is granted to a people in the fury of God. His rule cannot last, because God will not forget to show mercy, nor will he hold back his mercies in his anger; indeed, through Joel it is said that he is patient, rich in mercy, and ready to forgive wickedness.4 God does not allow tyrants to reign for long, but after the storm they brought upon the people, through their overthrow he will bring calm.
Riches Through Justice, Not Plunder
Kings grow wealthy through justice because their subjects guard them willingly and give generously, whereas tyrants must spend more on hired followers than they seize, and the greedy who disturb their households will never be satisfied.
So the wise one says: God has destroyed the thrones of arrogant leaders, and in their place he has made the gentle to sit. It's also clear from experience that kings gain wealth more through justice than through a tyrant's plunder. Because the rule of tyrants is offensive to the people under them, tyrants therefore need many followers through whom they can be kept safe against their subjects; and in doing so they're forced to spend more than they can seize from their subjects. But the rule of kings, which is pleasing to their subjects, has all their subjects as guards instead of hired followers, with no expense needed; and sometimes in times of need the subjects willingly give more to their kings than tyrants could seize from them — and so what Solomon says is fulfilled: others, namely kings, divide their own possessions by doing good to those under them, and become richer. Others, that is, tyrants, seize what isn't theirs, and are always in want. In the same way, by God's just judgment it happens that those who gather wealth uselessly scatter it, or even that it is justly taken away from them. As Solomon says: The greedy person will never have enough money, and whoever loves riches will get no profit from them — indeed, as Proverbs says... Proverbs 15 says: Whoever pursues greed disturbs their own household.
The Lasting Memory of the Just
God grants riches to just kings as He did to Solomon, and while good kings live on in lasting praise, the name of the wicked either vanishes or rots in infamy.
For kings who seek justice, God adds riches, just as with Solomon, who, when he sought wisdom to render judgment, received a promise of abundant riches. As for fame, it seems unnecessary to say much. For who would doubt that good kings live on not only in this life but even more after death, in a way, through people's praises and are held in lasting regard; but the name of the wicked either vanishes at once, or, if they were outstanding in wickedness, they are remembered with detestation? Whence Solomon says: The memory of the just man is with praises, but the name of the wicked will rot, because it either vanishes or remains with a stench.
Read the original Latin
Cum regibus tam grande in caelesti beatitudine praemium proponatur si bene in regendo se habuerint, diligenti cura se ipsos observare debent ne in tyrannidem convertantur. Nihil enim eis acceptabilius esse debet quam quod ex honore regio, quo sublimantur in terris, in caelestis regni gloriam transferantur. Errant vero tyranni, qui propter quaedam terrena commoda iustitiam deserunt; qui tanto privantur praemio, quod adipisci poterant iuste regendo. Quod autem stultum sit pro huiusmodi parvis et temporalibus bonis maxima et sempiterna perdere bona, nullus, nisi stultus aut infidelis, ignorat. Addendum est etiam quod haec temporalia commoda, propter quae tyranni iustitiam deserunt, magis ad lucrum proveniunt regibus dum iustitiam servant. Primo namque inter mundana omnia nihil est, quod amicitiae dignae praeferendum videatur. Ipsa namque est quae virtuosos in unum conciliat, virtutem conservat atque promovet. Ipsa est qua omnes indigent in quibuscumque negotiis peragendis, quae nec prosperis importune se ingerit, nec deserit in adversis.
Ipsa est quae maximas delectationes affert, in tantum ut quaecumque delectabilia in taedium sine amicis vertantur. Quaelibet autem aspera, facilia et prope nulla facit amor; nec est alicuius tyranni tanta crudelitas, ut amicitia non delectetur. Dionysius enim, quondam Syracusanorum tyrannus, cum duorum amicorum, qui Damon et Pythias dicebantur, alterum occidere vellet, is, qui occidendus erat, inducias impetravit ut domum profectus res suas ordinaret; alter vero amicorum sese tyranno ob fidem pro eius reditu dedit. Appropinquante autem promisso die, nec illo redeunte, unusquisque fideiussorem stultitiae arguebat. At ille nihil se metuere de amici constantia praedicabat. Eadem autem hora, qua fuerat occidendus, rediit. Admirans autem amborum animum, tyrannus supplicium propter fidem amicitiae remisit, insuper rogans ut eum tertium reciperent in amicitiae gradu. Hoc autem amicitiae bonum, quamvis desiderent tyranni, consequi tamen non possunt.
Dum enim commune bonum non quaerunt, sed proprium, fit parva vel nulla communio eorum ad subditos. Omnis autem amicitia super aliqua communione firmatur. Eos enim qui conveniunt, vel per naturae originem, vel per morum similitudinem, vel per cuiuscumque societatis communionem, videmus amicitia coniungi. Parva igitur vel potius nulla est amicitia tyranni et subditi; simulque dum subditi per tyrannicam iniustitiam opprimuntur, et se amari non sentiunt sed contemni, nequaquam amant. Nec habent tyranni unde de subditis conquerantur si ab eis non diliguntur, quia nec ipsi tales se ipsis exhibent ut diligi ab eis debeant. Sed boni reges, dum communi profectui studiose intendunt et eorum studio subditi plura commoda se assequi sentiunt, diliguntur a plurimis, dum subditos se amare demonstrant, quia et hoc est maioris malitiae quam quod in multitudine cadat, ut odio habeantur amici et benefactoribus rependatur malum pro bono. Et ex hoc amore provenit ut bonorum regum regnum sit stabile, dum pro ipsis se subditi quibuscumque periculis exponere non recusant: cuius exemplum in Iulio Caesare apparet, de quo Suetonius refert quod milites suos usque adeo diligebat ut, audita quorumdam caede, capillos et barbam ante non dempserit quam vindicasset: quibus rebus devotissimos sibi et strenuissimos milites reddidit, ita quod plerique eorum capti, concessam sibi sub ea conditione vitam, si militare adversus Caesarem vellent, recusarent. Octavianus etiam Augustus, qui modestissime imperio usus est, in tantum diligebatur a subditis ut plerique morientes victimas quas devoverant immolari mandarent, quia eum superstitem reliquissent.
Non est ergo facile ut principis perturbetur dominium, quem tanto consensu populus amat: propter quod Salomon dicit: rex qui iudicat in iustitia pauperes, thronus eius in aeternum firmabitur. Tyrannorum vero dominium diuturnum esse non potest, cum sit multitudini odiosum. Non potest enim diu conservari quod votis multorum repugnat. Vix enim a quoquam praesens vita transigitur quin aliquas adversitates patiatur. Adversitatis autem tempore, occasio deesse non potest contra tyrannum insurgendi: et ubi adsit occasio, non deerit ex multis vel unus qui occasione non utatur. Insurgentem autem populus votive prosequitur: nec de facili carebit effectu, quod cum favore multitudinis attentatur. Vix ergo potest contingere quod tyranni dominium protendatur in longum. Hoc etiam manifeste patet, si quis consideret unde tyranni dominium conservatur.
Non enim conservatur amore, cum parva vel nulla sit amicitia subiectae multitudinis ad tyrannum, ut ex praehabitis patet. De subditorum autem fide tyrannis confidendum non est. Non enim invenitur tanta virtus in multis, ut fidelitatis virtute reprimantur ne indebitae servitutis iugum, si possint, excutiant. Fortassis autem nec fidelitati contrarium reputabitur secundum opinionem multorum, si tyrannicae nequitiae qualitercumque obvietur. Restat ergo ut solo timore tyranni regimen sustentetur, unde et timeri se a subditis tota intentione procurant. Timor autem est debile fundamentum. Nam qui timore subduntur, si occurrat occasio qua possint impunitatem sperare, contra praesidentes insurgunt eo ardentius quo magis contra voluntatem ex solo timore cohibebantur. Sicut si aqua per violentiam includatur, cum aditum invenerit impetuosius fluit.
Sed nec ipse timor caret periculo, cum ex nimio timore plerique in desperationem inciderint. Salutis autem desperatio audacter ad quaelibet attendenda praecipitat. Non potest igitur tyranni dominium esse diuturnum. Hoc etiam non minus exemplis quam rationibus apparet. Si quis enim antiquorum gesta et modernorum eventus consideret, vix inveniet dominium tyranni alicuius diuturnum fuisse. Unde et Aristoteles in sua politica, multis tyrannis enumeratis, omnium demonstrat dominium brevi tempore fuisse finitum, quorum tamen aliqui diutius praefuerunt quia non multum in tyrannide excedebant sed quantum ad multa imitabantur regalem modestiam. Adhuc autem hoc magis fit manifestum ex consideratione divini iudicii. Ut enim in Iob dicitur: regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi.
Nullus autem verius hypocrita dici potest quam qui regis assumit officium et exhibet se tyrannum. Nam hypocrita dicitur qui alterius repraesentat personam, sicut in spectaculis fieri consuevit. Sic igitur Deus praefici permittit tyrannos ad puniendum subditorum peccata. Talis autem punitio in Scripturis ira Dei consuevit nominari. Unde per Oseae dominus dicit: dabo vobis regem in furore meo. Infelix est autem rex qui populo in furore Dei conceditur. Non enim eius stabile potest esse dominium, quia non obliviscetur misereri Deus, nec continebit in ira sua misericordias suas: quinimmo per Ioelem dicitur quod est patiens, et multae misericordiae, et praestabilis super malitia. Non igitur permittit Deus diu regnare tyrannos, sed post tempestatem per eos inductam populo, per eorum deiectionem tranquillitatem inducet.
Unde sapiens dicit: sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus, et sedere fecit mites pro eis. Experimento etiam apparet quod reges magis per iustitiam adipiscuntur divitias quam per rapinam tyranni. Quia enim dominium tyrannorum subiectae multitudini displicet, ideo opus habent tyranni multos habere satellites per quos contra subditos tuti reddantur, in quibus necesse est plura expendere quam a subditis rapiant. Regum autem dominium, quod subditis placet, omnes subditos pro satellitibus ad custodiam habet, in quibus expendere opus non est; sed interdum in necessitatibus plura regibus sponte donant, quam tyranni diripere possint; et sic impletur quod Salomon dicit: alii, scilicet reges, dividunt propria benefaciendo subiectis, et ditiores fiunt. Alii, scilicet tyranni, rapiunt non sua, et semper in egestate sunt. Similiter autem iusto Dei contingit iudicio ut qui divitias iniuste congregant, inutiliter eas dispergant, aut etiam iuste auferantur ab eis. Ut enim Salomon dicit: avarus non implebitur pecunia, et qui amat divitias fructum non capiet ex eis; quinimmo ut Prov. XV dicit: conturbat domum suam, qui sectatur avaritiam.
Regibus vero, qui iustitiam quaerunt, divitiae adduntur a Deo, sicut Salomon, qui, dum sapientiam quaesivit ad faciendum iudicium, promissionem de abundantia divitiarum accepit. De fama vero superfluum videtur dicere. Quis enim dubitet bonos reges non solum in vita, sed magis post mortem quodammodo laudibus hominum vivere, et in desiderio haberi; malorum vero nomen aut statim deficere, vel si excellentes in malitia fuerint, cum detestatione eorum rememorari? Unde Salomon dicit: memoria iusti cum laudibus, nomen autem impiorum putrescet, quia vel deficit, vel remanet cum foetore.
Scripture echoes
- ↩Prov.29.14 — A king who judges the poor with truth, his throne will be established forever.
Notes
- 1 ↩Rendering quaelibet aspera, facilia et prope nulla facit amor as 'Love makes all things — even harsh things — easy and almost nothing' preserves the paradoxical force while reading naturally.
- 2 ↩Long periodic sentence broken into natural English cadence while preserving the explanatory enim, temporal cum, purpose ut, and contrastive vero connectives.
- 3 ↩salutis here is objective ('salvation') not subjective wellbeing; audacter intensifies the reckless momentum of despair.
- 4 ↩'praestabilis super malitia' rendered 'ready to forgive wickedness'; the Latin can also bear the sense of 'one who makes amends/overcomes evil.' The merciful sense fits the broader argument about God's character restraining tyranny.
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