Liber Primus, Caput VIII. Ex pietate et contemplatione pulcherrimam quatuor primarum virtutum harmoniam et connexionem oriri.
The Birth of Temperance from Consideration
Consideration weaves prudence, fortitude, and temperance together, setting the mean between excess and deficiency with the help of apostolic and philosophical wisdom.
There, too, it's worth noticing a most delightful harmony and interweaving of the virtues, and how one depends on the other — just as you see here that prudence is the mother of fortitude, and that it's not fortitude but recklessness that anyone dares whom prudence has not brought forth. This same consideration, sitting as a kind of arbiter midway between pleasures and necessities, sets fixed boundaries on each side, assigning and offering enough to those who would take too much, and cutting away the excess from those who fall short — and so from the two together it forms the third virtue, which people call temperance. Of course, consideration itself judges a person intemperate who stubbornly strips away necessities just as much as one who indulges in superfluities. So then, temperance is not only about cutting away superfluities; it's also about admitting necessities. The Apostle seems to be not only a supporter but the author of this teaching, who instructs that care for our flesh is not to be fulfilled in desire. Indeed, saying that care for the flesh is not to be fulfilled, it restrains superfluities, and adding that in desire it does not exclude necessities. So it doesn't seem to me altogether absurd to define temperance as that which neither cuts off necessity nor goes over the line, in line with the philosopher's saying, 'Nothing in excess.'
Justice Shaped by Consideration and Tempered by Temperance
Consideration prepares the mind for justice through the golden rule, but justice depends on temperance to avoid excess, as Scripture warns against being 'too righteous.'
Now, concerning justice, which is one of the four, isn't it clear that the mind must be prepared by consideration, so that it may shape itself in it? For it is necessary that one first thinks for oneself, so as to draw from oneself the standard for justice, and not do to another what one would not wish done to oneself; nor refuse to do to another what one would wish done to oneself. In these two points, then, it is clear that the whole state of justice consists. But justice is not solitary by itself either. Consider now with me also this beautiful connection and coherence of justice with temperance, and likewise of both of these with the two higher virtues, that is, prudence and fortitude. For when the partial definition of justice is given — that one not do to another what one would not wish done to oneself — and the fuller perfection is what the Lord says, "Whatever you wish that others would do to you, do also to them": neither of these will hold, unless the very will from which the whole pattern is drawn has been so ordered that it neither desires anything excessive nor superstitiously refuses anything necessary, which is precisely what temperance does.✦ And finally, temperance sets the limit even for justice itself, so that it may be truly just. Do not be too righteous, says the Wise One, showing by this that the justice which is not held in check by temperance's guidance is far from worthy of approval.✦
The Mutual Need of Wisdom, Temperance, and Justice
Paul's wisdom toward sobriety and the Lord's rebuke of hypocritical fasting show that temperance needs justice, and both need fortitude to hold the middle ground of true virtue.
What's more, wisdom itself doesn't reject this bridle of temperance — as Paul says, according to the wisdom given to him by God: not to be wise beyond what is right, but to be wise toward sobriety.✦ But then again, the other way around — that justice is necessary for temperance — the Lord shows in the Gospel when he rebukes the temperance of those who fasted so that they'd be seen by people.✦ There was temperance in their food, but no justice in their heart — because they weren't aiming to please God, but people. How, then, can either this virtue or that one exist without fortitude? Since it's established that fortitude — and not ordinary fortitude — is what restrains our willing and unwilling within the constraints of too little and too much, so that the will is content in that middle ground: bare, pure, alone, steady in itself, equal on every side of itself, with every excess cut away on all sides alike. This alone, it's established, is what belongs to true virtue.
Measure as the Marrow of All the Virtues
The middle ground of measure belongs equally to justice, temperance, and fortitude, suggesting it is the innermost unity and marrow of all virtue.
Tell me, please, if you can: to which of these three virtues do you think this middle ground should especially be assigned, since it borders on all of them so closely that it seems to be the property of each?1 Or is it virtue itself, and nothing else? But in that case virtue wouldn't be manifold, but they would all be one. Or rather, because virtue doesn't exist without it, is the innermost power of all of them somehow one, and the marrow of the virtues, in which they are so united that accordingly they all seem to be one? especially because they don't share it by participating in it, but it is possessed whole and intact by each individual. For example, what belongs to justice as much as measure? Otherwise, if it leaves anything beyond measure, it clearly doesn't assign to each what is theirs—which, however, it is its very nature to do. What, again, belongs to temperance as much as this, which is surely temperance from no other source except that it admits nothing immoderate?
The Four Virtues United in Measure
Justice seeks, prudence finds, fortitude claims, and temperance possesses the measure of virtue, all revealed through contemplation.
But I think you'll agree it takes no less fortitude — and this is precisely what it most clearly is — to be the one who powerfully tears that pure thing away from the vices rushing in and trying to choke it off from every side, and claims it for a firm foundation of goodness and a settled seat of virtue. So to hold to measure is justice, is temperance, is fortitude. But see that they don't differ in this respect: that justice is a matter of the heart's disposition, while its strength comes from fortitude, and its possession and practice belong to temperance. It remains for us to show that prudence is not excluded from this shared bond. Isn't she the one who first discovers and recognizes measure itself — long set aside through neglect of mind, shut away as if in hidden places by the envy of the vices, and covered over by a certain darkness of old habit? That's why I tell you: it's noticed by only a few, because prudence belongs to few. And so justice seeks, prudence finds, fortitude claims, temperance possesses. It's not my purpose here to dispute about the virtues: I've said these things to encourage you to make room for contemplation, through whose help these and similar things are discerned.
The Gift of Holy Leisure
Such pious, useful leisure for contemplation is a gift not to be wasted, lest life itself be squandered.
To whom is such pious, truly useful leisure given for nothing in this life — isn't that the same as wasting your life?
Read the original Latin
Ibi etiam advertere tibi est suavissimum quemdam concentum complexumque virtutum, atque alteram pendere ex altera; sicut hoc loco vides, fortitudinis matrem esse prudentiam: nec fortitudinem, sed temeritatem esse quemlibet ausum, quem non parturivit prudentia. Haec item est, quae inter voluptates et necessitates media, quasi quaedam arbitra sedens, utrimque certis limitibus disterminat fines, istis assignans et praebens quod sat est; illis quod nimis est demens; et sic ex alterutro tertiam formans virtutem, quam dicunt temperantiam. Nempe intemperantem ipsa consideratio censet, tam eum qui necessariis pertinaciter demit, quam qui indulget superfluis. Non est ergo temperantia in solis resecandis superfluis: est et in admittendis necessariis. Hujus sententiae Apostolus non fautor tantum, sed auctor esse videtur, qui curam carnis nostrae docet non perfici in desiderio. Dicens siquidem curam carnis non perfici, superflua cohibet: addens, in desiderio, necessaria non excludit. Unde mihi videtur non omnino absurde definire temperantiam, qui hanc nec praecidere necessitatem, nec excedere dicat, juxta illud philosophi, "Ne quid nimis."
Jam de justitia, quae una ex quatuor est, nonne constat consideratione mentem praeveniri, ut se formet in ea? Se enim necesse est prius cogitet, ut ex se normam ducat justitiae, nec factura utique alteri, quod sibi fieri nolit; nec quod sibi velit fieri negatura. In his nempe duobus liquet integrum esse justitiae statum. Sed nec ipsa solitaria est. Intuere etenim nunc mecum etiam hujus pulchram connexionem et cohaerentiam cum temperantia, et item ambarum cum duabus superioribus, id est prudentia et fortitudine. Nam cum justitiae dicatur portio, quod sibi non vult fieri quis, alii non facere; porro perfectio, quod ait Dominus, Quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines et vos facite illis: neutrum horum erit, nisi ipsa voluntas, de qua tota ducitur forma, sic ordinata fuerit, ut nec velit aliquid superflum, nec necessarium quid superstitiose nolit, quod quidem temperantiae est. Denique et ipsi justitiae, ut justa sit, temperantia modum imponit. Noli nimium esse justus, ait Sapiens, ostendens per hoc minime approbandam justitiam, quae temperantiae moderamine non frenetur.
Quid quod et ipsa sapientia hoc temperantiae frenum non respuit; dicente Paulo secundum sapientiam a Deo sibi datam, non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem? Sed et e converso, quod temperantiae necessaria justitia sit, ostendit Dominus, arguens in Evangelio illorum temperantiam, qui abstinebant ut viderentur hominibus jejunantes. Erat in cibo temperantia, sed non justitia in animo: quia non Deo placere, sed hominibus intendebant. Quomodo rursum vel ista, vel illa sine fortitudine? cum constet fortitudinis esse, et non mediocris, cohibere velle et nolle suum inter augustias, parum et nimis; ut sit contenta voluntas modo illo medio, nudo, puro, solo, constante sibi, aequali undique sui, utpote ex omni parte pariter circumciso, quem solum constat esse virtutis.
Dicito mihi, quaeso, si potes, cuinam potissimum trium harum virtutum meditullium hoc dandum censeas, quod ita cunctis conterminum est, ut videatur esse proprium singularum? An ipsum virtus est, et nihil aliud? Sed sic virtus non esset multiplex, sed essent omnes una. An potius, quia sine eo virtus non est, omnium quodammodo intima vis una est et medulla virtutum, in qua sic uniuntur, ut proinde una videantur omnes? praesertim quod non illud participando communicant, sed totum a singulis atque integrum possidetur. Verbi causa, quid tam justitiae, quam modus? Alioquin si quid extra modum relinquit, non plane cuique tribuit quod suum est: quod tamen suum ipsius est facere. Quid tam rursum temperantiae, quae non aliunde profecto temperantia est, nisi quod nil immoderatum admittit?
Sed, puto, fatebere etiam non minus esse fortitudinis, cum vel maxime ipsa sit, quae ab irruentibus vitiis, et quasi hinc inde suffocare conantibus, purum illud potenter eruit et vindicat in quoddam stabile fundamentum boni, sedemque virtutis. Ergo modum tenere justitia est, temperantia est, fortitudo est. Sed vide ne in hoc differant, ut justitiae quidem in affectu res sit; a fortitudine autem efficacia ejus; porro possessio atque usus apud temperantiam. Restat ut doceamus ab hac communione prudentiam non excludi. Nonne ipsa est, quae modum, diu animi neglectu posthabitum, et vitiorum invidia quasi in abditis reclusum, et coopertum quadam vetustatis caligine, prior reperit et advertit? Propterea dico tibi: a paucis advertitur, quia paucorum prudentia est. Itaque justitia quaerit, prudentia invenit, vindicat fortitudo, temperantia possidet. Non mihi hoc loco propositum est de virtutibus disputare: sed haec dixerim hortans ad vacandum considerationi, cujus beneficio haec et similia advertuntur.
Cui tam pio, tamque utili otio nullam in vita operam dare, nonne vitam perdere est?
Scripture echoes
- ↩Matt.7.12 — Therefore, whatever you want people to do to you, do also to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.
- ↩Eccl.7.16 — Do not be overly righteous, and do not make yourself overly wise. Why should you destroy yourself?
- ↩Rom.12.3 — For by the grace given to me I say to everyone among you not to think more highly than one ought to think, but to think with sober judgment, each according to the measure of faith that God has assigned.
- ↩Matt.6.16-Matt.6.18 — And whenever you fast, do not be like the hypocrites, with gloomy faces. For they disfigure their faces so that they may appear to others to be fasting. Truly I tell you, they have received their reward. Matt.6.17 — But when you fast, anoint your head and wash your face, Matt.6.18 — so that you do not appear to others as one who is fasting, but only to your Father who is in the secret place; and your Father who sees in secret will reward you.
Notes
- 1 ↩meditullium is a rare Late Latin term for an inner core or middle ground; rendered here as 'middle ground' to fit the context of a shared boundary.
De consideratione (On Consideration) companion
Make consideration a daily appointment
Bernard told Eugene to set aside time every day. Chosen Portion holds that time for you, free.
Bernard's core prescription — a fixed daily time reserved for examining the soul — is exactly the habit Chosen Portion installs with its daily devotional portion.
- One 10-minute daily portion for self-examination and prayer
- Reflection prompts drawn from historic texts, not improvised journaling
- A visible streak that protects the daily interval Bernard insisted on